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Abstract
This dissertation contrasts the development of the regulatory structure of the American
and German banking systems until the mid-20th century. It explains why the countries’
regulatory structures diverged into diametrically opposite directions, even though both
countries had federal political systems and regularly observed the developments in the
other country. Furthermore, after the Second World War, the American military govern-
ment was even able to mold the German banking system into an idealized version of the
American one. The thesis also provides an explanation why this assimilation attempt ulti-
mately failed, and why there was a strong institutional persistency between Nazi Germany
and West Germany instead.
The original contributions to knowledge are the following: (1) This thesis offers a novel per-
spective on the evolution of the structure of American banking regulation by interpreting
it as being largely driven by constitutional conflict (2) it shows that prior to the Banking
Crisis of 1931 there was no intention to introduce a comprehensive regulatory structure
for the banking sector in Germany (3) It provides a reassessment of the origins of the
German Credit Act of 1961 as a non-deterministic process (4) It interprets German bank-
ing regulation after the Second World War as a failed Institutional Assimilation, which
provides evidence that the decentralized regulatory arrangement of the American banking
system was held in place by strong states’ rights. In the absence of strong states’ rights
such a system would not persist and, indeed, in Germany it did not (5) It re-interprets
German post-war economic history as being driven by the need of the German federal gov-
ernment to re-establish supremacy over economic matters. This assigns a new important
role for Ludwig Erhard in German post-war competition history, as being an enabler of
liberalization rather than being a liberalizing force himself.
Keywords: Banking regulation, banking supervision, law and economics, political econ-
omy, institutional assimilation, financial crises, financial stability, path dependency, diver-
gence, Olson Hypothesis, Weimar Germany, Third Reich, Germany, United States
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Introduction
“[..] there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.”
– Niccolo` Machiavelli in ‘The Prince’1
1.1 Motivation
This thesis grew out of an observation known as the long shadow of Hjalmar Schacht.2
Advocates of this view claim that the West German (henceforth Germany) economic struc-
ture looked much more similar to the corporatist economic structures implemented during
the Third Reich than it has been suggested by the traditional literature.
Traditionally, the initial post-war period is seen as a major break in the German
economic structure. In particular it is seen as a period of widespread economic liberal-
ization by the ordoliberal movement, embodied by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard
1The quote continues as follows: “For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order,
and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising
partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of
mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had the actual experience of it.” See
Machiavelli (1950, p. 21, Chapter VI).
2See Ritschl (2004). Hjalmar Schacht was a high profile German banker and policymaker during the
inter-war period. He served as President of the central bank from 1923–1930, and again during the Third
Reich from 1933 until 1939. From 1934–1937 he also held the office of acting Minister of Economics. Thus
he was instrumental of many key economic reforms undertaken during the Third Reich.
1
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and the idea of a ‘social market economy’.3 The ordoliberal movement, under the aegis
of the American military government, is thought to have successfully destroyed encrusted
interest groups that had monopolized the German economy in the past. Furthermore, the
American military government and the ordoliberal movement are credited with introduc-
ing innovative regulatory structures that reduced regulations and exposed large swathes
of the economy to strong competitive pressures. In turn, the increase in competition led
to the mythical Wirtschaftswunder.4 In a way, Ludwig Erhard is often depicted as the
German equivalent of Britain’s Margaret Thatcher.
Such an interpretation of German post war economic history is in line with the Olson
hypothesis, which suggests that the Second World War provided a shock that destroyed
encrusted interest group arrangements and allowed for socioeconomic reform and rapid
economic growth.5 As interest group coalitions began to encrust over time, economic
performance was again retarded. This interpretation of the German growth experience
has led to claims of a ‘Fading Miracle’.6
One of the first to challenge the traditional view was Abelshauser. He emphasized
that economic growth was underway well before Erhard allegedly liberalizing reforms took
place. As a consequence, Erhard’s reforms should not be seen as the principal driver behind
the Wirtschaftswunder. Instead, he saw the principal driver in the reconstruction of the
German economy and the return to Germany’s growth potential. However, Abelshauser
did not question the notion that a new and innovative economic framework was created
by Ludwig Erhard. He merely acknowledged a persistence between pre- and post-war
3For an introduction into the ideas of the ordoliberal movement see for example Wu¨nsche (1982) or the
manifesto by Erhard (1958) himself. Ludwig Erhard was German Economics Minister from 20. 9. 1949
until 16. 10. 1963, after which he served as German Chancellor until 01.12.1966. Prior to his appoint-
ment as Economics Minister he was involved in the monetary and financial reconstruction of Germany.
For biographies on Erhard see Hentschel (1998); Laitenberger (1986) and especially Mierzejewski (2004).
Interestingly, after the end of his career they paint him as an exhausted and unfulfilled politician.
4Up until this day, the traditional view of the structural break in Germany’s economic institutions is still
influential within Germany. See for example Buchheim (1988), Klemm and Trittel (1987), Klump (1985,
1996), Prollius (2006, pp 50–109) or Wu¨nsche (1986, 2001). A prominent exponent of the exceptionalism of
the Third Reich’s economic structure is also Temin (1991). More recently, Buchheim and Scherner (2006)
have emphasized that the Nazi economy adhered to market principles to a large extent after all, and that it
was by no means a totalitarian and monopolistic economic system it was often made to be. These findings
somewhat relativize the magnitude of the structural break after the Second World War, but they do not
call it into question altogether. Bel (2006) also highlights the remarkable privatizations undertaken by the
Nazi government. For a comprehensive overview of the legislation of the Third Reich see Puppo (1988).
5For the seminal Olson Hypothesis see Olson (1982). For an application to the European and thus
German scenario see also Olson (1996).
6See especially Giersch et al. (1992).
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Germany in terms of the corporatist ideas and decision making.7 More recently, an attempt
has been made to synthesize the traditional view of the institutional liberlizations with that
of reconstruction growth a´ la Abelshauser. The synthesis maintains the central importance
of the alleged liberalization of domestic economic institutions, in order for reconstruction
growth to take place.8
In the non-German literature a prominent view emerged that highlighted the com-
monality of the German growth experience. Indeed, it was much of Western Europe that
experienced a period of extraordinarily high growth after the Second World War. Since
not all the countries were successful in reforming their domestic institutional framework
after World War II, they see the source of the rapid economic growth in a reallocation of
productive resources. According to this view, resources had been misallocated due to a
lack of trade and a failure to adopt the newest technologies in the preceding decades. After
the Second World War, labour and capital was finally reallocated efficiently and modern
production technologies were adopted. This enabled rapid economic growth and produc-
tivity catch-up with more advanced economies such as Britain and the United States,
who had already undergone similar transformations and were closer to the technological
frontier. Fast post-war economic growth in Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe is
seen merely as the result of the closing of a productivity gap with the help of an improved
international institutional framework.9
Proponents of the existence of a long shadow of Hjalmar Schacht in Germany acknowl-
edge that the German currency reform of 1948 and the loosening of war-time price controls
were important moves towards normalizing economic conditions. Yet, in their view, these
reforms merely represented the necessary transition from a war economy to a peacetime
economy, thus enabling reconstructive growth. At the same time they point out a number
7See Abelshauser (1975, 1979, 1983, 1991). Similarly see Manz (1968). Ja´nossy (1966, 1971) made a
similar observation for Europe in general.
8See Lindlar (1997) for the German case. For a similar line of argumentation for Western Europe as a
whole and the importance of the reform of international institutions see for example Eichengreen (1996)
and Bradford and Eichengreen (1993).
9See for example Abramovitz (1986), Baumol (1986), Temin (2002) and Crafts and Toniolo (1996). The
most prominent theoretical embodiment of such a view is the first generation neoclassical growth model.
Eichengreen and Ritschl (2009, p. 194, fn. 4) point out that it was no coincidence that the Solow (1957)
growth model emerged at the time it did. Dumke (1990) conducted an econometric analysis comparing the
productivity gap hypothesis with the reconstruction hypothesis. He finds that the main driver of growth
was reconstruction rather than catch-up, and especially so in the German case. Similarly see also Vonyo´
(2008).
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of institutional persistencies, implying that the German economic institutional structure
did not undergo much of a change after the Second World War after all. Instead, the
economic framework of the Federal Republic of Germany constituted a return to the old
path – the path initiated by Hjalmar Schacht during the Third Reich. Whichever novel,
pro-market institutions Ludwig Erhard and the American military government might have
introduced in the post-war period were soon dismantled and replaced with their Nazi-era
sibblings. In several cases the economic institutions from Nazi Germany were adopted in
post-war Germany without any modification whatsoever. Thus, the alleged uniqueness of
the institutions of the social market economy cannot be seen as a driver of rapid German
economic growth. Instead, the proponents of a long shadow of the Third Reich see the in-
stitutional persistence as stability inducing. And it is this stability, which allowed German
reconstructive growth to take place at the pace it did.10
Existing explanations for such a strong path dependency emphasize that most eco-
nomic regulations introduced during the Third Reich did not find their origins in Nazi
ideology. Rather, they reflected an international tendency towards corporatist economic
structures that was already exhibited by the late Weimar bureaucracy. This made it pos-
sible for the German political elite after the World War to successfully de-ideologize the
Nazi economic reforms and to recycle the Nazi-era institutions, masquerading the long
shadow of Hjalmar Schacht as a long shadow of the Weimar bureaucracy, or, alternatively,
as innovative institutions that formed part of the new social market economy.11
But are the claims tenable that many of Germany’s path dependent institutions took
their shape in the early 1930s, and that Schacht and not Erhard, is consequently the father
of the Wirtschaftswunder? Is postwar Germany just a linear extension of the Third Reich
in terms of economic policy?12 If there is indeed an institutional shadow of the Third
Reich, one is left with a paradox. Given all the Thatcherite intentions of Ludwig Erhard
and the American military government, why is it that pre-war German institutions were
10Eichengreen and Ritschl (2009, 2009–214) and Ritschl (2005, pp. 159–164) provide an overview of
alleged economic institutional persistencies. Hardach (1980, pp. 140–160) also identifies many institutional
continuities. A similar point about the importance of continuity and consistency in policymaking is also
put forward by Wolf (1993). He argues that both France and Germany achieved rapid growth, despite
pursuing radically different growth strategies.
11See for example Carlin (1996), Dornbusch (1993), Eichengreen and Ritschl (2009), Paque´ (1993, 1996)
and Ritschl (2004, 2005).
12See especially Ritschl (2004, 2005).
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so persistent after all? If neither Ludwig Erhard nor the American military government
were the forces shaping the institutional economic framework of postwar Germany, who
or what did?
In order to find additional meaningful answers to this paradox one needs to look at
specific sectors of the economy.13 In particular the banking sector seems to have exhibited
a strong degree of path dependency. After the Second World War, the American military
government forced major structural changes onto the German banking system, assimilating
it to the American state banking system. And even given this major exogenously-imposed
institutional break, a return to the pre-war institutional arrangement takes place. Why
did German policy makers choose to remain on the historical path? Why did they not in-
troduce any structural innovations?14 Such a development becomes even more remarkable,
if one considers the fact that both Germany and the United States had federal political
systems. Thus, the failure of the American institutional set-up to survive in a German
constitutional context is intriguing not only for German banking history, but it holds
important lessons for American banking history and its regulatory development as well.
After all, the decentraliezd regulatory regime of the American banking sector was, until
the integration of European capital markets, unique.
Indeed, this thesis may even be of interest not only to economic historians, but also
to American and European policymakers today, who are working to reform the regulatory
framework. In particular it can hold important insights insights for current EU debates
with respect to the banking union. Up until the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007/08,
the regulatory arrangement within the European Union was – and to a large extend still
is – a decentralized set-up with a few harmonizing elements, such as the Basel rules or
13So far there has been relatively little targeted research into institutional persistencies between pre-war
Germany and the Federal Republic of Germany. Some studies have analyzed the influence of the Allied
intervention on the Antitrust Act of 1957, such as Berghahn (1986) and Murach-Brand (2004). Others have
highlighted the immense institutional persistencies in the regulation of the energy sector, such as Ku¨nsberg
(2012). Lo¨ﬄer (2002) provides evidence for personnel continuity within the Ministry of Economics, whereas
Marsh (1992) documents the return of the old guard within the Central Bank. Grunenberg (2006) compiled
evidence on the personnel persistency of the German business elite. However, these works rarely created a
direct institutional link between the Third Reich and post-war Germany.
14That banking systems show a large degree of path dependency was already recognized in Bagehot’s
time: “A system of credit which has slowly grown up as years went on, which has suited itself to the course
of business, which has forced itself on the habits of men, will not be altered because theorists disapprove of it
or because books are written against it.” Bagehot (1915, pp. 310–311) writing about the English Banking
System in 1873.
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coordination bodies at the European level, despite the efforts of the Lamfalussy process
which began in the early 2000s. The current financial crisis intensified the drive towards
a European banking union. The banking union aims to re-allocate regulatory powers
by lifting actual regulatory and supervisory powers from the country to the European
level. Of course, this attempt to change the regulatory structure and thus regulatory
responsibilities is not free from conflict, as it directly affects the sovereignty of European
countries. However, many of the (constitutional) issues debated today are indeed similar
to those that arose in both Germany and the United States in the time periods under
consideration in this dissertation. In particular the question of subsidiarity, i.e. the optimal
level of decentralization in banking regulation, has been a source of constitutional conflict
in the past.15 Thus, the current banking union debate is not without historical precedent.
1.2 Theoretical background
Debates about the origins of regulatory institutions typically assume one of two starting
points.16 The traditional viewpoint is that of ‘public interest’, where a benevolent gov-
ernment aims to rectify shortcomings of the market process (‘market failures’) to restore
economic efficiency.17 These market failures may be be caused by asymmetric information,
moral hazard, negative externalities, natural monopolies or other anti-competitive behav-
ior.18 Thus, any existing (banking) regulation would always be seen as the result of a
government intervention that led to a pareto improvement over an unregulated (banking)
sector, which was suffering from market failure. Otherwise such a regulation would not
arise in the first place.
15For an introduction into the principle of subsidiarity see for example Bermann (1994). For an appli-
cation of the subsidiarity principle to economic regulation see for example Laffont and Pouyet (2003).
16This is valid for financial as well as other types of regulation. For a general discussion of the two
positive theories of government policy see for example Joskow and Noll (1981) or Peltzman (1989).
17Important contributions to this viewpoint were for example Pigou (1932) and Samuelson (1954). Ger-
schenkron (1962) would also be an example of this viewpoint of government policy in the banking sector.
18For an overview regulatory instruments used to rectify these market failures in traditional industries
see Viscusi et al. (2005, Chapters 5,6). For an overview of the regulatory tools in the banking sector see
for example Mishkin (2010, pp. 255–271) or Brunnermeier et al. (2009, pp. 29–56).
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Since the late 1970s the ‘private interest’ viewpoint has become the preferred start-
ing position.19 It arose from observations of ‘government failure’ that the public interest
viewpoint failed to explain. Regulatory intervention did not always improve efficiency,
and in some cases even lead to adverse outcomes.20 The primary reason for this govern-
ment failure was found to be with the capture of regulatory institutions. Rather than
being interested in the welfare of society as a whole, policymakers were now assumed to
maximize their private interest.21 While in office, policymakers are subject to influences
by a number of interest groups, which also seek to extract rents. The ‘tools’ at the dis-
posal of interest groups to influence policymakers are considered to be either direct or
indirect. Direct measures may be contributions to campaign finance or votes, whereas
indirect measures promise future cooperation with the policymaker, such as the promise
of a well-paid job, once the policymaker leaves its current position.22 It is this political
market that determines the regulations that are eventually implemented. The outcome of
this political bargaining process redistributes rents, creating winners and losers. However
the regulations are often presented to the public as being in the best interest of soci-
ety, thus concealing the underlying interests of policymakers or special interest groups to
the public.23 Advocates of the private interest view, generally propose the deregulation
of markets to counter this kind of government failure. This ‘remedy’ has been a policy
adopted in a number of markets since the 1970s.24
Ironically, the widespread success of the deregulation ideology may have shown the
limitations of the private interest view, in the sense that certain regulations were aban-
doned even though they may have been in the interest of the vast majority of the regulated
19Influential works of this viewpoint were those of Becker (1983), Buchanan and Tullock (1962), Buchanan
(1975), Peltzman (1976), Laffont and Tirole (1991) Olson (1971) and especially Stigler (1971).
20See for example the works of Meyer et al. (1959) and Stigler and Friedland (1962).
21Related to the private interest of policymakers is the “grabbing hands” hypothesis, which postulates
that politicians seek control over banks to re-allocate capital according to their own preferences, to the
detriment of society. See Fischer and Pfeil (2003, pp. 6–9), La Porta et al. (2002) and Shleifer (1994).
22For an overview of the tools see for example Laffont and Tirole (1991, pp. 1090–1091).
23Financial services are often seen to be one area with the most extensive activity of special interest
groups. See for example Kane (1996), Kroszner and Stratmann (1998), Kroszner and Strahan (2001) or
more recently Admati and Hellwig (2013).
24Scholars have noted that even the deregulatory processes themselves can be subject to capture and
thus lead to inefficient outcomes after all. See for example Feijen and Perotti (2005) on the liberalization
of finance in developing countries.
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industry, and should not have been abandoned according to the private interest view.25
Additionally, it has been pointed out that some of the private interest influenced research
has overstated its explanatory power beyond what the evidence could support.26
More recently attempts have been made to move beyond the pure dichotomy of in-
terpreting regulatory outcomes as those of either public interest attempting to alleviate
market failure or of private interest engaging in rent seeking, by widening the objective
functions of the political actors. One strand of research has identified ideology as a po-
tentially important factor influencing policymakers decision-making.27 Another has high-
lighted the role of the institutional arrangement, not only by influencing policy through its
impact on the relative bargaining positions of interest group and policymakers, but also
through its role in constituting markets in the first place. Regulation is no longer seen as
merely market intervening, but can also be seen as market enabling.28 Other scholars are
experimenting with cooperative models of social and political behavior, which they often
find to be just as powerful explanatory tools as the private interest models.29
The main challenge remains, however, to identify the circumstances under which pri-
vate interest prevails over (an expanded definition of) the public interest. And in order to
identify them we need to search for historical instances in which private interest did not
trump public interest.30 This thesis can contribute to that search by identifying the key
players and their respective objective functions from a comparative perspective. Such a
cross-country study allows for a comparison of the relative merits of either viewpoints in
explaining the differences in the regulatory structure of both countries’ banking sectors.31
25See Peltzman (1989). In related articles, Kroszner (2001) and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) argued
that, at least in the banking sector, the private interest view could explain the deregulation after all.
26See for example Leight (2009), Wittman (2009) and especially Moss and Oey (2009), who point out
that there are a number high profile-cases in which special interest group with lesser benefits and higher
costs to organize have dominated those with more potential benefits from regulation and lower costs to
organize. According to Stigler’s theory of regulation this should not be possible.
27See for example the works of Gilligan et al. (1989) and Poole and Rosenthal (1993) on the regulatory
debates in the 19th century. Similarly see Furner (2009) and Fligstein (2009). They note that key regulatory
developments were driven in both the United States and Europe were sometimes driven by ideological
considerations relating to social and economic legitimization.
28See for example Weingast and Marshall (1988) on how legislatures are unlike markets and its impact
on policymaking. See Carpenter (2009) for the role of institutions to constitute markets.
29See for example Benkler (2009). See the edited volume by Balleisen and Moss (2009) for an overview of
the most recent trends in regulatory theory. The edited by Moss and Cisternino (2009) provides a number
of suggestions on how to improve actual regulations, based on the recent insights from research.
30See Moss and Oey (2009, pp. 30–31).
31See Leight (2009, p. 21) for the value of cross-country studies.
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Furthermore, this thesis has the unique advantage of benefitting from an intriguing inter-
action in the form of an assimilation of the German regulatory framework to the American
one after the Second World War by the US military government.
1.3 Research Agenda
This work sheds light on the evolution of the regulatory structure in Germany and the
United States from the early 19th century until the mid 20th century. It uses a com-
parative approach to identify the drivers behind the regulatory structure and the path
dependency of the two banking systems. In this thesis I will use the term ‘regulation’ as
the act of setting the specific rules banks need to adhere to, such as the act of imposing a
minimum capital ratio (a ‘regulatory tool’). The term ‘supervision’ is used for the day-to-
day operations that implement the regulatory policies by verifying banks’ compliance with
the regulations. The term ‘regulatory structure’ refers to those government institutions
with the power to supervise or regulate the banking sector.
The comparative perspective is interesting and relevant, because both are countries
with federal political systems,32 but their approach to regulating the banking sector fol-
lowed diametrically opposed principles for much of their history, even though their banking
history was closely intertwined. Indeed, after the Second World War the American mil-
itary government even had the opportunity to impose their regulatory principles on the
German banking sector, but the American institutions failed to persist.
The financial crises of the late 19th and early 20th century induced a spur of regulatory
discussion and reform in both countries. In the United States it culminated in the Glass-
Steagall reforms of 1933 and 1935, and in Germany in the Credit Act of 1934. What
is striking is that both countries enacted different regulatory structures, even though
during the respective debates they studied each other’s banking systems in great detail.33
In Germany it was decided to introduce a regulatory monopoly. Contrary to that the
32The exception were, of course, the years of the Third Reich, where political control was highly central-
ized.
33For example see the American and German banking commissions of 1911 and 1933, respectively:
National Monetary Commission (1910a,b, 1911); Volkswirtschaftliche und Statistische Abteilung der Re-
ichsbank (1933); Wilz (1933).
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United States emerged from the Great Depression with a complex decentralized regulatory
and supervisory system, where responsibilities were often overlapping between various
institutions both at the state and the national level. There is no comparative account as
to why this divergence took place. At first sight it seems that there was no agreement
on regulatory best practices. Furthermore, these reforms to the banking regulations have
an extremely long half-life time as they survive well into the 1970s and 1980s in both
countries.34 Path dependency seems to be the main driver of this development in both
countries. But what is it that drives this path dependency?
After the Second World War, the Americans were effectively in control of much of
West Germany. This allowed them to mold the German banking system to their liking.
The Soviets did use their ‘privilege’ in East Germany and completely dismantled the exist-
ing banking system and established a nationalized banking system.35 And indeed, during
this time, the Americans were not inactive either. They undertook extensive efforts to
impose an American-style banking system on Germany. This included the introduction of
branching restrictions, the decentralization of the largest banks as well as the decentral-
ization of the central bank and the regulatory authorities.36 Effectively, the Americans
attempted an institutional assimilation. Yet, when one looks at the German Credit Act
of 1961 one cannot help but be struck by the similarities to its 27 year old brother from
1934. Branching restrictions were also repealed and the three largest universal banks had
also ‘miraculously’ resurrected from their previous break-up into dozens of parts. Last
but not least, the Bundesbank looks more like the centralist Reichsbank and less like its
predecessor the Bank deutscher La¨nder, which was modelled along the lines of the de-
central American Federal Reserve System. Thus, it seems as if in the case of banking,
the American institutional assimilation has failed and that the long shadow of Hjalmar
Schacht prevailed. Where do these strong path dependencies between the Third Reich
and the Federal Republic of Germany come from? How large is, ultimately, the American
34The United States and Germany are by no means the only countries conducting extensive reforms to
their banking regulations in the 1930s. Other European countries include, Austria, Belgium, Hungary,
Italy, etc.. See (Cassese, 1984).
35See for example Adler (1949, pp. 333–334) for the Soviet approach towards the banking system in its
zone.
36This is much like the Allies had tried in other sectors of the German economy, in particular the heavy
industry and the chemicals. See Clay (1950, pp. 326–327) or Plumpe (1990, pp. 756–759).
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influence on German banking regulation and to what extent are the Americans successful?
In case they did not leave any mark on the German banking system, why is this so? What
can we learn from the American experiment in Germany for the American regulatory
structure?
1.4 Methodology & Sources
At the heart of this investigation lies the aim to analyze the decision-making processes that
lead to changes in the respective regulatory structures. Thus, it is a history of economic
decisions and therefore a history of the ideas and power struggles behind those decisions.
For the German history, the basis of my qualitative reconstruction of these decision making
processes relies to a significant extent on archival and digitalized government sources.
The American history is reconstructed using congressional records, a number government
publications, as well as the vast secondary literature on American banking history.37
In terms of German primary material, I am making use of records by the German
Finance Ministry, the Economics Ministry and of the Chancellery of both the pre-World
War II and post- World War II periods, as well as the records of the central bank of the
pre-war period. For the pre-war era these are the records of the Reichsbank (R2501), the
Reichsfinanzministerium (R2), and the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (R3101) found at
the German National Archives, the Bundesarchiv, in Berlin-Lichterfelde. The majority of
Reichskanzlei (R43) records are available digitally at the website of the Bundesarchiv.38
For the post-war period the relevant German files are the records of the Bundesfinanzmin-
isterium (B102), the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium (B126) and the Bundeskanzleramt
(B136) found at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz.
For the American occupation period of Germany after the Second World War, I am
also making use the Records of the American Office of the Military Government (better
known as ‘OMGUS’ - RG 260), the Records of the High Commissioner of the United States
in Germany (RG 466) and the Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of
37Literature reviews can be found in the introduction of each chapter.
38Available at http://www.bundesarchiv.de/aktenreichskanzlei/1919-1933/0000/index.html, last
accessed on 07.03.2013.
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State (RG 84). These were found at the National Archives and Records Administration
in College Park, Maryland.39
Apart from internal government material, I am making extensive use of government
hearings and other official publications. This includes printed materials of the German
Bank Commissions of 1906/07 and 1933/34, the American National Monetary Commission
of 1908-1913,40 various hearings of the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives as
well a number of studies prepared by the Federal Reserve Committee on Branch, Group
and Chain Banking, 41 and the documents prepared for the Board of Governors Federal
Reserve Bank Suspension Study.42
1.5 Structure & Outline
This thesis consists of three closely linked, but otherwise self-contained chapters (Chapter
2, 3 and 4), followed by an Epilogue and a Conclusion. Conceptually, this dissertation is
divided into two parts. The first part is a double biography of the regulatory structure in
Germany and the United States up until 1935 (Chapter 2). It tries to explain why there was
such a stark divergence of the regulatory structure between the two countries up until the
Second World War. Why did German policymakers decide to introduce centralized banking
regulation during the Great Depression, whereas policymakers in the United States did
not? This comparative approach is chosen so as to be able to highlight the different
regulatory and political traditions in both countries. This is especially important for the
second part of this dissertation, when I try to explain why the American Institutional
Assimilation failed.
The second conceptual part of my thesis is divided into two chapters that directly
address the long shadow of Hjalmar Schacht in the banking sector. Chapter 3 examines
39For the pre-World War II era, I have also examined the Records of the U.S. Treasury (RG 56) and the
personal papers of Adolf A. Berle and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., but this line of investigation did not yield
novel insights. The personal papers were found at the Roosevelt Presidential Library in Poughkeepsie in
New York State and the Records of the U.S. Treasury (RG 56) at the National Archives in College Park.
40The numerous volumes of the National Monetary Commission are available at via FRASER at http:
//fraser.stlouisfed.org/topics/?tid=13, last accessed on 04.03.2013.
41Available online via FRASER at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/author/?aid=1699, last accessed
on 04.03.2013.
42Also available via FRASER at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publication/?pid=684, last accessed
on 04.03.2013.
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the decision making behind the basic law determining the regulatory framework in post
war Germany. Chapter 4 builds on the findings of the previous two chapters. It interprets
German post-war banking regulation as an attempted Institutional Assimilation and looks
for reasons why it failed. This episode provides important insights not only for German
regulatory history, but also for American regulatory history. Chapter 5 serves as an
epilogue, providing the reader with a brief presentation of the regulatory developments in
the German banking sector in the immediate years after the passage of the Credit Act
of 1961. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis by identifying implications from this piece of
research. It also provides a link to today’s discussions surrounding the reform of banking
regulation in Europe and the United States.
Abstracts of the following chapters can be found below.
Chapter 2: Americans wanted it. Germans got it. Why Germany intro-
duced centralized banking regulation and the U.S. didn’t
The second chapter contrasts the development of the structure of banking regulation in
the United States and Germany before the Second World War. In the United States lead-
ing politicians and government officials tried to introduce centralized banking supervision
several times, however it failed to materialize. On the contrary, as ‘regulatory ruins’ from
previous attempts to unify the regulation were not removed, the United States moved even
further away from a centralized regulation of its banking system. Conversely, in Germany
the introduction of a centralized regulatory framework encounters little resistance. The
primary reason for this diverging development in Germany and the United States is to be
found in the prevailing constitutional and political systems at the time, rather than diverg-
ing views on regulatory best practices. The American constitution secured the states’ right
to charter banks and thus required American policymakers to create incentives for state
banks to subject themselves voluntarily to central regulation. The German constitution
contained no such provision, allowing for outright centralization of regulatory powers.
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Chapter 3: The (re-)birth of the German Credit Act of 1961
This chapter investigates the origins of the German Credit Act of 1961 that regulates the
German banking sector. The Act of 1961 was essentially a re-birth of its older brother
from 1934, even though the war and the subsequent Allied occupation of Germany had
introduced important changes to the regulatory structure. This chapter shows that the
reversal of Allied changes to the regulatory structure was not a conclusion foregone. The
primary reason for the similarity of the banking acts is to be found in the government’s
desire to re-introduce a unified regulatory structure, for which it required a parliamentary
supermajority. In order not to jeopardize the supermajority the government refrained
from introducing potentially controversial “innovations”. Furthermore, a key issue in the
drafting process was to what extent competition should be allowed in the banking sector.
This chapter provides evidence that the German private banking association successfully
lobbied for a restriction to competition.
Chapter 4: A failed Institutional Assimilation: The American attempt
to restructure German banking regulation after World War II
In the fourth chapter I am making use of a little-known episode in German banking
history to test whether the reason that the American regulatory system developed into
the decentral structure it did (and why the German banking system did not) was indeed
primarily a function of the extensive states’ rights – with respect to chartering banks
– enshrined in the American constitution. This chapter also adds to the literature by
presenting the history of German banking institutions from 1945 until 1961 from a unified
perspective.
After the Second World War, a drastic and direct effort to change the West-German
banking system was undertaken by the American military government. It restructured
the entire banking system: its rules, its regulatory institutions, and its major financial
institutions. The most important elements of the American state banking system were
imposed on the German banking system exogenously with the help of military decrees.
However, the new German constitution (the ‘Grundgesetz’) lacked similar provisions to
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those in the US constitution that guaranteed the states the right to charter banks. Thus,
this American assimilation effort can provide important insights into American banking
history, as it can be interpreted as a natural experiment testing whether the American
regulatory system was a second-best arrangement that was held in place by strong state
rights that would not survive in the absence of strong state rights.
And indeed, in the German political set-up one can observe a fierce struggle between
the German states, who wanted to retain their newly gained rights, and the federal govern-
ment, who wanted to re-centralize the regulatory structure. This struggle was ultimately
decided in the constitutional court. If the constitutional court had ruled in favour of the
states instead of the central government, parts of the American institutional structure
could have survived in the German banking system. Instead, the American institutions
disappeared completely. This implies that, indeed, the regulatory arrangement of the
American banking system was only a second-best solution that was held in place by these
strong state rights. In the absence of these institutional constraints, no such system would
have persisted in the United States. Rather than portraying a supposed resilience of the
German banking sector, this episode highlights the weakness of the American regulatory
arrangement.
Chapter 5: Epilogue
The epilogue presents the regulatory developments in Germany in the aftermath of the
passage of the Credit Act of 1961, which led to the removal of the main barriers to
competition that had been in place since the early 1930s. The liberalization was preceded
by a major dispute between the private banks and the public banks. Whereas the public
banks demanded that restrictions to competition be dropped, the private banks wanted to
maintain them for as long as the public banks’ implicit and explicit government subsidies
had not been abolished abolished. In the late 1960s the federal government proceeded to
remove both the restrictions to competition and some of the preferential treatments the
public banks had enjoyed in the past.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion & Discussion
This thesis finds that the main driver for the diverging developments of the regulatory
structure in Germany and the United States are not to be found with differing views of
best practice regulation of the banking sector, but with the varying degree of constitutional
states rights with respect to the chartering of banks. Whereas American policymakers at-
tempted to implement a centralized regulatory system at various points in time, it failed
to materialize as the central government was unable to strip the states from their rights
to charter banks. In Germany, the introduction of a centralized regulatory system is
only resisted after the Second World War, when the American military government had
assigned the right to regulate the banking sector to the German states. Since the Amer-
ican military government failed to implement equivalent constitutional safeguards in the
German Grundgesetz, the German central government was eventually able to recentralize
regulatory control. This post-war episode provides further evidence for the weakness of
the American regulatory arrangement and that it was indeed held in place artificially by
strong states’ rights, rather than by macro-prudential considerations.
The German need to recentralize control is also the primary reason why we see a
shadow of Hjalmar Schacht in the banking sector. Any innovative regulatory reform, would
have jeopardized the necessary supermajority to recentralize control over the banking
sector, and was consequently left for the future. This is why we see a retreat to the pre-
war status quo in 1961, which is then followed by a gradual liberalization of the banking
sector. Such an interpretation of German post-war history also implies an inversion of the
Olson hypothesis. It interprets the early after-war period as one of institutional sclerosis
that was induced by the American decentralization of economic control, which led to a
period of prelonged constitutional struggle between the states and the central government.
Only after the central government was able to reestablish its control over the economy
was it able to engage in truly liberalizing reforms. One of Ludwig Erhard’s primary
contributions to the German economy is thus seen in his ground-work to re-establish the
central government’s undivided primacy over economic matters.
Chapter 2
Americans wanted it. Germans got it.
Why Germany introduced centralized banking regulation
and the U.S. didn’t.
2.1 Introduction
Today there is much talk about the international harmonization of ‘best practice’ regula-
tions.1 Theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that in an integrated financial market
a unified regulatory system is superior to a strongly decentralized regulatory system. Pri-
marily, this is because under a decentralized regulatory regime, banking regulation yields
externalities, which create incentives for individual regulators to lower their standards in
an effort to promote banks under their supervision. Additionally, in times of crisis a cen-
tral regulatory agency has easier access to the relevant information and greater flexibility
in crisis resolution, as less coordination between numerous agencies is required.2 Current
1See for example Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009) or the efforts of the Basel
Committee to harmonize capital adequacy standards. For the limits to bank regulation and a critique to
harmonization of so-called ‘best practices’ see for example Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) or in general
Rodrik (2007).
2See for example Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006); Beck, Todorov, and Wagner (2011); Calzolari and
Gyongyi (2011); Cˇiha´k and Podpiera (2007); Freixas (2003); Goodhart (2002); Goodhart and Schoenmaker
(2009); Hackley (1966a,b); Holthausen and Rønde (2004); Kahn and Santos (2005); Padoa-Schioppa (1999);
Rezende (2012) and Schoenmaker (2011). For the proponents of centralized regulation, the only remaining
question is whether unified regulation should be the responsibility of the central bank or whether an
independent agency should be tasked with this. See for example Cˇiha´k and Podpiera (2007), Masciandaro
(2009) and Quityn et al. (2007). Others have argued that a decentralized system might be preferable
over a centralized one for three reasons. First, a decentral structure might allow for better gathering and
evaluation of soft (local) information on banks. Second, institutional competition might lead to more
efficient regulatory institutions. Third, decentral institutions reduce the risk of regulatory capture. See
Holthausen and Rønde (2004), Golembe (1967), Kane (1984), Laffont and Martimort (1999) and Rosen
(2003). For an agnostic view see Grossman (2010).
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developments in the wake of the Great Recession confirm this theoretical preference, as
policymakers strive to introduce more centralized regulatory arrangements.3
One of the most striking features of the American banking system is the absence of
a regulatory monopoly.4 This is true today, and it was true in the 19th century. The
contrary is true in Germany. For much of their history, the regulatory structures of the
banking sector in Germany and the United States followed opposing approaches. Whereas
in Germany a centralized structure was put in place, with only two federal institutions
involved in the regulation and supervision of the banks, in the United States the struc-
ture was decentralized, with several chartering authorities and numerous regulatory and
supervisory institutions at both the state and the federal level.5
This structural divergence becomes even more puzzling given the fact that, prior to
the Second World War, both countries were discussing banking regulation at roughly
the same times: after severe international financial crisis of 1907, and again in the early
1930s during the Great Depression. And even though they studied each others’ banking
systems extensively,6 they still implemented different regulatory structures. Why did we
not observe a harmonization of regulatory structures in Germany and the United States
in the wake of the Great Depression?7 Was it because policymakers in Germany and
the United States had different perceptions as to which regulatory structure would be
preferable? This question matters since the regulatory decisions taken then have largely
persisted and continue to influence banking policy.8 This chapter adds to the literature by
tracing the idea of a centralized regulatory regime through history in both Germany and
3As part of its plans to form a banking union, the Eurozone struggling to introduce a more centralized
regulatory structure . In the United Kingdom similar tendencies are also visible. See for example European
Commission (2012a,b),The Economist (2012b) and HM Treasury (2011).
4See (White, 1982, p. 37).
5‘Banking regulation’ is defined as all the legal rules and institutions that are targeted directly at banks.
Legal norms that apply to a wide range of businesses, such as corporate law, are not considered to be part
of the banking regulations. The ‘regulatory structure’ consists of the set of all those government agencies
that are tasked by law to establish, supervise or enforce the norms applying to the banking sector. ‘Banking
supervision’ is understood as the ‘policing’ or enforcement of banks compliance with the regulatory norms.
6For example, see the American and German banking commissions of 1911 and 1933, respectively:
National Monetary Commission (1910a,b, 1911); Volkswirtschaftliche und Statistische Abteilung der Re-
ichsbank (1933); Wilz (1933).
7A similar question is asked by Di Martino, Paolo (2010) for the case of the evolution of Bankrupcty
Laws and Procedures in Italy, the UK and the United States, and by Fear and Kobrak (2006), who analyze
the divergence in accounting systems in the United States and Germany prior to the Second World War.
See also Haber (2007), who compares the evolution of banking regulations in the United States and Mexico
from 1781–1932. However, Mexico’s constitutional set up was changing frequently throughout this period.
8See also Cassese (1984) for “The long life of the Financial Institutions Set up in the Thirties”.
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the United States, and by providing an explanation as to why it ‘succeeded’ in Germany
and not in the United States.
The political economy of American banking regulation for the period up until the
Second World War has been the subject of extensive research.9 Seminal works in the area
are Hammond (1957) for the time period to the American Civil War and White (1983) for
the years from the Civil War until the beginning of the Great Depression.10 The point of
reference for the regulatory reforms undertaken during the Great Depression is the careful
study by Burns (1974).11 Calomiris (2006b) provides an historical overview on the political
economy of all aspects of U.S. banking regulation from its beginnings up until the 1990s.12
The recent work of White (2010) tries to identify the origins of the regulatory impulse in
the United States. He argues that the nature of changes in regulation following financial
crises in the United States were a function of the political equilibrium at the time, which
in turn was upset by productivity surges.
In addition to these general studies, there are numerous other works analyzing specific
aspects of the regulatory history. For example, there is research on deposit insurance by
Golembe (1960), Calomiris (1990) and Calomiris and White (1994), on the seperation of
investment banks by White (1986), Benston (1990) and Kroszner and Rajan (1994), or
on branch banking by Sprague (1903), Chapman and Westerfield (1942), and Economides
et al. (1996). Surprisingly however, the question, why the United States did not develop
a centralized regulatory system, has hardly been tackled head on. The most prominent
work is the historical dispute between Hackley (1966a,b, 1969) and Golembe (1967) on the
optimality of the banking system. Whereas Hackley argues that there were attempts to
centralize banking regulation, Golembe takes the opposite standpoint. He argues that all
major regulatory changes taken were knowingly designed to ensure a decentralized banking
system.13 Golembe’s view seems to have prevailed, as in recent accounts on the regulatory
changes prior to the Second World War it is often assumed that there was never a serious
9For a general historiographical survey on U.S. commercial banking see Schweikart (1991).
10Redlich (1947, 1951) also provides a comprehensive history of regulatory ideas from independence until
1910. Fischer (1968) also provides a general overview of the American banking structure.
11Kennedy (1973) is often overlooked as it focuses on the Banking Crisis of 1933, rather than on the
regulatory reforms in its entirety. Nevertheless, it is also an invaluable source.
12The official history of the office of the Comptroller of the Currency by Robertson (1968) also provides
a long-term view up until the 1960s.
13See Hackley (1966b, pp. 824–830) and Golembe (1967, p. 1100).
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attempt to centralize the regulatory structure of the United States.14
This chapter re-opens the Hackley-Golembe debate. It carefully re-considers existing
research, underrepresented primary material,15 and the relevant legislation, in an effort to
lay bare any attempts to centralize the American regulatory structure prior to the Second
World War. It argues that before the Second World War there were three major attempts
by the federal government to introduce a centralized regulatory system.16 First, with the
establishment of the national banking system (1861–1865), second with the establishment
of the Federal Reserve System (1910–1917) and finally with the establishment of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance (1930–1935). However, the federal government could not simply
prohibit states from chartering and regulating banks. A constitutional barrier prevented
it from outright assuming control of banking regulation. As a consequence, the govern-
ment had to devise a system of regulation and economic incentives that would compel
state banks to subject voluntarily to federal regulation in order to benefit from associated
economic advantages that came with it. Unlike a direct assumption of control by the
federal government, these incentive schemes could easily by circumvented by state regu-
lators. Thus, every single of the three attempted centralizations prior to World War II
failed, as they were loopholed soon after their establishment either by legislation or finan-
cial innovation. Furthermore, each unsuccessful attempt to build a national framework
left behind institutions that were not torn down during subsequent efforts to reform the
regulatory framework. These ‘regulatory ruins’ developed into full-fledged political actors.
This is why the United States developed such a highly decentralized banking regulatory
framework for its banking sector.
Contrary to the United States, Germany introduced a centralized regulatory regime.17
However, the economic literature on the origins of the German regulatory structure is
not as extensive as its American counterpart. There is little research which takes into
account the entire regulatory discussion prior to the Second World War and that tries to
14See for example Calomiris and White (1994), Calomiris (2010), Wall et al. (2011) or White (1982).
White (1983) acknowledges that there might have been an attempt during the introduction of the Federal
Reserve System, but this aspect does not figure prominently in his work.
15This material includes Congressional Records, material by the National Monetary Commission and
numerous reports by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
16In the contemporary material this is often also referred to as the introduction of a ‘unified commercial
banking system under national supervision’.
17Indeed, this was the case in much of Europe. For an overview of regulatory developments in Europe
and the U.S., see for example the edited volumes by Battilossi and Reis (2010) and Sylla et al. (1999).
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explain why regulation took the structure it eventually did.18 Several works deal with the
development of the German banking system up until 1913, such as Edwards and Ogilvie
(1996), Fohlin (2002, 2007); Guinnane (2002); Pohl (1982b,c) or Tilly (1986). These do
shed some light on the regulatory structure and the discussions, but this is not their main
focus. The closest the literature gets to a an evaluation of the regulatory discussion at
the turn of the century are the contemporary works of Riesser (1911, Part III, Chapter
II, Section 8) and Schachner (1910), and the modern Tilly (1999). Similarly, the period
between 1914 and 1934 attracted numerous scholars analyzing the development of the
banking sector as a whole, such as Balderston (1991); Hardach (1984, 1995a,b) or James
(1985), or specifically the German financial crisis of 1931, such as Balderston (1993);
Burhop (2011a); Born (1967); Ferguson and Temin (2001); James (1984); Kopper (2011);
Ritschl and Sarferaz (2010); Schnabel (2004, 2005) or Temin (2008).
As part of his study of Nazi banking policy, Kopper (1995) was the first to examine the
politico-economic origins of the German Credit Act of 1934 – the Act, which codified mod-
ern banking regulation in Germany.19 His study presents the political discussions during
the Nazi rule, but does not consider prior developments. The work of the legal historian
Mu¨ller (2003) also focuses on the Credit Act of 1934, but also provides an overview of
banking laws throughout German history, including the emergency measures taken dur-
ing the financial crisis of 1931. However, his work does not provide a political economy
analysis of the evolution of banking regulation.
By relying on archival and other primary material,20 my work sheds new light on the
long-term evolution of the regulatory structure in Germany. It shows that prior to the
German financial crisis there existed little if any political intention to introduce a formal
regulatory regime.21 When the first regulations were introduced in the immediate after-
math of the German Banking Crisis of 1931, the problems of the decentralized structure of
banking regulation in the United States served as a cautionary tale to policymakers within
18Mostly they tend to be the works of legal historians such as those of Manaˆa (2011) or Mu¨ller (2003).
Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 368–384) contains a brief overview of the history of banking regulation from the
perspective of an economic historian.
19In the influential work on the Nazi Economy by Barkai (1988), only few of pages are dedicated to
developments in the banking sector.
20This includes the reports of two banking commissions as well as internal government documents from
the Finance and Economics Ministries, the Chancellery and the Central Bank.
21Manaˆa (2011) argued that in the fields of corporate law and banking regulation the crisis merely served
as the catalyst for reform, rather than being their immediate cause. A reform of corporate law was most
certainly in the pipeline before the crisis, however this chapter finds little evidence that there was in terms
of banking regulation. See also Ba¨hr (2006) for the reform of German corporate law during the 1930s.
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the central government not to follow the same route. Also, my research confirms more
recent research that argued that the Credit Act of 1934 is not to be considered a Nazi
piece of legislation, as it had been traditionally suggested.22 Indeed, the Act is in line with
the German corporatist tradition of regulating the economy. The comparative perspective
with the United States also shows that the reason why we do not see a harmonization of
the regulatory structures in Germany and the United States, lies primarily in the varying
degrees of states rights.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, the regulatory discussion in the United
States is presented up until the Second World War. Emphasis lies on discussions sur-
rounding the centralization of the regulatory strucutre. This is followed by an equivalent
section on the German regulatory deliberations. The final section discusses the findings
of this double biography.
2.2 The United States
2.2.1 Early banking regulation (pre-1860)
The first banking services in the United States were carried out by private individuals
or unincorporated associations often known as ‘private bankers’.23 With the American
War of Independence (1775–1783) the first incorporated banking businesses were formed.
Generally these required charters from the state governments to operate a banking business
and were generally known as ‘state banks’. In most cases the state charters were granted
on a case-by-case basis.24 Individual proprietorships or partnerships continued to operate
throughout this period. Yet, after 1813, most states prohibited (unincorporated) private
bankers from issuing their own banknotes. Only (incorporated) state banks with the
appropriate charter were allowed to issue banknotes.25 Thus, the term ‘private banks’
22For the traditional view see Ba¨hre (1982, p. 25) or Wandel (1982a, pp. 153–154).
23For a brief history of money and banking prior to the American War of Independence see Markham
(2002, pp. 43–57).
24Not all incorporated banks were ‘state banks’, but the line between mutual savings companies, stock
savings banks and trust companies vis-a-vis ‘state banks’ was often blurred. See Barnett (1911, pp. 9–11)
for a detailed exposition of the term.
25These bank notes were (in theory) convertible into gold specie upon demand.
Chapter 2. Americans wanted it. Germans got it. 23
was generally used for unincorporated individuals or associations that operated a banking
business without issuing notes.26
When chartering state banks, the states often maintained a right to sign part of the
capital of newly formed banking corporations, and in some cases they even outright owned
state banks. For a number of state governments, banks were an important source of income
as well as a tool to support politically desirable projects. For frontier states in the South
and West it was often also a way of promoting professional banking structures.27 The
charters hardly ever effectively restricted state banks’ scope of operations. Only towards
the middle of the century, after the panic of 183728 and the subsequent depression, did
bank charters become more restrictive and their issue more homogeneous within states –
but not across states. Many states began granting charters according to the ‘free-banking’
principle: anyone was given a charter to operate a banking business as long as certain pre-
established conditions were met.29 Other states began restricting incorporated banking
altogether or replacing them with government-owned state banks. By 1863, however, most
states had begun again to charter incorporated state banks on the free-banking principle.30
State regulation of state banks was light at best. As a matter of fact, during the first half
of the 19th century most banks’ accounts were generally kept secret.31
Contrary to what often is believed, branching of banks was generally permitted. In
some states, especially in newer states to the West and South, it was the predominant mode
of operation for incorporated state banks. Before the Civil War, there was no widespread
political or economic movement advocating the adoption of unit banking. On the contrary,
it is possible that by the mid 19th century, branching was more widespread in the U.S.
26See Redlich (1951, pp. 60) for an exposition of early private banking. See Barnett (1911, p. 11) for a
definition of the term private bank. While private banks had a period of relative importance in the 19th
century, their influence waned in the 20th century until they became virtually insignificant by the late
1930s.
27Doti and Schweikart (1991, pp. 19–23) describe the unconventional banking services in the westernmost
states. For the government stakes in banks and the states’ fiscal interest in banks see Dewey (1910, pp.
33–35) and Legler et al. (1994, pp. 121–122, 126). For the banks as a tool of public policy see Sylla (1999,
p. 264).
28For the origins of the panic of 1837 see Hammond (1957, pp. 451–457) or Rousseau (2002). For an
interesting account of the effect of the panic on banks in the American South see Schweikart (1987, pp.
48–90).
29See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 54–55) and Dewey (1910, pp. 40–46). Robertson (1968,
pp. 22–23) attributes the emergence of the free-banking laws to the sheer quantity of chartering requests
the states received at that time. Also note that free-banking in the U.S. is not equivalent to a complete
laissez-faire approach to banking. It merely meant that legislatures did not approve every single bank
charter anymore, and that anyone could set-up a note-issuing bank as long as certain conditions were met.
30See Hammond (1957, pp. 605–617).
31See Dewey (1910, pp. 5–22, 126–127, 142–151), Hammond (1957, pp. 452) and Markham (2002, pp.
170–173).
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than in any other European country, except Scotland.32 Merely in a few north-eastern
states, such as New York, was branching eventually restricted before the Civil War.33
There was, however, a resentment towards corporate banking institutions per se. It was
this resentment that even caused some states to prohibit incorporated banking altogether
for some time.34
The only banks to have federal charters prior to 1863 were the First (1791–1811) and
Second Bank (1815–1835) of the United States.35 These were early attempts at establishing
a public-private ‘central bank’. The intention was to install a banking institution, modelled
on the Bank of England, that made it easier for the U.S. federal government to attend to
its fiscal needs. It directly engaged in business with private banks, but it also served as the
federal government’s fiscal agent. At the same time, its dominant position helped to unify
the currency of the United States and it served as a regulating force on other state banks,
much like the role the Bank of England had in the England. While other state banks
were still allowed to issue banknotes, only the notes of the Bank of the United States were
considered legal tender in payments to the US government. Even though both the First
and the Second Bank of the United States were successful in their endeavours, they did not
have their charters renewed by Congress. Both the First and Second Bank of the United
States fell prey to political attacks. In particular the agrarian interests, represented by
the Presidents Jefferson and Jackson, were in opposition to any corporation issuing paper
money, but especially so to the two (allegedly monopolistic) federal banking corporations.
In their attacks on the banks the Agrarians questioned the constitutionality of the banks,
32Chapman and Westerfield (1942, p. 48) quoting Melchior Palyi, The Chicago Credit Market, p. 144,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937. See also the total number of banks and branches in operation
in the United States, 1834–1861 in table 2 in Chapman and Westerfield (1942, p. 48).
33Possibly this was due to a provision contained in the free-banking acts that prevented a bank’s branches
from emitting notes. It was a measure that was meant to prevent an excessive emission of notes by banks.
At the same time it made the operation of branches unattractive for state banks. See Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (1937a, p. 19).
34The resentment largely reflected the unreliable currency and the novel corporate way of organizing
production. It is not quite clear what prompted some north-eastern states in the ante-bellum period to
restrict branching at times. In part it was due to the fiscal interest of towns and states that expected a
higher income from local monopolies on banking. And to some extent the lack of branches might also have
been a factor of local economic conditions. In the case of Maryland, branching did not evolve, even though
banks were free to establish them. See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 36–49), Hammond (1957, pp.
605–617) and Dewey (1910, pp. 136–143 ).
35The earlier Bank of North America was chartered by the Continental Congress during the Civil war
in 1781. It was to serve as a ‘national bank’ to finance the war and to unify the currency, by issuing
paper money based on specie. It had also received a charter from the state of Pennsylvania and continued
operations as a state bank after the war. In 1786, it also received a charter from the state of Delaware
and in 1787 a new limited charter from Congress. The Bank of North America was later succeeded as
a ‘national bank’ by the First Bank of the United States. See Markham (2002, pp. 71–72, 87–88) and
Redlich (1947, pp. 7–8, 20–21) for details on the Bank of North America.
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the banks’ adherence to their charter, and, last but not least, that they had tried to
influence politics. Crucially, the Agrarians’ cause was aided by state banks that saw it as
an opportunity to dispose of the competition and the regulatory influences from the First
and Second Bank of the United States.36
The First and Second Bank of the United States had been successful in furnishing a
more uniform national currency and conservative banking practices. After their demise,
the United States reverted back to a system with no currency of nation-wide acceptance.
Throughout the early 19th century, the number of state banks grew rapidly.37 And every
state bank could (and did) emit their own currency. Hundreds of parallel currencies existed
alongside each other, amounting to over 10,000 different kind of banknotes in circulation.
Many of the currencies were not convertible 1:1 to each other, and even less so across state
boundaries. This made interregional trade more complex with respect to countries with a
unified currency. Convertibility of banks’ currencies was further hindered by low capital
ratios, mismanagement and speculative loans. By the time the Civil War broke out in 1861,
banks were relatively unsafe, uncertainty was widespread and the federal government had
no control over state banks. Only a handful of states succeeded in building relatively
sound banking systems.38
36See Hildreth (1837, pp. 51–56, 61–63 & 79–88), Holdsworth and Dewey (1910, pp. 9, 12–14, 50–51,
66–71, 83–97, 151–152, 163–175, 254–265) and Markham (2002, pp. 88–90, 126–127, 133–136, 142–147).
See Redlich (1947, pp. 96–101) for details on the regulating influence of these ‘central banks’ on other
state banks. See Hammond (1957, 1947, pp. 209–226) for the state bankers’ role.
37Redlich points out that two particularly strong growth bursts came after the demise of the First and
the Second Bank of the United States. Businessmen tried to fill the void these dominating institutions had
left. See Redlich (1947, pp. 187) and Redlich (1951, 69–80). For an overview of the growth of incorporated
banks see figure 2.1 on page 26.
38See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 49–51), Davis (1910, pp. 12–13, 17–27), Markham (2002, pp.
168–169, 173, 175–180) and West (1977, p. 16). The banking system from the “Wildcat” era (1836 to 1863)
was described in the classic Hutchinson (1975, p. 60) textbook on US banking as follows: “The nation’s
monetary ‘system’ was clearly a chaotic, deplorable shambles when the Civil War broke out. Indeed, it is
something of a misnomer to call it system at all.” Robertson (1968, p. 31) is sceptical of overly negative
assessments. He points out that even though the banking system had many shortcomings, it still enabled
rapid economic growth. See Rockoff (1974, 163) for another benign evaluation of the initial free banking
era. Gische (1979, p. 25) claims that bank notes from New York banks were generally accepted throughout
the country at par, given the stringency of New York state regulations for banks. Data by Jaremski (2010a,
pp. 1571, 1582) on state bank failures suggests, that while the decade from 1844–1855 had relatively few
failures, they were especially prominent from 1837–1843 and from 1855 until the Civil War. He attributes
many failures to the backing of note issues by state bonds, thus every time state bond prices collapsed, so
did the banks that had backed their note issue on those state bonds.
Chapter 2. Americans wanted it. Germans got it. 26
Figure 2.1: The number of incorporated banks and bank branches in the
United States (1783–1861)
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(b) The number of bank branches
Sources: Own elaboration based on data from Weber (2006, pp. 449–450). These figures
do not include (non-incorporated) private banks.
2.2.2 Introduction of the National Banking System (1860-1905)
Ideas on how to reform the banking sector had abounded in the decades before the Amer-
ican Civil War (1861-1865). A number of these came to fruition in the free banking laws
of several states, after the demise of the Second Bank of the United States and the sub-
sequent Panic of 1837. Two other important ideas spawned prior to the Civil War. One
was to introduce the free-banking principle on a national scale. The other idea suggested
circumventing opposition to a single national bank issuing a national currency by allowing
a number of state banks to issue a national currency subject to certain conditions. At
first, these proposals did not make much headway. Only towards the 1850 did these ideas
gain more prominence.39
The American Civil War provided the needed catalyst for reform, not least because
the agrarian South of the United States had seceded, and with it the primary opposition
to federal government involvement in the banking sector.40 In his Treasury Report to
Congress of December 1861, Treasury Secretary Chase proposed to Congress to pass an
Act that would create a unified currency by permitting, or if necessary forcing, existing
state banks to issue a national currency based on government bonds and subject to certain
39See Davis (1910, pp. 9–12) and Redlich (1951, pp. 99–100) for the various proposals prior to the Civil
War.
40The Southern states were generally opposed to greater federal government involvement in the economy,
besides for matters of war. See Sargent (2012, p. 23) referring to Section III, Chapter 14 of McPherson,
James, Battle Cry of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1988.
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regulations.41 This would finally provide the country with a unified currency again, and it
would possibly create a stronger demand for government war bonds. This, in turn, would
tie the banks, and thus the country, closer together with the federal government and
create a greater economic interest in a victory of the Union. Congress picked up Treasury
Secretary Chase’s proposal, but modified it substantially in the Currency Act of February
25, 1863. The idea of allowing state banks to issue a national currency was pushed into
second tier and eventually discarded completely. Instead, Congress focused on allowing
the federal government to charter ‘national-banks’ throughout the country according to
the free-banking principle. Only these national banks would be allowed to issue a national
currency. In return, the national banks were required to subject to stringent regulation and
supervision by the federal government’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
The Currency Act had little impact. Only a handful of national banks were founded in
the western regions of the country.42
It was quickly realized that the Act had several flaws that made it economically
unattractive to either set-up a new national bank or for state banks to convert into na-
tional banks.43 For example, the Act of 1863 lacked a provision that obliged national
banks to redeem other national banks’ notes at par. Another was that State Banks had to
change their name into the format “[First/Second/...] National Bank of [Name of City]”.
Additionally, some bankers felt that times of war were not an opportune moment to engage
in monetary experiments, and it was a certainty that most bankers disliked the federal
governments attempt to extend its influence on the banking sector. It was also not certain
that the government would survive the war and national banks’ survival was intricately
linked with the solvency of the government.44 Furthermore, it was also suggested that
the 1863 Act threatened New York’s standing as the financial center of the country and
thus found no acceptance by the influential New York Banks.45 Many state legislatures
also refused to pass enabling acts that would have allowed banks to convert into national
banks more easily. In short, the political and economic incentives were not strong enough
41Davis (1910, p. 7) reports that such a system had already been successfully implemented on a state
level in New York in 1838. Indeed, much of the legislators inspiration came from banking ‘experiments’
previously conducted in New York. See also Gische (1979, pp. 25–26, 35) and West (1977, pp. 21–22).
Redlich (1951, p. 105) also sees parallels with the English Bank Act of 1844, also known as the Peel Act.
42See Davis (1910, pp. 1–93), Hammond (1957, pp. 718–727), and Redlich (1951, pp. 99–108).
43See U.S. Department of the Treasury (1863) for the numerous suggestions for improvement.
44Indeed, after the American Civil War most state banks in the American south, who were heavily
invested in confederate securities, failed as confederate securities became worthless. See Doti and Schweikart
(1991, p. 24) and Schweikart (1987, pp. 311–313).
45See Gische (1979, p.42–43).
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to convince state banks to exchange their charter into a national one. Indeed, the early
national banks seem to have been set-up more in a spirit of patriotism rather than en-
trepreneurship. The National Currency Act of June 3, 1864 mended some of the defects of
the previous one, but also introduced a few other detrimental provisions.46 While national
banks were obliged to redeem notes from other national banks at par, capital requirements
for national banks were increased and national banks were forbidden from extending real
estate loans. As a consequence, growth of national banks was still lower than hoped. The
U.S. Congress realized that it had to find a way to make the operation of a national bank
more lucrative than that of a state bank. It eventually did so when, in an amendment
to the National Currency Act in 1865, Congress levied a tax of 10% on the note issue of
state banks. From then on it was no longer profitable for them to issue bank notes. As
note issue was an important source of income for many state banks, a wave of conversions
into national banks ensued.47 The first National Currency Act of 1863 and the tax levy of
1865 passed Congress only with the narrowest of majorities. This indicates that legislators
were well aware that their measures amounted to a massive infraction into states’ rights
that could have devastating effects on state banking.48
The more recent historical literature has generally interpreted the establishment of
the national banking system as an attempt by Congress to raise money for the ongoing
Civil War, whereas the older historiography has generally pointed out that it was primar-
ily and attempt to unify the currency and to establish a unified regulatory system. The
main argument put forward in favor of the war finance hypothesis was that contemporary
policymakers cited it as a motive for backing of the currency with government bonds.49
46Only later was the 1864 National Currency Act officially renamed into ‘National Bank Act’.
47See Davis (1910, pp. 94–202), Hammond (1957, pp. 727–739), and Redlich (1951, pp. 108–113).
Gische (1979, p. 59) argues that the balance had already tipped in favor of the national banking system
before the introduction of the tax, when a number of reputable large New York state banks decided to
exchange their charters in the winter of 1864. This broke the opposition of the New York Clearing House
association and created nation-wide trust in the system’s viability.
48See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, p. 61) and Robertson (1968, pp. 43–45, 49, 53–54). For a
schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement from 1863 onwards see figure 2.2 on page 31.
49War finance is cited as the primary motive for the introduction of the national banking system in
Haber (2007, pp. 31–32), Golembe (1967, pp. 1096–1097), Schweikart (1987, p. 311), Sylla (1969, p. 659),
Sylla (1999, p. 267), Wall et al. (2011, p. 4) and White (1983, p. 11). Chapman and Westerfield (1942)
see the war finance motive at par with the motive to unify the currency. West (1977, p. 18) is agnostic
as to the motives. Hammond (1957, pp. 718–738), Million (1894), Redlich (1951) and especially Davis
(1910) represent the traditional view that war finance was not a major driver behind this legislation, but
that the unification of the currency and the regulatory regime was. It is possible that the more modern
literature, which provides relatively little evidence for this claim, was mislead by the influential account of
Robertson (1968, pp. 36–54–183). In the main body of his text, he repeatedly stresses that at the time
of the inception of the national banking system, the war finance motive was often put forward. He even
stated that the tax on the bills was intended to boost the national banking system, rather than to replace
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However, there is significant evidence that besides hoping to unify the currency, the in-
troduction of the national banking system was indeed a Congressional attempt to unify
regulation by driving the state banking system out of existence. First, if Congress was
primarily interested in raising money for the ongoing war effort, there would have been
no need to introduce the national banking system. Congress could simply have worked on
the basis of the original proposal of Treasury Secretary Chase that foresaw the unification
of the currency on the basis of state banks issuing a national currency backed by gov-
ernment bonds. Second, influential policymakers publicly proclaimed that an important
aim of the National Currency Act was to absorb the entire state banking system in the
national banking system and thus centralizing control over the banking system.50 And
third, if Congress was serious about using the National Currency Act as a major source
of income, then it would probably not been enacted as slow as it did. After all, time is of
the essence in times of war. Between the first proposal of Treasury Secretary Chase in De-
cember of 1861 and the enactment of the first National Currency Act lay well over a year.
Indeed, the bill was even temporarily put on hold and greenbacks were issued instead.51
By the time the revised National Currency Act was passed, almost another year had gone
by. During this year, the support to war finance of the first National Currency Act was
negligible.52 And only after the taxation of state banks’ note issue took effect in 1865,
the state banking system. Yet, in the conclusion of the book he reverses his prior position and clearly
states that “Congress unquestionably intended that all commercial banks should be chartered by the federal
government.”
50“[...] only one system will prevail; it requires no spirit of prophecy to predict which of the two is destined
to give way. The losses which the people have sustained by bank failures; the inadequate protection which
state legislation, with rare exception, has given to the bill-holders; the fact that the credit of issues of the
strongest and best conducted State banks, outside of the States or the section where they exist, is not the
result of public confidence in their solvency, but of the influence of bankers and money dealers, who can as
easily depress that credit as they can sustain it.” See the Circular Letter of the Treasury Department, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, July 14, 1863, reprinted as Appendix II in Redlich (1951,
pp. 137–139). See also the furious reaction of the New York Clearing House Association to the Controller’s
statement reprinted as Appendix III in Redlich (1951, pp. 140–143). It accused the government to “[...]
unnecessarily throwing a firebrand into the state, raising the question of state rights.” and concluded that
“[...] the evil is upon us”. Similar to the Comptroller, the influential Senator Sherman proclaimed that
“The national banks were intended to supersede the State banks. They cannot exist together; [...] If the
State banks have power enough in Congress to prolong their existence beyond the present year, we had better
suspend the organization of national banks”, quoted in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1932d, p. 3) citing the Congressional Globe, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, February 27, 1865, p. 1139. In
Sherman (1895, Chapter XIII), Senator Sherman’s autobiography, an entire chapter is dedicated to the
“Abolishment of the State Banks”. Robertson (1968, p. 183) also points out that the national banking
system and the prohibitive tax were introduced against the unanimous opposition of the banks.
51See Robertson (1968, pp. 40–41).
52By October of 1864, just about $82 million of government bonds were used by national banks to
back their note issue. The total note issue itself was limited to $300 million in the National Currency
Act. Additionally, to my knowledge, there exist no estimates of what proportion of this amount actually
represents additional demand bought by the banks to back the currency, rather than bonds they already
had held previously. For the figure see U.S. Department of the Treasury (1864, p. 47).
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did the national banking system take off – well after the war had been decided. Even if
it had taken off in time, the size of the budget deficits incurred dwarfed any prospect of
obtaining a significant source of income from the introduction of the bond-backed national
currency.53
While it is of course tempting to infer that the primary reason for imposing the
backing in government bonds of the national currency was just a measure to increase the
demand of government bonds, it is just as plausible to assume that at that time it was a
necessary condition to ensure that the national currency was trusted and accepted across
the vast country. These government notes were issued by numerous banks. If one of
those banks failed, it would still be possible to redeem the note that bank had issued with
the US treasury. It was a measure that put the federal government’s weight behind the
currency. Additionally, it allowed the government to control the (paper) money supply,
without which the idea of a decentralized national currency would have been much harder
to realize.54 There are many plausible arguments for the establishment of the national
banking system, but the evidence for the national banking system having been primarily
a measure to finance the war is weak. The war finance motive served mainly as a patriotic
sweetener to the public.55
If the intention of the government was indeed to unify the currency and to replace
the state bank system with a centrally regulated national bank system, why did Congress
not simply issue a law prohibiting states from chartering banks or require all state banks
to subject themselves to central regulation? The barrier to such action was the American
constitution, which did not explicitly grant Congress such power. Congress could not
prevent states from chartering banks and neither could it regulate state banks directly
unless it was needed for currency matters.56 Consequently it had to create incentives, such
53See Davis (1910, pp. 40–42) and Goldin and Lewis (1975, pp. 303–306) for a brief exposition of the
union government budget during the war. The budget deficits for 1862 and 1863 were well over $400.000.000
and $600.000.000, respectively, whereas the National Currency Act limited the bond-backed currency to
just $300.000.000.
54The stabilizing aspect was also expressed by Treasury Secretary Chase and the Comptroller of the
Currency. See Redlich (1951, p. 104–105), U.S. Department of the Treasury (1863, p. 58) and U.S.
Department of the Treasury (1864, p. 48).
55Davis (1910, p. 107–111) reports that war finance arguments were indeed sometimes put forward by
contemporary legislators, but that they were primarily aimed at the public.
56For an analysis of the constitutional powers of the states and Congress in terms of banking see Ham-
mond (1957, pp. 91–95). This federal conflict in the banking sector regularly causes vigorous disputes.
See for example the current debate on federal preemption in the banking sector and its purported role
in allowing abusive mortgage practices as discussed in Natter and Wechsler (2012). Note that this par-
ticular discussion only considers to what extent state regulations apply to national banks if there is no
corresponding federal law, but not the other way around.
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that state banks would voluntarily subject themselves to federal regulation by converting
their charters into national ones. Congress hoped that the national currency emitting
privileges a national bank charter offered, paired with the tax on note emission by state
banks would suffice.
Figure 2.2: Schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement in the United
States (1863–1912)
National banks
State banks
Comptroller of  
the Currency
30+ State 
Regulators
Federal-level 
regulatory 
bodies
State-level 
regulatory 
bodies
Private Bankers
Not regulated
Note that Private Bankers were barred from issuing currency. Source: Own elaboration.
And indeed, in 1865 it seemed like the plan would succeed and that the national
banking system would replace the state banking system. Large swathes of state banks
converted into national banks, subjecting themselves to the federal regulations of the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency. Numerous new national banks were also founded,
whereas some state banks closed down altogether. However, growth of the national banking
system soon stagnated and the state banking system staged a comeback.57 This was
primarily due to three factors. First, between 1863 and 1870 note issue was limited to $300
million and this limit was already hit by 1867. As a consequence, few new national banks
formed until 1870. By the time Congress reacted and abolished the limit, government bond
prices had risen sharply and the profitability of national banks’ note issue consequently
decreased. Second, over time the cashless transfer of money began to spread rapidly. This
greatly reduced the need for banks to be able to issue currency as their main source of
57See figure 2.3 on page 34 for a rough overview of the evolution of the national and state banking
systems in the 19th century.
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income. And third, the regulatory institutions of the states did not remain idle to watch
their own demise.58
National bank regulation tended to be stricter than that of state banks. They had to
adhere to stricter capital and reserve requirements. Especially, in more rural areas it often
was not economically viable to set up a national bank with the minimum capital require-
ments specified by the National Bank Act. In addition, national banks were restricted in
their portfolio choices as they were required to invest in short-term, self-liquidating loans,
which effectively restricted them from engaging in the real estate and securities business.
National Bank shareholders were also subject to double liability. In case a national bank
had to be shut down, investors not only lost their initial investment, but they were also
liable for additional losses up to the par value of their stocks. Last but not least, national
banks were not allowed to operate branches.59 In contrast to that, the regulation of state
banks was often aligned with the fiscal interests of the states, rather than being determined
by safety concerns.60 Consequently, state bank regulators reacted to the competition by
the national banking system by lowering regulatory requirements. Free banking was in-
troduced in most of the states, permitting anyone to establish a banking corporation, as
long as certain conditions were met. Technically, these banks were even allowed to emit
their own bank notes, but this was no longer economically attractive given the 10% tax
incurred upon their issue. Investment restrictions as well as capital and reserve require-
ments were lowered well beyond the levels required from national banks. Yet, branching
restrictions were largely untouched until the 1900s.61 The Comptroller of the Currency
tried to counteract the resurgence of state banks by lowering regulatory requirements for
national banks as well. However, these measures were met by the states with even lower
58See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, p. 4), Hammond (1957, p. 734), Sylla
(1969, pp. 659–663) and White (1983, pp. 61–62).
59See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, pp. 7–11), Doti and Schweikart (1991,
p. 23–25), Macey and Miller (1992, pp. 2, 36), Redlich (1951, pp. 178–179), Sylla (1969, pp. 559–661) and
White (1983, pp. 18–21, 33–35). The national currency acts of 1863 and 1864 did not explicitly prohibit
the branching of national banks, but the Comptroller of the Currency interpreted the Act narrowly and
refused to authorize the operation of new branches to national banks . Merely banks that had branches and
joined the national banking system were allowed to retain these. Remarkably, the branching prohibition
found little resistance. Until 1890 there was no political movement to allow for the branching of national
banks. See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 59–60). For an overview of the different regulatory
requirements of national and state banks in 1895 and 1909 see (White, 1983, pp. 18–21, 30–31).
60See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, pp. 10–11). Banks often sought
methods to stabilize their industry through voluntary local arrangements such as clearinghouse associations.
Only towards the end of the 19th century did supervision of state and national regulators become more
professional. See Doti and Schweikart (1991, pp. 53–54). For an overview of regulatory practice and
method of state banks see Barnett (1911, pp. 144–181).
61See White (1982, pp. 34–35).
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regulatory limits for state banks. This competition between regulators, allowed banks to
engage in regulatory arbitrage – to switch charters depending on which system offered the
most suitable scheme.62
The national banking system had created a pyramidal scheme of reserve holdings,
where required reserves depended on a bank’s geographical location. Rural national banks
could hold part of their required reserves as deposits with national banks in reserve cities.
These banks could in turn hold part of their required reserves as deposits with national
banks in central reserve cities.63 Thus, any sudden changes at the bottom of the pyramid
would reverberate in the central reserve city banks. The advantage of holding deposits with
other banks was that it paid interest, whereas holding reserves as cash did not. The New
York banks, which were the ultimate reserve holders for the national bank system, invested
these short term reserves in call loan market that financed margin finance on the stock
market. Whenever rural banks would recall their reserves, the New York banks could, in
normal times, call in the loan, which could be readily repaid by selling the corresponding
securities.64
The American Civil War and the initial success of the national banking system had
also – unintentionally – wiped out branch banking in much of the United States. The
Comptroller of the Currency did not permit national banks to branch, and new state
banks were often small and did not develop branches.65
62See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, pp. 11–15), Sylla (1969, p. 664), and
White (1983, p. 14–61).
63The central reserve cities were New York, Chicago and St. Louis.
64See Sprague (1910, p. 20–24, 83) and Wilson et al. (1990, pp. 88–89), West (1977, pp. 29–32) and
White (1983, pp. 27–33). As Laughlin (1912, p. 47) figures show, the pyramidal reserve structure of the
national banking system contributed to skewing the capital towards the Eastern States. In general interest
rates were significantly higher for more central areas of the United States compared to coastal regions.
Jaremski (2010b, p. 14) also finds that a redistribution of capital from rural to urban centers took place,
not only because of the reserve scheme, but also because of the high capital requirements of national banks
that, paired with the tax on note issue, caused many small state banks to close down. Robertson (1968,
p. 51) traces the origins of this reserve scheme to similar correspondence reserve holding schemes that had
been the norm in several state banking systems and were consequently copied into the national banking
system. Gische (1979, pp. 47, 54) argues that the adoption of this structure was a concession to the New
York city banks that preserved New Yorks status as center of American finance.
65There is not much known as to why the Comptroller of the Currency restricted branching of national
banks as tightly as it did. There was no general movement towards restricting branch banking even after
the Civil War, but neither was there a movement advocating the permission of branch banking until the
1890s. Modern explanations why unit banking was widespread in the United States are rather limited.
The prohibition of branching of national banks is often interpreted as a historical accident, that was of
little relevance to banks and policymakers at the time. Once it became a relevant issue in terms of financial
sector stability, supporters of the existing system, i.e. unit bankers and anti-trust advocates fought those
attempting to liberalize the system. See Calomiris (2006c, p. 47), Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp.
59–65) and White (1983, pp. 14—16). A study of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1937a, p. 21) suggests that the national banking system might have been regarded by the first Comptroller
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Figure 2.3: The evolution of the national and state banking systems compared
by the number of banks (a), and by the amount of assets held (b)
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Sources: Own elaboration based on data from U.S. Department of the Treasury (1932, pp.
3, 5). The figures do not include private banks.
The regulatory race to the bottom consequently cemented a banking system, which
was highly fragmented with numerous small and mainly rural banks, with the exception
of a few large banks based in New York. Instead of developing a unified banking system
with the federal government as the sole regulator, as most countries did, the United States
developed a dual banking system that was separated into national and state banks.66
The cyclical nature of the predominantly agricultural economy, paired with the pyramidal
reserve system, led to recurring tightness in the New York money money markets. Cru-
cially, there was no standing mechanism to counter these liquidity shortages, such as a
of the Currency, McCulloch, as indeed a banking system with branches. After all, the structure of the
national banking system was similar to that of the Bank of Indiana that had been presided by McCulloch
himself. Other less convincing explanations often highlight Americans’ general suspicion or even hostility
towards concentrations of economic and financial power. See for example Barnett (1911, p. 135–143).
These explanations fail to explain the relative ease with which branching was accepted prior to the Civil
War and why quite a number of states allowed bank branching after all or did not explicitly prohibit bank
branching in the post-bellum period. It has also been argued retroactively that the aim of the National
Banking Act was to create “[...]local institutions that were independent of each other, but under national
control and supervision. Nationalization without centralization was the keynote of the law.”. See Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932b, p. 18), quoting the Solicitor General of the United
States in 1911 and citing the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, November 4, 1911, p. 1232; November
25, 1911, p. 1433 and United States Congress, 72nd, 1st Session, Senate Document No. 92, May 10,
1932, p. 3. It would also plausible to speculate that the branching restriction on national banks was a
necessity, because of the pyramidal reserve structure. Central reserve city banks naturally benefitted from
the reserves of all national banks being effectively deposited with them. If the central reserve city banks
were allowed to branch, they would easily outcompete other smaller national banks. Thus the need to
restrict the geographic spread of the ‘privileged’ central reserve city banks. For an overview of the legal
status of branching throughout the U.S. States in 1901 see Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 76–77).
66Indeed, it might would be more appropriate to speak of a triple banking system, as unincorporated
private banks still existed. However, we shall keep with the terminology of the dual banking system as
information on private banks is relatively scarce and their relative share declined over time. See figure
2.6(c) on page 42.
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central bank.67 This, paired with the lacking risk diversification of the unit banks, made
the banking system highly vulnerable to monetary shocks.68 Consequently, the banking
system was plagued by numerous banking crises.69
2.2.3 Introduction of the Federal Reserve System (1906-1917)
Even though there were periodical banking crises, proposals to reform the banking system
were relatively scarce after the introduction of the national banking system.70 Reform pro-
posals intensified towards the end of the 19th century, as a number of weaknesses in the
banking system were pointed out. Some argued for the liberalization of branching, others
for the introduction of a central bank and a currency based on assets rather than govern-
ment bonds, but the various proposals did not yield any significant legislative results.71
The only changes to the national banking system were changes that relaxed regulations
for national banks to put them on a slightly more equal competitive footing as the state
banks.72 The reform discussion never really took center-stage until the liquidity crisis of
1906/07.73
67Banks in reserve or central reserve cities often set up clearinghouse associations to counter this problem.
See Redlich (1951, p. 175).
68See Kemmerer (1910), Miron (1986, pp. 138–139), Sprague (1910, p. 48) and more recently Hanes and
Rhode (2012, p. 35). This traditional interpretation that monetary shocks largely originated in the cyclical
agricultural has been challenged by Calomiris (2006a, p. 140) and Wilson et al. (1990, pp. 89–101). They
point out that the stock market crashes of 1929 and 1987 occurred even though there was access to a lender
of last resort. As an alternative explanation they propose that the crises in the late 19th century were
primarily driven by the public’s lack of confidence in the stability of the banking sector, and the public
withdrew their deposits en masse in anticipation of a recession. See also Wicker (2000).
69In the US there were three major banking crises in 1873, 1893 and 1907 and seven minor ones in 1884,
1890, 1896, 1899, 1901, 1903 and 1905 according to a modern reclassification by Jalil (2012). See Sprague
(1910) for a contemporary account of some of these crises. Bordo (1985) compared the stability of the
Banking Systems in the U.S. with that of the U.K., Germany, France, Canada and Sweden. He finds that
the American banking system was much more crisis prone than any of its other major counterparts.
70West (1977, pp. 35–41) attributes this to the rather benign course of the crises and that contemporaries
believed that the underlying structure of a competitive banking system was desirable and functional.
Instead, individual banking practices were to blame. The prohibition of interest payments on reserve
deposits was the first major proposal voiced after the crisis of 1873. Although it was generally welcomed,
it failed to materialize. See also Sprague (1910, pp. 89–107).
71See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 64–74), Redlich (1951, pp. 207–217) and West (1977, pp.
42–49) for the reform proposals around the turn of the century, and in particular the Baltimore Plan and
the Indianapolis Monetary Commission.
72The most important piece of legislation was probably the Gold Standard Act of March 14, 1900, which
lowered the capital requirements for national banks in small towns and allowed national banks to issue
bank notes at par with the government bonds deposited with the Comptroller (previously they had only
been allowed up to 90% of the value of their deposited bonds. Its main effect was the founding of several
hundred of new small national banks, but hardly any state banks decided to convert. See Willis (1923, pp.
14–17).
73See White (1983, p. 63). Chapman and Westerfield (1942, p. 65) point out that reform of the currency
was a much more prominent issue than systemic considerations prior to the liquidity crisis of 1906/07.
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The effects of the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906 caused a monetary shock in the
international financial system via the gold standard that ultimately lead to a widespread
breakdown of the convertibility of deposits throughout most of the United States.74 In
contrast to the previous crises, the financial crisis of 1907 was so severe that it generated
enough political momentum to create the potential for a major change to the American
banking system.75 The swift ascent of the financial trusts, which were created to evade
existing regulation, and which pursued more risky business models that almost brought
the system to a collapse, caused a change of heart. The systemic risk associated with
the trusts’ business model did not go unobserved amongst ‘traditional’ bankers. From
that perspective it is thus unsurprising that it was especially the relatively strictly regu-
lated national banks, which were calling for increased regulation; regulation that would
encompass trusts and create a central institution that would be able to act as a reliable
lender of last resort.76 This is probably the key difference with respect to previous crises.
Prior to 1907, the banking industry saw no major reason for concern and largely opposed
regulatory reform. After 1907, influential parts of the banking industry actively sought
greater government involvement to protect their banks from failing due to the actions of
unregulated parts of the system.
The U.S. Congress felt compelled to establish two commissions. The National Mone-
tary Commission (NMC) was tasked with investigating the structure of the banking system
and its defects, in particular its lack of a central bank. The Money Trust Inquiry, better
known as the ‘Pujo commission’, was created to investigate the extent to which a few
financial institutions exerted an undue influence over other financial and industrial corpo-
rations.77 Especially the NMC became an immense exercise.78 It prepared reports on the
74See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 157) and Sprague (1910, pp. 286–290). The earthquake triggered
massive gold inflows to the United States, as European insurers indemnified American claimants. As a
consequence of the massive gold-outflows, the major European central banks were compelled to increase
interest rates. This increase in the international interest rate level caused a short but severe recession and
ultimately a banking crisis in the United States. See Odell and Weidenmier (2004) for the transmission
mechanism.
75It was considered by contemporary scholars to be the “[...] most extensive and prolonged breakdown
of the country’s credit mechanism which has occurred since the establishment of the national banking sys-
tem”(Andrew, 1908, p. 497). But as Calomiris (2009, pp. 5, 11-13) points out, the scale of bank failures in
the second half of the 19th century and the early 20th century was minor compared to what would follow
in the 1920s and 1930s.
76See Frydman et al. (2012, pp. 7–15), Moen and Tallman (1992, pp. 612-616, 621), Moen and Tallman
(1999, pp. 11,18–20), Moen and Tallman (2000) and Sprague (1910, pp. 319–320) for details on the crisis.
For the ascent of the financial trusts, see for example Barnett (1911) and Neal (1971).
77The claim of undue influence is exactly the same that has often been made in the case of the largest
German Universal banks as well.
78Over the course of 1909 and 1912, the commission published around 30 comprehensive reports. See
National Monetary Commission (1908-1913).
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history and the current state of the American financial system. More interesting still, the
NMC also conducted extensive studies of foreign banking systems in an effort to identify
and ‘import’ monetary and regulatory best practices to the United States. About half of
the documents published by the NMC are concerned with foreign banking systems rather
than the domestic one. Representatives from the commission travelled to Canada, Eng-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Scotland, Sweden and Switzerland to study those countries’
banking systems at first hand.79
The principal defect as outlined by the NMC and contemporary observers was the lack
of leadership and the absence of a lender of last resort. At best, the banks were the sum of
its parts. At worst, the lack of structure brought the system to the brink of collapse over
and over again as responsibility was ‘shared’ rather than centralized. In times of crisis,
banks acted rationally on an individual level (by cutting-down on lending), however, this
lead to collective irrationality as money markets froze.80 While the largest New York
banks had to some extent tried to fulfil this role, their actions were limited by the fact
that they did not have the legal power to emit notes based on gold or commercial paper.
The establishment of a central bank was a necessity to buffer these liquidity spikes.81
Surely enough, the atomization of the banking system and the lack of diversification
which resulted from it, was also recognized as a major problem for systemic stability. And
indeed, some states had already proceeded on their own to liberalize branching laws for
state banks, most notably California. However, it was deemed politically impossible to
remove branching restrictions on a national scale. The American public’s and the unit
banks’ opposition towards concentration of (financial) power was considered to be simply
too strong. Thus, this problem was to remain untouched at a federal level.82
79Other countries that were studied but not visited were Austria-Hungary, Holland, Japan, Mexico and
Russia. See National Monetary Commission (1912, p. 4).
80Any substantial attempt by depositors to convert their holdings into currency would necessarily have
to be satisfied by banks’ reserves. And as reserves dwindled, so did the loans extended by banks. In a
system with literally thousands of unit banks, this could easily lead to a wide-scale domino effect as did
during the late 19th and early 20th century.
81See Sprague (1913, pp. 17–18) and Vreeland (1912, pp. 9–10).
82“Much may be said in favor of branch banking from an economic standpoint but our people would never
accept it Under branch banking in 20 years a few great banks in a few of our great cities would own the
banking system of the country. Our people are satisfied with our system of home-owned banks. We do
not desire to change it in that respect.” (Vreeland, 1912, p. 9). Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp.
74–75) point out that the aversion towards bank branching coincided with the Antitrust movement of the
outgoing 19th century that saw the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission and the practise of
‘trust-busting’. Abolishing branching restrictions would, in the eyes of antitrust advocates, run counter
to the policies they were pursuing. For California’s liberalization and an overview of other states’ policies
towards branching in 1910 see Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 87, 89).
Chapter 2. Americans wanted it. Germans got it. 38
The central bank, which was, eventually, established in the United States was based on
the tested principles according to which successful European banking systems operated.83
However, the specifics of the American nation, its regulatory history and tradition, were
taken into account, i.e. it was a political compromise. The Federal Reserve System,
as created in 1913-1914, was not a central bank in the traditional sense. There was
no central decision-making body. It was more of a loose cooperation of special-purpose
banks, which could - to some degree - act as lenders of last resort and conduct open market
policies. The loose cooperation could break down just as easily as it would form.84 Apart
from its function as a lender of last resort, the Federal Reserve served as yet another
regulatory agency. Its aim was, once more, to centralize banking regulation. Again, the
government tried to provide state banks incentives to subject join the Federal Reserve
System and to subject themselves to regulation by the Federal Reserve, and thus create a
more homogenized regulatory regime. At the same time, Congress also somewhat relaxed
national banks’ regulations in order to put them on a more equal footing with state banks.85
While national banks were required to join the Federal Reserve System and subject
to its regulations, state and private banks where given the option to join the system if
they subjected themselves to the regulations of the Federal Reserve. Essentially, they
were given the choice to exchange access to a lender of last resort for increased federal
regulation. Consequently, banks could be separated into one of four categories, depending
83First drafts for a ‘National Reserve Association’ seem to have been strongly influenced by the experi-
ences of the German banking system. See West (1977, pp. 70–71) and Willis (1923, p. 528).
84See Willis (1934, p. 101). A critical figure in this process was Representative Carter Glass, who in the
1930s would continue to play a leading role in shaping banking regulation in the United States. See also
Glass (1927) and Willis (1923, pp. 3–825) for contemporary policymakers’ accounts on the origins of the
Federal Reserve Act and see West (1977, pp. 52–172) for a historical account.
85This aim becomes evident not only from the Act itself, but also from the Congressional Hearings. E.g.
U.S. Congress (1913, pp. 44–46, 156, 817, 838–842, 1976–1981, 2057–2059). See also Federal Reserve Board
(1915, p. 145) and White (1983, pp. 126–131). In his analysis of the National Reserve Plan that would
form the basis for the Federal Reserve Act, Laughlin (1912, pp. 276–277), a supporter of a centralized
regulatory system, reported enthusiastically: “[...] In fact, it is one of the best features of the National
Reserve plan that it would tend to unify the state and national banking systems. With a definite pattern
afforded by federal legislation, with which the state banks were willing to comply in order that they might
be placed upon terms of equality in competing with national banks, it may be expected that progress toward
uniformity in banking legislation throughout the country would be much more rapid than ever before. This
uniformity would be exceedingly desirable, since it would take away the possibility of evading legal provisions.
[...]” He, and certainly others, believed that state banks that stayed out of the Federal Reserve System
would be stigmatized and driven out of existence. Similarly, Benjamin Strong – the first president of the
influential New York Federal Reserve Bank, proclaimed in a speech that “No reform of the banking methods
in this country will be complete and satisfactory until it includes all banks.”, quoted in Chandler (1958, p.
80), citing a speech on May 14, 1915, reported in the Financial Age (May 22, 1915). In 1916, Benjamin
Strong even advocated asking Congress to take action to force state banks into the Federal Reserve System
– but he never did ask. Throughout his mandate, bringing the state banks into the federal reserve system
remained one of his main concerns. See Chandler (1958, pp. 80-82). See also White (2011, p. 2).
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on the regulations they were subject to: First, the national banks. These were regulated by
both the Federal Reserve and the Comptroller of the Currency.86 Second, state member
banks. These were regulated by the respective state governments and because of the
banks’ membership in the Federal Reserve System, they were also subject to regulation
by the Federal Reserve. Third, state non-member banks. These were merely regulated
by the respective state governments. Last but not least, there was still the option for
non-incorporated private banks to avoid regulation altogether.87
This second attempt to bring state banks in a centralized system of regulation was
ineffective. Less than one hundred state banks opted to join the system at its outset.
In order to make the Federal Reserve System more attractive, a 1917 amendment to the
Federal Reserve Act allowed state banks joining the system to retain all their charter
and statutory powers.88 This created far-reaching exceptions from federal regulation for
state banks, giving them them an important regulatory advantage vis-a-vis national banks.
Nevertheless, while some larger state banks opted to join the system, the vast majority
of state banks decided to stay outside. The economic benefits from joining the Federal
Reserve System did not outweigh its regulatory costs for most state banks. After all,
most of them were small rural banks that had little to no use for the re-discount facility
of the Federal Reserve System. If they needed a re-discount facility they could always
approach larger correspondent banks. Additionally, many state banks viewed the system
as an undesirable attempt by the central government to extend its control over the state
banking system.89 Consequently, the desired centralization of regulation did not come
about this time either. Instead, the regulatory system became more complex still as the
possibilities for regulatory arbitrage had been increased through the introduction of the
Federal Reserve System.90
86Crucially, the OCC was not abolished, even though this possibility was considered by Congress during
the deliberations of the Federal Reserve Act. It was also suggested that the OCC be transferred from the
jurisdiction of the Treasury to that of the Federal Reserve Board. See for example Harding (1925, p. 6).
87For a schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement in the United States from 1917–1931 see figure
2.4 on page 40.
88See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, p. 25–26, 29) and Wyatt (1932, pp.
239–240).
89See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1915, pp. 178–179) and White (1983, pp.
132–136). Willis (1923, pp. 1185–1187) attributes the temporary increase in state bank membership after
1917 due to state banks hoping to be shielded from financial turmoil caused by the war, which the United
States had just joined.
90For the evolution of the state and national banking system throughout this period see figure 2.5 on
page 42. For the proportion of banks members in the Federal Reserve System see figure 2.6 on page 44.
Indeed, White (2011, pp. 2-3, 38–40) argues that the introduction of the Fed as another regulator caused
a deterioration in the quality of banking regulation and supervision, as it further spurred the laxity in
competition.
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Figure 2.4: Schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement in the United
States (1917–1932)
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The much lesser known Pujo commission was investigating the concentration of fi-
nancial power, in particular several well-known Wall Street bankers and their practices.
In its final report, it called for the strict separation of investment and deposit banking
and the prohibition of national banks to exert any direct influence on each other, be it
through cross-shareholdings, interlocking directorates or common owners.91 These sugges-
tions were largely discarded by Congress. The most prominent bankers had withdrawn
from influential business positions, in order to pacify the public and the legislators. Merely
the prohibition of interlocking directorates found its way into the Clayton Antitrust Act.
Even so, the Pujo commission is sometimes credited with providing a powerful counter-
balance to the conservative congressional forces that sought to maintain the status quo.92
2.2.4 The regulatory discussion in the 1920s (1918–1929)
As the United States moved further away from being an agrarian state towards one based
on industry and services, it experienced a short but intense period of economic growth.93
91See House of Representatives (1913, pp 161–164 ).
92See Simon (1998, pp. 1082-1083) and Willis (1923, pp. 105–115).
93See Friedman and Schwartz (1963, pp. 240, 244-245).
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At the same time, however, the United States was experiencing a wave of bank failures on
an unprecedented scale. Between 1921 and 1929 well over 5000 banks failed. Interestingly,
this massive failure wave went about without full-fledged banking crises. These failures
could be traced back to a boom and bust in the agricultural sector and the still fragile
atomistic structure of the banking sector.94 The policymakers were well aware of this
problem. Also, the question on how to increase state bank membership in the Federal
Reserve System had remained firmly on Congress’ agenda.95 Repeated calls were also
made for the abolition of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the transfer of
its competence to the Federal Reserve Board. Several bills to that effect were introduced
in Congress, but without much success.96 The issue of reforming banking regulation never
died, but during the 1920s there was no sense of urgency either.97
The main subject of discussion during the mid-1920s was that of branch banking.
A few but important states experimented with lifting branching restrictions, in order
to encourage the development of larger and more stable banks.98 A majority of states
continued to prohibit branch banking. At the same time, the national banks pressed the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board for a relaxation of regulatory
standards that would allow them to compete better with state banks.99 And indeed,
the Board and Governors and the Comptroller of the Currency began authorizing a few
94See Alston, Grove, and Wheelock (1994). Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 23, 109) have called
the period from 1920 stretching to 1933 that of the “holocaust of bank failures”. For details on the failures
of national and state banks see also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932a).
95See for example U.S. Congress (1926) and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d,
pp. 26–28).
96Indeed, there were severe disagreements between the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Reserve Board with respect to regulatory issues. See Harding (1925, pp. 7, 201–214), Robertson
(1968, p. 113–115) and White (2011, pp. 35–40).
97Macey and Miller (1992, pp. 31, 37, 57–62) argue that there was no sense of urgency, since bank
depositors rarely lost large amounts. This, they argue, was due to the double liability bank shareholders,
which was mandatory for national bank stockholders, and a widespread practice for state bank stockholders
as well.
98And as Carlson and Mitchener (2009) point out, the removal of branching restrictions did indeed lead
to a more efficient and more stable banking system – at least in the case of California, which allowed
state-wide branching. Most other states that liberalized branching did so on a city level. See also Doti and
Schweikart (1991, pp. 78–85).
99The National Banking Act of 1863 was generally interpreted as having barred the establishment of
branches for national banks. The only cases of national banks having branches occurred, when national
banks took over state banks that did have branches or when these banks would convert to national banks.
Those branches were generally allowed to continue operating, even though they were now officially part
of a national bank. Similarly there were cases in which state banks with branches were admitted into the
Federal Reserve System. Branching regulations for member banks were not uniform in the years following
the establishment of the Federal Reserve System and were subject to changing attitudes of both the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve Board. See Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (1932c, pp. 117–137), Burns (1974, p. 54) and Federal Reserve Board (1924, pp. 285–286).
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Figure 2.5: The evolution of the banking system in the United States (1863–
1931)
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Sources: Own elaboration based on data from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1932a, p. 115), U.S. Department of Commerce (1949, pp. 25–26) and U.S.
Department of the Treasury (1932, pp. 3, 5). The figures (a) and (b) do not include
private banks, whereas figures (c) and (d) do. All figures do not include branches.
within-city branches from 1922 onwards.100 Yet, when a national bank tried to outright
establish a new branch in a state that did not allow branching, stating that it was a bank
with a national charter and hence state law did not apply, the Supreme Court ruled that
the national bank was not explicitly empowered to operate branches and that state law
was therefore applicable. The Supreme Court ruling essentially confirmed the practice
since the inception of the National Bank Act.101
In an effort to put the national banks at par with state banks, the McFadden bill
was introduced into Congress in 1924. It had become a necessity, since national banks
100Since the inception of the Federal Reserve System, both the Board of Governors and the Comptroller
of the Currency urged Congress to pass legislation to allow for at least limited branching of national banks
within city or county boundaries. See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 92–102).
101For the decision of the Supreme Court see Federal Reserve Board (1924, pp. 281–286).
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started converting into state banks in the 1920s.102 The McFadden bill was opposed
fiercely by the unit state banks who wanted to avoid competition from branch banks that
could have spelled the end of the unit bank system. They were supported by their larger
correspondent city banks.103 Similarly, Congresses opinion was on the whole not favorable
towards bank branching per se. It is possible that a Congressional majority could have
been found that would have voted for an outright ban of branching throughout the United
States. Yet, Congress did not possess the necessary constitutional powers to prevent
states from allowing their own state chartered banks to branch within state borders. The
next best option, to prevent both national banks and state member banks from operating
branches, was also considered. But such an option would most certainly have led to the
demise of both the national bank system and ultimately the Federal Reserve System in
its existing form, as it still depended to a large extend on the compulsory membership
of the national banks. If regulations proved too restrictive, national banks were free to
exchange their charters for state charters, and state member banks were also free to leave
the Federal Reserve system. If such a development would have taken place, it would
have amounted to Congress reneging its influence on the banking sector and this was not
an option to Congress. The hands of the federal government were tied by the states’
regulatory competition, and thus required Congress to pass a law that would put national
banks on a more equal footing with state banks.104
As a consequence of the branching controversy, the McFadden-Pepper Act was not
passed until 1927.105 The Act amounted to a a slight liberalization of branching restrictions
for national and member banks. It allowed them to establish branches within their home
city, as long as state laws gave state banks the same right. Additionally, the number of
branches was limited depending on the size of the city, and the opening of new branches
by national banks was subject to approval by the Comptroller of the Currency. State-wide
branching was still prohibited to national and state member banks, even if state banks in
102See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, pp. 26–28), Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1937c, p. 5–7) and Meltzer (2003, p. 216–217).
103Interestingly, in California, the state with the most liberal branching laws, a formidable unit banker
lobby emerged as well. It was grappling with the effect of the liberalization of branching restrictions in
its home state and sought to have it banned or at least restricted again. See Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1932c, pp. 150–151).
104For the preferences of political actors with respect to branch banking see Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1932c, pp. 139–141).
105The unit bank lobby formed associations for the defence of unit banking and even attempted to include
a permanent barrier to an extension of branching in the McFadden-Act in the form of the so-called ‘Hull
amendments’. This amendment would have turned the bill into a distinctly anti-branching measure; the
opposite of what was originally intended.
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Figure 2.6: Federal Reserve membership rates (1914–1941)
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portion of total banks assets
Sources: Own elaboration based on data from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1943, pp. 6, 16–17, 20–23). All figures do not include branches or unincorporated
private banks not reporting to State banking authorities. Banks in US possessions are
excluded as well. The letters ‘J’ and ‘D’ refer to either year ending in June or December.
the same state were allowed to do so. The Act introduced a number of other important
liberalizations on the lending restrictions of national banks. Their passage was largely
uncontroversial.106 The regulatory drive did not end with the McFadden-Pepper Act, and
neither did the conversions of national banks into state banks cease completely. Once the
Great Depression had set in and the rate of bank failures accelerated, it was clear that a
major reform of the regulatory statues for the banking system was on the books.107
2.2.5 The Glass-Steagall reforms (1930-1935)
The Great Depression is probably one of the most studied areas in economic history,
however, up to this date there is a lively debate as to what exactly caused banks to fail
during this time.108 What stands after decades of debate is the following, however: First,
there needs to be a mechanism in any banking system that aids prudent banks in coping
106See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932c, pp. 141–154) or Chapman and West-
erfield (1942, pp. 102–107) for an overview of the Congressional bargaining process and the controversy
surrounding the Hull amendment. See U.S. Congress (1927) for the actual McFadden-Pepper Act.
107Herbert Hoover even called for banking reform in his annual message to Congress in December of 1929.
See Burns (1974, p. 7) and U.S. Congress (1930, pp. 6–9). For an overview of the state and national bank
failure rates during the first years of the Great Depression see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (1932a).
108Traditionally, there have been two ‘camps’, the ones arguing that illiquidity, due to depositors panics
and the Federal Reserve’s inaction, were mainly to blame for most of the bank failures between 1929 and
1933. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Wicker (1996) are the most prominent most proponents of this
view. The other camp argued that it was insolvency, due to investments and loans going bad, which caused
most of the banks to collapse. Calomiris and Mason (2003), Temin (1976) and White (1984) are the most
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with adverse liquidity shocks. Second, there also needs to be a regulatory mechanism
preventing banks from engaging in lending practices that fail to diversify risk and make
them overly sensitive to shocks of the real economy.109 Contemporary policy-makers were
well aware of all this. Thus, Congress went into overdrive and both Houses began a series
of extensive hearings110 on the state of the American Banking System from 1930 onwards,
even before major banking panics had set in.111
One of the least appreciated aspects in the modern literature of the American attempt
to reform its banking regulations in the early 1930s is the fact that leading policymakers112
were advocating for a complete regulatory overhaul. This overhaul was to replace the cur-
rent system of over 50 different sets of rules and regulations with a unified commercial
banking system under federal supervision. Throughout the Congressional hearings con-
ducted in the early 1930s these opinion were put forward. In most cases it was suggested to
unify regulation under the Federal Reserve.113 In 1932, Senator Carter Glass, chairman of
the Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency of the United States Sen-
ate,114 even requested the Federal Reserve to “suggest a constitutional method of bringing
about the establishment of a unified system of banking under national supervision.” Judi-
cial and legislative precedents had established that states had the right to charter banks.
A unified banking system under federal supervision would have to find a way to take away
the states’ chartering rights. And indeed, the Federal Reserves’ general counsel opined
that Supreme Court rulings provided Congress with the constitutional power to establish
prominent proponents of this view. Of course, it is a tricky endeavor to separate the two from each other,
as they tend to be two sides of the same coin.
109These ‘lessons’ can already be found in the classic Bagehot (1915).
110In 1932, the idea of a full-fledged banking commission was unsuccessfully floated. It would have
infuriated Senator Glass (amongst others) given the extensive hearings both the House and the Senate had
already conducted. See for example an exchange of letters between Guy Emerson and Treasury Secretary
Ogden Mills dated July 27,1932 and August 2nd, 1932 in NARA RG 331, Central Files of the Office of the
Secretary of Treasury, Correspondence of the Office of the Secretary 1917-1932, Box 84.
111See for for example U.S. Congress (1930) and U.S. Congress (1932a).
112By this I mean experts of the Federal Reserve, the Comptroller of the Currency and politicians who
had been involved the reform of banking regulation for decades, such as Senator Carter.
113For example, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932d, pp. 131-134), Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1932e, pp. 43–51), U.S. Congress (1932a, pp. 33, 44) and U.S.
Congress (1932c, p. 2). Even President Hoover was not entirely hostile to this idea in his address to
Congress in 1931. See President of the United States (1931, p. 10). See also Burns (1974, pp. 11–12, 53)
and Kennedy (1973, p. 51).
114The chairmen of the relevant Senate and House committees have powerful roles in the American legisla-
tive process. Without their consent, pieces of legislature find it difficult to emerge from the (sub)committee.
See Berman (1964, p. 212).
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a unified commercial banking system under national supervision using a mixture of taxa-
tion and prohibition.115 The Federal Reserve was also strongly in favor of creating such a
centralized regulatory system.116 That the idea of a unified banking system was a powerful
one is further highlighted by a resolution of the State Bankers Division of the American
Bankers Association, in 1932. In the resolution, the state bankers decried the fact that the
idea was having the backing of “powerful interests” and needed to be fought.117 However,
these deliberations were cut short, first, by the upcoming presidential elections of 1932,
which led to a political stalemate and later by a wave of bank runs beginning in the fall
of 1932.118
Even though the United States were rattled by a series of banking crises from 1930
onwards, the federal government would not intervene actively until early 1933. Congress,
for its part, had passed a series of legislations aimed at stabilizing the general economic
conditions and at improving the operations of the Federal Reserve. But there had been
no direct intervention in the banking sector. Until then, it was the state governments
trying to combat the various banking crises themselves. It was only with the inauguration
of President Roosevelt that policy changed sharply and a nation-wide bank holiday was
declared.119 The first acts passed immediately after the declaration of the bank holiday
115The General Council of the Federal Reserve argued that Congress should resort to compulsion, justify-
ing this with three separate lines of reasoning. First, Congress could argue that the competition from state
banks represented a danger to the national banking system’s stability and survival. Second, since Congress
had the power to provide for a national currency it could simply discriminatorily tax the issue of checks by
state banks. And third, Congresses power to regulate and protect interstate commerce also applied to the
banking sector according to him, as banks could essentially be interpreted as instruments of interstate com-
merce, whose breakdown had catastrophic consequences on the economy as a whole. The General Council
recommended a prohibition of any other than national banks to receive checkable deposits, a prohibitive
tax on all checks or similar instruments not drawn or payable at a national bank, as well as the generally
prohibition of national banks to interact with state banks. See Wyatt (1932). For a similar opinion see
Rodkey (1934). It is uncertain, however, whether the prohibition of state banks to offer checkable deposits
would have indeed been proclaimed constitutional and whether it would have done the trick. After all,
they still did not take away the right of states to charter financial institutions per se. For example, the
ascent of money market funds after the Second World War would probably not have been affected by such
a provision. Additionally, Duncan (1999, pp. 221–222) points out that the courts had begun to develop
the “competitive balance” doctrine, which referred to the balance between state and federal statutes. It
was originally meant as a defensive device for the national banking system, but it turned into a shield
for state banks from federal regulation and national bank competition. Scott (1977, p. 42) claims that
the doctrine stemmed from an incorrect interpretation of the courts of the intentions behind the original
National Bank Act.
116See for example a statement read by Governor Meyer on behalf of the Federal Reserve Board to Senator
Norbeck in U.S. Congress (1932b, pp. 357–358).
117A later report by a less partisan committee of the American Bankers Association would somewhat
soften its attacks and instead call for more cooperation amongst regulators. See Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (1932d, p. 68). See also Burns (1974, pp. 71–73) and Kennedy (1973, pp.
232–233).
118See Willis (1935, p. 718).
119For the frantic discussions surrounding the Emergency Banking Act during the first days of Roosevelt’s
administration see for example McJimsey (2001).
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provided the necessary funds to re-capitalize banks through the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (RFC) in return for preferred stock. By the end of the banking holiday, the
government had equity interest in half of the countries’ banks.120
During the first three months of Roosevelt’s presidency, Congress acted both swiftly
and decisively. In doing so, Congress was benefiting from three years of prior Congressional
hearings and debate. The options were clear and it was only a matter of compromising
on measures that could be readily implemented and that would restore confidence in the
American banking system. This made a major overhaul of the banking system, such as
a centralized regulatory agency, an unlikely candidate.121 Nevertheless, the unification of
the banking system under national supervision was an option taken into consideration and
advocated by an increasing number of individuals, including the New York State banking
authorities.122 Swift actions in Congress were aided by a significant shift in public opinion.
This was of course primarily due to the general banking holiday, but also to some extent
to the so-called ‘Pecora’ Investigation. It was a Congressional inquiry, which had been
launched in 1932 to investigate the origins of the Wall Street Crash of 1929. Initially, the
commission was unable to reveal much of interest. Only when Ferdinand Pecora took over
in early 1933 as chief council did the investigation uncover fraudulent practices amongst
Wall Street banks, which outraged the public.123
In the summer of 1933, major regulatory reforms, commonly referred to as the Glass-
Steagall Reforms, were passed after a series of intense discussions.124 By then, the situation
in the banking sector had already stabilized. Nevertheless, the Act introduced compre-
hensive changes to the regulatory framework and to the banking structure. In terms of
regulation, it introduced stricter limits to investment and it included the possibility of
the removal from office of bank directors or other bank officers. The Glass-Steagall Act
required the complete separation of investment and deposit banks. Investment banks were
120More than 2
3
of the banks the government had a stake in, were state banks according to Kregel (1997,
pp. 262–263).
121See Burns (1974, p. 89), Schlesinger (1960, pp. 4–7) and Willis (1935, p. 697).
122See McJimsey (2001, Document 14, pp. 78-98), which contains the minutes of a series of meetings in
the U.S. Treasury beginning March 5, 1933. For the growing support of a centralized banking system see
Burns (1974, pp. 82–84).
123For a recent account of the Pecora Commission see Perino (2010). For a more academic account see
for example Kennedy (1973, pp. 106–128, 204–205).
124See Burns (1974), Calomiris and White (1994), Kennedy (1973) or Preston (1933) for detailed accounts
of the discussions taking place in the spring of 1933. See U.S. Congress (1933a) for the Banking Act of
1933.
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not allowed to accept any deposits from the general public nor from deposit banks. In-
terlocking directorates were also explicitly banned. Deposit banks were only allowed to
buy investment securities on account of their customers. This was the same idea that had
been proposed by the Pujo commission 20 years earlier. This time around, it was Senator
Glass who had thrown his weight behind it.125
The Act also introduced deposit insurance. Deposit insurance, too, had been an
idea with a lengthy albeit largely unsuccessful history. During the 1930s, it had been
strongly opposed by the entire league of ‘technocrats’, as well as the larger banks and
President Roosevelt. Essentially, deposit insurance was only a partial kind of remedy for
the structural problems caused by the atomistic structure of the banking system. Once
depositors knew that their money was federally insured, they had no incentive to ‘run’
anymore. This strengthened unit banks vis-a-vis larger banks, as safety was no longer
a distinguishing feature by which they had to compete with them. The technocrats had
preferred to solve the problems resulting from the atomistic structure of the banking
system by allowing banks to branch.126 The lobby for deposit insurance centered around
the Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Representative Steagall,
and faced the resistance of the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Banking and
Currency, Senator Glass. Each of them was opposed to the reform plans of the other.
However, the unit banker lobby embodied by Representative Steagall successfully linked
their call for deposit insurance with the public’s cry for the safety of their deposits, and
eventually Steagall and Glass settled for a ‘tit-for-tat‘. They simply passed both measures,
deposit insurance and the separation of investment and deposit banks, as they were not
in direct conflict with each other. Additionally, Steagall sweetened the deal by agreeing
to another provision Senator Glass was trying to include: an interest rate prohibition on
125See Burns (1974, p. 25). Macey (1984, pp. 16–21) suggests that Senator Glass must have been
supported by the existing pure investment banks, as they were effectively protected from the competition
of commercial banks by this measure. However, most modern evaluations of economists see the separation
of deposit and insurance banks as a case of misguided public policy. See for example Benston (1990),
Kroszner and Rajan (1994, 1997) or White (1986). One important, but often overlooked fact, is that
these rules applied only to national banks and member-state banks, but did not apply to non-member
state banks, as pointed out by Benston (1990, pp. 9–10). Neither were commercial banks prohibited
from underwriting and dealing in securities outside the United States. This allowed some national banks
to become key players in the Eurobond market. For an interesting analysis of the initial effects of the
separation on the investment banking industry see for example Carosso (1970).
126See Calomiris and White (1994, p. 147–152). Macey and Miller (1992, pp. 34, 37–40), Mitchener and
Richardson (2013, pp. 23–24) and White (2011, pp. 49–50) point out that the introduction of deposit
insurance came hand in hand with the abolition of double liability. They see the abolition as a major cause
for banks’ increased risk-taking in recent decades.
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demand deposits.127 The existence of deposit insurance paired with branching restrictions
largely still in place, effectively meant that the atomistic structure of the banking system
would prevail for as long as the states upheld the branching restrictions. Indeed, in its
report on the bill preceding the Banking Act of 1933, Senator Glass once more stated that
the proposed measures were a temporary fix, rather than a comprehensive reform, and that
a way needed to be found to harmonize, i.e. centralize, banking regulation throughout the
United States.128
Instead of centralizing the regulatory framework of the United States, the introduction
of deposit insurance created yet another new regulatory institution: the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation. Thus, the regulatory framework was to become even more frag-
mented. All national banks as well as all state banks who were members of the Federal
Reserve System were required to join the FDIC. Non-member banks of the state system
could apply to join. The regulatory structure of the United States became more com-
plex still. Now banks were either national banks (and regulated by the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC), state member banks (regulated by the
Federal Reserve, the FDIC and the respective state of origin), insured nonmember banks
(regulated by the FDIC and the respective state of origin) or noninsured nonmember banks
(regulated merely by the respective state of origin).129 The commercial banks had even
more options than ever to engage in regulatory arbitrage.
Interestingly, the Banking Act of 1933 also contained three key provisions that would
have given state banks a much greater incentive to either become members of the Federal
Reserve System or to convert into national banks altogether. First, after July of 1936,
access to the permanent federal deposit insurance fund was to be restricted to member
banks of the Federal Reserve System only. State banks that did not subject to regulation by
the Federal Reserve would not be able to benefit from deposit insurance from the summer
of 1936 onwards.130 Second, the banking act also repealed a provision that allowed state
banks to become members of the Federal Reserve System with only 60% of the capital
127Senator Glass wanted this in order to further weaken potential links between investment and deposit
banks. See Calomiris and White (1994, pp. 172–175) and Preston (1933, pp. 587–590).
128See U.S. Congress (1933b, p. 2). Indeed, quite a number of states liberalized branching restrictions.
By the end of the decade, 17 of 49 states allowed at some kind of limited branching, whereas 19 states
even allowed state-wide branching. See Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 128–129).
129Private banks which wanted to continue receiving deposits were required to subject to regulation by
either the federal government’s or a state’s regulation.
130See Section 8 (f) of the Banking Act of 1933. See also Preston (1933, p. 592). Kennedy (1973, pp.
218–221) reports that Senator Glass was able to push this provision past Representative Steagall and that
even the Comptroller of the Currency O’Conner lobbied strongly for this provision.
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Table 2.1: Banks’ membership rates in either the Federal Reserve and/or the
FDIC in 1935
Proportion of
all banks
Proportion of
all deposits
Member Commercial Banks 40.0% 69.5%
National Banks 33.7% 44.8%
State Member Banks 6.3% 24.7%
Insured Non-Member banks 48.6% 12.0%
Commercial Banks 47.9% 9.9%
Mutual Savings and Other 0.7% 2.1%
Non-Insured Non-Member Banks 11.4% 18.5%
Commercial Banks 5.7% 1.3%
Mutual Savings 3.2% 16.1%
Other 2.5% 1.2%
Merely 40% of banks, but with 70% of the deposits were members of the Federal Reserve
System, and almost 90% of bank joined the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance, representing over
80% of all deposits in the country. Source: Own elaboration based on data from Federal
Reserve Board (1937, pp. 782–784).
that comparable national banks would have to hold.131 This greatly reduced incentives
for national banks to convert to state banks in order to benefit from the lower capital
charge incurred by state banks. The third provision clarified that national banks would be
allowed to branch in states, where state banks were explicitly allowed to operate branches
as well.132. Once more, the federal government created strong incentives for state banks to
submit to central regulation of the Federal Reserve, if state banks wanted to benefit from
the rediscount facility of the Federal Reserve System or deposit insurance. Senator Carter
Glass and his supporters were thus trying to implicitly create the incentives necessary
for greater centralization of banking regulation, just as the U.S. government had done
in 1863–1865 and 1913.133 However, the provision requiring banks to be members of
the Federal Reserve System in order to gain access to the Federal Deposit Insurance was
relaxed numerous times in the following years. In the Banking Act of 1935, membership
to the Federal Reserve was only made mandatory for banks with deposits over US$1
million, if they wanted to join the deposit insurance. And even that only as of July 1942.
Additionally, the Board of Governors was given the possibility to exempt banks from the
requirement altogether. In 1939 this key provision was repealed entirely.134
131See section 17 (b) of the Banking Act of 1933. Exceptions were given merely for particularly small
state banks.
132See section 5 (b) of the Banking Act of 1933.
133Preston (1933, p. 597) claims that these provisions were indeed Senator Carter Glass’ intentions.
134See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1936, p. 8) and Board of Directors of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (1959, Section ‘Legislation under which the Corporation has operated’).
The latter was found in BArch B102/41817.
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Although the inception of the FDIC technically brought most state banks under the
influence of a federal agency, the American regulatory structure was far from being a
centralized system as there was no uniformity in regulatory standards and supervisory
responsibility was still diffused.135 The states were still free to charter banks and to engage
in regulatory competition. As part of the regulatory reforms, the federal government had
also created the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system in 1932, which was a system of
banks that provided rediscount specifically to mortgage banks. The Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (FHLBB) both chartered and regulated federal savings and loan associations
(S&L’s), which would automatically join the FHLB system. Furthermore, their deposits
were insured by the newly established Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC). Again, existing state chartered S&L’s could opt to join these systems.136 The
separation of deposit and investment banks also led to the creation of a separate regulatory
agency for investment banks – the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). The SEC
indirectly regulated investment banks through their activities in stock exchanges, which
were subject to regulation by the SEC. Thus, the government had created a separate
regulatory system for the different types of banks. Furthermore, the three main federal
regulatory institutions for commercial banks (the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Reserve and the FDIC) had severe disagreements with respect to regulatory practice, which
hindered effective cooperation.137 Last but not least, all banks, including national banks
and member banks, were generally still subject to regulations by the respective states they
were in, if the federal government or its independent regulatory institutions had failed to
regulate a certain aspect of the banking business. In those cases, state law could still apply.
Sometimes, the federal regulators even specifically relied on the legislation provided by the
states for certain regulatory definitions.138
From 1936 until 1939, the Federal Reserve launched another attempt to convince the
Roosevelt government to attempt the centralization of the commercial banking sector.
135Burns (1974, pp. 174–175) sees the introduction of the FDIC as a big success for the federal government,
given the degree of opposition it faced in introducing its reforms. For the complexities of the regulatory
structure see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1937b) as well as figures 2.7 and 2.8
on pages 53 and 54. In contemporary accounts, the Department of the Treasury and the RFC were
also depicted as additional (temporary) regulatory agencies. While the Treasury had minor licensing
responsibilities, the RFC could conduct examinations in banks that it had taken a capital stake in.
136See Harriss (1951), Wallace (1938) and Wheelock (2008, pp. 140–145).
137See Robertson (1968, p. 134).
138See for example Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1984, p. 73). It is still the case today that
state legislation can have an effect on federally regulated banks, unless the federal government or its
regulators pre-empt state law. See for example Natter and Wechsler (2012) or Duncan (1999).
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In a series of memoranda, the Federal Reserve laid out the case for the centralization of
banking regulation and the possible measure that could be taken by the government to
bring about a unified commercial banking system.139 A number of bills that attempted
to unify regulation on the federal level were even introduced in Congress between 1938
and 1939.140 But the political momentum of the banking crisis of 1933 had already been
used up in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, and the Federal Reserve’s calls went
unanswered.141
139See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1936-1938) for the ‘Bank Suspension Study’
and in particular Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1936) for a memorandum on the
‘Unification of the Commercial Banking System’. See also the Annual Report of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (1939, pp. 1–21), as well as a concrete plan to improve federal banking
supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1941).
140See Hackley (1966b, pp. 800-801).
141This ‘window of opportunity view’ is echoed in Calomiris (2006b, p. 76) However, it is not clear
from the existing literature, why exactly further regulatory reform did not take place. One suggestion by
Chapman and Westerfield (1942, pp. 125–126) is that from 1936 onwards the influential American Bankers
Association combated any law that endangered the dual banking system and that threatened to increase
the federal government’s influence over the banking sector. For a schematic overview of the American
regulatory structure in 1935 see figure 2.7 on page 53. For a detailed view of the regulatory responsibilities
see figure 2.8 on page 54.
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Figure 2.7: Schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement in the United
States in 1938
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Investment banks (both state and private) are not included in this chart since they were
not allowed to accept deposits. Investment banks were regulated indirectly, through their
activities in stock exchanges, by the SEC. Contemporary accounts sometimes also included
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Reconstruction and Finance Company (RFC) as
other potential regulators of the commercial banks. See figure 2.8 on page 54. Source:
Own elaboration.
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Figure 2.8: The principal regulatory responsibilities for commercial banks in
the United States in 1938
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This overview does not include non-incorporated banks (e.g. savings and loans banks) or
investment banks. It does however include the Refinance and Construction Corporation
(abolished after World War II) and the US Treasury, which are generally not included
in other overviews of the regulatory structure. Note that each federal regulatory agency
operated with a number of sub-offices throughout the United States. Source: Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1939, p. 9) and Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (1941, pp. 5–6).
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2.3 Germany
2.3.1 Pre nation-state banking regulations (1815-1870)
The development of a modern German banking system only began towards the middle of
the 19th century, when the first corporate banks were founded and when measures were
taken to unify the country and the currency.142 Before the Napoleonic wars, Germany
consisted of a loose federation of about 300 individual kingdoms, principalities, duchies
and city states, which were formally united under an elected Emperor in the Holy Roman
Empire.143 Many of these had their own currency. Under the Napoleonic occupation, the
number of states and kingdoms was drastically reduced. The end of the Napoleonic wars
also saw the ascent of the kingdom of Prussia, which was instrumental in bringing about
the unification of the numerous German states and kingdoms into a single German nation
state. Furthermore, in 1815, the Congress of Vienna established a loose association of 41
German states in a “German Confederation”.144
In the Confederation the number of currencies circulating simultaneously was reduced
to just nine. In 1834, a German customs union was established by some of the member
states of the German Confederation, which promptly attempted to standardize the cur-
rency amongst its member states, albeit with limited success.145 Even so, the pace of
industrialization increased significantly. As the German territory was still dominated by
agriculture, up until the middle of the 19th century the predominant mode of banking
was still ‘pre-industrial’ in nature. Private bankers dominated the scene, which helped to
finance governments and to some extent also the expansion of transport networks. Some
larger government run banks were set-up, but their primary concern was that of govern-
ment rather than commercial or industrial finance. In Prussia, so-called ‘Landschaften’
had been installed in the 18th century already, to facilitate mortgage credit to wealthy
142Prior to that it is difficult to speak of a banking system in a modern sense. For an overview of banking
in Germany prior to 1806 see Klein (1982).
143The central structures of the Holy Roman Empire were weak at best. Ever since the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648 they were virtually non-existent anymore. Nevertheless, the last Emperor only stepped down in
1806. Voltaire humorously summarized this arrangement as follows: “This agglomeration which was called
and which still calls itself the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire.”, cited
in Knowles (2001, p. 797). For a brief history of the German Reich under a Kaiser see Winkler (2006, pp.
4–46).
144Prussia and Austria were the largest and most powerful of the states and dominated the German
Confederation politically and economically. See also Kitchen (1978, pp. 9–33) or Winkler (2006, pp.
64–70).
145Austria did not join the customs union, leaving Prussia to dominate it.
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landowners. They were organized according to the cooperative principle, but excluded
poor small scale farmers. During the first half of the 19th century, the public Sparkassen
or savings bank system developed strongly, primarily as a measure of social policy. The
Sparkassen were adjunct offices of the municipal administrations. They accepted savings
deposits only from the low to middle income strata of society in urban centers. At the
outset, the Sparkassen did not even offer credit to their depositors. Instead, they invested
the deposits in save assets, primarily in mortgages, but also in (municipal and eventually
federal) government paper or in some cases in local businesses, and paid the depositors
interest. At the outset, the Sparkassen were thus more similar to mortgage banks. Due to
decentralized nature of the political framework, the German banking system also adopted
a decentralized structure by the middle of the 19th century. Contrary to the banking
system in other European countries such as England, Scotland or France, it was a highly
localized unit bank system with the added disadvantage that capital markets were not well
developed either.146
A further contrast to the United States was that incorporated credit banks only began
to develop as late as 1848. In large measure, this was due to the dominant Prussian state,
which did not look favorably upon the establishment of joint-stock companies in general.
Consequently it had established strict chartering requirements. Other German states were
even less inclined towards joint-stock companies. After all, industrialization threatened
the economic and social standing of the landed aristocracy. The pace of industrialization
increased substantially after the German Revolution of 1848, and incorporated banks were
founded in increasing numbers as the Prussian state adopted a more liberal stance. The
cooperative banking movement established a foothold in Germany after the revolution of
1848 as well. These cooperative banks meant to alleviate the lack of credit in rural areas, for
both small scale farmers and manual laborers.147 At the same time, the division between
protectionist Austria and the increasingly liberal Prussia widened. After a prolonged
period of diplomatic manoeuvring and shifting Alliances, a series of wars ensued in the
1860s. These culminated in the in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71. From this a unified
146For the Customs Union see for example Kitchen (1978, pp. 34–61). For the German Banking System
up until 1848 see Born (1985, pp. 31–34, 55) and Pohl (1982a). For the development of the Sparkassen
see also Pohl (1982b, pp. 195–201).
147See Born (1985, pp. 31-34), Kitchen (1978, pp. 61–109), Pohl (1982a) and Pohl (1982b, pp. 171–194,
202–210) and Tilly (1999, pp. 135–137). Manaˆa (2011, p. 98) points out that the prevailing mercantilist
thought only deemed the limitation of personal liability acceptable, as long as the corporation was driven
by the motive to foster the common good, rather than being driven by the profit motive.
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German national state under the sole leadership of Prussia emerged.148 This state was a
federal political system in many respects. However, unlike the United States, the federal
legislature had the right to impose regulations for the entire banking sector throughout
Germany.149
2.3.2 Uninhibited growth (1871-1905)
The spoils of the Franco-Prussian War also included French war reparations, which the
French government was able to pay within merely three years. This influx of capital,
paired with the creation of a new unified market, fuelled a substantial economic boom
that already began in 1867 with the formation of the North German Confederation –
the first German nation state in the modern sense, which then evolved into the German
Empire. Numerous joint-stock companies, including banks, were founded. The creation of
joint-stock companies was made possible not only by the abundance of capital searching
for investments in the new nation state. It was also facilitated by new liberal legislation,
which introduced the principle of freedom of trade (Gewerbefreiheit). This waived the
governments’ rights to charter joint-stock companies throughout much of Germany.150
The boom ended in a major stock market crash, soon termed Gru¨ndercrash (literally:
start-up crash), as the ensuing recession weeded out many of the newly floated companies
and reduced their stock to worthless paper. Nevertheless, the boom had paved the way for
the wide-spread acceptance of joint-stock banks throughout Germany. The boom had also
seen the ascent of specialized mortgage banks. They too were joint-stock companies, but
they focused exclusively on agricultural and later on urban mortgage credit. From 1871
to 1875, the currency was unified and the Gold standard formally introduced. In 1875, an
act of parliament created a public-private central bank, the Reichsbank, that served as the
main note issuer, and re-discount facility for banks. The Reichsbank’s introduction was
not universally welcomed, as there were 33 different private note issuing banks prior to
its introduction. In a political compromise, these private note-issuing banks were allowed
to continue to exist, but their note issue was limited, and it was taxed to a higher degree
148See Kitchen (1978, pp. 110–132) and Winkler (2006, pp. 118–191).
149For an analysis of the constitutional arrangement see Burhop (2011b, pp. 20–23), and for the consti-
tution itself see Reichsgesetzblatt (1871).
150Interestingly, the government was well aware that this liberalization would lead to a boom in coopera-
tions, some of which might not be run by prudent managers. See Manaˆa (2011, p. 97) and Wandel (1982b,
p. 15).
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than the note issue of the Reichsbank. Also, the other private note issuing banks were only
allowed to establish branches within their home state, whereas the Reichsbank was allowed
to branch nation-wide, through which it accepted deposits by the public. However, these
did not yield any interest payments and primarily served for cashless payment services. As
a consequence of the newly established Reichsbank, almost half of the private note banks
reneged their privilege to issue notes within the first year of the Reichsbank’s existence.151
The private note banks continued to cause some headaches to the Reichsbank until the
turn of the century, primarily because they offered better conditions for re-discount. This
practice was prohibited by law at the turn of the century at about the same time as the
Reichbank’s notes were officially declared the only legal tender in 1906.152
The Reichsbank was an institution created by public law, but as part of the compro-
mise it was funded by private capital. This gave the shareholders significant influence
over the Reichsbank’s affairs. As a public institution it was officially under the control
of a government Curatorium. However the government rarely got involved in internal
Reichsbank matters. Instead it delegated most of its responsiblities to the Reichsbank’s
executive body, the directorate. The President and the Vice President were the most im-
portant individuals within the organization. Rarely did members of the directorate oppose
motions put forward by either of them. The directorate was, however, further supervised
by a Central Committee. This was a committee elected by the private shareholders of the
Reichsbank to represent their interests. By the beginning of the 20th century, most of the
committee members were affiliated in one way or another with the major private banks at
the time. The Banking Act of 1875 stipulated that the opinion of this committee had to
be heard on a range of issues and in some cases it had veto power. This was for example
the case with the extension of credit to the government that went beyond normal business
dealings. While the influence of this committee on actual policymaking is debated, there
is no doubt that there was a close connection between the major banks and the Reichsbank
developed towards the end of the 19th century.153 Interestingly, the Banking Act of 1875
did not contain any regulatory provisions for other types of banks although the possibility
was discussed. It was discarded on the grounds that the legislators were not willing to
151See Born (1985, pp. 52–58, 115–119), (Do¨ring, 1933, p. 144), Kitchen (1978, pp. 132–160), Manaˆa
(2011, p. 98), Pohl (1982b, pp. 210–215) and Pohl (1982c, pp. 223–229, 243–251, 305). For the unification
of the currency see especially Borchardt (1976, pp. 6–14).
152See Do¨ring (1933, pp. 140, 144) and Wandel (1982b).
153See Borchardt (1976, p. 16), Feldman (1993, pp. 26–27), Habedank (1981, pp. 15–21) and Reichsge-
setzblatt (1875).
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abandon the principle of ‘freedom of trade’ that had been introduced just a few years
earlier.154
Banking regulation was only discussed after 1891 again. A number of private banking
businesses had collapsed amid allegations of fraud. In the subsequent government com-
mission with respect to stock market practices, the issue of bank regulation was not part
of the official discussions. Nevertheless, a draft law was proposed by conservative mem-
bers of the commission that aimed at protecting depositors. It would have regulated the
private banking sector and would effectively have amounted to a separation of investment
and commercial banks.155 This draft law was briefly discussed within the commission,
but quickly discarded as not being actionable. Eventually, the German parliament merely
passed a resolution in which it urged the government to study the feasibility of univer-
sal banking regulation, and to prepare a corresponding legislative proposal – which the
government never did.156 And it was with the executive government, where the de-facto
power lay during the German Empire. It was nearly impossible for the parliament to im-
pose legislation against the will of the executive. Indeed it was not uncommon for interest
groups to bypass parliament and to go straight to the chancellor with their demands.157
The German parliament did pass a new corporate law, however, that had a direct effect
on the incorporated banks. Already in 1884 the government had already re-introduced
specific chartering requirements for the establishment of new incorporated banks in an
effort to increase the quality of newly established incorporated banks. The Corporate Act
of 1896 introduced additional rules to protect the public from fraudulent corporations.
One of these barred new corporations from selling their shares on a stock exchange for
one year after after the corporation’s establishment. Its shares would have to be held by
a bank for that time period. But it was only larger banks, which could afford to conduct
such a risky investment. Thus, this specific change in corporate legislation greatly favored
larger banks over smaller ones. The law, which had the intention of protecting the public,
ended up promoting one part of the banking sector at the expense of the others. This
154See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910, p. 4), Manaˆa (2011, pp. 112–113) and Wandel (1982b, p. 19).
155The law would have required quarterly balance sheet reporting of minor financial agents (individuals
and entities whose primary business was not financial) and monthly balance-sheet reporting of full-fledged
financial institutions. Additionally, the draft called for deposit banks to be prohibited from engaging in
speculative activities, from acquiring shares in any ‘undertaking’ or corporation, as well as prohibiting
deposit banks from helping in placing bonds of any ‘undertaking’ or corporation on the capital markets -
apart from government paper and well-collateralized securities. This 1896 proposal from Graf Arnim et.
al. is reprinted in Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910, pp. 65–67).
156See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910, p. 4).
157See for example Gall (1995, p. 78) or Feldman (1981, p. 165).
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fostered concentration in the banking sector. Concentration tendencies had already been
fairly strong in previous years. After all, industrialization had created new sectors such
as the mining and steel industry, which were capital intensive and it was only corporative
banks, which possessed the necessary financial muscle to cater to these industries, as capital
markets were not sufficiently developed.158 Similiarly, in 1881 already, a tax was passed on
the transfer of securities at stock exchanges (the Reichsstempelgesetz of 1881). Again, this
law benefited larger players, as they could simply conduct transactions internally, without
conducting actual (and thus taxed) transactions.159 After the passage of the Corporate
Act of 1896 a number of credit banks began to develop extensive branch networks, to a
large extent by taking over competitors and by turning their offices into outright branches.
Already in 1881, the largest private and Berlin based banks, began to form a cartel (the
Berliner Stempelvereinigung). At first it was a tax-saving association, but it soon turned
to harmonizing short-term interest rates and commissions.160
Towards the beginning of the 20th century, the issue of banking regulation resurfaced
in public again. On one hand, this was due to the rapid development of the banking sector
and the increasing concentration in the private credit bank segment, and on the other due
to some isolated bank failures of private bankers and mortgage banks caused by fraudulent
practices. Concrete proposals for both regulation and supervision of large swathes of the
banking sector were put forward by academics, in order to protect depositors. But these
failed to make much headway in parliament and no action was taken by the government.161
By the turn of the century a system with specialized banking types had evolved in
Germany. Cooperative banks focused on rural working-class customers, the Sparkassen on
urban working-class and small business customers, mortgage banks on urban real estate,
regional government banks on agricultural mortgage credit and medium sized companies,
while private credit banks catered to industry, and private bankers acted as brokers and
158See Do¨ring (1933, pp. 145–146), Manaˆa (2011, p. 112), Tilly (1999, pp. 139–141) and Wandel (1982b,
pp. 14-16).
159See Riesser (1911, pp. 618–623).
160See Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unter-
ausschuß) (1930, pp. 25–28) and Hardach (1995b, p. 915–917).
161Draft laws by Professor Warschauer proposed the establishment of a federal deposit bank, as well as
state deposit banks and they aimed at restricting the maximum amount of deposits investment banks and
credit cooperatives could accept. Professor Wagner was the most vocal proponent of the establishment of
a supervisory supervisory agency. Another prominent proponent was Dr. Georg Obst. See Bankenenquete
1908/09 (1910, pp. 4–5, 77–78). For a contemporary work on the concentration movement of the largest
private credit banks see for example Riesser (1911).
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Table 2.2: Market shares of the different banking groups in Germany (1860–
1913)
Bank Group 1860 1880 1900 1913
Sparkassen 12.0% 20.6% 23.3% 24.8%
Cooperative Banks 0.2% 4.4% 4.1% 6.8%
Incorporated Banks 9.2% 10.0% 17.2% 24.2%
Mortgage Banks 16.9% 26.7% 28.5% 22.8%
Private Bankers 35.3% 18.5% 8.6% 4.4%
Private note emitting banks 22.4% 11.6% 6.3% 4.4%
Other banks 4.0% 8.2% 12.0% 12.6%
Source: Burhop (2011b, p. 168).
investment advisers. However, the private bankers and the note emitting banks had al-
ready lost much of their market shares during the early years of the new nation state, in
particular to the largest private credit banks.162 Similar to the United States, Germany
had thousands of small unit banks, either taking the form of cooperative banks, Sparkassen
or private bankers.163
A major difference with the United States was the fact that large parts of the German
banking system were comprised by government-sponsored banks, such as the Sparkassen
and Landesbanken. Technically, the Sparkassen were not full-fledged banks, yet. They
were adjuncts to municipal or city governments and did not have an independent legal
shell.164 As public institutions, the Sparkassen and Landesbanken were subject to the
directives of the corresponding state and were not allowed to conduct business in other
states. However, they were also exempt from corporate taxation and they benefited from
implicit government guarantees, giving them an advantage over other private banks.165
In Germany, no comprehensive federal regulation existed for any bank type, besides
for the mortgage banks. This regulation had been passed in 1899 to harmonize mortgage
bank legislation throughout Germany, as some states had begun to pass their own special
legislation in this particular field. As of 1900, mortgage banks were restricted in their range
of investments and they were subject to federal or state chartering as well as supervision
by the states they were located in. Federal norms also existed for private note emitting
162See Fohlin (2007, pp. 21–28). See tables 2.2 and 2.3 on pages 61 and 62, respectively, for an overview
of the market shares and the number of banks over time.
163This is indeed remarkable as both France and the United Kingdom had systems with merely a fraction
the amount of banks. Rajan and Ramcharan (2009, p. 40) suggest that countries with a higher number of
banks per capita had a less concentrated distribution of farm land.
164The Sparkassen were only given an independent legal form in 1931. See Reichsgesetzblatt (1931a,
Fu¨nfter Teil: Handels- und Wirtschaftspolitik, Kapitel 1, pp. 554–556).
165See Hardach (1995b, p. 919) and Speer (1933, p. 179).
Chapter 2. Americans wanted it. Germans got it. 62
Table 2.3: Number of Banks in Germany (1861–1913)
Bank Group 1861 1885 1900 1913
Sparkassen 323–517 1,318 2,685 3,133
Cooperative Banks 300 2,495–2,595 12,140 19,300
Incorporated Banks na 71 118 160
Mortgage Banks 1 24 39 40
Private Bankers 642 na 1,386 1,221–1,800
Private note emitting banks 29–33 17 7 4
Other banks na na na 236
Source: Own calculations based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, pp. 38, 56–
67). The higher figure for the private banks in 1913 is a guesstimate reported in Ziegler
and Wixforth (1994, p. 102).The estimate for the note emitting banks and the private
banks in 1913, and the Sparkassen for 1861 is reported in Pohl (1982b, pp. 155, 160,
199), the number of private banks in 1900 is reported in Pohl (1982c, p. 262) and the
number of Cooperative Banks in 1861 and 1885 is reported in Guinnane (2002, p. 89).
These figures do not include branches, and they do not represent all incorporated banks
as small incorporated banks were omitted from the central bank statistics.
banks, because of their special privilege.166 State and municipal governments oversaw
their own banks and sometimes emitted laws that served as guidelines for the operations
of the Sparkassen. Entry to the banking sector was generally unrestricted and did not
require government chartering, besides for mortgage banks. Merely the general norms
applying to all corporations applied to incorporated banks. The federal government or the
central bank had no say in the public banks’ operation and neither did it have any tools
to influence the public or the private banks’ behavior besides the interest rate. A liberal
laissez-faire approach to the banking system was taken, albeit a somewhat myopic one.
On the one hand, anyone could enter the sector. On the other hand, the local and state
governments engaged directly in the sector. They entered the banking sector as actors
under the veil of ‘public interest’, with the added benefit that it helped to foster their
private (fiscal) interests.167
Unlike the United States, there were generally no branching restrictions in Germany.
Banks could operate throughout the country and diversify risks. At first, only some of
the credit banks and the note emitting banks developed branches. Towards the beginning
166For the relevant laws see Reichsgesetzblatt (1899) and Reichsgesetzblatt (1875). For an overview of the
supervisory structure see BArch R2501/6920, pp. 82–87. For the origins of the mortgage bank regulations
see Pohl (1982c, pp. 297–301). Sometimes it is argued that the Cooperatives Act of 1899 also constitutes
a regulation of the cooperative banks. However, it is not a specific regulation targeting cooperative banks
per se. Rather it is a law establishing a new cooperative type of company. It is thus no more a piece of
banking regulation than corporate law is. See Reichsgesetzblatt (1889).
167For the fiscal interest of the government in the public banks see Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 55–58). For a
schematic overview of the German regulatory arrangement see table 2.4 and figure 2.9 on pages 63 and 63,
respectively.
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Table 2.4: The German banking sector and its regulatory arrangement in
1900 by balance sheet size
Type of regulation Balance sheet size
Federal regulation & state supervision 28%
Federal business restrictions 6%
Government owned 33%
Private and unregulated 33%
The only banks subject to federal regulation (but state supervision) were the mortgage
banks. The private note emitting banks were a special case that were loosely regulated,
because of their ability to emit currency notes. The Sparkassen and the regional govern-
ment banks were not under any special federal government regulation and all other banks
were under no specific regulation whatsoever. Sources: Own estimate based on data from
Burhop (2011b, pp. 168) and Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 67).
Figure 2.9: Schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement of the German
banking sector (1900–1930)
State Supervision
Federal 
Regulation
Sparkassen / 
Public Banks
Private Bankers
Incorporated 
Banks
Mortgage Banks
Private Note 
Emitting Banks
Cooperative 
Banks
Unregulated
Other private 
banks
Source: Own elaboration.
of the 20th century, large parent organizations evolved for the cooperative banks and the
savings banks. These could even out capital needs amongst the associated cooperative
banks and, consequently, the entire country. This was a crucial difference with respect to
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the American unit bank system that had developed after 1863.168
Additionally, Germany did have a central bank (the Reichsbank), which could help to
overcome liquidity shortages, although its ability to help was restricted by its adherence
to the gold standard. However, the Reichsbank’s willingness to act as a lender of last
resort developed into a problem for financial stability. Towards the beginning of the 20th
century the major banks increasingly lowered their liquidity and capital provisions and
thus became dependent on liquidity support from the Reichsbank. Especially at the end
of every quarter the liquidity needs of the banks increased, only briefly, but dramatically.
Indeed, the degree to which the Reichsbank was willing to act as a lender of last resort
even surprised foreign commentators.169 The explanation for the Reichsbank’s willingness
to act as a lenient lender of last resort, probably lay with the incentives the directors
of each Reichsbank branch were confronted with. Their salary was linked to the volume
and profitability of the discount business they were conducting. As a consequence their
private incentive was to discount freely, with little regard as to systemic stability or the
gold coverage ratio.170 What made matter worse was that the Reichsbank thought that by
strongly promoting the use of cashless transfers throughout the country it would alleviate
the problem of the liquidity spikes. But by doing so it only augmented the banking
system’s ability to increase the money supply, thus achieving the opposite effect of what
it intended in the first place.171 Unlike in the United States, the stability of the banking
system as a whole was never in acute danger up until the turn of the century. There were
no major runs and neither did large numbers of banks have to restrict convertibility of
deposits. Nevertheless, the adherence of the gold standard, coupled with the rapid rise
of cashless transfer and the lowering of safety margins amongst the largest private credit
banks, created significant vulnerabilities within the system.
168For the evolution of the parent organizations of the cooperative banks see Deumer (1933, pp. 254–256)
and for the parent organizations of the Sparkassen system that evolved from 1908 onwards see Neumann
(1933, pp. 339–341).
169See Borchardt (1976, pp. 46–47), Feldman (1993, pp. 29–30) and Habedank (1981, pp. 22–23). For
the seasonal variation see also Seeger (1968, pp. 106–109). For the foreign commentators view on the
lender of last resort practice of the Reichsbank see Borchardt (1976, p. 51).
170See Seeger (1968, pp. 111–112).
171See Seeger (1968, pp. 110–111) for the Reichsbank’s thinking in this matter. See also Do¨ring (1933,
pp. 142–143) for an overview of the development of the cashless transfers before the First World War.
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2.3.3 The first Banking Enqueˆte (1906-1917)
These vulnerabilities of the German banking system came into plain sight when the San
Francisco earthquake of 1906, that had ultimately caused a recession and financial crisis in
the United States, forced the Reichsbank to drastically hike interest rates in order to main-
tain the gold coverage ratio. Fortunately, this period of financial stress was only relatively
brief and it did not even lead to a recession.172 However, just like in the United States,
these turbulences created significant public irritation, as Germany had barely escaped a
more serious financial crisis. Richard Koch, the president of the Reichsbank, was replaced
and a banking commission, a so-called Enqueˆte, was established by the German parliament
upon the urging of the new Reichsbank president Rudolf von Havenstein. Havenstein then
also presided over the commission.173 Whereas previously the main concern of the regula-
tory discussion was to protect depositors, now the discussion had shifted towards ensuring
the stability of the financial system.174 In large measure, Havenstein was particularly
concerned about ‘war readiness’ of the financial system, i.e. it’s ability to withstand large
political shocks in the face of an actual war of Germany with her imperial competitors.
Thus, the liquidity dependence of the large credit banks’ on the Reichsbank was his major
concern.175 At the same time Havenstein was confronted with the private interests of the
directors of the Reichsbank branches, who did not want to reduce overall credit activity
in the economy, as this would reduce their personal income.176
The core of the commission was dominated by representatives from the banking sector.
Additionally, there were representatives from industry, a number of politicians and just
two academics. A number of representatives from the state and federal government also
attended the hearings, but their involvement was limited.177 The bank inquiry was given
the task to discuss six topics and to provide recommendations on each. Five of these
were related to Reichsbank. In particular these addressed how to attract more gold, how
to prevent another such rapid outflow of gold without the need to raise interest rates to
172See Borchardt (1976, p. 30) and Do¨ring (1933, pp. 152–153). It was estimated that 3% of the private
Credit banks had failed throughout Germany between 1903 and 1908. See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909b,
p. 34).
173For the replacement of the president of the Reichsbank in see Borchardt (1976, p. 47).
174See also Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910, pp. 4–5).
175See Habedank (1981, pp. 22–23).
176See Seeger (1968, pp. 112).
177At least 12 out of 25 of the core members were associated with the banking sector, four were associated
with industry, and another eight held political office. Some of these held both political office and a position
in banking or industry simultaneously. See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909a, pp. III-V) for the composition
of the commission.
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unacceptable levels, and how to prevent the recurring liquidity needs by the major banks
at the end of each quarter. The sixth topic addressed the question of whether there was
a need for actual government regulation of banks accepting deposits and if so, what this
regulation should look like. Though the question of banking regulation was only one of
six topics, it was the one that was dealt with in the most detail. The stenographic records
for the first five topics fill 275 pages, whereas the stenographic records for the sixth topic
alone, are 192 pages long. The formulation of the topic areas and the corresponding
guiding questions, also reflect the commission’s primary concern. The credit creation by
the banking sector was to be reigned in, in such a way that liquidity needs would no longer
spike at the end of each quarter. This was to be achieved by ensuring banks’ liquidity and
transparency, so that they would no longer resort to the Reichsbank as a lender of last
resort as a matter of routine.178
Many different regulatory ideas were being debated during the inquiry, including the
separation of investment and deposit banks, the establishment of a dedicated regulatory
oversight agency or even a cap on bankers’ wages and bonuses.179 It was discussed, whether
these ideas might be able to improve corporate governance within banks and thus foster
the public interest by protecting the depositors of banks. However, depositors’ safety was
not the main concern of Reichsbank President Havenstein. He was almost exclusively con-
cerned about the liquidity of the major banks as, to safeguard overall financial stability
and ‘war readiness’. Havenstein believed that it would be preferable to come to a gentle-
men’s agreement with the major banks, under which they would voluntarily increase their
liquidity positions, rather than risking outright government legislation. Such government
regulation might, after all, go well beyond the required measures and turn into a “Spanish
boot”, hampering the development of not only the major credit banks, but of all other
banks, such as the public and cooperative banks, which had not constituted a threat to
178See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909a) and Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909b) for the original stenographic
reports and Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910) for an assembly of the different opinions on the condition of the
banking system as well as on the different reform proposals. The Reichsbank’s compilation of proposals is
not only based on the proceedings of the bank inquiry, but it also takes into account the public discussions
with respect to banking regulation in the decades prior to the bank inquiry. See National Monetary
Commission (1910a) and National Monetary Commission (1911) for the English translation, commissioned
by the American National Monetary Commission in 1910/1911. In the following paragraphs, I shall mostly
refer to the original German publications as information tends to get lost in the process of translation.
179The bankers’ counter-argument used back then against limits to bonuses is still in use today: the
bonuses were claimed to be crucial in attracting the best and the brightest. If it was not the best and
the brightest working in the banks, surely the banking system would suffer serious crises as a result
of incompetence (Bankenenquete 1908/09, 1909b, pp. 109–111). A summary of the various regulatory
proposals put forward in the decades before and during the Enqueˆte itself can be found in Bankenenquete
1908/09 (1910, pp. 4–62) or alternatively in Riesser (1911, pp. 546–599).
Chapter 2. Americans wanted it. Germans got it. 67
stability until then. Havenstein mentioned the “Spanish boot” only in 1914, but his line of
thinking was consistent throughout this period. He prefered Reichsbank -led self-regulation
over inflexible and unpredictable parliamentary legislation that could have undermined the
Reichsbank’s influence.180
Despite the discussion of a number of regulatory measures, the official opinion among
the majority of commission members was that there would be no need to regulate. This
recommendation by the commission is not surprising given the fact that the majority of
commission members were affiliated with either banks or industry. They argued that the
problems the German banking system had in the recent past were to some extent due
to some moderate excesses, but especially due to a few ‘black sheep’. These black sheep
could easily be identified and weeded out. After all, it had not come to a breakdown of the
financial system and only relatively small banks had failed up until that point. At the same
time, the remaining bankers, in particular the large credit banks, promised to significantly
increase the liquidity ratios of their banks.181 Only few members of the enquiry were in
favor of introducing regulation and supervision.182 Opponents argued that government
regulation and supervision of the banking sector was considered to be not only a sign of
mistrust towards the banks, but also largely ineffective in preventing failures as American
and other foreign experiences had supposedly shown. In Jakob Riesser’s recommendations
to the Enqueˆte, he paraphrased a 1895 report by the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency,
in which the Comptroller supposedly acknowledged that violations of the regulations by
national banks were generally only revealed after banks had failed. Thus, the regulators
depended to a large extent on the honesty and prudence of bankers.183
Regulatory measures were rejected unanimously by representatives from all the bank-
ing groups, including the Sparkassen and the Credit Cooperatives. Representatives of in-
dustry were also largely siding with the banks.184 Additionally, the major banks pledged
180For Havenstein’s view on government regulation see Feldman (1993, p. 31), Feldman (1995, p. 132),
Habedank (1981, p. 23), Hardach (1995b, p. 918) and Zilch (1980, p. 239).
181The notable exception was the the failure of the rather large Leipziger Bank in 1901. But it was an
isolated case of mis-investment and not a case systemic instability and the Reichsbank was able to deal
with the fallout of this crisis effectively. See Borchardt (1976, p. 51) and The New York Times (1901).
182One of the academic members of the Enqueˆte, Adolph Wagner, had argued in favor of increased
regulation since the turn of the century. Jacob Riesser, a banker-turned academic, vehemently opposed
regulation. The third academic member of the commission, Lexis, was also rather unenthusiastic about
the merits of government supervision and regulation. See for example Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909b, pp.
43–50, 87–90, 97–100, 121–122, 193–210). For Wagner’s changing views see for example Riesser (1911, pp.
600–601, 777).
183See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909b, p. 210).
184See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910, pp. 5–7).
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to cooperate with the Reichsbank in order to prevent future crises of the financial sector.
The largest private credit banks preemptively agreed to publish their balance sheets bi-
monthly, according to a common standard. This could give the Reichsbank better and up
to date information on the status of the most important banks.185 At the same time they
promised to increase their liquidity ratios. It was a strategic move by the larger banks
to signal cooperation with the Reichsbank in order to prevent the banking inquiry, and
in particular Reichsbank President Havenstein, from proposing active government involve-
ment in the sector. Furthermore, the Director of the Deutsche Bank even proposed the
creation of a permanent advisory committee to the Reichsbank and the federal government
to act as a mediator between the banking sector and the government. However this ad-
visory committee was never established.186 The large credit banks’ signal of cooperation
worked. The inquiry’s chairman concluded the hearings of the banking commission with
the words: “My gentlemen, I hope and wish to all of you, that with us [i.e. in our country]
there will be no need for legal measures [...]”187 This reflected Havenstein’s stance at the
time. If somehow possible federal government interference in the banking sector was to be
avoided. And in parliament no majority could be found that favored to overrule the find-
ings of the commission either, let alone within the executive government where the true
power was.188 Thus, the banking sector remained largely unregulated. This was in a stark
contrast with the federal governments’ stance in other industries such as railways, energy
and telecommunications, which it also considered vital for ‘war-readiness’, and were it was
much more active.
However, one part of the German banking sector, which saw its range of businesses
expand in the wake of the bank inquiry were the public Sparkassen. Their competencies
were increased as they were allowed to accept cashless deposits and to conduct cashless
transfers, granting them increasingly the same rights as other private banks. Without this
move, it was feared that the Sparkassen customers would migrate to the private credit
banks, which offered better terms on the deposits, further increasing the concentration
185The mandatory end of year balance sheet statements were unreliable since banks typically engaged in
window dressing. See Borchardt (1976, pp. 52–53), Nordhoff (1933a, pp. 245–246), Nordhoff (1933b, p.
481) and Seeger (1968, p. 113).
186The banks’ agreement to publish their balance sheets was announced on October 12, 1908. See Banke-
nenquete 1908/09 (1910, pp. 169–173). See also Borchardt (1976, pp. 52–53) and Do¨ring (1933, p. 153).
For the proposal to establish a permanent advisory committee see for example Bankenenquete 1908/09
(1909b, pp. 182–183) and Paersch (1933, pp. 33–34).
187See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1909b, p. 192).
188See Bankenenquete 1908/09 (1910, p. 7).
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tendencies of the banking sector. Additionally, the Sparkassen were encouraged to form
regional parent organizations, to facilitate cashless transactions and to even out capital
and liquidity needs amongst its member banks – similar to the parent organizations previ-
ously formed by the Credit-Cooperatives. In part this was encouraged by the Reichsbank
to achieve its goal of increasing cashless transfers, but it was also meant to provide a
counterweight to the large private credit banks. Nevertheless, at that time, the different
banking groups were not considered to be in competition with each other. Rather, it was
thought of as a system of division of labor up until the first World War.189
The discussion with respect to the banking sector did not subside immediately in
the aftermath of the banking commission. An increasing number of private credit banks
agreed to publish bi-monthly balance sheet statements and in 1910 this practice was turned
into law for all private incorporated credit banks, whose stocks were listed on the stock
exchange. Previously, it was attempted to have this requirement passed as a voluntary
measure by the German stock exchanges, but it was opposed outright by the Berlin stock
market association (the Berliner Bo¨rsenaussschuß). Consequently the Reichsbank asked
the legislators to act.190
The much more pressing issue of increasing the major credit banks liquidity ratios
did not advance much after 1909, despite the pledge by the banks’ to do so during the
Enqueˆte. During the commission most commission members agreed that a liquidity ratio
of 10% would be desirable, given that the English banks tended to have liquidity ratios of
approximately 15%. Yet in the subsequent years, the major private credit banks hardly
increased their liquidity ratios above 5%. The self-regulation that was agreed upon during
the banking commission did not work. The strong competition in the banking sector
led to a situation where none of the major credit banks, were willing to increase their
liquidity holdings as it would affect their profitability. Consequently, Reichsbank President
Havestein continued to lean on the banks to increase their liquidity ratios, with little
success at first.191
189See Born (1983, pp. 247–248), Hardach (1995b, p. 919, 922, 924) and Speer (1933, p. 179). Note that
the Sparkassen were only allowed to maintain checkable deposits up to 10% of their total liabilities. See
Neumann (1933, p. 336).
190See Nordhoff (1933a, p. 246). He makes no mention as to why the Berlin stock market association
opposed this measure and why the Reichsbank did, after all, call for government intervention.
191See Do¨ring (1933, p. 153), Nordhoff (1933a, pp. 246) and Seeger (1968, p. 113).
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With the Moroccan Crisis of 1911, the liquidity question became acute once more and
Havenstein then began to address the competitive pressures amongst the private credit
banks, which he and the banks saw as the main obstacle towards higher liquidity ratios.
Havenstein proposed the creation of an cartel, which the major Berlin credit banks were
willing to comply with. Even a number of regional banks joined the cartel in the following
years. Members within this association harmonized their short term interest rates and
other bank charges.192 An agreement between the Reichsbank and the major banks with
respect to an increase in the liquidity ratios to 10% was reached at the end of 1912 – and
only after Havenstein threatened the banks with the prospect of legislative measures. As
part of the agreement, the banks were granted a period of three years during which they
should increase the liquidity ratios to their target. Yet, with the outbreak of war, the
agreement was abandoned again, leaving it in place for barely 112 years.
193
In the weeks before the outbreak of the First World War, Havenstein launched yet
another attempt at moral suasion to convince the major credit banks to increase their
liquidity holdings to 10% of their assets. Once more Havenstein reiterated that he wanted
to avoid government regulation at all cost. He was certain that if he proposed the intro-
duction of a liquidity ratio for banks, proponents of regulation would use this opportunity
to attempt to introduce much more far reaching changes, such as the separation of invest-
ment and deposit banks or other supervisory mechanisms. But he also pointed out that
in both the United States and in the United Kingdom the prescribed or de facto liquidity
ratios were significantly higher than in Germany. If liquidity ratios would not improve in
Germany, he would have to recommend government legislation. The major credit banks,
were largely receptive of Havenstein’s message. While some pointed out improvements
that had taken place and others highlighted that an immediate liquidity increase was not
feasible as long as the public banks and the regional banks did not have to abide by it
either, they understood that the Reichsbank could no longer stand by without any real
192Note that these ‘general Agreements of the Associations of privater bankers and banks’ (the allgemeinen
Abmachungen fu¨r Vereinigungen von Banken und Bankiers (AA.) were not a strict cartel as the prices
varied by region. Nevertheless, the associated banks cooperated with each other in setting the local rates,
and the Berliner Stempelvereinigung served as a leader for the smaller associations. See Verhandlungen und
Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unterausschuß) (1930, pp. 25–28),
Nordhoff (1933a, pp. 258–259), Walb (1933, p. 151) and Zilch (1980, p. 238).
193See Do¨ring (1933, p. 153) and Nordhoff (1933a, pp. 253–254).
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change happening. Further discussions were prevented by the onset of the war.194 How-
ever, this meeting made it clear that in their differences in interests, the Reichsbank and
the major Berlin banks had one thing in common, however: their antagonism towards
involvement by parliament.195 And in order to avoid involvement by parliament they had
to cooperate – or at least give the impression of cooperation.196 This close connection,
which developed in these and the following years between the Reichsbank and the banking
sector, and which was to safeguard the stability of the financial system, was later termed
‘corporatist regulation’.197
2.3.4 Corporatist Regulation (1918-1930)
At the outset of the Weimar Republic, a heated debate took place as to the future structure
of the German economy. This took place against the backdrop of socialist ideas that swept
across Europe at that time. Both the socialization and nationalization of the banking
system was being discussed in the so-called Socialization Commissions of 1919 and 1920.
However, no recommendation for socialization of the banking system was given.198 Indeed,
the banking system – like much of the economy – remained almost unscathed by these post-
war discussions.199 The only piece of regulation affecting the banks was the establishment
of government registration for corporate banking activity. This measure was introduced as
an emergency decree in 1920, in an effort by the government to prevent capital flight. It
was not motivated out of a need to regulate the operation of the banking sector as such.200
An important institutional change took place within the Reichsbank due to pressure
by the Allies. In order to break with the Reichsbank’s inflationary past and to regain the
public’s confidence in the institution, the bank law was amended and the gold standard
194The detailed minutes of this meeting are reprinted in Zilch (1980, pp. 237–250). See also Feldman
(1995, pp. 132–133) and Habedank (1981, pp. 23–24).
195See Feldman (1993, p. 31).
196Similarly see Borchardt (1976, p. 53) and Riesser (1911, p. 781).
197See Hardach (1995b, p. 918).
198See Honold (1956, pp. 46–50). These government commissions consisted of both politicians and experts
that were to study the feasibility of socialisation of parts of the German economy. A notable member in
these commissions was Joseph Schumpeter. See Winkler (1993, pp. 46–47) for details.
199Winkler (1993, p. 46) attributes this to the opposition of the unions to socialization. This in turn was
due to an agreement the unions reached with the employers that working hours would be reduced in return
for a support of the existing economic structure. This practically forecluded any socialization attempts.
200See Reichsgesetzblatt (1920b). For the legislation on preventing capital flight until 1925 see Reichsge-
setzblatt (1919, 1920a, 1921, 1922b,c, 1923, 1924b, 1925b).
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was re-introduced after the currency was successfully stabilized.201 Most importantly, the
Reichsbank was made independent from direct German government influence. No longer
was the government officially in charge of executive matters within the central bank.
Additionally, the federal government’s ability to obtain central bank credit was severely
restricted. The governments ability to nominate the executive directors was revoked in the
summer of 1924 as well. At the same time, it was attempted to also give the Reichsbank
more independence vis-a-vis its shareholders. Furthermore, from 1924 until 1930, half of
the supervisory board of the Reichsbank was composed of foreign representatives. 202
After the death of the by then discredited President Havenstein in November 1923,
Hjalmar Schacht, was installed as the new president of the Reichsbank by the German
government in the spring of 1924.203 This was remarkable, since the Reichsbank directorate
favoured Karl Helfferich, a conservative politician of their kind, who was seen as the
‘natural’ successor to Havenstein. Schacht was the opposite of Helfferich. He had not
studied law like the other directors. Instead, he had studied economics and he represented
a new generation of bankers that (at that time) supported the idea of a republic and of
international economic cooperation.This made him the preferred candidate for the Allies,
the German government and possibly even the banking community. He was consequently
first installed as the Currency Commissioner in charge of overseeing the stabilization of
the currency, and later as the director of the Reichsbank despite the strong opposition of
its directorate. In this position Schacht was instrumental in shaping the aforementioned
institutional changes to the Reichsbank. Even more, he began to restructure the internal
201The gold standard had been abandoned at the outbreak of the war. For details on German government
finance during and immediately after the war see Feldman (1993) and Haller (1976).
202For the relevant legislation see Reichsgesetzblatt (1922a) and Reichsgesetzblatt (1924a).The interna-
tional supervision of the Reichsbank was introduced in accordance with the reparations settlement set out
in the Dawes plan to provide a measure of control over German finances, to prevent another hyperinflation
and to ensure regular reparation payments. These foreign representatives were removed from the supervi-
sory board in the wake of the Young Plan in 1930. Note that the Central Committee that represented the
Reichsbank’s shareholders continued to exist, yet its powers were limited. See also Born (1967, pp. 28–29),
James (1985, pp. 19–25) and Hennig (1930, pp. 13–33, 34). For the pressure of the Allies see especially
Reinhardt (2000, pp. 85–132).
203Havenstein had been unwilling to put a halt to the government’s inflationary finance during, but
especially after the war, when the public-sector inflation turned into a private-sector hyperinflation. He
believed the hyperinflation could only be stopped, once the Allies were willing to renegotiate the war
reparations. See Feldman (1993, p. 833), Habedank (1981, p. 74–80), Holtfrerich (1986, pp. 155–172)
and James (1985, pp. 19–20). Note that Schacht could be installed by the government, since the Bank
Act amendement of 1922 still allowed the government to nominate the president against the opposition
of the Reichsbank’s directorate and Central Commission. With the amendement to the Bank Act in the
Summer of 1924, the government’s ability to nominate Reichsbank personnel was revoked. See the change
from Reichsgesetzblatt (1922a, §27) to Reichsgesetzblatt (1924a, §6).
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operations of the Reichsbank and its personnel according to his private interest, so that it
could serve not merely as a central bank, but as an ‘instrument of economic control’.204
The “Great Disorder”, as the First World War and the subsequent hyperinflationary
period was later called, became important for the future development of the banking
sector for three main reasons.205 First, during the hyperinflationary period the large
credit banking banks resumed their concentration process and increased the number of
branches significantly, covering much of the country. Throughout the inflation period
most of the private credit banks remained highly profitable thanks to their speculation
in the stock and in currency markets. The numbers employed in the four “D” banks
quadrupled between 1913 and 1924. In part it was due to their expansion, but even more
so due to the inflationary speculation. Indeed, it came to a boom in new private stock-
market banks, whose sole business model consisted in taking advantage of the volatility
in the stock markets.206 Despite the relative success during the inflation years for many
of the private credit banks, the capital of the largest credit banks was only about 13 of
what it had been back in 1913, once currency had been stabilized and brought back to the
pre-war gold parity in 1924. But at least they had a significantly larger branch network
to show for it.207
The second important development in the German banking sector was with the pub-
lic banking sector. During the war, the Sparkassen and their parent organizations were
increasingly used by the municipal and regional governments as a political tool to foster
their private (fiscal) interest. This was nothing new, as prior to the war the Sparkassen
were often obliged to invest a limited amount of their deposits in government paper. Their
main investements prior to the war was, however, the mortage business.208 During the
204See Feldman (1993, pp. 821–823, 832–835) and Reinhardt (2000, pp. 167–174). See also James (1985,
pp. 19–21), especially for the paraphrase.
205For a general account of the inflation see Bresciani-Turroni (1937), Holtfrerich (1986), Mu¨ller (1933,
pp. 190–206) or Pfleiderer (1976). For ‘The Great Disorder’ see Feldman (1993). See Born (1982, pp.
32–61), Gru¨ger (1933, pp. 32–55) and Speer (1933) for overviews of the effects of the inflation on the
German banking system.
206The four “D” banks were Deutsche Bank, Diskonto-Gesellschaft, Darmsta¨dter Bank and Dresdner
Bank. It is estimated that between 700 to 3000 private banks and credit banks were founded during
the inflationary period. It is also estimated that approximately 1
4
to 1
3
of these banks closed their doors
immediately after the currency stabilization. See Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r
Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unterausschuß) (1930, pp. 12–17), Feldman (1993, p. 273), Gru¨ger
(1933, pp. 52–55), Hardach (1995b, pp. 924–925) and Bresciani-Turroni (1937, pp. 215–216).
207See Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unter-
ausschuß) (1930, p. 6).
208For the business model of the Sparkassen prior to the outbreak of the Second World War see especially
Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 23–63) or Neumann (1933, pp. 336–337).
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war, the need for both state and federal government finance increased enourmously and
consequently the public banks were pushed to do their share. At the same time the federal
government encouraged the growth of the Sparkassen system and fostered this development
with the help of its war propaganda as well.209 During the inflation the Sparkassen were
forced to alter their business model in order to survive. Long-term investments, their main
asset class, were no longer profitable. And as the profits of the public banks decreased, so
did their ability to support the regional and municipal governments financially. Both the
Association of the Sparkassen and the local governments consequently pushed the state
governments, who set the general rules for the Sparkassen system, to liberalize the range
of businesses the Sparkassen were allowed to conduct. By 1921 a restriction to short term
deposits was lifted completely, and soon thereafter the Sparkassen’s were liberated in their
operations altogether. Some investment restrictions applied, but from the mid 1920s on
they could engage in all types of banking activities if they so wished. They were allowed
to become universal banks as well. While the expansion of the Sparkassen was ultimately
driven by fiscal incentives of the local governments, the official explanation for the expan-
sion of the Sparkassen into other fields of banking was generally touted as being due to
the abandonment of the small- and medium scale depositors and creditors by the large
credit banks during the inflation. Such a development may well have taken place, but the
municipal government’s fiscal interest was the main driver of the expansion.210
Last but not least, the German people had emerged impoverished and the business
sector illiquid from the Great Disorder. On top of that, Germany had to service its war
reparations. Consequently, the need for credit was immense. Much of the banks’ capital
had all but evaporated during the hyperinflation and the subsequent stabilization. The
balance sheet size of the banking sector at the end of 1924 was barely 20% of what it had
been at the end of 1913. Any source of credit was welcomed by the banks at that time.
This included the relatively cheaper foreign credit, irrespective of its inherent dangers in
209See Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unter-
ausschuß) (1930, p. 40), Neumann (1933, p. 337), Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 65–66, 75–77).
210See Born (1967, pp. 26–28), and Neumann (1933, pp. 337–339). For the liberalization of the Sparkassen
see also Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 79–81). The view of the Sparkassen only extending their customer base
because of the abandonment of the large credit banks was also given as the official explanation in Verhand-
lungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unterausschuß) (1930,
p. 41). This was a commission that studied the demand and supply conditions within the economy. The
banking sector was one of several sectors analyzed. James (1986, pp. 39–41) also reports that the share of
taxation that went to the federal government increased with the new Weimar constitution. Thus this may
have been another important driver for the regional governments to encourage the growth of the public
banking sector.
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a system of fixed exchange rates such as the gold standard. And indeed, by the end of
1925 the banking sectors balance sheet size had already recovered to approximately 35%
of its pre-war level.211 Furthermore, there is significant evidence that German politicians,
welcomed the foreign credit as part of a long-term strategy to rid itself of the reparations
problem or at least to commercialize the reparations debt.212 While the Reichsbank under
Schacht was critical of foreign short-term loans, it encouraged the intake of long-term
loans as it saw in it an essential role for the reconstruction of the German economy. The
Reichsbank tried to brake the intake of short-term foreign credit, but there was not much
that it could do other than moral suasion.213
Schacht was, however, particularly critical of foreign loans to German governments as
he thought that this constituted undesirable competition for the private sector, whom he
regarded as more apt to invest the money productively. Consequently he tried to gather
political support to do find a way to restrict the government’s foreign credit intake. Even-
tually, it managed to come to an agreement with the German federal and state governments
to ‘control’ the German governments’ external borrowing by establishing an Advisory Of-
fice for Foreign credit (the Beratungsstelle fu¨r Auslandskredite), which was to advise on
the desirability of the emission of long-term foreign government loans. Short-term foreign
loans to governments were only supervised by the Office for foreign Credit at the end of
1930. Even given these nominal restrictions, whatever credit was not directly given to the
governments found its way into state and municipal coffers on indirect ways. Given the
Reichsbank’s inability to prevent this development, President Schacht eventually began
warning foreign investors publicly of the dangers of giving loans to the German munici-
pal and state governments.214 Furthermore, borrowing by the private sector was largely
unchecked, even though the Economics Ministry (the Reichswirtschaftsministerium) at-
tempted to install a similar controlling body as the one for the public sector. However,
211See Born (1983, pp. 245–248) and Mu¨ller (1933, pp. 198 & 212-214). For the data on the balance
sheet sizes see Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 74). See also Bissing (1933).
212See Fischer (1933, pp. 519–520), Hardach (1976, pp. 142–143) and Ritschl (2002, p. 125–127).
213See Habedank (1981, pp. 116–117), Hardach (1976, pp. 55–56, 60) and Nordhoff (1933a, pp. 254–255).
214SeeHardach (1976, pp. 55–57), James (1986, pp. 94–96) and Tewaag (1933, pp. 124–125). The
Advisory Office was composed of an equal number of representatives of the German federal government,
the states and only one representative of the Reichsbank. Thus, the power to limit foreign credit to the
government was with the federal and state governments, and not with the Reichsbank. Furthermore, the
municipalities were not separately represented and were thus often discriminated against, making them
more dependent on their ‘accessible’ source of finance, the Sparkassen.
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this measure did not find the support of the Reichsbank and as ultimately successfully pre-
vented in cooperation with the main business associations.215 Consequently, the German
economy experienced a boom on the back of borrowed (hot) money, most of which was
used for the payment of the reparations or internal consumption, rather than productive
investment.216
After the First World War, the German territory was reduced significantly in size.
Because of this and because of additional growth in the banking sector, the number of
banks per capita had grown substantially since the outbreak of the war. If branches are
taken into account, the density of banking offices per inhabitants in Germany may well
have been almost twice the density in the United States.217 Consequently, the issue of
competition became increasingly important during the 1920s. However, it was no longer
just the competition amongst the private credit banks themselves that was a source of
concern for the Reichsbank. In an increasing measure it was the competition amongst
the three main banking groups: the Sparkassen on the one side, who aggressively entered
new markets, and the credit cooperatives and the private credit banks on the other, who
felt threatened by these state sponsored actors.218 The private sector banks criticized
the public banks for their incompetence and fraudulent practices, and that they were
invading the private banks’ traditional lines of business by abusing their status as public
institutions. Indeed, there were reports that the Sparkassen aggressively attempted to
acquire new customers by directly making reference to the implicit government guarantee,
such as by using their forms on letterhead of the local government, or that they distributed
savings account booklets for free. Last but not least, the private credit banks pressed for
the abolition of the tax exemption of the public banking system. The Sparkassen in turn
argued that their expansion was a legitimate challenge to the concentrations amongst the
private credit banks, i.e. they were an essential counterweight to the great credit banks
that threatened to monopolize the banking sector. The public banks were merely fostering
215See Hardach (1976, pp. 57–58) for the failed proposal of the Economics Ministry.
216Most of this money came from the United States. For an introduction into the credit scheme and for
an explanation why foreign creditors were so eager to lend money to Germany despite her large reparation
requirements see for example Ritschl (2012) or Tooze (2007, pp. 24–26). For the spend-thrift of the
municipal governments see for example Balderston (1993, pp. 250–265), Feldman (1984, pp. 188–189),
James (1986, pp. 85–101) or Pohl et al. (2005, p. 95).
217See figures 2.11 and 2.6(d) on pages 82 and 42, respectively. If branches are taken into account there
was approximately one banking office per 1,927 inhabitants in Germany in 1925. For German population,
bank and branch figures in 1925 see Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, pp. 7, 122). See also the overview of the
German banking system between 1913 and 1929 in figure 2.10 on page 77.
218See for example Walb (1933, pp. 167–173).
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the public interest by serving a niche, which had been abandoned by the large credit banks.
To make matters more complex still, a number of foreign banks became active in Germany
from 1927 onwards, fighting for their share in the market.219
Figure 2.10: The key developments of the German banking sector between
1913 and 1929
Total Assets (mio. RM) No. of Banks
Bank type 1913 1925 1929 1913 1925 1929
All banks (excl. Private Bankers) 66,388 22,936 60,142 20,960 22,900 23,452
Large Credit Banks 8,391 6,141 13,765 9 8 6
Provincial Credit Banks 6,266 1,318 1,971 104 67 60
Other Credit Banks na na 2,346 na na na
Private Bankers na na na 1,221 1,406 1,100
Zentralkassen 684 1,911 1,498 47 43 45
Credit Cooperatives 5,087 1,726 4,600 17,323 19,615 20,260
Mortgage banks 13,871 1,644 7,738 43 47 50
Large Public Banks 2,906 3,305 8,634 13 38 42
Sparkassen 20,802 2,875 12,149 3,133 2,622 2,609
Other banks 8,381 4,016 7,441 na na na
(a) Total Assets & Number of Banks
No. of banking offices
Bank type 1913 1925 1929
Large Credit Banks 550 1,230 1,220
Provincial and Local Credit Banks 1,335 1,296 1,045
Other Credit Banks 36 182 221
Private Bankers 1,377 1,612 1,270
All Credit Cooperatives (incl. Zentralkassen) 18,544 22,400 21,968
Mortgage banks na na na
Large Govt. Banks 46 294 310
Sparkassen na 5,145 6,133
(b) Number of banks and full service branches (not including acceptance and payment
offices)
Note that the availability of German bank data for the 1920s is patchy and of fair quality.
The numbers may not may add up and the definition between the bank types may not
be consistent over time. Thus, these tables do not necessarily represent a fully accurate
picture of the banking sector. The interested reader is strongly advised to refer to the
original data source for details. Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from
Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, pp. 63, 69–122).
219See Neumann (1933, p. 340) and especially the two memoranda written in February and April of 1926
by the Association of the Credit Banks and Private Bankers (the Centralverband des Deutschen Bank- und
Bankiergewerbes and the Sparkassen Association (the Deutscher Sparkassen- und Giroverband), found in
BArch R2501/6464, pp. 395–444. For the aggressive methods of the Sparkassen see Verhandlungen und
Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unterausschuß) (1930, p. 40–41)
and the Reichsbank memorandum Vorarbeiten der Volkswirtschaftlichen und Statistischen Abteilung der
Reichsbank vom 4. November 1933: Konkurrenzmethoden der Banken, found in BArch R2501/6913, pp.
27–36. For the conflict over taxation see Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 93–95) and for the foreign banks entering the
German marketplace see especially Balderston (1991, pp. 575–577) and Hardach (1984, p. 214). Hardach
(1995b, p. 209) also points out that the Reichsbank did to some extend compete with the commercial
banks by directly discounting bills of the largest industrial companies.
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Ever since the outbreak of the First World War the practice of requiring banks to
publish their balance sheet on a bi-monthly basis had been suspended. After the infla-
tion, Schacht urged the banks to re-establish this practice and he asked the government
to formally establish this requirement, which it did in early 1925.220 A few months there-
after, the parliament also passed an Investment and Security and Deposit Bank Act that
was meant to protect small-scale depositors and to prevent further growth in the banking
sector. It is possible that this law also played an important role in ensuring the foreign
creditors’ trust in the German banking system.221 For the first time in German banking
history, the German government had created actual restrictions to the creation of new
banks. Not all banks were affected in equal measure, however. Not much changed for the
public banks, as the set-up of a new one was subject to a permit of the relevant state
agencies. New credit cooperatives could also be created, as long as they were subject to
a specific audit scheme, and as long they only conducted credit business with members of
the credit cooperative. Anyone could also become a private banker as long as he could
demonstrate five years of experience in banking. The restriction was binding for the pri-
vate incorporated banks, however. From now on, new banks required the joint permission
of both a relevant state agency and of the Economics ministry. This chartering require-
ment for private incorporated banks was not just a formality. Both the state and federal
government could deny an application if the bank did not meet basic requirements such
as sufficient capital or if the proposed management was not considered to be experienced
or trustworthy. Additionally, they could deny the issuance of a new charter, if it did not
deem it sensible in terms of the general well-being of the economy.222
The act required periodic renewal by parliament. It was renewed twice in 1926 and
1927, but was let to expire in 1929 as no consensus could be reached on an amendment
to the act. Consequently, entry to the German banking sector was entirely free once
more. There were a number of perceived issues with the existing Security and Deposit
Bank Act, which had caused a call for revision. One was that it left too many gaps
for private bankers and credit cooperatives. Another was that no provision had been
made to provide the necessary resources to check each and every application. It seems
220See Nordhoff (1933a, p. 248).
221For the potential role of this law in international negotiations see the “Entwurf eines Gesetzes u¨ber
Depot- und Depositengescha¨ft, from 28.04.1930, pp. 6-20, found in BArch R3101/15566.
222See Reichsgesetzblatt (1925a).
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that during the law’s duration the majority of charters requested were merely rubber-
stamped. Since Germany had just entered a recession at the end of the 1920s, there
was little willingness to increase government bureaucracy amidst a general environment of
austerity. Also, the law had become dispensable as a political tool to signal the German
banking sectors solidity to foreigners. Furthermore, the private banking sector and the
industry pressed the government to lift the restrictions on the private credit banks. At the
same time they encouraged the federal government to restrain the expansion of the public
bank system. They wanted a provision included, which only allowed for the establishment
of new public banks if there was proof that the private banks had failed to provide the
necessary banking services.223 The Economics Ministry seemed willing to accede in part to
the demands of the private banking sector and of industry, in part also because it feared
American-style regulatory arbitrage. Consequently it pushed for a uniform concession
requirements throughout the country. This ran into the opposition of the German states,
who wanted to retain their say over the chartering of public banks in their state and they
did not want to cede power to a central institution.224
It never came to a vote in both chambers of parliament on the same bill. At first
this was due to the disagreements between the state and federal governments and later
due to the rapidly changing governments as the German economy. It had experienced a
sudden stop in foreign credit inflows and entered a deflationary tailspin that destabilized
the German government at both the federal and state levels. This also lead to a marked
deterioration in the relationship between the German states and the federal government.
Even so, the amended law would have meant less, not more, regulation for the banks.
With respect to the previous 1925 act, the new proposals would have abolished the need
for government consent. Instead new banks could simply take up operations. They would
only have had to notify the relevant government authority, which could then object if it
found fault with the capital available or the suitability of the individuals.225
223See for example BArch R3101/15564, Memo by Korsch, Besprechung betreffend das Depositengesetz im
Reichswirtschaftsministerium, from 03.07.1929. See also BArch R3101/15566, “Bericht des Arbeitsauss-
chusses zu Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes u¨ber Depot- und Depositengescha¨fte, from 02.07.1930.
224See BArch R3101/15566, Statement by the Economics Ministry from 02.07.1930.
225See BArch R3101/15566, Motivation of the“Entwurf eines Gesetzes u¨ber Depot- und Depositengescha¨ft,
from 28.04.1930, as well as the “Bericht des Arbeitsausschusses zu Beratung des Entwurfs eines Gesetzes
u¨ber Depot- und Depositengescha¨fte from 02.07.1930. See also BArch R3101/15567, Entwurf eines Gesetzes
u¨ber Depot- und Depositengescha¨fte, from 01.06.1931. James (1986, pp. 73–85) reports major fiscal conflicts
taking place at the onset of the Great Depression between the states and the federal government. For the
political instability see also Born (1967, pp. 39–54) or James (1986, pp. 25–38).
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In the second half of the 1920s, the Reichsbank acted as a proxy for the government, to
reign in the, what it perceived to be, excessive competition in the banking sector.226 The
Reichsbank tried to do so using the corporatist method of regulation, i.e. by attempting to
come to an agreement between the various banking associations. Ideally, it wanted to bring
about the return of the pre-1913 specialization, when each banking group focused on a
special segment of the market. This soon proved illusive and the Reichsbank subsequently
attempted to negotiate voluntary restrictions to competition. In 1928, it brokered a non-
binding agreement (the Wettbewerbsabkommen) between the major banking associations
that restricted advertising practices and created arbitration boards throughout the country
to solve conflicts between the banking groups. While the arbitration boards seemed to
have worked reasonably well, the competition for clients continued with a similar intensity
until the worsening recession forced the banks to reduce their leverage.227
Similarly, as of 1924 the Reichsbank attempted to persuade the banks to lower their
interest rates and to harmonize them throughout the country, in an effort to restrict
competition and to improve the transmission of its monetary policy to ultimately support
German industry. After the First World War, the Berliner Stempelvereinigung continued
to act as an association that sought to harmonize short term interest rates amongst its
member institutions. Moreover, its interest rate decisions provided the benchmark for
another 68–100 other regional private banking associations throughout the country. The
major credit banks acted as an enforcer of the interest rates in the smaller associations via
their branch network. But even so, long-term interest rate competition was unrestricted.
Additionally, both the credit cooperatives and the public banks were not affiliated to
these associations, but they tended to have similar harmonization measures amongst their
members. The Reichsbank attempted to orchestrate a coordinated effort to both harmonize
and reduce interest rates across all banking segments. It only succeeded to do so after much
pressure in early 1931, when a binding agreement (Zinsabkommen) by the major banking
associations was announced. This agreement attempted to reduce not only interest rates,
226In this context it is interesting to note that the Reichsbank, especially under Schacht, generally acted
as if it was part of the German government, and it often attempted to influence government policy. At
the same time it never felt the need to comply with the elected government’s line and it made sure to
safeguard its independence. See Reinhardt (2000, pp. 181–182, 197–199, 229–232).
227See Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unter-
ausschuß) (1930, p. 41), Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 97–98), Walb (1933, pp. 151–152) and BArch R2501/6913,
Vorarbeiten der Volkswirtschaftlichen und Statistischen Abteilung der Reichsbank vom 4. November 1933:
Konkurrenzmethoden der Banken.
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but also the banks’ interest rate marginsen, which made it unpopular with all banking
groups as they saw their profitability affected.228
By the beginning of the 1930s, neither the Reichsbank nor the federal government had
obtained any additional tools to regulate or supervise the banking sector.229 There was no
major discernible push by the federal or the state governments to obtain these tools, either.
What little restriction to market entry was introduced in 1925 was largely ineffective and
was soon abandoned amidst pressure from the private banking associations. Regulation of
the banking sector effectively existed only via the moderating influence of the Reichsbank
that attempted to to so primarily via moral suasion. The threat of increased government
regulation was rarely used. If anything it threatened to withold Reichsbank funding.
Furthermore, in 1929, the Reichsbank’s charismatic President Schacht had resigned in a
public conflict with the German government over the government’s fiscal and reparation
policy, in which he broke with many of his former Allies. He was replaced by the less
charismatic Hans Luther, who quickly developed difficulties with his fellow directors at
the Reichsbank, most of which had been handpicked by Schacht and who remained loyal
to him.230 Thus, by the onset of the German financial crisis of 1931, the German banking
sector was – in terms of its regulatory structure – either government owned or private
and officially unregulated. Merely the mortgage banks were subject to actual regulation
and supervision, but their importance had shrunk significantly with respect to the pre-war
period, whereas the large credit banks and the public banking system could expand their
market share.231
2.3.5 Compelled to regulate (1931-1932)
The German Ponzi scheme fuelled by foreign loans came to sudden stop with the on-
set of the Great Depression. The German economy found itself in a deflationary spiral
due to a reparations cum balance of payments crisis, not least due the large amount of
228See Verhandlungen und Berichte des Unterausschusses fu¨r Geld- Kredit und Finanzwesen (V. Unter-
ausschuß) (1930, pp. 25–28, 175) and Walb (1933, pp. 151). See also BArch R3101/15491, Letter from
the Reichsbank to the Ecnomics Ministry, No. I 10349, from 30.09.1930 and BArch R2501/475, Berliner
Tagesblatt, article no. 437, from 15.09.1925, Overtu¨re zum Bankiertag. Das beherrschende Problem: Die
Frage der Zinssenkung.
229The subsequent amendments to the Bank Act of 1924 in 1926 and 1930 contained only provisions
which affected the Reichsbank. See Reichsgesetzblatt (1924a, 1926, 1930).
230See Reinhardt (2000, pp. 197–235).
231See figure 2.12 on page 83 for an overview of the proportion of banking assets under federal government
control. See figure 2.10 on page 77 for the evolution of the German banking system in the 1920s.
Chapter 2. Americans wanted it. Germans got it. 82
Figure 2.11: Evolution of the German banking Sector from 1900 until 1931
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Sources: Own estimate based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, pp. 6, 55–67,
74, 112, 121). All figures do not include branches. There is no data available for the
hyper-inflationary period following World War I.
short term foreign loans taken in by both the banking sector and the regional and local
governments.232 By early 1931, the German government resorted to passing much of its
legislation via emergency decrees.233 Again, the issue of restricting entry into the banking
sector was picked up inside the government. However, the government and the Reichsbank
were extremely cautious. They feared that introducing any major changes via an emer-
gency decree, would lead to a loss in confidence of foreign creditors and to a full blown
run on the German banking system – up until that point there had not yet been a wave
of bank failures234
No major changes to the regulation of the German banking system were in the pipeline
prior to the financial crisis in the summer of 1931. While there were tentative attempts
by the Reichsbank and the parliament to restrict competition in the banking sector, there
was no intent to install a dedicated regulatory system of the banking sector, let alone
the intent to create central regulatory and supervisory institutions for the whole country.
This changed radically after a nationwide bank-run and the failure of two of the largest
banks (the Danat and the Dresdner Bank), when the government had to declare a banking
holiday. It found itself compelled to take a major stake in the largest credit banks of the
232See Born (1967, pp. 15–19), Hardach (1976, pp. 126–131), Ritschl and Sarferaz (2010) or Schnabel
(2004).
233Indeed, it is sometimes argued that the Weimar democracy already de-facto disappeared in 1930, and
only disappeared de-jure with the rise to power of Hitler. See Bracher (1973, pp. 216–227).
234See the minutes of a meeting in the Reichskanzlei from the 30.05.1931, in BArch R3101/15567.
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Figure 2.12: The German banking sector and its regulatory arrangement by
balance sheet size in 1930
Bank type Balance sheet size
Pure Mortgage Banks 10.0%
Sparkassen 20.6%
Govt. Regional Banks/Girozentralen/Landesbanken 14.7%
Other (special) government banks 7.5%
Credit Cooperatives 7.2%
Zentralkassen 2.2%
Private Bankers 5.3%
Large Credit Banks 19.4%
Other banks 13.2%
(a) Percentage of total assets
Type of Regulation Balance sheet size
Federal regulation & state supervision 10%
Government owned 43%
Private and unregulated 47%
(b) Regulatory Responsibility
The federal government’s direct influence over the banking sector was minimal in 1930.
Virtually all of the government owned banks were in the hands of either the states,
municipalities, counties or cities. Source: Own elaboration based on data from Deutsche
Bundesbank (1976, p. 121).
country in order to prevent an even greater financial disaster. Many of the directors
at the credit banks receiving government capital injections were eventually sacked and
government caretakers appointed.235 Furthermore, federal money was used not only for
the largest credit banks, but also to prop up the public Sparkassen system as well.236
From that moment on, the issue of banking regulation was on the top of the agenda,
both inside the government and amongst the public. The question was no longer, whether
a comprehensive regulatory system would be introduced, but what form it would take.
235Nearly all of the directors at Danat Bank and Dresdner Bank were eventually dismissed from their
positions and over a third were removed at both Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank. See Born (1967,
pp. 170–172) and James (1985, pp. 209-210). Hardach (1984, p. 227) points out that the government
subsequently never intervened in day to day bank management, and that from the outset it was the
government’s intention to merely re-restructure the banks and then to re-privatize them.
236It also provided some guarantees and funds to the cooperative banking system. For figures on the extent
of the support to the banking system by both the Reichsbank and the federal government by 1932, see Hasse
(1933, pp. 87–88). The major source of instability in the Sparkassen sector were the Landesbanken of the
Rheinprovinz and the Provinz Westfalen, which had been particularly active in lending to municipalities,
which in turn failed to repay their loans. See Born (1967, pp. 97–98, 163–164), Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 142–
143), BArch R43 I/1450, pp. 213 – 219, Ministerbesprechung vom 6. Juli 1931, 11 Uhr and pp. 227–232,
Ministerbesprechung vom 6. Juli 1931, 17 Uhr. For details on the emergency steps taken by the government
during the bank holiday in the Summer of 1931 to stabilize the banking system see Balderston (1991, pp.
596–599), Born (1967, pp. 110–152) and Hasse (1933). An important measure was the introduction of
capital controls, and the negotiation of standstill agreements, which effectively took Germany of the gold
standard. This in turn increased the scope of the Reichsbank to act as a lender of last resort. See also
Hardach (1995b, pp. 930-932).
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On one hand, the Chancellor Bru¨ning was furious about the large banks that were too
big to fail, which had privatized their gains, but now had their losses socialized. On
the other hand, he felt that he was unable to justify the rescue of the largest universal
banks and the public Sparkassen system to its voters, if it did not establish some kind of
control mechanism. He consequently put the Economics Ministry in charge of drafting an
emergency decree to establish supervision over the banking sector.237
A number of discussions on this matter took place in August and September of 1931.
The top-level meetings were closed to the public, but a handful of representatives from
the private banking sector, agriculture, industry and politics were invited by Chancellor
Bru¨ning to act as part of an advisory committee. However he intended the committee to
serve as a fig-leaf for parliament, to signal that all the relevant interests had been heard.238
Several proposals were floated behind closed doors, including the separation of deposit and
investment banks, increased regulation by the Reichsbank, a temporary regulatory agency
or even a dedicated regulatory agency. The separation of investment and deposit banks
was discarded relatively quickly, since this was a much more comprehensive reform to the
banking structure, than Bru¨ning was prepared to do at the moment. His priority lay on
returning the public’s trust in the system and to provide a measure of federal government
supervision over the banking sector. Moreover, such a move would cause a major political
upheaval, in particular from the private banking lobby, something he wanted to avoid.239
237See the various meetings within the Chancellory in the Summer of 1931, such as BArch R43 I /1450, pp.
423-429, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses des Reichskabinetts vom 15. Juli 1931, 12 Uhr, pp. 557-564,
Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 27. Juli 1931, BArch R43 I/1451, pp. 17-31,
Ministerbesprechung vom 3. August 1931, 16 Uhr or pp. 419-432, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der
Reichsregierung vom 22. August 1931, 10 Uhr. See also Luther (1964, pp. 228–238).
238The committe consisted of: Dr. Schmitz from IG Farben; von Flemming the president of the Agri-
culture Association in Pomerania; Prof. Stein for the Credit Cooperatives; Reinhart as the Director of
the Commerzbank, Robert Pferdmenges as an expert on Industry and Private Bankers; Rudolf Hilferding,
Dernburg Adolf Weber as subject experts; and Albert Hackelsberger as a representative from the konser-
vative Zentrumspartei. For Bru¨ning’s thoughts on the committee and the composition of the committee
(Alfred Weber was only added later), see BArch, R43 I/1451, pp. 325–340, Ministerbesprechung vom 14.
August 1931, 18 Uhr. Note that the parliament was adjourned during the summer until the 26. of Septem-
ber. See also Born (1967, p. 155–156), who notes that this committee was probably selected so as to
represent a majority of the political spectrum represented in parliament (excluding the National Socialist
German Worker’s Party (NSDAP), commonly known as the Nazi party, and the Communist party), rather
than representing the most knowledgable individuals.
239See BArch R43 I/1451, pp. 17-31, Ministerbesprechung vom 3. August 1931, 16 Uhr, pp. 325–340,
Ministerbesprechung vom 14. August 1931, 18 Uhr, pp. 397–409, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses
der Reichsregierung vom 18. August 1931, 15 Uhr, pp. 419–432, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses
der Reichsregierung vom 22. August 1931, 10 Uhr, pp. 511-520, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der
Reichsregierung vom 29. August 1931, 10 Uhr. See also BArch R43 I/2373, pp. 1121–1132, Besprechung
mit Vertretern des Reichsverbands der deutschen Industrie vom 18. September 1931 in which Bru¨ning
declares to the industry that he does not want to risk political upheavals. See BArch R2501/1182 pp. 1–
200 for newspaper clippings that document the intense public debate that accompanied the governmental
discussions.
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Interestingly, it was Reichsbank president Luther who was of the opinion that a sep-
aration of deposit and investment banks was highly desirable and that even the best
supervision of banks would not have been able to prevent the banking crisis. It is not clear
whether Luther sincerely believed in the separation or whether it was meant to punish
the major credit banks. The banks felt betrayed by the Luther’s adherences to the law
and consequently the Gold standard, which had prevented him from acting as a lender of
last resort as the gold reserves dwindled. The private banks consequently tried to pres-
sure the government into dismissing Luther at the outset of the crisis – even though the
government no longer had the legal power to dismiss the president of the Reichsbank since
1924.240 It is clear however, that Luther wanted to prevent the introduction of an indepen-
dent supervisory agency as he saw it as a challenge to the Reichsbank’s political standing.
The support of the separation of investment and deposit banking might have been part
of his defense.241 Indeed, Luther was the only high-level official strongly pushing for the
serparation of investment and deposit banks. In turn, the Reichsbank was criticized by
members of the Bru¨ning cabinett and some of the political members of the advisory com-
mittee. They suggested that the Reichsbank’s directorate needed reform. In their view it
had become too close to the banks and it had repeatedly undermined the policies of the
government in the recent months. Bru¨ning, who had a good working relationship with
Reichsbank president Luther, acknowledged that it would indeed be desirable to increase
the political influence on the Reichsbank, but that this would currently not be viable as it
would worsen Germany’s relationship with its foreign creditors.242
The attempts by the representatives of the private banking sector and by the Reichs-
bank to prevent the introduction of a supervisory agency were unsuccessful. After all, this
decision had been taken already well before they were invited as act as advisers. Conse-
quently, they changed their strategy and henceforth pushed for the regulatory agency to
be as close as possible to the Reichsbank. And indeed, the most most controversial argu-
ments developed around which parts of the banking system were to be regulated and who
would be in charge of the supervisory agency: whether it should be the Reichsbank or the
240See BArch R43 I/1451, pp. 397–409, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 18.
August 1931, 15 Uhr. For the banks’ futile attempt to have Luther dismissed see Born (1967, pp. 110–113)
and Reinhardt (2000, pp. 255–258).
241See also Born (1967, pp. 158–159).
242See for example BArch R43 I/1451, pp. 325–340, Ministerbesprechung vom 14. August 1931, 18 Uhr,
pp. 397–409 and Dernburg’s comment in BArch R43 I/1451, pp. 511-520, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsauss-
chusses der Reichsregierung vom 29. August 1931, 10 Uhr. See Reinhardt (2000, pp. 235–246) for the
working relationship between Bru¨ning and the Reichsbank.
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central government via a Bankenamt. On one hand, the Reichsbank was the institution
with the most expertise and it would give the regulatory agency the necessary authority,
without assuming outright responsibility for the individual actions of banks. This was a
lesson policymakers had drawn from Germany’s experience with regulating its insurance
sector. One of the principal insurance companies, the FAVAG, had failed at the outset
of the Great Depression. Although regulation of insurance companies was a centralized
arrangement, the failure was attributed to the ineffectiveness of the independent regulator,
which lacked sufficient authority and credibility.243 On the other hand, the Reichsbank
was also independent of the government and had allegedly counteracted the government’s
policy on several occasions. Thus, it was feared that if it were given complete control over
regulatory matters the government might be excluded from banking policy altogether.
And this seemed unacceptable, now that the government had recapitalized major parts of
the banking system. Furthermore, the Reichsbank could easily find itself in a situation in
which it would have to deal with two potentially conflicting policy goals: monetary and
financial stability.244
Both Chancellor Bru¨ning and acting Economic Minister Trendelenburg saw the main
cause of the banking crisis not in some structural defect of the banking system, but they
believed it was a problem of corporate governance and hence there was no need for heavy-
handed regulation that a full-fledged government-run Bankenamt would entail. After all,
that only increased the government’s responsibility for developments within the banking
sector. And that would tie developments in the banking sector directly to the government,
unless it could use the Reichsbank as a shield. The only structural change in the bank-
ing sector policymakers saw as an absolute necessity was with the Sparkassen, who were
under the direct influence of the respective municipal politicians. Furthermore, despite
their disagreements with Luther and the Reichsbank, Bru¨ning wanted to minimize future
conflict. As a consequence, the Economics Ministry was instructed at the end of August to
henceforth prepare the emergency decree, with which banking supervision was supposed
to be introduced, in agreement with the Reichsbank. This allowed Luther to press for a
243See BArch R43 I/1541, pp. 397–409, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 18.
August 1931, 15 Uhr and the article “Unter Kuratel. Die Bankenaufsicht” by Bruno Saekel in the Berliner
Tageblatt, Nr. 438 from 17.09.1931, found in BArch R2501/1182, p. 200.
244See BArch R43 I/1451, pp. 397–409, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 18.
August 1931, 15 Uhr and pp. 511-520, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 29.
August 1931, 10 Uhr.
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relatively weak supervisory office and a stronger role of the Reichsbank.245
During the deliberations, ample use was made of foreign countries’ experience with
banking regulation, including that of the United States. Without exception, the American
experience served as a cautionary tale to the German policymakers on what regulation was
realistically able to achieve (and what not) and that a centralized regulatory structure was
imperative to avoid regulatory arbitrage. Thus, there was never the question of whether
to install a decentralized regulatory regime, in which, for example, the federal government
would set the general guidelines and the states would implement it.246
The regulatory framework, which was introduced after barely a month of deliberations
with the help of emergency decrees, was a compromise universally known to be a temporary
stopgap measure. The ‘real’ reform of the banking sector was only to take place later, once
the dust of the financial crisis had settled and the situation could be analyzed properly.247
Even so, and despite its relatively light touch, it was heavily critized by the association
of private banks and private bankers.248 A centralized two-tiered regulatory oversight for
the banking sector was introduced. An oversight agency (the Aufsichtsamt), based with
the Reichsbank, was installed alongside a banking commissioner (the Bankenkommissar),
which was formally adjunct to the Ministry of the Economy. The oversight agency would
set the regulatory policies (such as capital and liquidity ratios) and the banking commis-
sioner was to be in charge of implementing these policies. Almost the entire banking sector
was covered by this regulatory arrangement. Merely the Sparkassen were exempt from
245See BArch R43, I/1451, pp. 511-520, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 29.
August 1931, 10 Uhr, BArch R43 I/1452, pp. 471–476, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses des Reichsk-
abinetts vom 17. September 1931, 10.30 Uhr and Born (1967, pp. 160–161).
246German ministries and the Reichsbank had kept a close eye on regulatory developments abroad
throughout the 1920s. See for example BArch R3101/15565, folder Bankenaufsicht in anderen La¨ndern,
R3101/20155, folder Bank-, Finanz-, Steuerwesen u.a.m. Amerika (01.01.1931-1932) or R3101/20156,
folder Bank-, Finanz-, Steuerwesen u.a.m. Amerika (11.3. 1932-6.1.1933). In later discussions, Germans
continued to analyze the American regulatory experience. See BArch R2/13636, pp. 31ff, Bericht des
Unterausschusses fu¨r Bankwesen am 2. Mai 1932, BArch R2501/6910, pp. 412–472, Bankfreiheit oder Re-
glementierung - Vorga¨nge und Erfahrungen in anderen La¨ndern or the article “Amerikanische und deutsche
Kreditbank Reform: Ein Vergleich”, by Dr. Victor Wrede in Die Bank, Nr 18 from 01.05.1935, found in
BArch R2501/1174. Indeed, the American experience seems to have served as a cautionary tale also to
their very own neighbours. The framers of the Canadian constitution made sure to clearly separate federal
and state powers and to leave matters of banking in the hands of the central government. See Hammond
(1957, pp. 737–739).
247See BArch R43 I /1450, pp. 557-564, Sitzung des Wirtschaftsausschusses der Reichsregierung vom 27.
Juli 1931.
248See Hardach (1995b, p. 933).
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the oversight.249 Instead, the emergency decrees established specific universal operational
rules for all the banks of the Sparkassen System (the Sparkassen and their parent organi-
zations, the Girozentralen). The state governments were required to codify these rules into
corresponding state laws. The federal government also decreed that all Sparkassen had to
be given their own legal entity. Prior to that, they were technically just another branch
of of local or municipal governments. While the separate entities were still owned and
run by the respective governments, this provision created a stricter separation between
the government and the Sparkassen and Girozentralen, preventing the governments from
accessing the banks’ funds at will. In a large number of cases, the local Sparkassen had
served primarily the private interests of the municipal or regional politicians. This was
reflected by the fact that some Sparkassen had the vast majority of their assets invested
in municipal debt, well above the already generous 50% limit.250
During the crisis, it had been difficult for both the central government and the Re-
ichsbank to obtain up-to-date and accurate data on the health of the banking sector. It
proved to be a massive liability throughout the crisis of 1931.251 This shortcoming was
addressed in the regulations. They provided for strict publications rules and gave the
newly created regulatory agencies extensive inspection rights and eventually the right to
impose liquidity and capital ratios for the sector as a whole. The regulatory regime also
tackled two issues that had been of concern in the 1920s. It allowed for the restriction
of entry to the banking sector and it also allowed the banking commissioner to impose
an interest rate cartel, with uniform and binding interest rates for the entire country.252
Together, these provisions went a long way towards reducing competitive pressures within
the banking system.
249Their larger parent organizations were subject to supervision and regulation. Even so, the Sparkassen
appear to have largely cooperated with the new regulatory institutions to some extent. See Pohl et al.
(2005, p. 148). For details as to the nominal state supervisiors of the Sparkassen see BArch R2501/6920,
pp. 76–77, Memorandum on the Staatsaufsicht u¨ber Sparkassen.
250For the emergency decrees establishing the new regulatory institutions see Reichsgesetzblatt (1931a),
Reichsgesetzblatt (1931b) and Reichsgesetzblatt (1931c). For the Sparkassen reforms see also Ashauer
(1982, pp. 285–289), Born (1982, p. 133–135), James (1986, pp. 101–104) and Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 145–
150). For a poignant analysis of the new regulatory structure by a contemporary observer see especially
“Briefe eines Bankdirektors and seinen Sohn: Der Reichskommissar fu¨r das Bankgewerbe”, by Argentarius,
in Die Bank, Nr. 29 from 26.09.1931, found in BArch R2501/1182.
251See Luther (1964, pp. 231-233) and Scha¨ffer (2008, pp. 21–52).
252The banking associations were to negotiate a level of universal interest rates, which the banking
commissioner could then declare to be universally binding. This was introduced a two months after the
first emergency decrees had introduced the new regulatory structure. See Erster Teil Kapitel III, Zweiter
Abschnitt, §§ 1-4 of Reichsgesetzblatt (1931c, p. 704).
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The tradition of ‘corporatist’ regulation was not entirely discarded by this new regu-
latory scheme. Quite the opposite, the corporatist tradition was reflected in the new reg-
ulatory structure. In a newspaper report, the designated banking commissioner, Friedrich
Ernst, explained his future role as that of a mediator between the different types of banks
in order to restore the overall stability of the system. He wanted to foster the coopera-
tion between the banks, the government and the Reichsbank. Ernst wanted to avoid fixed
capital and liquidity regulations. Those should merely serve as a measure of last resort.253
Throughout much of 1932, banking regulation was not on the government’s agenda
anymore.254 It was still busy dealing with the fallout from the financial crisis that required
further recapitalizations and even the creation of a bad bank. Eventually the central
government owned controlling stakes in the Dresdner Bank (91%) and the Commerz- and
Privatbank (70%) and a significant share of the Deutsche Bank (35%) and in a number of
other private banks.255 The public mood was extremely hostile towards the banks during
1931-1933 and it was the first and only time in German history that the worker’s unions
would call for a complete nationalization of the largest credit banks.256 Throughout this
time period, the Nazi Party was gaining popularity, whose proclaimed aim it was to ‘break
the interest-rate-slavery’ by socializing the entire banking system. Other proposals voiced
during this time were the break-up and thus the regionalization of the largest credit banks
as well as the separation of investment and deposit banks. During these years, the future
structure of the German banking system was an unsettled question.257
2.3.6 Enter Hjalmar Schacht (1933–1934)
The reorganization of the banking system was only tackled by the German government
once the Nazi party had cemented its power in 1933. Given the radical economic changes
253See the article in the Berliner Tageblatt, Nr. 464 on 02.10.1931 with the title “Ab 1. Oktober
Bankaufsicht”. It can be found in BArch R2501/1183, p. 4. Indeed, the government did not prescribe any
capital and liquidity ratios before or during the Second World War. See Ba¨hre (1982, p. 28).
254Merely preliminary meetings were held in the Fall of 1932 on a general law specifying chartering
requirements from deposit-taking banks. See for example BArch R2501/6502, pp. 333–337, Memo on a
meeting in the Economist Ministry from 18.11.1932 on a deposit law.
255See Born (1967, p. 176) and Bel (2009, p. 7) for ownership figures. See also BArch R2501/6918 , pp.
63–66, 152–155 for Reichsbank loss estimates of the different banking groups.
256See Bu¨schgen (1977, p. 27)
257One can obtain a good overview of the different proposals in the public (but not necessarily political)
sphere through the various press clippings that can be found in BArch R2501/1173. See also the press
clippings from BArch R2501/1182. See also Barkai (1988, pp. 27–33) and James (1995, pp. 281–283) for
the ideological background of the Nazi party in terms of financial matters.
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Figure 2.13: The key developments of the German banking sector in 1930–
1938
Total Assets (mio. RM)
Bank type 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
Large Credit Banks 12,976 9,618 8,803 7,917 7,687 7,590 7,653 8,071 9,012
Provincial Credit Banks 1,913 1,097 970 912 906 942 1,021 na 1,301
Other Credit Banks 3,008 3,040 2,996 3,113 3,646 5,782 5,849 na 7,303
Private Bankers 3,556 na 2,099 na na 1,739 1,559 1,391 1,260
Zentralkassen 1,466 1,393 1,315 1,232 1,257 1,391 1,446 1,678 2,095
Credit Cooperatives 4,809 4,559 4,284 4,314 4,490 4,784 5,000 5,404 5,988
Mortgage banks 8,674 8,717 8,352 8,153 8,025 8,092 8,145 na 8,473
Large Public Banks 9,803 9,093 8,821 9,487 10,642 10,829 10,579 11,598 12,557
Sparkassen 13,746 13,823 13,756 14,548 16,433 17,473 18,339 20,128 22,471
Other banks 6,854 6,713 6,896 7,347 7,552 8,300 8,145 na 6,695
Note that Other Credit Banks contains the federally owned and rather large Golddiskont-
bank. Note also that the definition between the bank types may not be consistent over
time. These tables may not necessarily represent a fully accurate picture of the bank-
ing sector. The interested reader is strongly advised to refer to the original data source
for details. Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from Deutsche Bundesbank
(1976, p. 121).
advocated by fringes of the Nazi party, it was highly uncertain whether the regulatory re-
forms set in motion before the Nazi’s ascension to power, would be continued.258 Crucially,
Hjalmar Schacht, the former president of the central bank, was re-nominated to be presi-
dent of the Reichsbank. Ever since his resignation as president of the Reichsbank, Schacht
had developed more extreme political views, coming to favor more authoritarian modes
of governing the country.259 Schacht had first met Hitler in January of 1931. Until 1933
a close working friendship would develop between the two of them. Schacht would serve
as Hitler’s personal adviser in all matters related to the economy. At the same time, the
cooperation with Schacht helped Hitler gain credibility vis-a-vis the international commu-
nity and the business elite. In particular the private banking community preferred Schacht
over Luther as the Reichsbank president as they him best able to secure continuity within
the banking sector and to protect them from the radical demands regularly emerging from
within the NSDAP.260
It was thanks to Schacht and his close relationship with Hitler that the initiative in
terms of banking regulation came back to the Reichsbank. In the late 1920s and during the
258See Ba¨hr (2006, p. 41).
259See for example Kopper (1995, pp. 24–27, 67) or Luther (1964, pp. 306–307). For more information
on Schacht see for example Kopper (2006, pp. 1-3, 195) or Ahamed (2010). On July 30, 1934 Schacht was
also assigned the role of acting Economics Minister, which he held until November 1937.
260See James (1985, pp. 335–345), Kopper (1995, pp. 67–70, 86), Kopper (2006, pp. 189-191, 195–199,
216) and Reinhardt (2000, pp. 255– 261).
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early 1930s, every government policy with respect to the banking sector had been drafted
under the auspices of the German Economics Ministry with inputs from the Finance
Ministry and the Reichsbank. In a political coup, Schacht bypassed both the Finance
and Economics Ministries and obtained permission directly from Adolf Hitler to set up
a banking commission under the auspices of the Reichsbank. Furthermore, Hitler trusted
Schacht’s advice almost blindly and protected him from the more (in terms of banking
reform) extremist backbenchers of the Nazi party, who had become increasingly aggressive
in their agitations against the private banking system.261 By taking the initiative, Schacht
wanted to forestall attempts by more extremist wings of the nationalist socialist party to
socialize the entire banking system.262
The inquiry was announced in the summer of 1933, two years after the financial crisis of
1931. Officially, it was to conduct a thorough analysis of the banking sector and to propose
structural changes. However, Schacht and his men from the Reichsbank cleverly selected
the composition of the members of the banking composition, as well as the experts that
were being heard, so that the proponents of a private banking sector were outnumbering its
critics. At the same time, he was not subject to direct influence by the (private) banking
sector either, allowing him to press for more comprehensive regulation. The committee
members were selected such that the Reichsbank had a dominating role. Schacht and the
Reichsbank’s vice president Dreyse acted as chairmen of the commission and were thus the
agenda setters. A third Reichsbank representative was also on the commission, as well as
Friedrich Ernst, the banking commissioner who regularly cooperated with the Reichsbank.
Both the Economics and the Finance Ministry were represented by sub-secretaries, one
of which, Feder, was a well-known NSDAP ideologue who advocated nationalization of
the banking sector. Schacht included him and Keppler, the ‘special representative to
Hitler for Economic matters’, in the commission so as to pacify the Nazi party’s lower
ranks. They were joined by a handful of representatives from industry and agriculture
as well as a representative from academia. Unlike the banking commission of 1907/08,
261See Hansmeyer and Caesar (1976, pp. 375–376), Kopper (1995, pp. 74–86) and Kopper (2006, pp.
203–205, 216). Indeed, Schacht was able to turn the Reichsbank into the main economic policy making
body within the Thrid Reich, something he had already attempted during the Weimar Republic, as James
(1985, pp. 343–344) points out. Intriguingly, Hitler’s pro-business approach was often in direct conflict
with the official Nazi Party line, an in particular with some nazi leaders of the old guard and the “rank-
and-file of the nazi movement”, as Hardach (1984, pp. 228–229) points out. He attributes this to Hitler
wanting to rely on cooperation, rather than coercion, of the business elite. Similarly see also Hansmeyer
and Caesar (1976, p. 370).
262See BArch R2501/6910, pp. 1–16, Memo Zur Frage der Veranstaltung einer neuen Bankenquete from
09.06.1933.
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no representative of either the private or the public banking sector formed part of the
commission, presumably to prevent accusations of regulatory capture by the organized
banking interests.263
Additionally, most of the experts that were asked to prepare the official preliminary
reports came either from the Reichsbank or the supervisory office (10), academia (4),
the private banking sector (4) or the Prussian Economics Ministry (1).264 And since
the commission took place under the auspices of the Reichsbank, all additional support
work was carried out by Reichsbank staff loyal to Schacht.265 Schacht also laid down
the general (liberal) principles according to which the Enqueˆte was supposed to operate.
These principles confirmed the adherence to private ownership and private intitiative,
albeit under the guidance of the government. Schacht made clear that he did not intend to
introduce major structural changes to the private banking system. Of course he was careful
not to make such remarks in public before the commission had taken up its workings.266
The major decisions had already been taken before the banking commission even began
its work. There would be a tightening of the centralized regulatory regime, but there would
be no nationalization of the private banking sector and no break-up of the universal banks
either. Indeed, first drafts for two new banking laws were prepared within the Reichsbank
even before the Commission’s discussions had begun.267 According to Schacht, the Enqueˆte
was a mere fig leaf in order to give the banks the impression that their concerns have been
heard, to neutralize extremist regulatory demands from individuals within the Nazi Party
and to prepare the general public for the upcoming changes to the regulatory structure.268
263See Barkai (1988, p. 197), James (1995, p. 283–285), Kopper (1995, pp. 88–90). See Mu¨ller (2003,
pp. 116–121) for biographical details on the key commission members.
264See Reichsbank (1933a) and Reichsbank (1933b) for the official preliminary reports.
265See Mu¨ller (2003, p. 136).
266In making it’s case for the importance of private ownership, the Reichsbank carefully collected state-
ments by prominent NSDAP figures that seemed to support these liberal principles. For the principles and
the guiding questions see BArch, R2501/6912, pp. 372–382, Protocol of an internal Reichsbank meeting on
the Banking Commission, dated 21.10.1933, and BArch R2501/6913, pp. 184–186, Memo on the working
principles of the Banking Commission, dated 11.11.1933, and Barch R2501/6910, pp.12–15, Annex 2 to
the Memo Zur Frage der Veranstaltung einer neuen Bankenquete, from 08.06.1933. For the Reichsbank’s
attempt to appear objective by not making public statements in this case see Kopper (1995, p. 97).
267See BArch R2501/6912, pp. 383–389, Entwurf eines Sparkassengesetzes from 18.10.1933 for a unified
Sparkassen law, pp. 390–393, for the Memo Thesen zur Sparkassenfrage, from 18.10.1933, on the Sparkassen
issue, and BArch R2501/6913 pp. 141–152, Vorentwurf zu einem Bankengesetz, from 19.11.1933, for a draft
Credit Act.
268See Schacht’s remarks in BArch R2501/6915, pp. 81–85, Sitzungsprotokoll der nichto¨ffentlichen Sitzung
des Bankenqueteausschusses from 27.11.1933. Similarly see James (1995, p. 284), who reports that Schacht
made an equivalent remark to an official at the Bank of England in early October of 1933.
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Interestingly only few contemporary observers seem to have seen it as such.269 Virtually
any major change to the banking sector was forestalled by Schacht’s actions.
There was one controversial question, however, which Schacht wished to address. It
was that of the public banking system. In accordance with the private banking communi-
ties long-voiced opinion, the initial Reichsbank memos asked the question, whether there
was a way to restrict the banking activities of the Sparkassen to their original scope of
the time period before the First World War. This issue had become more urgent since
the Sparkassen had been subject to the ongoing Nazi Gleichschaltung, which had replaced
many municipal and regional politicians and brought them into line with the NSDAP.270
These politicians, with the backing of the NSDAP, then instructed the Sparkassen to adopt
aggressive methods to expand their market share in an effort to increase their income. In
some extreme cases the municipal governments gave the order not to transfer any money
to accounts that were not held with Sparkassen, forcing businesses that dealt with the
government to open a Sparkassen account. The ideological justification for this behavior
was given as the necessary push-back against anonymous private banking capital. By the
end of 1933, Schacht had managed to push through an end to these aggressive methods
for the time being, but for this he had needed the support of the Economics Ministry.
He consequently pushed for the regulatory institutions to obtain the necessary tools to
prevent such behavior in the future.271
The government commission began on the 6th of September 1933, first with introduc-
tory remarks by Schacht, Keppler and Feder, which were subsequently followed by the
presentation of the experts’ preliminary reports on the state of the German banking sys-
tem. Only on the 21st of November did the official debates and the hearings of additional
experts begin. They were organized by banking group, rather than by topic. This ensured
that whenever private banks issues were being discussed, not too many supporters of the
Sparkassen system were present. The hearings were concluded after a month on the 20th
of December. Nevertheless, the hearings were important as they allowed representatives
from all the banking groups and the industry to voice their opinion. In particular for the
269An exception was Alfred Lansburgh in his article Brief eines Bankdirektors an seinen Sohn: Die
Banken und die Bank–Enquete, by Argentarius (pseud.) in Die Bank, Nr. 77 from 22.11.1933, found in
BArch R2501/1173, pp. 89–90
270For the Gleichschaltung of the Sparkassen system see Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 159–171).
271See Kopper (1995, pp. 90–92) and Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 150–151). And indeed, throughout the 1930s,
the Sparkassen were the banking group that grew the most, to the detriment of the private banking sector.
See James (1995, pp. 279–282).
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private banking sector it was an important forum in which it could publicly defend itself
against the attacks from the NSDAP and other parts of the public, which demanded their
nationalization. Most of their hearings were public and closely followed by the press. The
importance Schacht attributed to the different points of discussion are reflected by his
attendance. Schacht attended and hence chaired most of the sessions that dealt with the
private banks, to ensure that any discussion went in the direction he desired, if need be
by cutting short any undesirable discussion. However he did not chair any session on the
Sparkassen System or the Credit Cooperatives.272
Given the composition of the banking commission, the invited experts and the overall
Reichsbank leadership, it was relatively easy for the private banking sector and the Ger-
man industry to fend off the nationalization suggestions put forward by Feder and other
ideologues. A plan that attracted significant attention in public, and that proposed to
break up the Dresdner Bank and the Commerzbank into regional government banks, was
also fended off in the banking commission with ease.273 Indeed, the wealth of testimonies
in favor of the private banks, not only from the bankers themselves, but also from medium
and large scale industry and other business men, were successful in temporarily silencing
the banks’ critics during the hearings. The private banks did their share as well, by trying
to present themselves as wholly cooperative with the overall aims of the national socialist
movement. In the summer of 1933 they even had pre-emtively agreed to collectively lower
their interest rates in order to gain the goodwill of the public and the government.274
Schacht managed to deflect a good deal of attention away from the private banking
system and towards the public banking system. There were just as many working sessions
deliberating reform proposals for the public banking sector, as there were for the private
banking sector. Thus, proponents of the private banking sector once more used this op-
portunity to demand that the tax exemption of the Sparkassen be lifted.275 Furthermore,
272For the protocols of the month long working sessions of the commission see the folders BArch
R2501/6915, 6916 and 6917. For press articles covering the Enqueˆte see for example the folders BArch
R5201/1177, 1180. See for example BArch R2501/6916, Protocol of the commission’s 2nd working session
from 14.11.1933 for Schacht’s intend not to let any undue discussion arise in the first place.
273For the Regionalbankenplan proposed by Kurt von Schro¨der a private banker, who was rising quickly
through the Nazi party ranks see for example the Berliner Tageblatt article Nr. 531, Großbanken wehren
sich gegen die Regionalbanken-Pla¨ne, from 11.11.1933. Kopper (1995, pp. 94–96) believes that Schro¨der’s
motivation for proposing this plan was that these Regional banks would have given him personally signif-
icant resources to further his political interests. For Schro¨der’s testimony in front of the commission see
BArch R2501/6015, Protocol of the working session from 28.11.1933.
274See James (1985, p. 284) for the silencing of the critics and Barkai (1988) for the humble approach of
the private bank representatives. See also Hardach (1995b, p. 934).
275See BArch R2501/6915, Protocol of the working session from 13.12.1933.
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Schacht had determined that most of the hearings and working sessions should not be
open to the public. Officially this was to avoid upsetting the population as the commis-
sion revealed the flawed workings within the Sparkassen sector. It is much more likely
however, that he saw the relative secrecy as the most promising way to eventually impose
restrictions on the Sparkassen operations, without triggering the immediate opposition
from Sparkassen supporters.276
One and a half years later, the banking commission ended almost where it began.277
The actual hearings had taken only about a month. The remainder of the time was divided
between the initial preparations for the commission and the drafting of the law. Schacht
cleverly delayed the reform process as time was on his side.278 On one hand, it gave the
regime the time to focus on unemployment, which was the much more pressing problem.
On the other hand, it also helped to heal the wounds of the public, which had been outright
hostile towards the large credit banks. The drafting of the law was largely uncontrover-
sial, as the main direction of thrust had already been determined by Schacht and the
subsequent commission. Additionally, Schacht found a way to have Feder and Keppler
excluded, the most vocal advocates of a nationalization of the private banking system.
Feder had tried to mount public pressure on the commission and on the Reichsbank, since
he was dissatisfied with their pro private banking stance. With him and Keppler gone,
no prominent representatives of the NSDAP were left in the commission. The only major
issue that caused some prolonged discussion, was whether the banking commissioner was
supposed to be independent from the federal government. Government ministers, who
were Nazi party members and who were eventually invited to offer their opinion on a draft
version of the Credit Act tried to press for more control of the federal government of the
banking commissioner and banking policy in general. When their demands were rejected
by Schacht and his men, some of them withdrew from the deliberations in protest.279
276Indeed, the non-public nature of the hearings of the Sparkassen, did alarm many of their representatives.
See Kopper (1995, pp. 105–106).
277The Economist (1934) remarked that the principles advocated in the final report were not revolution-
ary. Instead, they reflected standard regulatory principles that had already been adopted in many other
countries. Nevertheless, at the time this view was not shared by all outside observers. Dessauer (1935, p.
224) took the opposite view and saw it in line with Nazi policy that tended to “[...] foster the authoritarian
influence of the government.”
278Newspapers were reporting that the release of a new law was imminent, just a month after the hearings
had ended. Instead it would take almost a year for it to be released. See for example an article in the
Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Nr. 11 from the 08.01.1934 found in Bundearchiv R2501/1177, p. 17. For
details on the committee’s drafting work see Kopper (1995, pp.116–122) and Mu¨ller (2003, pp. 129–135).
279Schacht excluded Feder by accusing his aide, an consequently him, of leaking internal commission
material to the press. See Barkai (1988, p. 197), Hansmeyer and Caesar (1976, pp. 375–377), Hardach
(1995b, p. 934), Kopper (1995, pp. 119–122) and Mu¨ller (2003, pp. 130–135). James (1995, p. 285)
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When the Credit Act of 1934 was proclaimed in December of 1934, it confirmed
the regulatory structure that had been introduced in 1931, and it gave the regulatory
institutions even more powers. From now on the entire banking sector would fall under a
unified federal regulator, including the public Sparkassen system and the mortgage banks.
This implied that the central government would regulate regional and local government
banks. Thus, while the Reichsbank was not able to restrict the Sparkassen operations
to the pre-war level, it was able to force federal control and supervision upon it. At the
same time, this meant that the Sparkassen had been formally accepted as full-fledged
universal banks.280 No changes were made to the structure of the banking system as
such. After all, the German banking system did not have a structural problem. There
was no inherent instability, which made it vulnerable during every economic downturn.
Rather, the German banking system had, if anything, a corporate governance problem and
that could most effectively be tackled by increased government regulation.281 Not only
were publicity requirements strengthened, but from now on banks were required to invest
savings deposits more conservatively than other forms of money deposited with them.
Limits to investment in certain asset classes were established and minimum liquidity and
capital standards could be imposed as well. Furthermore, entry to the sector and even the
creation of new branches was only possible with the explicit permission of the regulatory
agencies. This allowed them to restrict entrance to the banking sector. The government-
sponsored interest rate cartel was also included as an official provision of the Credit Act
and so was the restriction to advertising practices that had been agreed upon in 1928.282
Given the extensive powers granted to central regulatory authorities by the Credit
Act of 1934, the reforms essentially gave the Reichsbank (and thus Schacht) the power
to control the banking system at her will. While the private banks escaped structural
change, they were negatively surprised by the heavy-handedness of the regulations, which
reports that Feder and his ideologues retaliated by attempting to humiliate Schacht and the community
of the private bankers. They demanded ‘emergency donations’ for the party coffers in the form envelopes
full of money, that had to be put into physical collecting boxes held by Schacht and the presidents of the
major stock exchanges.
280Note that the state institutions in charge of regulating the public banks could continue their operations
afterwards, as long as they did not counteract federal regulations and supervision.
281See also the Kieler speech by Schacht (1934) from January 1934, in which he outlines this view. The
Kieler speech also served as the ideological legitimization, as he attempted to link Nazi thinking with the
reforms he intended to implement.
282See Reichsgesetzblatt (1934). In order to encourage prudent behavior by bank managers, the law also
included a provision that retained banker’s bonuses even after the bankers’ had left the bank. It is likely
that this provision found its origins in a similar one existing for Reichsbank branch managers. For the
Reichsbank provision see Do¨ring (1933, p. 147).
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Figure 2.14: Schematic overview of the German regulatory structure as in-
troduced by the Credit Act of 1934
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The Supervisory office was based with the Reichsbank, but it also contained members
of the government. The Banking Commissioner was an independent agency under the
auspices of the Economics Ministry. Banks submitted monthly reports to the Reichsbank,
which analysed the balance sheet data and made it available to both the Supervisory Office
and the Banking Commissioner. The only credit institutions not subject to regulation
were special purpose banks, such as the Reichsbank, the Golddiskontbank or the German
Postal Service and its affiliated institutions. Source: Own elaboration.
they feared would affect their profitability.283 Even though the Reichsbank held significant
powers over the banks, it seems like it did not make much use of these specific ones in
the pre-war period. Indeed, the government even reprivatized the large credit banks by
1937.284
2.4 Conclusion
Why did Germany get a regulatory monopoly for its banking system and why did the
United States not? Was it because all major regulatory changes in the United States were
designed to ensure a decentralized banking system? Was it because Congress unanimously
283See also Barkai (1988, pp. 198–199, 203–204). For a schematic overview of the German regulatory
structure as introduced by the Credit Act of 1934 see figure 2.14 on page 97.
284See Barkai (1988, p. 203), Bel (2009) and Kopper (1995, pp. 199–208).
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rejected the idea and never tried to implement it? My research suggests that this was
not the case. Indeed it is striking how close the United States was to bringing about a
centralized regulatory structure. Ever since the 19th century, Congressional majorities
could be found at various times that attempted to bring about a regulatory monopoly.
American policymakers thought about centralizing their regulatory system well over a
century before their German counterparts, who were only most reluctant to introduce
comprehensive regulation of their banking system in the first place. The reason why the
United States did not develop a centralized regulatory regime was because of a specific
constitutional barrier that granted the individual states the right to charter their own
banks. In Germany, a comparable constitutional barrier did not exist ever since it became
a nation state in 1870.
At several occasions throughout its history, the American federal government tried to
bring about a unified regulatory banking system under national supervision. First, with the
establishment of the national banking system (1861–1865), then with the establishment of
the Federal Reserve System (1910–1917) and finally with the establishment of the Federal
Deposit Insurance (1933–1935). All of these institutional additions were attempts by the
federal government to set the incentives in such a way that would compel state banks to
subject themselves to federal regulation. In exchange, banks would obtain competitive
advantages vis-a-vis banks not submitting to national regulation. The federal government
had to take this route, since the constitution prevented it from outright assuming control
of banking regulation by prohibiting states to charter banks. The states’ right to charter
banks is enshrined in the constitution. Consequently, every single one of these attempts
failed as they were circumvented either by legislation or financial innovation.
The introduction of the national banking system was specifically designed to replace
the state banking system. It was made possible by the special conditions of the Civil
War. It had seen the secession of a number of states that were particularly averse towards
federal control of the banking sector. The first attempts to introduce a national banking
system were only mildly successful. Only after a punitive tax of 10% on states’ bank
note issue was introduced in 1865, was the national banking system turned from a virtual
failure into an astounding success. Almost all of the state banks converted to national
banks or ceased operations. However, Congress made a crucial mistake in not realizing
that in a fractional-reserve system money could not only be created in a physical form in
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the form of gold-backed notes, but also in the form of deposits. The state governments did
not remain idle either and reacted to the federal competition by loosening the regulatory
requirements for state banks. Together with the rapid rise of the cashless transfers, the
advantages enjoyed by national banks were erased over time.
A major liquidity crisis in the aftermath of the San Francisco earthquake of 1906
created the necessary conditions for major banking reform. Numerous crucial defects of
the banking system were quickly identified, in particular the prohibition of branching, the
lack of regulation of certain parts of the banking system as a result of various regulatory
agencies, and the lack of a central bank that could act as a lender of last resort. The Federal
Reserve was installed not only as a central bank but also as another regulatory institution
in an attempt to coax state banks under a central regulatory body. National banks were
forced to join the system, whereas state banks were given the option to join. At the outset
of the Federal Reserve System, national and state member banks were required to subject
to the same federal reserve regulation. However, this provision was loosened a few years
later for the state banks as hardly any of them converted into national banks. It was
a desperate attempt by the government to boost the Federal Reserve System. Congress
had vastly overestimated the attractiveness that access to a lender of last resort would
have for small state banks. Even with the looser regulations in place, the vast majority
of state banks decided not to join the federal reserve system and not to subject to federal
regulation. In loosening entry restrictions for state banks, the federal government bowed
to the regulatory competition of the states, rather than solving this problem once and
for all. The possibilities for regulatory arbitrage increased further, which was quite the
opposite of what was originally intended. For the time being, federal policymakers could
not find their way around the constitutional barrier to centralize regulation.
The reforms enacted before the First World War only managed to address part of the
structural problems plaguing the banking system. Consequently, reform of the banking
sector was very much on the agenda throughout the 1920s. It was fast-tracked with the
onset of the Great Depression, when it became clear that the reforms enacted before the
First World War were far from sufficient. Therefore, the reforms of the 1930s picked up
almost exactly where Congress had stopped in 1913. Top policymakers again correctly
identified the key problems besieging their banking systems at the time. They were well
aware of the structural problems caused by the atomistic nature of the banking system. It
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was also known that the banks were playing the regulators against each other in a game
of regulatory arbitrage. Banks chose the regulation that was best apt for their particular
necessities and that tended to be less regulation. The United States was engulfed in
a regulatory race to the bottom and needed to find a way to stop it. The country was
suffering from the wrong regulations, rather than too little regulation. Government officials
were aware of this (on both sides of the Atlantic), and some policymakers were willing to
change it, if possible by introducing a unified banking system. But outright assumption of
control was out of the question, given the constitutional barrier and the political structure.
Interest groups of the unit banks and the state regulators, which had not lost their political
power in the course of the crisis lobbied hard for the status quo in which they had quasi
monopolies in their respective cities. Indeed, even less far-reaching reforms, which were
eventually introduced as the Glass-Steagall Act, found it hard to gain the support of a
majority during a period of economic depression and banking instability.
Reform was only possible after a cataclysmic nationwide breakdown of the banking
system. The kind of compromises made were those of least resistance by introducing new
regulatory institutions. In 1933/34, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Securities and Exchange Commission were created. Initially, the plan was to require banks
to subject to regulations by the Federal Reserve System if they wanted to accede to the
FDIC. It would have been a powerful incentive and could have gone a long way to extend
the regulatory hand of the Federal Reserve over much of the American banking system. But
this provision was first loosened in the Banking Act of 1935 and later dropped altogether.
There was no doubt, however, that many key American policymakers considered a unified
banking system superior to the decentralized arrangement that was in place.
Another important obstacle on the path to a regulatory monopoly was the fact that
each unsuccessful attempt to build a national framework also left behind ‘regulatory ruins.
And these were not torn down during subsequent attempts to reform and unify the regula-
tory framework. Consequently, the ‘regulatory ruins’ developed into full-fledged political
actors with their own agenda. Thus, instead of developing a unified banking sector a most
complex web of regulatory and supervisory institutions evolved.
The situation was quite different in Germany. By the turn of the century, Germany’s
banking system had developed into one with specialized banking groups that each catered
to a particular segment of the market. There were no branching restrictions in place ever
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since the unification of the country and private sector banks were virtually unrestricted
in their activities. Merely the mortgage banks and a handful of note-issuing banks were
regulated to some extent. As a consequence of the liberal approach to banking regulation,
and as a side-effect to stock market regulation, a number of large credit banks emerged,
which maintained branches throughout the country. This lead to an equivalent decline with
the private bankers. Another crucial difference with the American banking sector was that
the local and regional government played an increasingly important role in offering banking
services via the Sparkassen system. Last but not least, from 1875 onwards Germany had
a public-private central bank (the Reichsbank) that acted as the government’s proxy in
banking matters.
The 1907 liquidity crisis triggered a banking commission in Germany as well, as the
large credit banks had become reliant on liquidity support from the Reichsbank, which in
turn endangered the adherence to the gold standard. The commission was meant to find a
way to reduce the reliance of banks on liquidity support from the central bank. While the
commission also evaluated a number of potential regulatory options, it recommended not
to regulate the banking sector. This was hardly surprising considering that the majority
of the members were either representatives from the banking circles, or from big industry.
Furthermore, the Reichsbank President Havenstein, also tried to avoid government inter-
vention at all cost as this would have meant a loss of influence for the Reichsbank. The
major credit banks agreed to publishing their balance sheets on a bi-monthly basis as a
gesture of cooperation. In the aftermath of the banking commission, the Reichsbank re-
sorted to ‘corporatist regulation’ by attempting to influence the banking sectors’ behavior
through moral suasion. It also encouraged the formation of interest rate cartels. It was
also in the aftermath of the banking commission, that the public Sparkassens’ permissible
range of operations was widened. In part this was meant to increase the use of cashless
transfers throughout Germany, and in part it was meant to encourage the growth of the
public banking sector, in order to provide a counterweight to the largest credit banks. The
expansion of banking activities of the Sparkassen system was also in the fiscal interest of
municipal and regional governments, as it provided them with access to cheap credit.
After the war and during the hyperinflation, the Sparkassen’s operations were further
expanded upon the insistence of the municipal governments, which relied heavily on the
public banking sector for their fiscal needs. Not only did the Sparkassen benefit from
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their explicit backing of the repsective governments, but they were also exempt from
taxation. Consequently, the increasing competition between the public banking sector and
the private banking sector became the most controversial issue that had to be addressed by
the Reichsbank during the 1920s. It attempted to do so by negotiating first a restriction to
competitive practices, and later a general interest rate cartel covering the entire banking
sector, not just the private credit banks. It is worth noting that prior to the banking
crisis of 1931, the government had no intention to replace the Reichsbank’s ‘corporatist’
regulation of the banking sector with a comprehensive regulatory framework. If it were
not for the Great Depression, Germany might well have gone the same way as Britain and
introduced comprehensive regulation only much later.
In the summer of 1931, the German government found itself forced to recapitalize
the largest universal banks as well as the public Sparkassen system. From that moment
in time, the government’s attitude towards federal regulation changed drastically for two
main reasons. First, it was taken by surprise by the weaknesses in the countries largest
banks (which is understandable, giving the dearth of real-time data available on the bank-
ing system at the time), and thus felt betrayed by the large banks. Second, it would not
have been able to justify the costly nationalization and recapitalization of large swathes
of the banking system in front of voters, without installing comprehensive government
oversight in return. Within a month, the German federal government scrambled to eval-
uate various potential regulatory schemes – behind closed doors. Contrary to the usual
modus operandi of the German legislative process, neither the banking sector nor the state
governments were given much of a say. Instead, regulatory experiences abroad were ana-
lyzed, in particular the American one. The regulatory race to the bottom in the American
system convinced the German government not to go the decentralized route. Merely the
Reichsbank was able to represent the interests of the (private) banking community. And
indeed, it tried to prevent the introduction of a comprehensive regulatory regime. As it
was unable to do so, it switched its strategy to ensure sufficient Reichsbank influence over
the eventual regulatory institutions. Barely a month after the crisis, the federal govern-
ment called into existence a centralized regulatory regime, where most responsibility for
banking regulation was ultimately located with the Reichsbank. In line with earlier at-
tempts of the Reichsbank to establish uniform interest rates throughout the country, it also
gave the supervisory authority the power to impose an interest-rate cartel and restrictions
to banks’ advertising practices, in order to reduce competitive pressures in the banking
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sector. At no time was a decentral regulatory regime, that would have given regulatory
or supervisory powers to the German states, even under discussion in that summer. The
regulatory regime introduced in the fall of 1931 was hardly radical. On one hand, it was
intended to be a stopgap measure. On the other hand, it was a reflection of the federal
governments’ ‘hands-off’ stance that delegated most regulatory responsibility to the Re-
ichsbank. Indeed, the 1931 regulations are probably best described as the continuation of
the Reichsbank’s ‘corporatist regulation’ under the veil of federal supervision.
Matters were even easier for the German government from 1933 onwards, since parlia-
mentary activity had been entirely suspended under Nazi rule. From that point in time,
the German government could ram through any of its proposals without much consider-
ation for external interest groups. Other than the publicly owned Sparkassen, the banks
did not have an influential lobby anymore. Virtually, any structural change seemed pos-
sible at this point. The government entity that would take the regulatory initiative was
almost guaranteed to leave its mark on the banking sector. If it would not have been for
Hjalmar Schacht and his close connection with Adolf Hitler, it is almost certain that some
kind structural change would have been imposed on the private banking sector. It was a
real possibility that under a different leadership the large universal banks would have been
broken up into regional banks or the entire banking sector nationalized. The pressure from
the extremists of the Nazi party and the general population was immense. Schacht un-
derstood that a separation of deposit and investment banks was largely superfluous, since
the German banking system had already developed a ‘natural’ specialization, with each
bank group catering to a certain kind of customer. This specialization from the pre-World
War I period was largely carried over into the 1920s and 1930s. Additionally, the banking
systems’ problems were not structural, but, if anything, managerial and the best way to
address these problems is through regulations and supervision. Schacht went through great
lengths to defend the private banking sector from the attacks of Nazi ideologues and at the
same time he attempted to reign in the expansion of the public banking sector. Instead of
undergoing a structural change, the German banking system experienced a solidification
of existing structures. At the same time, Schacht expanded the regulatory framework first
introduced by the Weimar bureaucracy and thus wrapped a regulatory straitjacket around
the entire banking sector, which gave him significant control over the entire system, both
public and private.
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In Germany, central government policymakers did not face major constitutional head-
winds by the German states, when it tried to introduce a regulatory monopoly. This was
primarily because, the German states’ constitutional powers with respect to chartering
banks were weaker than those of states in the United States. Additionally, the German
states’ bargaining position and that of the largest private banks was further weakened by
their reliance on the central government for capital during the banking crisis of 1931. Once
the Nazi government came to power in 1933, the only remaining question was whether the
banking sector would experience a large-scale nationalization or whether it would remain
private, but under the supervision of the government. The ultimate regulatory structure is
to a large extent an embodiment of Hjalmar Schacht’s personal preference – the acting Eco-
nomics Minister and President of the Central Bank at the time. Schacht outmaneuvered
more radical elements of the Nazi party, as well as more conservative elements within the
banking sector. And Schacht’s personal preference overlapped to a large extent with the
framework that had already been put in place by the Weimar politicians in the aftermath
of the Banking Crisis of 1931. As such, the Credit Act of 1934 is not to be considered as
a Nazi piece of legislation, but in line with German corporatist tradition of regulating the
economy.
Even though they do not form the focus of this study, a few key regulatory develop-
ments are worth highlighting. Contrary to the United States, in Germany there was not
even a discussion surrounding the ability of banks to branch. Until the introduction of the
National Banking Act, branching was uncontroversial in the United States as well. And
it is unlikely that branching would subsequently have developed into a controversial issue,
would it not have been due to the strong states’ right with respect to chartering banks.
Similarly, deposit insurance was tried by various states in the United States in the 19th
century already, and in the 1930s it was implemented for a wide section of the American
banking sector. At first deposit insurance was meant as a tool to protect depositors from
the bank failures of the relatively small and unstable American unit banks, which, in large
parts of the United States, were not allowed to branch or form larger banking trusts any
longer. Later, deposit insurance was used as a key measure to protect the unit banks
from competition of larger and presumably more stable banks. In Germany, government
mandated deposit protection was not on the agenda throughout the period under consid-
eration. Instead, banks either had branches, or they created parent organizations to even
out liquidity needs, or they formed cartels as a measure of restricting competition and thus
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profit margins, and ultimately banks’ safety. Interestingly, both countries also introduced
government-sponsored short-term interest-rate cartels in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion, in an effort to restrict competition. Universal banking was not really challenged in
Germany in the period under consideration either. On the contrary, the Sparkassen and
Credit Cooperatives that began as specialized institutions, increasingly expanded their
operations. Whenever, the separation of investment and deposit banking was suggested,
it was an attack targeted at the largest credit banks that meant to reduce their size, albeit
with little success as Antitrust considerations did not nearly play as an important role in
the German economy, as in the American one. In the United States, Antitrust considera-
tions were the main drivers for restricting universal banking first via the National Banking
Act and later through Glass-Steagall Act. After all, by the 1930s most banks did not have
branches and could not have been broken up into regional operations. Therefore, the only
option that was left to reduce them in size was to split them up along operational lines.
This chapter highlights the crucial role states rights played in shaping the American
regulatory discourse and ultimately the regulatory structure of its banking system. The
adverse developments in the American banking sector, due to the regulatory arbitrage
between the various regulatory institutions, served as additional impetus for the Ger-
man central government to install a centralized solution. This implies that the regulatory
arrangement of the American banking system was only a second-best solution that was
held in place by strong states rights. In the absence of these institutional constraints, no
such system would have evolved and persisted. The United States would have eventually
adopted a centralized approach to banking regulation like most other countries. Instead,
the United States developed most complex set of regulatory and supervisory institutions
that continue to plague its banking sector to this day.285 These findings do not replace
existing analyses, but they supplement them. They suggest that when the political econ-
omy of the regulation of the American banking sector is discussed, not only should the
attention of scholars be focused on the issues of branching restrictions, deposit insurance,
and the separation of deposit and investment banks,286 but also on the issue of the central-
ization of the regulatory structure. This constitutional conflict was a crucial bargaining
chip throughout much of American banking history.
285The complexity of America’s regulatory system is the subject of an informative article in the The
Economist (2012a) on the recently passed Dodd-Frank Act.
286These are the standard ‘ingredients’ found for example in Benston (1990), Calomiris and White (1994,
pp. 170–176), Calomiris (2006b, pp. 75–76) or White (1983, p. 39). Sometimes the interest rate caps
introduced during the Great Depression (‘Regulation Q’) are also included as in Calomiris (2010).
Chapter 3
The long (re-)birth of the German Credit
Act of 1961
3.1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Allies forced substantial institutional
changes on the West-German banking system (henceforth just Germany).1 Under the
leadership of the U.S. military government, the Allies decentralized the largest commercial
banks, the central bank and the regulatory structure. In particular, the Allies changed
the structure of regulation from a centralized one to a decentralized one. In a major break
with German administrative tradition, they also transferred the competency in terms of
Credit and Money (and thus banking regulation) from the Ministry of Economics to the
Ministry of Finance. Yet, by the beginning of the 1960s most of these institutional changes
were reversed by the Germans.
While there exist accounts for the changes to the central bank and to the structure
of the large commercial banks2, the literature is sorely missing a more detailed account of
German banking regulation after the Second World War. Moreover, the existing literature
treats the changes to the supervisory institutions largely as a by-product, whose reversal
1In what would later be East Germany, even more radical changes to the banking system took place,
but they are not the topic of this chapter.
2See for example Horstmann (1991) and Horstmann (1985) for the Allied changes to structure of the
great universal banks. See Dickhaus (1998) and Wandel (1980) for the establishment of a new central
bank by the Allies, the Bank deutscher La¨nder, and see Ha¨user (1998), Hentschel (1988a,b) and Marsh
(1992) for the origins of the Bundesbank, which largely reversed the changes introduced to the central bank
structure by the Allies.
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was a mere formality.3 Indeed, the 1961 Credit Act constitutes in most respects a re-birth
of the Credit Act of 1934.4 But why did Germany pass almost exactly the same Credit Act
twice, within a 30 year period? Was it really just a matter of returning to the historical
path, once the Allied influence had waned?
This chapter seeks to provide a more detailed account of the origins of the German
Credit Act of 1961 by drawing on the relevant government files.5 The archival evidence
suggests that the Credit Act of 1961 was the product of an intense federal conflict. It needs
to be interpreted as the minimum consensus for a coalition that sought to re-centralize
banking regulation and which needed a parliamentary supermajority to break the German
states’ objection.
The chapter will proceed as follows. The next section sets out the regulatory frame-
work in place before the Second World War. followed by a section describing the changes
made by the Allies up until 1948. Then the first drafts of a new Credit Act are presented,
which were produced under the auspices of the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry.
This is followed by a description of the work under the auspices of the Economics Min-
istry, and a failed recentralization attempt. A Credit Act draft was introduced into to
parliament in 1959 and passed after two years of parliamentary struggle in the summer of
1961.
3.2 The regulatory framework prior to 1945
A comprehensive regulatory framework for the German banking system was first intro-
duced during the Great Depression. It was introduced in the form of emergency decrees
in the aftermath of a severe financial crisis in 1931. These regulations were later expanded
and codified during Nazi rule in the Credit Act of 1934.6
3See for example Ahrens (2007), Ambrosius (1998), Bu¨schgen (1982), Holtfrerich (1995), Wolf (1998b)
and Wolf (1998a) for their treatment of the German regulatory system after the Second World War. The
contemporary dissertation of Honold (1956, pp. 74–86) analyzes the state of banking regulation primarily
from a legal perspective, but he does not address the political economy of a new credit act. Hardach
(1995a, p. 292) sees a major liberalization taking place after the Second World War, but he, too, provides
no details as to the Credit Act’s origins. Please note that the dissertation on the Credit Act of 1961 by
legal historian Ritter von Georg (2013) was prepared simultaneously and independently from this one.
4The Credit Act of 1934 constitutes the origin of comprehensive banking regulation by the central
government in Germany. In section 3.2 on page 107, I summarize its main contents.
5Of particular relevance are the files of the Economics Ministry (the Bundeswirtschaftsministerium),
the Finance Ministry (the Bundesfinanzministerium) and the Chancellery (the Bundeskanzleramt).
6On events that lead to the regulatory regime in 1931–34 see Born (1967), Kopper (1995) and Mu¨ller
(2003). For a long term view on the origins of German banking regulation see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
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The regulatory framework had a centralized structure. Only two institutions were
involved in the oversight of the entire banking sector.7 One was an oversight agency
(the Aufsichtsamt), which was based with the central bank (the Reichsbank). Most of its
members were holders of political office, but de facto power lay with the President of the
Reichsbank. The oversight agency was in charge of determining the regulatory policies to
pursue. The other regulatory institution was the office of the banking commissioner (the
Reichskommissar), whose task it was to execute the policies decided upon by the oversight
agency. The Reichskommissar was a central government agency adjunct to the Economics
Ministry. Banks were required to hand in their balance sheets on a monthly basis to the
Reichsbank, which would then pass on relevant information to the oversight agency or the
banking commissioner.8
The regulations set out in the Credit Act of 1934 provided for strict publications rules
and gave the regulatory agencies extensive inspection rights. They also enabled the reg-
ulatory agencies to establish liquidity and capital standards.9 The banking commissioner
was allowed to impose an interest rate cartel and to restrict advertising practices. Also,
entry to the banking sector could be restricted on the mere basis of ‘economic necessity’,
i.e. almost at will. These two policies went a long way towards neutralizing competition
in the banking sector. Additionally, banks were required to adhere to a set of investment
restrictions, aimed at reducing both maturity mismatches and lacking diversification in
banks’ portfolios.10 The states’ governments did not have any regulatory functions or
powers. The only powers regional or local governments wielded was over the banks they
were operating.11
Important changes to the organization of the regulatory institutions were made in
1939 and in 1944. The changes in 1939 eliminated the central banks’ oversight agency
and thus eliminated much of the central bank’s influence on regulation and supervision.
Instead, these powers were transferred directly to the Economics Ministry, giving the
central government more control over regulatory matters. Indeed, the wording of the 1939
amendment was so open that, in theory, it allowed the Economic Ministry to dictate specific
7The only financial institutions exempt from supervision and regulation were a few special purpose
banks.
8See Reichsgesetzblatt (1934).
9However, the law did not impose a minimum liquidity or capital ratio. These norms needed to be filled
with life via a decree by the oversight agency.
10See Reichsgesetzblatt (1934).
11This was still a significant amount of influence over the banking sector, considering that about a third
of the banking sector was government-run in the 1930s.
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Table 3.1: The German banking system in 1935
Bank Group % of assets
Public Savings Bank Systema 42.3%
Incorporated Private Banksb 21.4%
Mortgage Banksc 12.1%
Cooperative Banking Systemd 9.2%
Private Bankers 2.6%
Othere 12.4%
aIncludes the Girozentralen and other public Landesbanken and Staatsbanken.
bIncludes the Berliner Großbanken, the Provinzbanken and the Spezial- und Hausbanken.
cIncludes pure mortgage banks, mixed mortgage banks and the Landschaften.
dIncludes all Kreditgenossenschaften and Zentralkassen.
eThe most important banks in this category are government ones with specific functions such as the
Golddiskontbank.
Source: Own calculations based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976, p. 121).
business policies to individual banks.12 The banking commissioner was also renamed into
the supervisory agency (the Reichsaufsichtsamt). In 1944, the central bank regained some
regulatory powers, as the supervisory agency was dissolved. Most of the agency’s functions
were transferred to the Economics Ministry, but some of these functions went to the central
bank directorate.13
3.3 Allied regulatory changes (1945-1948)
After the Second World War, the Credit Act of 1934 was still the basic guideline for
the regulatory framework of the banking system in Germany.14 However, three things
made regulatory matters problematic. First, as mentioned above, the Credit Act had
been amended several times during Nazi rule.15 Second, with the end of World War II
the Allied occupying forces had assumed supreme command. Consequently, all the central
government bodies ceased to exist, including the centralized regulatory bodies.16 And
third, new laws or proclamations regarding banking regulation were passed by either the
Allies or the states’ legislatures (on behalf of the Allies). Most importantly, military laws
transferred the competency for money and credit (and thus banking regulation) from the
12See for example the blanket clause in §30 of Reichsgesetzblatt (1939a).
13For details see Reichsgesetzblatt (1939a), Reichsgesetzblatt (1939b) and Reichsgesetzblatt (1944). For
an overview of all the ordinances passed between 1934 and 1945 with respect to banking regulation see
Hofmann (1949, pp. 179-370) and Koch and Roeder (1938).
14(West-)Germany was considered the legal successor of the Third Reich and the Weimar Republic.
Hence, the majority of the laws still applied. See for example Stolleis (2008).
15Important changes were made in 1939 and 1944. See section 3.2 on page 107 for the changes.
16Technically, the Reichsbank still existed, but its central operations were shut down.
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Table 3.2: The German regulatory structure before World War II
1934 1939 1944
Supervisory
Office
Regulatory
guidelines and
emergency actions
Dissolved Dissolved
Banking
Commis-
sioner
Policy
implementation
Policy
implementation
Dissolved
Central
Bank
Balance sheet
analysis
Balance sheet
analysis
Balance sheet
analysis and policy
implementationa
Economics
Minister
-
Regulatory
guidelines;
emergency actionsb
Regulatory
guidelines and
implementation.
aThe central bank directorate could exempt banks from a wide range of regulations. For key aspects
approval by the Economics Minister was necessary. See Reichsgesetzblatt (1944) in combination with
Reichsgesetzblatt (1939b).
bAddionally, the Economic minister had the power to directly prescribe banks how to manage their
business. See §30 of Reichsgesetzblatt (1939a).
Source: Own elaboration based on the relevant legislation: Reichsgesetzblatt (1934), Re-
ichsgesetzblatt (1939a), Reichsgesetzblatt (1939b), Reichsgesetzblatt (1940) and Reichsge-
setzblatt (1944).
auspices of the non-existing central Economics Ministry and the Reichsbank to the Fi-
nance Ministries and central banks of the various states.17 Thus, the Allies decentralized
the regulatory institutions of the German banking system and they broke with German
administrative tradition by instigating a transfer of competences.18 These factors cre-
ated a situation of legal uncertainty, where banking regulation was not uniformly applied
throughout the states. Apart from different day-to-day operations, the Credit Act con-
tained blank provisions for capital and liquidity ratios (amongst others). These needed to
be filled out by the regulatory institutions. In theory, each state’s supervisory institution
could set different capital and liquidity ratios.19
17See BArch B102/23052, Letter from Fischer to Kattenstroth from 31.01.1950. For an overview of the
laws, decrees and ordinances see table 3.3 on page 112. Generally, the finance ministries were assigned
the qualitative aspects and the state central banks the quantitative or statistical aspects of regulation and
supervision. For a chronological overview of the changes see Honold (1956, pp. 75–76). It was also the
finance ministries who were now responsible to uphold and enforce interest rate restrictions. See Ambrosius
(1998, p. 164).
18For the intentions of the Allies see Horstmann (1991).
19The Allies expected each German state to pass laws to regulate the banking sector. An attempt was
made by the La¨nderrat of the U.S. zone, which forwarded a draft on 04.11.1947 to the American military
government. It was meant to amend the existing law to clarify the regulatory and supervisory competences.
The draft was withheld by the American military government, because of the impending introduction of a
central bank. See OMGUS (1949a, Art. II, Law Nr. 57 (revised)) and BArch B126/12141, Memo “Bank
Deutscher La¨nder und Bankenaufsicht” by Lubowski from 03.06.1948
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Figure 3.1: Schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement in West-
Germany (1948–1961)
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Banking regulation was restricted to the state level. The special committee of banking
supervision was a consultative body only that was meant to aid to harmonize regulatory
and supervisory practice. It could not issue binding resolutions. Officials from the Federal
government participated in its meetings merely in an advisory function. Note that the
number of state boundaries changed throughout this period. This chart assumes state
boundaries as existing in 1952. Source: Own elaboration.
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Table 3.3: Laws that formed the basis for banking regulation in Germany
after the Second World War
Credit Act Credit Act from 25.09.1939
Credit Act in its amended form from 18.09.1944
Regulatory Decentralization
U.S. zone:
Bavaria Law Nr. 54 from 27.09.1946
Bremen Senate Ordinance from 21.02.1947
Hesse Military Decree Nr. 4 from 20.10.1945
Wu¨rtt.-Baden Law Nr. 50 from 12.03.1946
U.K. zone: Military Decrees Nr. 18 & Nr. 133
F zone: Military Decree Nr. 208
Baden Ordinance from 12.03.1946
Rheinland-Pfalz Finance Ministry Ordinance from 13.01.1949
Wu¨rtt.-Hohenzollern Ordinance from 12.03.1946
BdL Laws
U.S. zone: Military Law Nr. 60 (revised)
U.K. zone: Military Ordinance Nr. 129
F zone: Military Decree Nr. 155a
State Central Bank Act
U.S. zone: Military Law Nr. 66
U.K. zone: Military Ordinance Nr. 132
F zone: Military Decree Nr. 209
2nd Currency Act
U.S. zone: Military Law Nr. 62
U.K. zone: Military Ordinance Nr. 62
F zone: Military Decree Nr. 159
Bank Decentralization Laws
U.S. zone: Military Law Nr. 57 (revised)
U.K. zone: Military Ordinance Nr. 133
F zone: Military Decree Nr. 208
Decartelization Laws
U.S. zone: Military Law Nr. 56
U.K. zone: Military Ordinance Nr. 78
F zone: –
Sources: Honold (1956, pp. 75–76) and BArch B102/41900, Statement of grounds for a Draft
Credit Act from 30.05.1949 and from 30.09.1951.
First unofficial German proposals for a reform of the Credit Act of 1934 were made as
early as 1946.20 But it was only in the spring of 1948, that the Americans began pushing
the German authorities towards drafting a new Credit Act for the whole of Germany that
would replace the numerous laws and directives that constituted the basis for German
banking regulation.21 When the Americans pressed the Germans for a new Credit Act,
they initially wanted to see two important structural features to be implemented. First,
20One of the first proposals stemmed from the former Commissioner of the banking sector, Friedrich
Ernst. See BArch B102/23052, Letter from Fischer to Kattenstroth from 31.01.1950.
21See BArch B102/4190, Minutes from the meetings of the Special Committee on Banking Regulation
on 21.05.1948, 12.10.1948 and 16.11.1948.
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they wanted banking regulation to maintain its decentralized structure, with the states
being the main regulators. Second, they wanted the central bank to focus exclusively
on monetary policy and to have no influence over supervisory matters. The Americans
explicitly wanted the Germans to adopt a two-tier regulatory framework, where the state
governments would be in charge of qualitative regulatory matters and the state central
banks in charge of quantitative matters.22
3.4 First drafts (1948-1953)
Work on a new Credit Act began by the end of 1948 under the auspices of the Bank
deutscher La¨nder (henceforth just ‘BdL’) – the new central bank that had been founded
earlier that year. After all, the BdL was the only German institution covering the three
western zones at that time. In this process, the BdL cooperated with the Special Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (the Sonderausschuß Bankenaufsicht).23 It was an informal
body created to harmonize regulatory practices throughout the German states, by bring-
ing together the relevant regulatory agencies of all states. Given its informal character,
any decisions taken by this body were non-binding.24
Over a period of two years, a preliminary Credit Act draft was prepared. During the
deliberations, the Credit Act of 1934 (in its amended 1939 form) was used as the basis for
discussion.25 This first official draft was drawn up by the central bank in association with
the various state regulatory agencies. While the representatives from the Federal Finance
Ministry attended the discussions as of the fall of 1949, the federal government did not
get actively involved. Additionally, neither the public nor the banks were given access to
these discussions. This attracted sharp criticism from the banking sector, both for the
lack of practical experience and the contents of the draft. Influential representatives of the
banking sector complained to Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard that
‘[...]a bureaucracy without leadership celebrates orgies’
22See BArch B102 / 41900, Section A of the Statement of grounds for a Draft Credit Act from 30.05.1949.
23As of the fall of 1949, the BdL-led Commission was joined by experts from the central government’s
Finance Ministry.
24For the minutes of the meetings of the Special Committee on Banking Supervision see BArch
B126/7401, 12141, 12142, 12143, and 26185.
25See for example BArch B102/41901, Appendix to the Statement of grounds for a draft Credit Act from
30.09.1951.
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and that
‘if one glanced at the current draft one could get the impression that the entire
banking sector is in the hands of criminals or, alternatively, that the sector
is about to be subjected to softening-up barrage in preparation for an all-out
attack, leading to socialization.’ 26
The draft was not quite as extreme as these representatives from the banking sector
made it sound like.27 However, in line with American demands, the draft foresaw the
continued decentralization of banking regulation, which was seen by these private bankers
as a most undesirable feature. Additionally, the Credit Act draft changed the scope of some
norms in order for them to be compatible with the new constitution (the Grundgesetz ).28
Nevertheless, a working group of the associations private banks prepared its own draft law
and presented it to the federal government. However it was of little impact.29 What made
matters even more complex, was the fact that several political issues, that potentially
would have a significant effect on a new credit act, were still pending.
First, with the help of military laws (decrees) the Allies had decentralized the Ger-
man banking sector by introducing barriers to interstate branching and by breaking up
the three largest banks into 30 state-level banks. This decentralization would, eventually,
have to be codified by a democratically legitimized law. The Allies wanted to see this
26The German original is as follows: “[...] die Bu¨rokratie, die keine Fu¨hrung hat, feiert sonst Orgien” and
“Wenn man den Text u¨berfliegt, ko¨nnte man zu dem Ergebnis kommen, daß die gesamte Kreditwirtschaft
nur von Verbrechern geleitet wird, oder aber, daß sie in ihrem Gesamtumfange langsam fu¨r die Sozial-
isierung sturmreif gemacht werden soll.” See BArch B102/41902, Letters from Pferdmenges to Erhard
and from Rath to Pferdmenges from 21.04.1950 and 19.04.1950, respectively. See also BArch B136/1216,
Letter from Scheliha to Rust from 24.03.1950. Similar complaints were made by other banking associations
as well. See for example BArch 126/1216, p. 24, Letter of the Working Group of the Mortgage Banks from
24.03.1950.
27Even so, representatives of the private banking associations prepared a draft, which they forwarded
to the government. This draft was found little attention within the Finance Ministry. For the draft see
BArch B102/41899.
28See BArch B102/41901, Statements of grounds of the Draft of a Federal Credit Act from 30.09.1951.
29The draft law of the working group can be found in B102/41899. In the same folder, see also the letter
from Henckel to von Rauschenplat from 19.12.1950, in which he acknowledges the receipt of the draft, but
at the same time urges the private banks to remain patient with their demands for a centralized regulatory
regime. He pointed out that the states were currently dominating the drafting process, but the federal
government would soon take over the initiative.
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codification to happen under their control, before full legislative autonomy would be re-
turned to Germany.30 Some kind of reversal of the decentralization – which the German
private banks vigorously lobbied for – was nevertheless a possibility. Second, the trans-
fer of competence for money and credit from the Economics to the Finance Ministry by
the Allies was considered a preliminary measure. Settling this issue had an impact on
which Ministry would eventually be in charge of regulating the banking sector. Third, an
Antitrust Act, subject to Allied approval, had to be passed by the German parliament
as well. The pre-war Credit Act allowed for a government-enforced cartelized banking
sector. If the future Antitrust Act were to be as restrictive as the American Antitrust
Act, many key provisions in the Credit Act might be incompatible with the Antitrust Act.
Similarly, the interpretation of the constitutional clause of economic freedom (‘Gewerbe-
freiheit’), potentially affected a clause limiting entry to the banking sector. Last but not
least, the BdL was a provisional central bank. It was founded before the Federal Republic
of Germany had been and article 88 of the German constitution stated that a new Central
Bank Act needed to be passed.31 Depending on the structure of the central bank and the
norms provided in the corresponding Act, the regulatory framework might be affected. It
was certainly a possibility that none of the issues at hand would change much from the
American imposed status quo. But the general expectation was that in the near future
there would be some substantial change in either of these areas.32 Irrespective of these
uncertainties, a first draft for a new Credit Act was officially presented to the central
government in the fall of 1951.33
At this time, however, the German Economics and Finance Ministries were engaged
in a fierce struggle for competence over money and credit matters. This struggle had its
origins well before the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany34 and broke out in the
open at the end of 1949, when the Minister of Economy Ludwig Erhard openly demanded
to transfer the competence for money and credit from the Finance back to the Economics
30The founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 and the declaration of the Occupation Statute
and the signing of the subsequent Petersberg Accords, limited legislative autonomy had been returned to
the Germans. Autonomy would be expanded even further when the Occupation Statute was revised in the
spring of 1951. Nevertheless the Allies formally retained veto powers in what they considered important
legislative aspects such as in the field of decartelization and deconcentration.
31See Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Artikel 88).
32See for example Adler (1949) for the notion that change was in the air.
33The draft had no official character as the BdL was not in a position to introduce official legislative
drafts. In its statement of grounds, the draftees also stated that a new Credit Act should only be enacted,
once both a Central Bank Act and a Branch Restriction Act had been passed. See BArch B102/41901,
Statements of grounds of the Draft of a Federal Credit Act from 30.09.1951.
34See BArch B102/23051, Memorandum by Dr. Martini from 14.09.1948.
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Ministry – in line with German bureaucratic tradition.35 Eventually, the bureaucratic
tradition was restored both on a federal and on a state level. However, the struggle was
only resolved in the spring of 1952 and the transition period would prove to be a long
one.36
Even though the decision to reinstate the Economics Ministry’s competence in terms
of money and credit was taken in the spring of 1952, formal transition would only occur
in the summer of 1952. And even then the Federal Ministry of Economics needed several
months to bring its newly founded division VI for money and credit up to speed. Skilled
and experienced bureaucrats were in short supply. The Economics Ministry went through
significant efforts in order to identify individuals that had worked either in the Economics
Ministry’s former division for money and credit or within the regulatory institutions, prior
to the Second World War.37 Eventually, the ministry was able to enlist the services of
a handful of experienced bureaucrats, including those of of Dr. Heinrich Schreihage and
Heinz Kalkstein. Both of whom had not only worked within the regulatory institutions
before the Second World War, but also with the BdL after the Second World War. While
at the BdL, both men were involved in the first draft of a new Credit Act.38 Within the
Economics Ministry, Kalkstein became the head of Department 5, in charge of matters
relating to the savings banks and other public banks. Schreihage was assigned the position
of the head of Department 3, for general questions relating to the banking system. It was
to be a one-man department. This made Schreihage the sole advisor for matters relating
to the Credit Act at first. Every matter with respect to the Credit Act had to be run
by him.39 There was also a considerable change in personnel with the state supervisory
institutions, as the changes at the federal level were mirrored at the state level. Thus,
35See BArch B102/23051, “Kabinettsvorlage zur Gescha¨ftsverteilung auf dem Gebiete der Wirtschaft-
spolitik” from 24.11.1949.
36At one point during this struggle, Erhard implicitly flirted with resignation if he were not given
the competence over money and credit. See BArch B102/23052, Letter from Erhard to Adenauer from
23.09.1950. See Lo¨ﬄer (2002, pp. 368–391) for an in-depth discussion of the struggle for competence and
BArch B102/23051, 23052, 23054, 23055 and 23056 for the original files.
37As a matter of fact, the Ministry’s headhunting drive already began well before it could be certain
that the competences for Money and Credit would be transferred, albeit with little success. Only when
competence was transferred, could it persuade targeted individuals to join the Ministry of Economics.
See BArch B102/42911, correspondence with Fischer from 23.02.1950, 25.02.1950, 27.02.1950, 17.03.1950,
06.04.1950, 11.04.1950 and 19.06.1951
38For detailed biographies of Kalkstein and Schreihage see BArch B126/16984, I7038, cited in Lo¨ﬄer
(2002, FN 126 on pp. 399–400). Both had previously declined offers to join the Economics Ministry, since
it did not have the competence over money and credit. See also BArch B102/42911, Letters from Fischer
on 27.02.1950 and 17.03.1950.
39For the composition of Schreihage’s department and its responsibilities see BArch B102/23080, Undated
questionnaire, Division VI, Department 3.
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supervision of the banks was transferred from the states’ finance ministries to the states’
economics ministries. As a consequence, many senior state regulators left the regulatory
field altogether, since they were presumably anticipating a recentralization of all regulatory
and supervisory powers with the federal government in the near future.40
Another intriguing aspect of the transfer of competence is that parts of the press
speculated openly about whether the regulation of banks might be minimized or even
scrapped altogether. After all, the press argued, the free market doctrine carried significant
weight within the Economics Ministry, as the Ministry was led by Ludwig Erhard and by
Alfred Mu¨ller-Armack, two prominent sympathizers of free market ideas of the time. And
in a free market the banking system needed little to no supervision.41
Work on a new Credit Act effectively stalled between 1951 and 1953. The Allies did not
provide any new impulses for the Germans to restart work on the Credit Act. Even more,
there is evidence that Americans began to acknowledge that their policy of decentralizing
banking supervision had adverse effects, and they were more than happy for Germans to
return closer to their old more centralized model. The current decentralized system had
led to political appointments in the supervisory agencies, rather than appointments based
on knowledge and skill. 42 Instead, all the attention in terms of banking policy on both
the German and the Allied side was concentrated on the roll-back of branching restrictions
and the separation of the large credit banks, previously imposed by the Allies. Most of
German politicians and businessmen were indignant to accept the branching restrictions
and the separation of the largest credit banks imposed by the Allies. Similarly, a complete
restoration of pre-World War II conditions was unacceptable to the Americans, as they
considered the break-up of the three large credit banks as a stellar achievement in terms of
the decentralization of financial power. Eventually, a partial roll-back was agreed upon in
the spring of 1952.43 From then on, the Allies left banking matters entirely in the hands
40See BArch B102/41902, Memo from 26.08.1952, which warns of a collapse of the states’ supervisory
institutions, caused by an exodus of experienced supervisors.
41See BArch B102/41886, Memo by Schreihage from 15.02.1954. Alfred Mu¨ller-Armack was the head of
the influential policy division, the Grundsatzabteilung.
42See Memo by Warner to Lowell and Pumphrey from 09.02.1950 and Memo from Klopstock to Pumphrey
from 02.02.1950 in NARA, RG 466, Decartelization and Deconcentration Division, Subject Files, 1948-55,
folder ‘Banking Deconcentration 1950’ box 1. State regulators also failed to enforce the interest rate
restrictions, leading to unofficial, or ‘grey’, deposit rates. See Franke (1999, p. 257).
43See the minutes of the negotiations between the Allied High Commission and the German Government
(FIN/FED/M(50-51)), for example in NARA, Record Group 84, Germany, Berlin Mission, AK Secretariat,
Classified Files 1945-1990, box 107. As part of the negotiations with the Allies over the partial lifting on
branching restrictions, the German government had promised not to modify branching restrictions within
the next three years. Additionally, it would try to implement a few other measures the Allies wanted to
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of the Germans.
Also, it must be kept in mind, that the turn of the decade was an economically and
politically highly uncertain period. Important policy decisions were being debated that
were to define the parameters for the future German economic and political structure. The
so-called Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle)44 had to overcome numerous hurdles, such
as the Korea Crisis, the reintegration of Germany into the international economic system
or the settlement of claims with interwar debtors and compensation for Jewish victims
during the war. Only afterwards could the ‘economic miracle’ begin to unfold. Some
measure of normality returned to the German political and economic scene only in 1953,
when the legislative period came to an end.45
Thus, by the end of the first legislative period in 1953, Germany had not come closer
to passing a new Credit Act, despite the Allies’ initial wishes to do so. Only a draft Credit
Act had been prepared by a group of experts, without any involvement of the banks or
the public. It essentially incorporated the status quo (and thus Allied demands) into
the existing German framework of banking regulation. However, this draft was of little
impact, as the Finance and the Economics Ministry fought a bitter and prolonged struggle
for competence. At the same time the Allies and Germans wrangled over the liberalization
of branching restrictions and the passage of an American-style Antitrust Act. This was
flanked by an array of crucial political and economic developments, that put the drafting
of a new Credit Act firmly in the back seat. Officially, the banking sector was ‘regulated’
after all – the quality of which was another (controversial) question altogether. However,
the transfer of competence from the Finance to the Economics Ministry and the subsequent
headhunting activities for ‘experienced’ personnel set important precedents for future work
on a Credit Act.
transplant to Germany, such as a tighter restriction of proxy voting and the introduction of registered
shares. See the Letter from Adenauer to the Allied High Commission from 27.03.1952 in NARA Record
Group 466, Records of the US Representative to the HICOM Law Committee, Box 2. For the act that
partially lifted the branching restrictions see Bundesgesetzblatt (1952). See also Horstmann (1991, pp.
219–286).
44See Ritschl (2005) for the economic miracle that was not.
45See Tooze (2011) for an account of this time period and all the challenges that German policymakers
needed to tackle simultaneously.
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3.5 Internal Disagreements within the Economics Ministry
(1954-1956)
After the general election in the fall of 1953, work on a ‘new’ Credit Act was taken up in
earnest by Schreihage again. By 1953, Allied influence in terms of banking regulation was
minimal. It was clear that the Allies would return full legislative sovereignty to Germany
soon.46 Already earlier, the Americans had made it known to the German authorities, that
they would not oppose a recentralization of supervisory institutions. Schreihage undertook
a fresh start to the Credit Act, now that he was essentially free of Allied restrictions.
Instead of using the BdL draft of 1951, Schreihage went back to the drawing board, using
the proceedings of the German banking commission from 1934 and the Credit Act of 1934
(in its 1939 form) as his starting point.47
Over the next few years, Schreihage would be in regular contact with the Federal As-
sociation of the Private Banks (Bundesverband des Privaten Bankgewerbes). This was not
because of Schreihage’s sudden affinity with the private banking sector. It was because
Minister of the Economy, Ludwig Erhard, had a slightly more integrative approach than
his fellow Finance Minister, Scha¨ffer, when it came to business associations.48 And it was
also because the private banking sector was able to enlist the services of Friedrich Ernst,
the former Commissioner for the Banking Sector, who was probably the most respected
German expert in terms of Banking Regulation at the time. In mid-1954, the Federal
Association of the Private Banks created a special Credit Act Commission (Kommission
fu¨r die Neufassung des Kreditwesengesetzes) under the chairmanship of Ernst. Its task
was to study the current regulatory framework and propose changes that were to be imple-
mented in a new Credit Act, in an effort to influence the decision making process within
the Economics Ministry.49 After the second meeting of the Credit Act Commission, Ernst
46The three Allies and Germany had signed the Deutschlandvertrag on the 26.05.1952, which gave Ger-
many full legislative autonomy, once it entered into force on the 5th of May 1955.
47See BArch B102/41899, Thank you note from Schreihage to the Economics Minister of Lower Saxony
from 11.10.1954 as well as an opinion piece by Schreihage (1961) in which he acknowledges the Credit Act
of 1934 as the starting point.
48At one point Adenauer even criticizes the Economics Ministry for being too close to the banks, for
being too passive and not political enough. See Lo¨ﬄer (2002, p. 389). This statement of Adenauer’s is
somewhat ironic, since one of his main advisors in economic matters was the banker Robert Pferdmenges,
the head of the of the private credit bank association in the 1950s. See for example Die Zeit (1953).
49See BArch B102/41893, Minutes of the first meeting of the commission for the new Credit Act draft
from 12.07.1954.
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invited Schreihage to take part in the commission’s meetings.50 And indeed, Schreihage
would become a regular attendee throughout the period from 1954 until 1958.51
In the first meetings, the old Credit Act was discussed in minutiae detail; paragraph
per paragraph. The merit and demerit of every norm was laid out. In the later years,
Schreihage would sometimes present and discuss changes to the Ministry’s unofficial draft
with the committee. Ernst, and thus the private banks, could be certain to have Schrei-
hage’s attention. The key points the private credit banks’ association wanted the new
Credit Act to reflect, were already decided upon in the first two meetings of the com-
mission. Schreihage was not present at these meetings, but the minutes of the meeting
were forwarded to him a few weeks after they had taken place. Ernst also had a personal
conversation with Schreihage outlining the private credit banks’ position. The commission
supported a return to a unified regulatory structure and it was also in favor for a continued
restriction to competition. It wanted the state sponsored interest rate cartel, the restric-
tions to entry, and the restrictions to advertising practices to be upheld. Furthermore, the
commission criticized the expansion of the public banking sector and wanted the federal
regulator to be given the power to limit the scope of activities the Sparkassen were allowed
to engage in. The competitive threat from the public banking sector is also the primary
reason that the private credit banks wanted a continued restriction to competition.52
The private banks, were not the only institution Schreihage discussed regulatory mat-
ters with. He also traveled to the central bank on a regular basis.53 The Federation of
the Savings Banks also created a corresponding Credit Act Panel (Arbeitsausschuss KWG
des Deutschen Sparkassen und Giroverbandes e.V.). Schreihage attended several of these
meetings as well, but they only began in late 1955 and they did not take place with the
same frequency as the private credit banks’ commission.54 Thus, the private credit banks
had a significant first mover advantage over the savings banks. On top of that, the private
credit banks had the former banking commissioner Ernst on their side, giving them a much
better position to influence Schreihage and consequently the Economics Ministry. It was
50See BArch B102/41893, Memo VI 3 - 15483/54 by Schreihage from 22.09.1954.
51See the various minutes of the meetings of the commission in BArch B102/41893, 41894, 41895 and
41896. Meetings took place roughly on a monthly basis.
52See BArch B102/41893, Minutes of the first meeting of the commission for the new Credit Act draft
from 12.07.1954, and BArch B102/41893, Memo VI 3 - 15483/54 by Schreihage from 22.09.1954.
53On many occasions he would combine a visit to the Commission of the private banks with a visit to
the central bank directorate, as both were located in Frankfurt am Main.
54See the memos of Schreihage and the minutes of the meetings of the Credit Act Panel in BArch
B102/41898.
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also no secret that the Economics Ministry favored private over public initiative and thus
would be more likely to attend to the private banking sector’s demands than to the public
banking sector’s. The savings banks were aware of their strategic disadvantage vis-a-vis
the private banking sector. Nevertheless they decided to press for important regulatory
concessions. Ideally, they wanted the Sparkassen to be exempt from federal supervision
altogether, but they were aware that this was unacceptable to the Economics Ministry.
As a second best alternative, they hoped for the Sparkassen to be exempt key regulatory
norms, such as capital and liquidity requirements. After all, because of their statutes the
Sparkassen did not have any capital (only reserves), but they had the financial guarantee
of the respective local government. They wanted this financial backing by the government
to be recognized in the Credit Act. Of course, exempting them from these norms would
give them important competitive advantages over private sector banks.55
The credit cooperatives, too, had set up a Special Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (Sonderausschuss Bankenaufsicht). However there is little evidence to suggest that
Schreihage regularly attended their meetings or that minutes of those meetings were sent
to him.56 Thus, this indicates that the private credit banks were the banking group in Ger-
many that had the best opportunities to influence the regulatory decision making process
within the Economics Ministry. Another important aspect of the initial drafting process
is that it took place without any major influence from the German federal states. Even
though Schreihage attended the meetings of the states’ Special Committee on Banking
Supervision57 as an official representative from the Federal Economics Ministry, he would
only report on the latest developments. Rarely did engaging discussions ensue about the
future structure of the regulatory system.58
The Economics Ministry’s contact with the banking associations at such an early
stage in the drafting process was certainly unusual, but it was not exceptional. In the case
of the Antitrust Act, Erhard and his Ministry had even more intense contact with the
55See BArch B102/41898, Minutes of the Credit Act Panel meeting from 23.11.1955 and memo of the
Federation of Savings Banks from 14.11.1955, AZ 7205. For Erhard’s position on protecting the private
sector from the public sector see for example a remark made in connection with the Antiturst Act in BArch
B126/701, Letter by Erhard to subsecretary of the Chancellery, from 26.04.1952. In this letter he stresses
that he wants has no intention to pass an Antitrust Act that favors the public sector at the expense of the
private sector, and that he believes in fair competition between the public and private enterprises.
56The only mention of Schreihage traveling to take part in one of the credit cooperatives’ meeting I could
find is in BArch B102/41898, Memo by Schreihage from 28.09.1957.
57This committee had been formed in 1948 to harmonize regulatory practices between the states. See
section 3.4 on page 113.
58See for example the minutes of the meetings of the Committee in BArch B126/ 7401.
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Association of the German Industry (BDI) in 1954 and 1955. In these meetings, Erhard
came to a actual agreements with the BDI on the fundamental principles of the Antitrust
Act. However, he then repeatedly ignored the agreements and did not incorporate them
in his ministry’s subsequent drafts.59 Furthermore, the meetings with the representatives
of the banking sector had no official character.
From 1954 until 1956, the progress on a new Credit Act was slow, however, and
eventually came to a standstill. No official draft was released for public scrutiny before
1957. Many key issues were subject to excruciating discussions within the Economics
Ministry. This was due to fundamental disagreements within the Ministry’s Division
1 (Policy) and Division 6 (Money and Credit). Division 1 was led by Alfred Mu¨ller-
Armack, a prominent Economist of that time, who shared Ludwig Erhard’s conviction for
free markets rather than cartels. Division 6 was the division Schreihage was in, where
a number of officials from the pre-war regulatory institutions worked, and who were in
regular contact with the banking associations. Major disagreements between Division
1 and Division 6 were about to what extent the banking sector should be subjected to
competitive pressures.60
Division 1 argued that the banking sector should be treated no different than other
sectors as it was not inherently different from other sectors of the economy. Contrary to
that Division 6 argued that the banking sector constituted indeed a special case and that
this was also reflected in the draft for an Antitrust Act, which stated that the banking
sector was not susceptible to automatic regulation through competition.61 While compe-
tition was generally welcomed by Division 6, it argued that a restriction of competition in
the banking sector was necessary in order to avoid a competitive race to the bottom that
would destabilize the banking sector. In particular a fierce competition between the largest
private credit banks and the savings bank system was feared. Furthermore it argued, the
59See Hu¨ttenberger (1976, pp. 300–304), who also reports that Erhard had only grudgingly begun
discussions with the BDI in the first place, possibly because he was ordered by Adenauer to engage in
them. See also BArch B126/702, which contains numerous memos and minutes on the discussions between
the Economics Ministry and the BDI, which document that the positions between the two sides were
diametrically opposed.
60Division 1 originally even went as far as claiming that the Credit Act originated from National Socialist
thought and for that reason alone it should be largely discarded. See BArch B102/41886, p. 1 of the Minutes
of a meeting between Divisions 1 and 6 that took place on the 28.06.1955, from the 01.07.1955 (VI A 3 -
13 372/55).
61Interestingly, Mu¨ller-Armack countered this claim by saying that the inclusion of such a remark in the
Antitrust Act’s draft must have been a “mistake”, which would most certainly be corrected. See Barch
B102/41886, Minutes of a meeting between Divisions 1 and 6 that took place on the 28.06.1955, from the
01.07.1955 (VI A 3 - 13 372/55).
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ongoing expansion of the public banking sector, which enjoyed substantial competitive ad-
vantages over the private sector banks. Division 6 was willing to shield the private banking
sector from the public banking sector by restriction competition. As a result the divisions
disagreed over the government’s ability to limit entry to the banking sector, over whether
the practice of a government-enforced interest cartel and the restrictions to competitive
practices should be upheld, over whether the government should be able interfere in core
decisions of the banks, such as imposing strict capital and liquidity ratios, and whether
there was a clear enough division between banking supervision and monetary policy. The
only fundamental issue they agreed on was that if there was to be regulation of the banking
sector, it should be at the federal level.62
A most interesting aspect of the Division 1’s struggle for less regulation and more com-
petitive pressure in the banking system, was a proposal to abolish most of the regulatory
restrictions limiting competition and instead to introduce deposit insurance as a measure
of neutralizing competitive advantages. Paired with an effective Antitrust Act, it should
remove fears of either monopolies or cut-throat-competition, Mu¨ller-Armack argued.63
The two divisions were unable to resolve their key disagreements over the restrictions to
competition in the banking sector, until the end of 1957.64
Also, during this period, the ministry was working intensively on a new Antitrust Act
and on a new Central Bank Act. Both these laws were considered a priority over the
Credit Act. However, work on them took much longer than originally anticipated.65 As
long as these two laws were not passed, the government was hesitant to put forward a
new Credit Act. After all, there was considerable interaction between these acts. The
future structure of the central bank influenced the possibilities for cooperation between
the regulatory agencies. The stringency of the Antitrust Act restricted the options for
government intervention in the banking sector. If, for example, the Antitrust Act banned
all cartels, a government-enforced interest rate cartel in the banking sector, as it had been
the norm since 1931, would not be permissible.
62See BArch B102/41886, Memo by Schreihage to the head of Division 1 from 11.05.1955 (VI A 3 - 13
205/55).
63See BArch B102/41886, Page five of the minutes of a meeting between Divisions 1 and 6 on the
28.06.1955 from the 01.07.1955 (VI A 3 - 13 372/55).
64See BArch B102/41887, Letter from Mu¨ller-Armack to Division VI from 09.12.1957.
65See Hu¨ttenberger (1976) and Murach-Brand (2004) for accounts of the origins of the German Antitrust
Act of 1957.
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Overall, the mid-1950s were characterized by two developments: First, a regular ex-
change of opinions between the Economics Ministry and the private credit banks’ asso-
ciation (and to a lesser extent with the savings bank system). And second, fundamental
disagreements within the Economics Ministry on whether to re-establish the old cartelized
regulatory system, or whether to loosen the grip on the banking system and thus allowing
for more competitive pressures. Work on a new Credit Act was only third in line during
this period, behind a new Central Bank Act and a new Antitrust Act, which further helps
to explain the slow progress. It is in 1955 that Germany regained unrestricted legislative
sovereignty, thus freeing itself completely from Allied influence. In terms of banking reg-
ulation, the Allied grip had already loosened considerably by the beginning of the 1950s
and ceased with the codification of regional branching restrictions into a democratic law
in 1952.
3.6 A failed centralization attempt (1957)
In order to make at least some progress before the end of the legislative period in 1957,
a decision was taken in November of 1956 to press through the one regulatory aspect
that the entire Economics Ministry, all the federal Government Ministries and the lower
house of parliament (the Bundestag) could agree on: The (re-)centralization of banking
supervision.66 An important rationale for pushing ahead with the re-centralization of
regulatory supervision, was the fact that the parliament lifted branching restrictions on
banks entirely at the end of 1956.67 It was certain that the largest commercial banks,
which had been decentralized by the Allies in 1948 and who had been allowed to partially
re-centralize in 1953, would merge in 1957 and thus re-establish national operations. Both
the Economics Ministry and the Bundestag’s Committee for Money and Credit argued that
nationally operating banks could only be supervised efficiently by a national supervisory
agency.68
A brief draft of five paragraphs was drawn up that would create a single Federal
Supvervisory Office for the Banking Sector (a Bundesaufsichtsamt fu¨r das Kreditwesen) in
66The Bundestag ’s Committee for Money and Credit (also known as the ‘Scharnberg Committee’) was
strongly in favor of a recentralization. See for example BArch B102/23342, Confidential Memo from
Henckel to Erhard and Westrick from 30.11.1956 and Letter from Scharenberg to Erhard from 26.11.1956.
67For the law scrapping branching restrictions entirely see Bundesgesetzblatt (1956).
68See BArch B102/23342, Confidential Memo from Henckel to Erhard and Westrick from 30.11.1956,
and Cabinet proposal by Erhard that includes a draft bill from 20.12.1956.
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anticipation of a comprehensive new Credit Act, which was to follow a few years later. The
draft would essentially reinstate the Credit Act of 1934 in its amended form of 193969 When
the draft was made public, it amounted to a surprise move by the central government.70
It was public knowledge that the German states (represented in the upper house of
parliament the Bundesrat) would oppose any law that attempted to take their regulatory
privileges away from them. However, the central bank, the BdL, also voiced its strong
opposition towards the pre-emptive measure. It argued that the Credit Act should be
passed as a whole, and not in a piecemeal manner. Also, the decision of whether the
regulation of the entire banking system should be centralized or decentralized, did, in
the eyes of the BdL, depend on whether the future central bank would have a central or
decentral structure. Consequently, the central government should wait until the passage
of the Central Bank Act before taking any regulatory measures. The central bank also
disagreed with the notion that a centralized regulatory system was needed to supervise
the large credit banks, which were operating throughout the country. Quite the contrary,
it argued that a decentralized system would be better able to supervise a banking system
that had become more complex since the 1930s. Another major critique was the proposed
re-enactment of the Credit Act of 1934 with the 1939 amendment. The 1939 amendment
robbed the central bank of most of its influence over regulatory affairs. Instead, the
BdL argued, parliament should reenact the Credit Act of 1934 in its 1944 version. The
amendment of 1944 had reinstated the central bank’s influence, without burdening it with
day-to-day supervisory tasks.71 Additionally, the headquarters of the proposed federal
regulatory agency was supposed to be in Bonn, the seat of the government, instead of
Frankfurt, where the BdL and the majority of the large banks had their headquarters.
The BdL objected to this as it would hinder cooperation between the two regulatory
institutions. In sum, the BdL painted a bleak picture of a federal regulatory agency
that was without any support from the BdL expertise, in case the proposed bill was
enacted.72 Under the surface however, matters within the BdL looked a bit different. It
69A negligible amendment from 1940 was also included. For the first draft including its rationale see
BArch B102/23342, Cabinet proposal by Erhard that includes a draft bill from 20.12.1956.
70It deemed the time as strategically advantageous. See BArch B102/23342, Draft for a Cabinet level
memo from 05.01.1957, for the meeting on the 09.01.1957.
71For the pre-war regulatory and supervisory responsibilities see table 3.2 on page 110.
72See BArch B102/23342, Minutes of the 234th meeting of the board of the central bank from 9.-
10.01.1957; the report of Schreihage’s business trip to Frankfurt from 16.01.1957 and the letter of the BdL
directorate to Erhard from 25.01.1957 as well as B102/23344, Letter from Pfleiderer to Dermitzel from
04.05.1957.
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was the board of the central bank, whose members were the presidents of the state central
banks and naturally closer to the states’ interests, who objected strongly to the proposed
centralization. The directorate of the BdL, however, supported the proposed bill, but it
was overruled by the central bank board.73
Despite the severe criticisms from Bundesrat and BdL, the federal government went
ahead and introduced the corresponding bill to parliament. The official statement of
objection by the Bundesrat followed along similar lines as the argumentation of the BdL.
Additionally, it brought onto the field constitutional concerns that would arise if the
government passed this bill.74 Even though it was impossible to obtain the support of the
Bundesrat on this matter, the Economics Ministry was confident that it could pass the bill
with a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag.75 For the remainder of the legislative period
a bickering over the seat of the future Federal Supervsiory Office took place. At first,
it was a struggle between Bonn and Frankfurt, and eventually the possibility of basing
the supervisory office in Berlin was thrown in the ring as well. It was a highly political
decision that needed to be taken at that time.76 However no compromise could be reached
before the end of the legislative period that would have secured the necessary two-thirds
majority.
What further hindered last minute legislative re-centralization of the regulatory in-
stitutions was the fact that two other crucial bills were also making its way through
parliament hoping to make a spot landing: the Antitrust bill and the Central Bank bill.
These had priority over supervisory matters. Whatever political capital was left during
this legislative period was spent on their passage.77 Throughout the drafting process, the
Antitrust Act changed almost radically, from a virtual copy of the strict American An-
titrust legislation that prohibited all cartels, as Erhard originally wanted it, to one that
73See BArch B102/23343, Memo by Henckel for Erhard and Westrick from 08.02.1957.
74Amongst them concerns that the reinstated 1934 Credit Act in its amended form of 1939 would contain
provisions that were incompatible with the current federal constitution. For details see the bill and the
official statements of the central government and the Bundesrat in “Deutscher Bundestag, 2. Wahlperiode,
1953, Drucksache 3264, Bonn, den 8. Ma¨rz 1957 (6 – 55101 – 1215/57 V) found in BArch B102/23342.
75See BArch B102/23343, Memo by Henckel for Erhard and Westrick from 08.02.1957.
76Government bureaucracies tended to be significantly smaller than they are now. The federal su-
pervisory office would eventually employ around 74 people (including secretaries and janitors). Today’s
supervisory agency, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) employs over 2000 individuals.
The agency is now also in charge of the supervision of the stock market and the insurance sector. Even when
taking that into consideration it amounts to an increase in personnel by a factor of almost 10. For today’s
personnel figure see Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (2011) for the 1962 figure see BArch
B136/1218, newspaper article “Bankenaufsicht nimmt Arbeit auf” from 30.12.1961, in the Industrierkurier.
77See BArch B102/41898, Schreihage’s remarks in the minutes of the Sparkassen’s Credit Act Panel
meeting from 22.06.1957.
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had numerous exceptions more akin to Antitrust legislation in other European countries,
as German industry and parts of the German government, sought. In particular repre-
sentatives of the states, as well as a number of cabinet minister’s sought exemptions for
government-run companies. Initially, Ludwig Erhard could count on considerable support
from within the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU),
the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Allied High Commission (AHC), as well as from
small and medium sized businesses, which sought protection from large competitors.78
However, in the early years Erhard was unable to forge a compromise between the German
side and the AHC, which was reluctant to compromise on the strict, American-inspired, in-
terpretation of Antitrust. As the process dragged on, the influence of the AHC decreased.
At the same rate as the AHC withdrew from German politics, the influence of the BDI
increased. Moreover, several sectors of the economy experienced significant bouts of (re-
)concentration, such as the banking sector, driving the small and medium sized businesses
to the side of those generally supporting cartelization, and with them substantial parts of
the CDU and CSU.79 The Antitrust Act which was eventually passed in the summer of
1957 contained a general ban on cartels. However, it included a number of sectors, which
were exempted from this ban, in particular those with a strong government participation.
The banking sector was one of them.80 There is little doubt that this was included at the
behest of much of the public and private banking sector, which wanted to have a continued
restriction to competition.81 This exemption in the Antitrust Act opened the way for the
German government to include provisions for a government sponsored interest rate cartel
in the future Credit Act.82
78The American High Commissioner thought that the German Antitrust Act could have important
economic implications for the rest of Europe, too. See BArch B126/702, Letter from Erhard to Adenauer,
from 01.08.1954. See also BArch B126/700, Memo about a draft Antitrust Act, from 20.10.1950
79See Hu¨ttenberger (1976, pp. 293–307).
80Indeed, in a meeting between Schreihage and the Association of the German Industry’s (BDI) Money
Credit and Currency Committee, it was remarked that the industry was “jealous” of banking sector’s
extensive exemptions from the Antitrust Act. After all, any dedicated supervisory office for the banking
sector would naturally be closer to the sectors interests than a general Antitrust authority could ever be
to industry. See B102/41887, minutes of the meeting of the Money, Credit and Currency Committee of
the BDI on the 10.12.1957, from the 19.12.1957.
81An important argument in favor of the feasibility to exempt the banking sector that was brought
forward early on, was that the banks were already subject to special supervision, which made sure that
no socially adverse developments took place in the sector. See for example BArch B136/701, Letter from
Scha¨ffer to Erhard, from 18.03.1952, as well as Deutscher Bundestag (1975, p. 17).
82Other areas that were exempted from the general ban on cartels are transportation, agriculture and
forestry, banking and insurance, intellectual property rights, as well as the public utilities for electricity, gas
and water. For the exemption of the banking sector from the general bans on cartels in the Antitrust Act
see Bundesgesetzblatt (1957a, §102) and Deutscher Bundestag (1975, pp. 16–28). Note that the exemption
of the banking sector was only included in the drafts only relatively late in the legislative process, since
Erhard had tried to block this.
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The Central Bank Act (Bundesbankgesetz ) had an equally lengthy history, albeit with
a more successful outcome for Erhard. It was primarily a struggle between the supporters
of a centralized one-tier organizational structure, such as Erhard, and those that wanted
to maintain the decentralized two-tier structure, such as the BdL itself and the German
states. The Central Bank Act transformed the BdL into the Bundesbank, whose structure
was now that of a one-tier central bank. The state central banks lost power-vis-a-vis the
central bank directorate, but maintained limited functional independence from the center.
This shift in power within the central bank translated into a change in the central banks’
stance towards the possible recentralization of banking regulation.83
An alliance between the Bundestag and the Economics Ministry tried to re-centralize
the regulatory institutions through the back door in 1957. It encountered stiff resistance
from the states and from the BdL. On top of that, the Bundestag engulfed itself in a fruit-
less debate over the seat of the proposed regulatory agency. Given the already stretched
capabilities of the German parliament with the passage of two major acts, just before the
end of the legislative period, the centralization attempt failed. It never came to a vote as
the necessary two-thirds majority could not be rallied. Nevertheless, both the successful
passage of the Bundesbank Act and the Antitrust Act meant that a new Credit Act was
next in line. Its passage would finally have the undivided attention of all the parties in-
volved. Additionally, the two enacted laws finally set important parameters that would
eventually allow the German federal government to reinstate the old regulatory system, if
it wished to do so.
3.7 Labor and (re-)birth (1958-1961)
The central government put the Credit Act on top of its agenda after the elections in the
fall of 1957. It also forced the Ministry of Economics wrangling Divisions I and VI to settle
their disputes. And indeed, by the end of 1957 an agreement was reached. Competition
in the banking sector was to remain restricted. No additional competitive pressures were
to be introduced for the time being. There is no evidence as to why Division VI prevailed,
even though Economic Minister Erhard must have sympathized with the ideas put forward
by Division I. They were similar to his intellectual thinking to give market forces a greater
83For the Central Bank Act see Bundesgesetzblatt (1957b). For the origins of the Bundesbank Act see
Hentschel (1988a,b) or the next chapter of this thesis.
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role in the economy. The most likely explanation, judging by the subsequent strategy by
the Economics Ministry, is a decision by Erhard, as he realized that he could not gather
the necessary 23 majority in the Bundestag to recentralize banking regulation, if the bill
contained the free-market provisions that Division I advocated for. Also, the Antitrust
Act that had just been passed and it served as an important precedent by exempting
the banking sector from the general ban on cartels. If the Credit Act did not contain
restrictions to competition, why exempt the banking sector in the first place from the
Antitrust Act?84 By the beginning of 1958, the first official draft for a new Credit Act
was finally made public.85
The banking associations and all other central government ministries were once more
given the opportunity to provide their inputs. Only that this time, the feedback would not
take place in the intimate setting of a closed meeting, but in public.86 It is little surprising
that the private banks had few objections, and neither did the credit cooperatives. In its
official statement the association representing the private credit banks largely praised the
draft’s conception. It especially praised the adherence to restricted competition within
the banking sector. Indeed, the association argued for a permanent interest rate cartel –
the draft only allowed for an interest rate cartel if it was ‘economically necessary’, which
the private credit banks was too weak a formulation. The association also demanded a
prohibition of the practice of ‘revolving loans’, in which short term loans from institutional
investors were taken in and lent out on a long-term basis to finance investment projects.
The revolving-loan practice was not subject to regulation, as the brokers did not accept
deposits by the public. Moreover, the brokers began to turn into competition for the major
credit banks.87 Furthermore, in the draft the government had included a provision that
restricted the usage of savings accounts to natural persona and charitable institutions only.
Savings accounts were a vehicle meant to facilitate saving of the ordinary population and
as such attracted a higher interest than comparable term deposits. The vast majority of
these savings deposits were held with Sparkassen. As businesses and corporations began
to invest their excess funds in these savings deposits with the Sparkassen, the private
credit banks wanted to restrict this practice. Officially, this was meant to prevent volatile
84For the continuing disagreements between the Divisions I and VI, and the need for a Ministerial decision
see BArch B102/41887, Mu¨ller-Armack to Abteilung VI from 09.12.1957.
85For the first official draft see BArch B102/41889, “1. Referentenentwurf” from 18.01.1958.
86For the different banking groups’ statements on the first official draft see BArch B126/7413, B102/41895
and B102/41927.
87More on these revolving loans will follow, as they became a major point of discussion in parliament.
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institutional funds from ‘abusing’ this ‘privileged’ type of account. Unofficially, it was
of course a move to protect the private credit banks from the public banking system,
and in particular it helped the private credit banks to retain their traditional clientele by
the way of law.88 The attempts by the private credit banks to protect themselves from
the public banking system were founded in the public banking system’s relatively strong
performance in the mid to late 1950s that had arise because of a number of structural
advantages. The government actively encouraged its citizens to deposit their spare money
in savings accounts, which were the traditional domain of the Sparkassen. Furthermore,
the development of an increasingly wealthy, while at the same time financially conservative
middle class, greatly benefitted the Sparkassen as well. After all, these were traditionally
customers of the Sparkassen and the credit cooperatives, rather than the private credit
banks. An additional competitive advantage for the Sparkassen system came through
the near universal adoption to transfer the pay cheque electronically in the 1950s. The
Sparkassen and Credit Cooperative with their countrywide bank network and thus cost-
effective payment systems benefitted greatly from this development, not least because
many new customers were forced to open bank accounts, if they wanted to receive their
pay cheque.89
The association representing the public banks raised strong objections however. They
criticized continued, extensive regulatory provisions, which they deemed to be a form of
direct (federal) government planning. The government’s draft prescribed concrete mini-
mum capital and liquidity ratios. The Sparkassen objected to these, because these ratios
neither addressed the specificities of the Sparkassen system90 and because such a system
lacked flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. They demanded that no concrete
minimum capital or liquidity ratios should be specified in the law itself, as it was the case
with the existing legislation. In a similar vein went a further critique. A ruling by the Fed-
eral Administrative Court in 1957 had already sunk the original provision that allowed the
government to restrict both the establishment of banks on the basis of economic necessity
88See BArch B102/41895, Stellungnahme des Bundesverbandes des Privaten Bankgewerbes (E.V.) zum
Referenten-Entwurf des Bundeswirtschaftsministeriums fu¨r ein Kreditwesengesetz.
89See Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 266-308). For an overview of the development of the different banking groups
in the German banking system after the Second World War see figure 3.2 on page 132. Alternatively, see
also Wolf (1998a, pp. 127–148).
90Because of their legal statutes, the Sparkassen did not have shareholder capital, they only had retained
earnings and the backing of the government. Also, the Sparkassen held most of their liquidity reserves with
the Girozentralen or Landesbanken and the government’s draft only wanted to consider cash equivalents,
such as reserves with the central bank, but not reserves held with other banks for the calculation of liquidity
ratios.
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as unconstitutional, as it collided with the constitutional clause that guaranteed anyone to
choose its ‘freedom of trade’.91 As a consequence of this a flurry of new branches were es-
tablished by banks. Now, the draft suggested that the government should retain the right
to restrict new branches, though not new banks, once more. The association considered
this provision as obsolete, and it argued that competitive pressure could effectively regu-
late the amount of branches in the country. Furthermore, the public banks’ association
objected to restricting savings deposits to natural personas and charitable institutions.
The savings account was the most popular and most important source of funds, and they
certainly did not want an artificial restriction to it. In this they were supported by the
BDI.92 While the association of the public banks continued to favor certain restrictions
to competition, it was slowly abandoning this position. The public banks’ strong perfor-
mance in the 1950s made them aware of their competitive advantages with respect to the
private credit banks. They now saw an opportunity to expand their market share at their
expense and consequently toned down their demands for restrictions to competition.93
Junior-level deliberations amongst the different ministries and the Bundesbank (Ressortbe-
sprechungen) to work out the details of the individual paragraphs began in February of
1958. The Economics Ministry installed three working groups. One for matters relating
to entry restrictions, another for liquidity and capital ratios and another related to infor-
mation disclosure. The proposed centralized structure of the regulatory system was not
put up for fundamental discussion, however, and neither was the inclusion of the central
bank in regulatory matters. The working group on the entry restrictions was made obso-
lete, when the ruling of the Federal Administrative Court on entry restrictions was made
public.94 The court’s ruling had made it clear, that no rule restricting entry or the estab-
lishment of branches, would survive a constitutional challenge. Also, the working group
on the liquidity and capital ratios had decided, at the urging of both the Bundesbank
and the banking sector associations not to prescribe minimum capital and liquidity ratios
91For the ruling of the Federal Administrative Court see Bundesverwaltungsgericht (1958) and for the
relevant clause in the constitution see Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Art. 12, (1)). See also Pohl et al. (2005,
pp. 302–303).
92For the official statement of the public banks’ association see BArch B102/41895, Stellungnahme des
Deutschen Sparkassen- und Giroverbandes e.V. zum Referenten-Entwurf eines Gesetzes fu¨r das Kreditwe-
sen. For a summary of other associations’ viewpoint see for example BArch B102/41927, Memo by Schrei-
hage, from 06.03.1958, about a meeting with the various banking associations on the draft of a new Credit
Act (VI A 3 - 5660/58). For the BDI’s position on the savings account controversy see BArch B102/41930,
Letter from the BDI to Schreihage, from 02.02.1959.
93See Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 305–308).
94See Bundesverwaltungsgericht (1958) for the ruling.
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Figure 3.2: Market shares of the banking groups in Germany by balance sheet
size (1947–1961)
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Note that the break in the time series is probably due to the currency reform in 1948.
The Public Bank System includes the Landesbanken and the Sparkassen, the Cooperative
Banking System contains the Credit Cooperatives and the Zentralkassen. There is no data
available for 1949. Source: Own elaboration based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank
(1976, pp. 126–127) for the time period from 1946–1948. For the time period form
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have been used (year end data).
in the law, but to leave them blank. Of all the banking associations, merely the private
credit bank association had sought them. A general agreement was reached by the working
groups by the end of October of 1958. The was merely one issue that remained somewhat
controversial. It was the restriction of savings deposits to natural persona only, which
was supported not only by all the private sector banks, but also by the Bundesbank. The
Interior Ministry objected to this provision on behalf of the German States and the public
banking sector, but it was not successful in having the provision removed in subsequent
high-level discussions.95
By March of 1958, the government bill was introduced to parliament, where it encoun-
tered immediate resistance by the Bundesrat (i.e. the German states).96 There was little
95See BArch B102/41904, various minutes and memos of the intragovernmental deliberations in 1958. See
especially the Memo by Schreihage, from 29.10.1958, which outlines the outstanding points of agreement.
96The Bundesrat even debated a state-sponsored competing piece of legislation that would have trans-
ferred some regulatory responsibilities to the federal level. See BArch B136/1216, p. 84–89, 165–168 &
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disagreement about the actual material regulations, such as the credit institutions covered
by the Credit Act, the provisions regarding capital and liquidity ratios, or the restrictions
to competition. Once again, the key issue was the structure of the regulatory system that
caused the dissent. The states were not prepared to accept the proposed centralization of
the regulatory structure.97 The most they were willing to accept was a central regulatory
agency for the largest credit banks and for banks operating in more than two states. The
likely reason, why the states did not want to give up their regulatory privileges stems
from the fact that the close contact with the banks allowed them to support their own pet
projects.98 It was clear to Schreihage and his men that it would be impossible to obtain the
support of the states, as long as the draft foresaw the centralization of banking regulation.
The passage of the bill was bound to end in a head-on confrontation between the central
government and the federal states.99 In doing so, the federal government could build on
the overwhelming support of the Bundestag. This was all it needed to pass the Credit Act,
as the field of banking supervision was one of competing competences between the states
and the central government. The central government could assume responsibility for the
field if there were reasons that made it indispensable for the central government to assume
control. However, unless it had the support of the Bundesrat, the central government
would need a supermajority in the Bundestag to overrule the Bundesrat’s objection.100
Importantly, the Economics Ministry was also able to secure the political support of the
Bundesbank. After all, the opposition of its predecessor, the BdL, had helped to stop the
government’s attempt to bring about the regulatory centralization in 1957.101
On the Credit Act’s way through parliament, two other issues were vigorously debated.
The Bundesrat, the Bundestag, and the Bundesbank suggested to include some form of
179, regarding the “Entwurf eines Gesetzes u¨ber Zinsen, Gebu¨hren und Wettbewerb im Kreditgewerbe”
from 29.04.1958
97See for example BArch B102/41907, Letter by von Hofe to Westrick from 18.03.1959, BArch
B102/41907, report by Veit from 20.03.1959 and the newspaper article “Ist eine zentrale Bankenaufsicht
Notwendig?”, by Hermann Veit from 16.12.1958 in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
98See BArch B102/41907, Memo by Schreihage from 16.02.1959, and Memo by Warner to Lowell and
Pumphrey from 09.02.1950 in NARA, RG 466, Decartelization and Deconcentration Division, Subject
Files, 1948-55, folder ‘Banking Deconcentration 1950’ box 1. By 1960, 55% of all government loans were
provided by the public banking sector. See Pohl et al. (2005, p. 277).
99See for example BArch B102/41889, Memo from 28.10.1958 (A 3 - 6122/58).
100The Bundesrat was unanimously opposed in this case, thus the government needed the Bundestag to
overrule the Bundesrat with a supermajority. See Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Art. 72, 74 and 77).
101Initially, the state central bank presidents demanded the establishment of a central regulatory agency
with a decentral substructure. Such a structure would have required the explicit approval of the states.
This demand was soon dropped, however. See for example B102/41889, Blessing to Erhard from 15.10.1958
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deposit insurance. The Economic Ministry studied the possibility in detail.102 However, it
eventually blocked all efforts to introduce deposit insurance as part of this Credit Act. It
argued that deposit insurance was not viable in Germany. The German banking sector was
politically dominated by three large banking groups. Neither of which had an interest in
deposit insurance.103 The Savings banks, as public institutions, had the implicit backing
of the local and regional governments. The Credit Cooperatives had devised their own
scheme to insure the deposits of their customers. Furthermore, the largest commercial
banks were so large, that if one of them were to fail, any deposit insurance scheme would
not suffice to contain the damage. Instead government intervention would be needed as
they were too big to let fail. Both the government and the large commercial banks were
aware of this. Thus, the only banking group interested in any kind of deposit insurance
would be the smaller private banks. Additionally, the government sponsored interest rate
cartel secured banks’ margins, decreased competitive pressures and therefore reduced the
probability of collapse. Thus, deposit insurance was no immediate necessity it was argued.
And even if deposit insurance were to be introduced after all, an important issue would
have to be tackled at the same time: that of equal competitive starting positions. The
savings bank system had the advantage of implicit government guarantees. It was certain,
that any attempt to privatize the savings bank system would lead to major opposition
and thus delay the Credit Act indefinitely. Thus, for the time being, not dealing with
the issue of deposit insurance, was the preferred strategy for the Economics Ministry.104
The Ministry proposed to study the issue in more detail once the Credit Act had been
passed.105
The other hotly debated issue was that of ‘revolving loans’. This was a practice
championed by finance broker Rudolf Mu¨nemann. He used revolving short term loans
from institutional investors and lent them out on a long-term basis. The Bundesbank, the
102See BArch B102/41817, Letter by Erhard to Niederhalt from 26.09.1958. Indeed, at the time the
American System of Deposit insurance was studied within the Economics Ministry. See for example BArch
B102/41817, Memo by Schork from 25.09.1958 or the Annual Report of the FDIC in 1958.
103For the market shares of banking groups in Germany see figure 3.2 on page 132.
104See BArch B102/41817, Letter by Westrick to Schedl from 08.03.1961 (VI A 3 - 4107/61), Handwritten
draft Memo from 15.09.1960, and Letter from Du¨rre to the head of Division VI from 04.01.1956. See
also BArch B102/41915, BT Drucksache 2563, 3. Wahlperiode from 01.03.1961, in which the Bundestag
encourages the government to study whether certain parts of the banking sector are at a competitive
disadvantage with respect to others, and how it would be possible to reduce competitive inequalities, such
as by introducing deposit insurance.
105Eventually Erhard even had to tell the Bundesbank off its public support for deposit insurance in order
not to jeopardize the passage of the Credit Act. See BArch B102/41817, Memo from 18.09.1959, outlining
the Bundesbank’s position. See also the Letter from Erhard to Blessing from 14.03.1961, asking to cease
its support for deposit insurance.
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Private Banks and the Finance Committee of the Bundestag wanted to see such a practice
specifically regulated in the Credit Act. They were concerned about the inherent maturity
mismatch of such a scheme and feared that as revolving credit became more ‘popular’
it would jeopardize the stability of the entire financial system. The Economics Ministry
and the Bundestag Committee on Economics were against including special provisions in
the Credit Act. After all, all the parties engaged in such practices were professionals,
and it was presumed that they understood the risks they were taking. More importantly,
the Ministry wanted to avoid being seen as passing a “lex Mu¨nemann”. Once more, the
Economics Ministry stood firm and no special provision was included in the Credit Act.106
As the legislative period drew to a close, and after over two years of discussions in
parliament, the government pressed for the enactment of the law. Just as with the previous
failed attempt to recentralize regulatory supervision, a major political wrangling ensued
over the eventual seat of the central regulatory agency. Once more the potential host-cities
of Frankfurt, Bonn and Berlin were discussed. This discussion almost derailed the project.
In order to ensure that the Credit Act could still be passed during the current legislative
period, the ruling party, the CDU, agreed to have the future supervisory agency to be
based in Berlin.107
The Bundestag passed the Credit Act with an overwhelming majority. Once again,
the Bundesrat then did everything in its powers to delay the legislative process. It called
upon the conciliation committee. The committee presented a compromise, which did not
have a chance to be accepted by the Bundestag, as it proposed the continued decentral-
ization of the banking supervision.108 The proposal was rejected by the Bundestag. The
Bundesrat, for its part, rejected the Credit Act, as it had been passed by the Bundestag.
The Bundestag in turn, overruled the Bundesrat with almost unanimity109 and the Credit
106See BArch B136/1217, Memo for the Cabinett Meeting from 02.12.1960 (6 - 55101 - 4643/60), and
Memo for the Cabinet Meeting from 13.01.1961 (6 - 55101 - 5092/61). See also BArch B102/41905, Memo
of a departmental meeting from 24.08.1960.
107See BArch B102/41915, Draft letter of Henckel to Merkatz from 04.03.1961, and Memo regarding the
Credit Act Draft from 14.03.1961. This actually created a vigorous protest by the Soviet Union, even
before the Credit Act was passed, as it did not consider West-Berlin to be part of the Federal Republic
of Germany. See BArch B102/41915, Letter by von Hofe to the Minister and the Sub-Secretary from
10.05.1961 (VI A 3 - 4253/61II) and as an appendix to the letter the translation of the Soviet protest from
15.04.1961.
108See BArch B102/41915, Memo by von Hofe from 30.05.1961 (VI A 3 - 4298/61).
109There were 350 delegates in favor and 31 against the Credit Act, with two absensions. See BArch
B102/49334, Monthly report by the Bundesbank for the month of August 1961.
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Table 3.4: Conceptual overview of the different interest groups
Centralized Regulation
Decentralized
Regulation
‘Free’ Competition Division 1a
Restricted competition
Bundestagb,Division 6c,
Private banks, Credit
Cooperatives, Bundesbank
Bundesratd, BdLe, Savings
Banksf, (Finance Ministry)g
aThis is the position by the Division led by Mu¨ller-Armack. They were most likely supported by
Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard.
bSome elements of the Bundestag actually favored increased competitive pressures in the banking sector.
cThis was the division in the Economics Ministry that was officially in charge of drafting the new Credit
Act. This division cooperated closely with the banking associations.
dThe upper house of parliament, in which the states are represented
eThe BdL was restructured into the Bundesbank in the Summer of 1957.
fThe public banks were initially in favor of restricting competition, however with increasing success in
the late 1950s they began to shift towards a loosening of the restrictions to competition.
gThe Finance Ministry did not have a strong opinion on this matter and seemed to accept the status
quo.
Note: The positions shown here are conceptual in nature. The actual positions are not
necessarily as clear cut and indeed more nuanced. Source: Own elaboration.
Act was finally passed, just before the end of the legislative period.110
Three months later, several of the German states decided to challenge the Credit Act
in the constitutional court.111 While this created a somewhat uncomfortable situation
for the government, it did not deter it from going ahead from setting up the new central
supervisory office.112 And indeed, the states’ challenge was dismissed after a round of oral
hearings.113
The Credit Act that was passed in 1961 was essentially the younger brother of the pre
World War II Credit Act of 1934. Even the constitutional court remarked the similarity
110It would only enter into force on January 1st of 1962, which was meant to give the government time
to set up the new central supervisory agency. For the Credit Act see Bundesgesetzblatt (1961).
111The states argued that the federal government had violated a number of norms that prevented it from
establishing a centralized regulatory regime without the explicit approval of the states. In particular the
states challenged that there was a pressing need to centralize regulation. Without a pressing need the
government needed the explicit approval of the states. The states also argued that the dual regulatory
structure also required approval by the Bundesrat. Last but not least, the states argued that the con-
frontational nature of the federal government violated the unwritten constitutional principle of the ‘loyalty
to the federation’ (Bundestreue). This requires all parts of a federation to cooperate with mutual respect.
For details see the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsericht from 24.07.1962, BVerGE 14, 197 - Kreditwesen.
See also the most critical norms in Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Art 87, III; Art 84 I, and Art. 72 II).
112The Economics Ministry was convinced it would win the case. The only problems it could foresee was
the possibility of an interim injunction that would prevent the government from setting up the regulatory
agency for the duration of the case. See for example BArch B102/49331, Confidential letter to Henckel from
07.10.1961. For the discussions within the federal government see also B102/49331–49334 and B136/1218,
pp. 141–143, 146.
113Bundesverfassungsericht, ruling from 24.07.1962, 2 BvF 4, 5/61, 1, 2/62 (BVerfGE 14, 197 - Kreditwe-
sen).
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of the two laws in its ruling on the constitutionality.114 Not many significant provisions
changed. Probably the most significant change was one the Americans had previously also
advocated. The central bank was to leave matters of ‘qualitative’ regulation of the banking
sector to the government’s Federal Supervisory Office; the central bank’s supervisory office
from 1934 (the ‘Aufsichtsamt’, which had been abolished in 1939) was not re-established.
Instead, the central bank focused almost entirely on monetary policy. The federal super-
visory office, was almost entirely in charge of ‘qualitative’ norms and regulation. Another
indirect ‘victim’ of American influence were the restrictions to enter the banking sector
that were based on the vague concept of ‘economic need’. These kinds of restrictions col-
lided with the constitutional right to choose ones freedom of trade and were consequently
dropped.115 A major addendum was a banking crisis manual, which described the steps
the government could take in case of a systemic crisis. This was introduced to give the
government the flexibility to act in times of crisis. In the 1934 Credit Act, such a provision
had not been a necessity, as the Weimar constitution already provided for the necessary
emergency powers. Other than that, the Credit Acts were de facto the same.116
After the first official draft of the Credit Act had been made public in 1958, a number of
suggestions for improvement were made. Amongst these were the introduction of deposit
insurance and specific regulation for revolving credit businesses. What is remarkable,
however, is that while the changes made to the draft were numerous, they did not change
either the regulation or the regulatory structure in a significant way. Thus, the original
character stood firm and the Economics Ministry made sure it would. It had to, because
any major liberalization to the regulations would in turn thwart the supermajority that
was needed to recentralize the regulatory structure, the primary objective of this piece of
legislation. Any prolonged public discussion would also thwart its probability of passage
and so it almost did. While standing firm, the Ministry could count on the support
of much of the private banking sector, which sought the restriction to competition as
a necessary shield from the competition of the public banking sector. The Economics
Ministry was further aided by the fact that the Bundestag also wanted to see the Credit
Act pass once and for all before the end of the legislative period; even more than it
wanted to see the inclusion of deposit insurance or other amendments. The German states
114See Bundesverfassungsericht, ruling from 24.07.1962, 2 BvF 4, 5/61, 1, 2/62 (BVerfGE 14, 197 -
Kreditwesen). See also Ambrosius (1998, p. 162), who reports that the similarity was noted by the public.
115For the corresponding ruling of the Federal Administrative Court see Bundesverwaltungsgericht (1958).
116For a schematic overview of the regulatory structure see figure 3.3 on page 138.
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Figure 3.3: Schematic overview of the regulatory arrangement in West–
Germany in 1962
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The centralized twin regulation and supervision of the banking sector from 1934 was
essentially re-introduced. Crisis resolution measures, such as the declaration of a bank
holiday or a moratorium for the liabilities of a bank were reserved for the federal govern-
ment. The only credit institutions not subject to most regulation were specialized credit
institutions such as the Bundesbank, the Federal Post Office or the Reconstruction Credit
Institute (KfW). For details on the exceptions see Bundesgesetzblatt (1961, §2). Source:
Own elaboration.
fought the centralization of the regulatory institutions to the very end. The states even
launched a constitutional challenge, claiming essentially that the centralization of state
powers without their consent was unconstitutional. However the constitutional court ruled
in favor of the central government and ‘its’ Credit Act.
3.8 Conclusion
The genesis of the German Credit Act of 1961 is one of twists and turns, and certainly
not as straightforward as it is traditionally assumed in the literature. Initial drafts for a
‘new’ Credit Act were substantially different in character than the final version eventually
passed by parliament. This is not simply attributable to the fading of Allied influence on
German legislation. Instead it is a manifestation of a constitutional struggle between the
federal government and the states over the right to regulate the banking sector. The fact
that restrictions to competitions were upheld is to a significant extent a reflection of the
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demand for it by the private banking sector, which feared the competition from the public
banking sector.
At the outset of the Federal Republic of Germany, regulatory powers lay with the
states’ finance ministries. First drafts of a Credit Act largely confirmed the Allied-imposed
status quo, and the Finance Ministry under Scha¨ffer seemed like it would have accepted
such a Credit Act. The transfer of competence in terms of money and credit, from the
Finance Ministry to the Economics Ministry under the leadership of Erhard, was therefore
a key turning point. The Ministry under Erhard cooperated closely with the banking
associations in preparing new drafts. In particular, the private banks had significant
influence. However, at the same time, the Ministry of Economics was torn internally
over how much competitive pressure should be allowed within the banking sector. On
one hand, there was the ‘free’ market faction under Mu¨ller-Armack’s Division I, whose
intellectual views were similar to those of Erhard. On the other, there was the Money and
Credit Division, Division VI, which, in key positions, contained several former employees
of the supervisory institutions (or the Economics Ministry) of the pre-war period, and
which was in close contact with the banking associations. The private banking sector,
and to some extend the public banking sector as well, sought to maintain the relative
calm the restrictions to competition in the banking sector provided. Especially the private
credit banks sought the restriction as a necessary shield from the competition of the public
banking system. Both the passage of the Antitrust Act and the Bundesbank Act served
as important primers for the Credit Act. The Antitrust Act permitted the government an
exception to the rule so it could establish a cartel in the banking sector. The Bundesbank
Act redistributed the balance of power from the state central banks, to the central bank
directorate. This, in turn, changed the stance of the Bundesbank towards the Credit
Act, from supporting decentralization of banking supervision to supporting a centralized
supervisory system.
In a parallel development with the drafts on an Antitrust and a Bundesbank Act, the
drafts for the Credit Act showed remarkable change over time: from clearly Allied- (or
more accurately, American-) inspired pieces of legislation, back to the path the Germans
were on before the Second World War. The first (unofficial) drafts for a new Credit Act
were written while the Allies were still involved in German legislative affairs, and while
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the supervisory institutions, the central bank and the large commercial banks were decen-
tralized. Consequently, the first drafts tried to incorporate Allied demands, which aimed
at codifying the status quo. But already then, the Allies main preoccupation lay with the
large commercial banks and their decentralization. The Allies wanted to prevent them
from recentralizing completely as they saw in them an excessive concentration of finan-
cial power. At the same time, the Allies also realized that the decentralized supervisory
structure had suffered from political capture – state politicians were using the close link
to their personal advantage. Thus, the Allies were open to a reintroduction of centralized
supervision.
Indeed, the influence of the Allies in terms of regulatory supervision does not reach
much beyond the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Allies left
Germany with a crudely decentralized supervisory system and with no concrete guidelines
on how to put the system on a sound footing. The only general guidelines, given to the
Germans for an eventual redrafting of their credit act, were the separation of qualitative
and quantitative regulation – the central bank should worry about monetary policy and
the supervisory institutions should be ‘policing’ the banks – and the decentralization of
regulatory institutions. The latter guideline was scrapped by the Allies in 1950. From the
spring of 1951 on, the Americans did not exert any active pressure in terms of banking
supervision on the German government. Only on the issue of branching restrictions did
Americans continue to exert their influence. Once the Branch Restriction Act of 1952
was passed, the Allies de-facto withdrew completely from matters relating to the German
banking system. After 1955, Germany had also regained full legislative independence
and Allied influence on all German legislation was negligible. Thus, probably the longest
lasting effect on German banking supervision was an indirect one. The new constitution
created a federal state and these states were originally given the competence to regulate.
But it was also the same constitution that allowed for the central government to take the
reigns of banking supervision away from the states. Indeed, what the birth of the German
Credit Act of 1961 most vividly portrays, is the struggle between the central government
and the federal states in the early Federal Republic of Germany.
One most striking aspect of the (re-)birth of the Credit Act is that the private banks
did not try to use this opportunity to rebel against the regulations, even though they were
given intimate access to the drafting process. The banks did not jump on the free-market
Chapter 3. Credit Act of 1961 141
bandwagon advocated by many German (and American) economists of the post-war pe-
riod. Instead, the banks preferred the cosy, government-cartelized system introduced be-
fore the Second World War, which restricted competition. The private banks tried to reign
in increasing competition from the public savings bank system by working closely with the
government, to prevent major overhauls of the pre World War II system. Throughout the
drafting process, there is little evidence that German officials systematically looked out-
wards at other regulatory systems, in order to determine the regulatory best practices at
the time (as they had done between 1931 and 1934). The only reference points for German
policymakers was their own Credit Act of 1934 and its subsequent amendments. Merely
in the case of deposit insurance did they study the American Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation system.
Theoretically, the Germans could have changed their regulatory system in several
ways. They could have introduced deposit insurance, a separation of investment and
deposit banks, a prohibition or strict regulation of revolving credit, measures against too
big to fail or even tackled the privatization of the public banks – which to this day are in
public hands. Only deposit insurance was seriously under consideration at one point. It
was not adopted because of the special structure of the German banking sector. Public
banks and credit cooperatives already had implicit or explicit deposit insurance, and large
commercial banks were, even back then, too big to fail and would have required government
intervention in case one of them failed.117 This is probably the most striking part of the
birth of the Credit Act of 1961. That the government was well aware of the too big to fail
nature of its largest banks and that it deemed that it was a risk the government could not
(or should not) tackle. The lack of innovative desire caused the Germans to pass effectively
the same Credit Act they had already passed almost thirty years earlier.
The lack of innovative desire can be explained. After all, the centralization of the
supervisory institutions was the key issue the federal government wanted to see introduced.
However, this provision encountered stiff opposition by the states as the government had
learned in a first failed attempt to recentralize the regulatory responsibilities in 1957.
Consequently, the government had to rally a two-thirds majority within the lower house of
parliament, the Bundestag. Every ‘innovation’ that deviated from the status quo of a, with
the banking sector, still popular Credit Act of 1934 would most likely have jeopardized the
117Government mandated deposit insurance was only introduced in 1998. A voluntary scheme was intro-
duced in the early 1970s.
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necessary two-thirds majority. Consequently, the government played it safe and decided
to leave innovative reforms for the future, when a two-thirds majority would no longer be
necessary.118
Figure 3.4: A schematic overview of the struggle over the Credit Act
Central 
Regulation 
Decentralized 
Regulation 
‘Free’ 
Competition 
Ludwig Erhard’s goal 
Restricted 
Competition 
Credit Act 1934/61 Status Quo 1948 
1962+ 
1948-1961 
The ultimate goal of Ludwig Erhard and the ordoliberals within his Ministry of Economics
was to recentralize regulatory control and to overhaul the regulations of the banking sector
in order to introduce more competitive pressures. Eventually it became clear that it was
not politically feasible to tackle both issues at the same time. Consequently a two step
strategy was adopted. The recentralization of regulatory control happened in a first step
by retreating effectively to the Credit Act of 1934. After that, the central government
would gradually introduce competition into the banking sector. Source: Own elaboration.
118For a schematic overview of this rationale see figure 3.4 on page 142.
Chapter 4
A failed Institutional Assimilation
The American attempt to restructure German banking
regulation after the Second World War
4.1 Introduction
After the Second World War, the American Military Government undertook drastic efforts
to change the banking system in West-Germany (henceforth just Germany). It restruc-
tured the entire German banking system, its rules, its regulatory institutions, and its major
financial institutions, in an attempt to introduce the principles governing the American
banking system.1 The German banking sector was subject to one of the most comprehen-
sive transformations of a banking system, ever.2 What makes this little-known episode
of German banking history3 so intriguing is that it can provide important insights into
American banking history.
1The title of this chapter is a nod to the article by Guinnane (1994). In the article he describes
an attempt to transplant German-style credit cooperatives into the Irish banking sector. In Germany,
such credit cooperatives had performed exceptionally well in providing micro-credit to rural areas. The
credit cooperatives were installed upon the Irish banking sector ‘from above’. As it turned out, the credit
cooperatives failed to thrive in Ireland since the population largely ignored these institutions. Eventually,
the ‘experiment’ was abandoned. The historically grown structures of the banking system and their social
context, would simply not accommodate such an additional institution. For a different perspective on why
the transplant failed in Ireland see Colvin and McLaughlin (2012).
2Reform of the banking system had been pondered by the American Military Government in Japan
after World War II as well, but no major changes were implemented. For the Americans’ reform of the
Japanese banking system see Tsutsui (1988).
3I found that it is an almost unknown episode outside of the German-speaking economic history litera-
ture. At best the break-up of the largest credit banks, the Großbanken, is known, but not the full extent
of the American assimilation effort.
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In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I concluded that the reason why the American bank-
ing system developed into the decentralized structure it did (and why the German banking
system did not) was primarily a function of the extensive states’ rights – with respect to
chartering banks – enshrined in the American constitution. This implies that the reg-
ulatory arrangement of the American banking system was only a second-best solution
that was held in place by these strong states rights. In the absence of these institutional
constraints, no such system would have evolved and persisted. The American assimila-
tion effort in Germany provides a natural experiment to test this hypothesis. The most
important elements of the American state banking system were imposed on the German
banking system exogenously with the help of military decrees. However, the new German
constitution (the ‘Grundgesetz’ ) lacked the strong states’ rights to charter banks present
in American constitution. The struggle between the German states – who wanted to retain
their newly gained rights – and the federal government – who wanted to recentralize the
regulatory structure – was eventually even taken to the constitutional court. If the con-
stitutional court had ruled in favor of the states instead of the central government, parts
of the American institutional structure could have survived in the German banking sys-
tem. Instead, the American institutions disappeared completely. Rather than portraying
a supposed resilience of the German banking sector, this episode highlights the weakness
of the American decentralized regulatory structure in a different political set-up.
This chapter adds to the literature by presenting the failed Institutional Assimilation
as a natural experiment of the American regulatory structure. To the best of my knowl-
edge it is also the first comprehensive account of the American influence on the German
banking system for the post-war period all the way up until 1962 – when all of the Allied
reforms had been largely reversed.4 The most detailed historical accounts of the discus-
sions taking place after the Second World War with respect to the banking system are
those of Horstmann (1991) and Loehr (1952). Horstmann (1991) describes Allied policy
and discussions with respect to the Großbanken in detail. However his treatment of other
aspects of the banking regulation is light. Additionally, Horstmann’s focus only lies on the
post War period up until 1952. Loehr (1952) is the official U.S. Military Government his-
torian’s account of the Allied attempts to change the German banking system as a whole.
Again, Loehr’s work only covers the time period up until 1952. Additionally, it lacks
4There are, however, several comprehensive works on the American attempt to decartelize and decon-
centrate German industry. See for example Berghahn (1986), Murach-Brand (2004) or Partridge (2011).
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the inputs from German archival sources and is generally less detailed than Horstmann.
Adler (1949) is a most valuable contemporary account of the events from the American
perspective on the ground up until 1949. Other works on German banking from that time
period only cover specific parts of the banking sector such as individual larg credit banks5
or the Bundesbank and its predecessor the Bank deutscher La¨nder.6 The history of the
regulatory institutions had received little treatment so far. It is touched upon in an edited
volume by Pohl (1998) and in Bu¨schgen (1982), but neither make use of archival material.
To the best of my knowledge, the first complete analysis of the politics behind the changes
to the regulatory institutions in the banking sector based on archival material is the third
chapter of this thesis. Thus, this chapter also adds to the research by presenting the
history of German banking institutions from 1945 until 1962 from a unified perspective.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section describes the German and Amer-
ican banking regulations prior to World War 2. This is followed by a discussion of the
legal persistence between pre-war and post-war Germany. After this, the original plans of
the American Military Government for the German economy and its banking system are
presented. It is then contrasted with the actual regulatory developments in the banking
system. The final section provides a discussion of the divergence of the outcomes with re-
spect to the original plans, and the interpretation of this episode as an important natural
experiment for American banking history.
4.2 German and American banking regulation prior to the
Second World War
For much of its history the German banking system was largely unregulated. At the
same time, local and regional governments intervened directly in the sector by forming
their own credit institutions. As a consequence, by the 1930s the banking sector had
developed a most peculiar structure. Apart from the fact that a major share of its banks
were government run, it was characterized by comprising tens of thousands small banks,
as well as a few hundred larger banks. What was further remarkable about the system
5Such as the works on the Commerz-, Dresdner- and Deutsche Bank by Wolf (1995), Ahrens (2007) and
Holtfrerich (1995), respectively. Holtfrerich’s account also studies the motivations of American intervention
in detail.
6See for example Dickhaus (1998); Hentschel (1988a,b); Marsh (1992) or Wandel (1980). Wandel also
discusses the American motivation and plans for the banking system as a whole.
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was, that it had an inherent division of labor and was not yet a system dominated by
universal banking.7 Over 20,000 credit cooperatives specialized on micro-credit in rural
areas. More than 2500 public savings banks (or Sparkassen) focused on small-scale loans
as well as saving deposits in more urban areas. Much of the savings banks’ investment
was in regional government papers. The Regional Banks (or Girozentralen) were the
umbrella organizations of the savings banks within a particular region, which helped to
even out credit demand and supply inequalities throughout the savings bank system within
their region. The credit cooperatives had similar umbrella organizations as well, called
the Zentralkassen. Mortgage banks would engage only in real estate business. About
1000 private bankers tended to perform the function of stock-brokers and investment
advisers, whereas the Großbanken8, some of which had a few hundred branches throughout
Germany, would be mainly engaged in wholesale banking, i.e. export finance, mid to
large-scale industrial loans, keeping checking accounts for the largest corporations as well
as securities trading. So did other regional credit banks.
Germany’s central bank (the Reichsbank) had a centralized structure as it was typical
for European central banks. Through most of its history it was not independent from the
government.9 At the same time, it could open branches throughout Germany and these
branches accepted deposits and thus competed directly with other commercial banks to
some extent. This gave the Reichsbank some information with respect to the conditions
of the banking system. However it had no regulatory powers until the 1930s.10
Widespread banking regulation was only introduced when a major financial crisis in
1931 forced government to rethink the regulatory framework of its banking system. The
immediate cause of the crisis was not the banks’ behavior, but the German government’s
reparation policy. Yet, much of the banking system, including savings banks and the
credit banks had overextended credit throughout the 1920s. Furthermore, this credit had
been extended on the back of short term foreign debt.11 While the government had not
7Fohlin (2007) and Guinnane (2002) make the case for the division of labor for the period up to 1914.
This specialization lasted even well into the 1920s and even 1930s, as it is reflected in contemporary
discussions of the banking system. See for example Reichsbank (1933a) and Reichsbank (1933b). See also
Pohl, Rudolph, and Schulz (2005, pp. 91-98).
8Often they are better known as “the Universal Banks”. The literal translation of Großbanken is ‘large
banks’. In this chapter Großbanken and large credit banks will be referred to interchangeably.
9Apart from a brief stint in the 1920s.
10See James (1985, pp. 19–25). See also chapter 2 of this thesis.
11For modern interpretations of the crisis see Ritschl and Sarferaz (2010), Schnabel (2004) or Temin
(2008).
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explicitly prohibited this policy, due to the lack of proper bank regulations, it was largely
unaware of the critical state of Germany’s banking system until the crisis hit.12
The regulatory changes first introduced in the emergency decrees of 1931 were ex-
tended and codified in the Credit Act of 1934.13 They created a centralized regulatory
supervision of the entire banking sector. Regulation was organized in two central institu-
tions which held extensive powers. The supervisory office, as part of the Reichsbank, and
the commissioner of the banking system, a regulatory body associated with the Ministry
of Economics. The supervisory office was in charge of issuing general rules such as the
liquidity and capital ratios, whereas the commissioner’s office was to enforce these rules.
Cooperation between these two regulatory institutions was close, by necessity. The reg-
ulatory reforms of the 1930s also introduced an auditing scheme, stiff barriers to entry
in the form of chartering14 and a state-sanctioned interest-cartel that was meant to stifle
competition. Furthermore, investment restrictions were put in place, and the regulatory
institutions were given the power to enforce liquidity and capital requirements. However,
the reforms of the 1930s did not change the basic structure of the banking sector. Quite
the opposite, it cemented the existing structures.
These characteristics would not change significantly during the remainder of the Third
Reich. There would merely be a shift in the regulatory powers from the Reichsbank and
the Commissioner’s office, directly to the Minister of Economics.15 Thus, by the beginning
of the Second World War, the German banking system was characterized by a centralized
central bank, centralized regulatory supervision, and a cartelized banking sector with
significant barriers to entry as well as a ‘division of labor’ amongst the banking groups.
How did regulation differ in the United States?
Regulating the banks had a much longer tradition in the United States than in Germany.
In fact the first attempts to regulate banks went back almost as far as American indepen-
dence.16 Banks had to adhere to the regulations of their chartering authority. Prior to the
12The confusion with respect of the condition of the German banking system in those days of crisis is
vividly portrayed in Born (1967, pp. 98–109).
13See Reichsgesetzblatt (1931a,b,c, 1934).
14The regulatory authorities could deny virtually any application for a new bank or a new branch, if it
wished to do so on. They could do this on the grounds of its ‘potential adverse impact on existing banks’.
15See the amendments to the Credit Act in Reichsgesetzblatt (1939a,b) and Reichsgesetzblatt (1944).
16For the early history of American banking regulation see for example Hammond (1957) and Legler,
Sylla, and Wallis (1987). See also Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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Table 4.1: The German banking system prior to World War II
Assets as a %
of all banks
Number of
banksa
Bank Group 1930 1938 1930 1938
Public Bank System 35.3% 45.4% 2624 2558
Sparkassen 20.6% 29.1% 2583 2517
Public Regional Banksb 14.7% 16.3% 41 41
Cooperative Banking System 9.4% 10.5% 19115 19076
Cooperative Banks 7.2% 7.8% 19070 19040
Zentralkassen 2.2% 2.7% 45 36
Incorporated Private Banks 26.8% 22.9% 186 109
Berliner Großbankenc 19.4% 11.6% 6 5
Provinzbanken 2.9% 1.8% 55 37
Spezial und Hausbanken 4.5% 9.5% 125 67
Mortgage Banks 13.0% 11.0% 44 36
Pure Mortgage Banks 10.0% 8.1% 33 27
Mixed Mortgage Banks 2.6% 2.5% 3 3
Landschaften 0.4% 0.4% 8 6
Private Bankers 5.3% 1.6%
800-
1000d
491
Othere 10.2% 8.7% 219 132
TOTAL 100% 100% 23139f 22270
aThese numbers do not include branches.
bIncludes the “Girozentralen” and other public “Landesbanken” and “Staatsbanken”.
cThese are commonly (and somewhat mistakenly) referred to as the German universal banks. In
Germany all banks could be universal banks, unless their own founding statutes prevented them from
engaging in certain business practices.
dExact numbers for private bankers are not available for this year.
eThe most important banks in this category are government ones with specific functions such as the
Golddiskontbank.
fThis number assumes that there were 950 private bankers in 1930.
Note the size of the Public Bank System with respect to the largest Credit banks – the
Großbanken. Source: Own calculations based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank (1976,
p. 121).
1860s, American banks could be chartered only by state regulatory institutions – usually
these were the states’ Finance Ministries.17 Regulation of banks was thus decentralized
to the state level. In the 1860s the central government introduced the national banking
system in an effort to unify the currency and to replace the state banking system . The
former goal was achieved by giving a de-facto note issue monopoly to banks with a national
charter. State banks’ note emission was taxed so heavily that it was not viable anymore.
As a consequence, most state banks either ceased operations or converted their charters
into a national one. The American federal government had to go this indirect route to
centralize banking regulation, since the constitution did not grant it the power to simply
17The exceptions to the rule were the First and Second Bank of the United States, which were chartered
by Congress.
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take away the states’ right to charter and regulate state banks. Thus the need to create
incentives for state banks to convert their charter into national banks.18
At first it seemed like the plan would work, and that the state banking system would
be replaced by the national banking system. The Americans had come close to de-facto
unifying banking regulation throughout the country. However, the state banking system
staged a comeback and the so-called ‘dual banking system’ took hold in the United States.
In part this was due to the strict regulatory requirements of national banks, and in part
due to the spread of cashless transfers. The comeback was further aided by the state
regulators lowering regulatory regulatory requirements. Since banks had been given a
choice of their regulator – either a national regulator or the respective states’ regulator –
they could now engage more actively than ever in regulatory arbitrage.19
This regulatory arrangement increased further in complexity with the establishment
of the Federal Reserve in 1913. The introduction of a (decentralized) central bank to
the American banking system was also used, once more, to attempt to unify the banking
system. Banks wanting to have access to the re-discount facility of the Federal Reserve
had to subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve. While national banks were forced by
law to become members of the Federal Reserve System and to subject themselves to its
regulations, state banks were free to join. Almost none of the state banks opted-in due to
the stringency of the regulations. These were subsequently relaxed for state banks (but
not for national banks) in order to increase their membership rates.
During the Great Depression, the regulatory structure of the banking system increased
yet more in complexity. Congress mandated the separation of investment and deposit
banks and it moved towards slightly more centralized decision making within the Federal
Reserve System. It also introduced a deposit insurance scheme. Once more, it was also
used as an indirect attempt to unify the regulation of the banking system under the
auspices of the Federal Reserve. In the original 1933 Banking Act, all banks wanting
to accede to deposit insurance were required to join the Federal Reserve System, if they
were not a member already. However, the date by which this provision was to come in
force was first delayed and eventually dropped. Thus, at the outset of Second World War,
the regulations of the German and American banking systems followed radically different
18This and the following paragraphs are based on chapter 2 of this thesis.
19To some extend, state banks could already engage in regulatory arbitrage before, by choosing the state
in which to incorporate.
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Table 4.2: German and American regulations in 1935
Structural
Regulations
Germany (1935) United States (1935)
Regulatory
Institutionsa
Centralized Decentralizedb
Central Bank Centralized Decentralizedc
Branching Free Restrictedd
Investment
Restrictions
Universal bankinge
Separation of investment
and deposit banksf
Deposit Insurance None Yesg
aThis also includes the supervisory institutions
bAlthough the national banking system is a centralized one, banks are free to change from one system
to another thus making regulation permeable.
cEven though the Federal Reserve System had just moved to a more centralized approach to decision
making, it can still be characterized as a decentralized banking system as many important competences
still lay with the individual Federal Reserve Banks. See Cwik (1970, p. 35).
dInter-state branching was generally prohibited. There was limited intra-state branching however. The
individual states could decide whether to allow branching within their state. Most states chose not to allow
it.
eThere was a mandated internal separation for the use of funds depending on their origins.
fTechnically this separation only applied to National Banks and State Member Banks. State banks
that were not members of the Federal Reserve System did not have to adhere to this separation.
gDeposit insurance was mandatory for all national banks and for state member banks. State non-
member banks could opt in. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also acted as an additional
regulatory institution.
approaches.20 In particular, while the German system was subject to a highly centralized
regulatory supervision, the American system was mostly decentralized.
4.3 The Allied reform plans
The immediate aftermath of the Second World War is a highly interesting but complex
period. While the German military had officially surrendered, there was no declaration of
submission by the German government and neither was there a formal armistice. Instead,
the armies of the Allies had occupied the territory, and assumed “supreme authority” of
Germany. At the same time, the occupiers explicitly refrained from annexing Germany.21
Such a situation was a novelty from a legal standpoint. The key question for legal experts
was whether the nation Germany had ceased to exist as a sovereign nation, or whether
it was merely occupied.22 This question was not only of academic interest, but also of
practical relevance when the Allies tried to rebuild the economic and legal system. If
20See table 4.2 on page 150 for a comparison.
21See the ‘Berlin declaration’ in U.S. Department of State (1985).
22See Kunz (1950) or Rheinstein (1948) for contemporaries’ views of this ‘legal dilemma’.
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Germany had not ceased to exist, then its laws and (banking) regulations would still be
applicable.
And indeed, this was how West-Germany was de-facto treated. All the laws and
regulations from the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich did, in principle, continue
to be in force. Since the Allies were in control of the legislature, the executive and the
judicial system, it was in their hand to decide whether the old laws were applied or not.23
At the same time, the Allies issued proclamations, ordinances or military ‘laws’ in order
to administer the country. These overrode Germany’s existing laws. In most cases these
did not replace the old laws entirely.24
The Allied Control Council’s first law repealed all laws enacted during the Third
Reich, which were political in nature or which had helped cement the National Socialists’
grip on power.25 The most important laws to be repealed were explicitly listed in the
Control Council’s law. However, many more laws enacted during the Third Reich were
not mentioned. Consequently every single one of them would, in theory, have had to be
checked for their National Socialist content. This led to great uncertainty, especially with
laws like the Credit Act of 1934, the act specifying the nature of the regulatory institutions
and their powers, which had been amended during Nazi rule.26 Additionally, the central
institutions in charge of regulating the banking sector, the Ministry of Economics and the
Reichsbank, had ceased to function with the end of the Second World War.27
The German political set-up was largely reached over a series of conferences between
the Americans, the British and the Soviets at Tehran, Yalta and, finally, Potsdam.28 The
23The Directive to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military
Government of Germany (or simply Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067 – J.C.S. 1067), described the
situation as follows to the American military forces: “[You are] clothed with supreme legislative, executive,
and judicial authority in the areas occupied by forces under your command” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1945).
24One can compare this to how EU law superseeds any existing national law of one of its member
countries.
25See Allied Control Council for Germany (1945).
26This uncertainty was further increased when Germany obtained its new constitution in 1949. Thus,
every paragraph of every law not explicitly and implicitly repealed by the Allies, needed to be checked for
its conformity with the new constitution as well.
27The Reichsbank’s branches in the states capitals were used by the Allies in the initial occupation
period, however it’s main central bodies in Berlin were not.
28Much of the discussions behind the scenes took place at the European Advisory Commission (EAC)
that was a joint body of the three Allies set-up to facilitate planning for the post-surrender period. See
Hammond (1962, p. 316).
Chapter 4. Failed Institutional Assimilation 152
main policy principles for post-war Germany, which these Allies agreed on, were those of
demilitarization, denazification, decentralization and democratization.29
The Potsdam Agreement installed the Allied Control Council as the supreme governing
body of the whole of Germany. Any political or economic system that was to be applied
uniformly throughout the four zones, needed approval by the Council. The original plan,
as stated in the Potsdam agreement, was to treat Germany as a ‘single economic unit’.
Of course, this required agreement on the future economic structure of Germany by all
four countries. Obtaining such an agreement would prove elusive, especially with respect
to the banking system.
4.3.1 American economic policy towards post-war Germany
The American government began studying feasible policies for the post-war treatment of
Germany almost with the outset of the American entry into the war in 1941. Nevertheless,
first concrete policy proposals for occupation would only be drawn up in the first half of
1944 as the set date for the invasion of France came closer.30 The Combined Directive
for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, better known as CCS
551, was a joint directive for the American and British armed forces.31 It was a rather
benign directive. It did not contain any provisions requiring a restructuring of the German
economy or the banking system. While it gave the military ultimate control over the
productive capabilities, the economy was to be kept at full output, with exception of the
war industries. No major reconstruction or reorganization was on the cards at that time.32
This would change when the first American cabinet-level discussions with respect to
the post-war treatment of Germany took place in the Summer of 1944. As a result of the
Allied invasion in Normandy, the immediate collapse of the ‘Third Reich’ and its economy
seemed to be a real possibility. The American military in Europe pressed urgently for
more concrete policy prescriptions that would be valid after a German surrender as well.33
29France was not a party at the conferences and consequently did not sign the agreement. Thus, in
principle, is was free to pursue its ‘own’ policy (Clay, 1950, p. X).
30For details of the first period up until 1944 see Hammond (1962, pp. 311–326) and Zink (1957, pp.
6–19).
31The directive CSS 551 was later weaved into the American Handbook for Military Government in
Germany.
32See Hammond (1962, pp. 327–329), Horstmann (1991, pp. 21–23), Murach-Brand (2004, pp. 28, 30)
and Zink (1957, pp. 19–20). The line of a “stern peace with reconciliation” taken by the CSS 551 was
indeed the line advocated by the U.S. State Department. See Hammond (1962, pp. 343–344, 346).
33See Dorn (1957, pp, 490–491), Hammond (1962, pp. 340–341) and Murach-Brand (2004, p. 30).
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At about the same time, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. had become
acquainted with post-occupation plans for Germany on a trip to Europe in August of
1944. He and his advisor Henry D. White were outraged by the “benevolently paternalistic
character”34 of the provisions vis-a-vis Germany. Both were convinced that a soft peace
would not be successful in preventing Germany from waging war again. On his way back
to Washington, Morgenthau decided to become heavily involved in the policy planning
for post-war Germany. Up to that point Morgenthau and the Treasury had hardly been
involved. Morgenthau made good use of his excellent relationship with President Roosevelt
to instigate a complete re-think of American policy. In late August of 1944 a cabinet
commission was installed by President Roosevelt to re-consider the economic future of
occupied Germany.35
The commission consisted of the Secretaries of State (Cordell Hull), of the Trea-
sury (Henry Morgenthau Jr.) and of War (Henry L. Stimson). Hull, Morgenthau and
Stimson all aimed to democratize Germany through de-militarizing, de-nazifying and de-
centralizing its political system and its economy. Yet, the main point they failed to agree
on, was the long-term economic policy to pursue in occupied Germany. The opinions within
the government varied considerably on this point. While Stimson argued for as little in-
tervention as necessary and a quick exit of the military, Morgenthau was arguing for the
‘pastoralization’ of wide stretches of previously highly industrialized areas of Germany and
a long-term engagement. In his “Suggested Post-Surrender Program for Germany” (better
known as the original ‘Morgenthau Plan’) he called for the de-militarization, partitioning
and decentralization of Germany. On one hand, the plan called for extreme infractions
into the German state and the economic system, such as the internazionalization of the
Ruhr area. On the other hand, it propagated a hands off approach in operational eco-
nomic issues such as price controls, rationing and distribution. The economy was to be
converted into one highly dependent on foreign trade, in order to take away its capability
to re-arm in autarky. Additionally, the German population was to be held to subsistence
levels. It was a plan that was extreme in its policy recommendations as it called for the
34Cited in Horstmann (1991, p. 25) from the Morgenthau Diary I, p. 443ff.
35See Dorn (1957, p. 491), Hammond (1962, pp. 348–356), Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 402–403). and
Morgenthau (1946, pp. 125–126).
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permanent dismemberment of Germany and it would have prevented economic reconstruc-
tion.36 The Morgenthau plan was followed up by a series of heated memoranda between
the commission members and the President’s office.37
In particular the antitrust experts of the Treasury and the Justice department were
determined to reconstruct Germany according to an idealized American model of capi-
talism. By extension they hoped this would influence the rest of Europe as well. The
German economy with its tendency to form cartels served as a stark contrast to the ideal
American model. The only major question was how far de-concentration should be taken.
Was it about the break-up of just the largest companies or was it about the atomization
of the entire German economy?38 Despite the strong objections from Stimson and Hull
and continued opposition throughout the spring of 1945, the basic ideas behind the Mor-
genthau plan became the official policy of the American Government towards Germany in
the initial occupation period.39 There was to be a strong break between Nazi-Germany
and post-war Germany not only in terms of its political system, but also in terms of its
economic system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067 (or simply J.C.S. 1067) was is-
sued to the military on May 21st, 1945, as the new basic document guiding the policies of
the American Military Government in Germany. It contained very much the same policy
Morgenthau had advocated for, albeit in a moderated form. In turn, the influence of the
J.C.S. 1067, and thus of Morgenthau’s ideas, on the Potsdam Agreement was evident as
well.40 However, guidelines were one thing. Their practical application was another mat-
ter altogether. This led to severe tensions between the American Military Government in
Germany and the federal government in Washington D.C..41 Soon enough, the Americans
had to accept the realities on the ground and adapted their economic policies accordingly.
36See U.S. Department of the Treasury (1944) for the original Morgenthau Plan. A reprinted version of
plan that Roosevelt took with him to a conference in Quebec can also be found in Morgenthau (1945, pp.
1–4).
37Both Hull and Stimson opposed the radical Morgenthau approach to the economy and the German
population, whereas President Roosevelt was sympathetic to it. For a comprehensive description of the
dispute see Hammond (1962, pp. 353–388).
38See Berghahn (1986, pp. 85–88).
39For the discussions in the Fall, Winter and Spring of 1944/45 see Dorn (1957), Hammond (1962, pp.
387–427) and Moltmann (1967).
40See also Murach-Brand (2004, pp. 39–40). Holtfrerich (1995, p. 405) points out that the J.C.S. 1067
underwent further moderation under the Potsdam agreement. Democratic parties were now permissible
and the living standard of Germans would not be allowed to exceed the average of its neighbours. The
J.C.S. 1067 had required a special permission for democratic parties and it would grant German living
standards not to exceed that of its poorest neighbour.
41See Dorn (1957, pp. 481–482) and Stolleis (2008, pp. 280, 290).
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Instead of decentralizing the German economy in order to keep it weak, it was supposed
to be reconstructed according to the American antitrust ideals.42
The different viewpoints within the American government, with respect to German
occupation policy, were a key characteristic of the period. There was no clear mandate
as to which department was responsible for the occupation policy. Thus, several depart-
ments joined in on the discussion.43 Only over time would the Military Governor General
Lucius D. Clay learn to assert himself over the quarrelled departments back home, in
part thanks to his superior local knowledge and in part thanks to a withdrawal of the
US Treasury from occupation policy.44 Additionally, with President Truman in power as
of April of 1945, the disproportionate influence on the President’s office by Morgenthau,
and consequently the U.S. Treasury, had come to an end.45 Nevertheless, many treasury
officials and sympathisers with Morgenthau’s views were sent to Germany as officials in
the American Military Government, where they would hold key positions in the financial
and decartelization divisions.46
4.3.2 The Dodge plan for the German banking system
As outlined in both the J.C.S. 1067 and the Potsdam Agreement, the basic principles of
decartelization and decentralization paired with denazification also applied to the banking
system. But there was no specific reform prescription other than these principles. However,
what the Potsdam agreement did specify was that the banking system would be one of
joint responsibility of the four Allies. Thus, any reform of the banking sector should have
to be agreed upon in the Allied Control Council.
For much of the initial occupation period there had been no definite American plan
as to what to do with the banking system.47 On one hand, this was due to the fact that
42See Berghahn (1986, pp. 88–90).
43The fact that the US Treasury was initially so much involved in post-war planning carries home that
point. Common sense would dictate that the Department of State or the War Department would be the
obvious choices. One, because it is in charge of international affairs and the other, because it was to
implement the actual policies on the ground. Indeed, during the early occupation period turf wars were a
constant source of disagreement in the American administration.
44See Dorn (1957, pp. 494–497) and Wandel (1980, pp. 157–158).
45Indeed, Morgenthau was so frustrated by Truman and his administration – Morgenthau was not invited
to join the US delegation at Potsdam – that he resigned in July 1945. See Holtfrerich (1995).
46See Horstmann (1991, pp. 54–60) and Murach-Brand (2004, pp. 43–45).
47For the early deliberations with respect to the Financial system see Horstmann (1991, pp. 54–60).
Analyses of the German banking system and corresponding memoranda from mid 1944 until mid 1945
can be found in NARA RG 260, OMGUS, FINAD, Financial Policies & Military Government Legislation,
NND 775058, Box 109.
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there were much more pressing matters to attend to than the reform of the banking sector,
such as the construction of a military administration, as well as dealing with the millions
of refugees, prisoners and an impoverished population, which needed to be fed.48 On the
other hand, it was due to the American military on the ground not receiving much policy
guidance from Washington either.49 Washington did not press for immediate reform plans
of the banking sector and General Clay and his top advisors (a businessman and a State
Department official) did not see any need for reform, given that decisions with respect
to the banking system were to be made jointly by the Allied Control Council. Thus, no
concrete progress was made on this matter until the fall of 1945.50
The first reform plan that was pursued by the Americans was that decided upon by
Joseph M. Dodge, the freshly instated director of the finance division of the Office of the
Military Government of the United States (henceforth just “OMGUS”).51 The ‘Dodge
Plan’ was presented to the Allied Control Council in November of 1945.52 Although his
proposal did not explicitly say so, it established that the principles of the American state
banking system should be replicated in Germany. Emphasis was put on the elimination of
‘excessive’ control of the German universal banking system over German industry. For that
matter, the largest credit banks, the Großbanken, were to be split into several smaller units
and their number of branches were to be reduced. But decentralization should not stop
there. The entire banking system was to be decentralized and all banks would be prevented
from operating branches in other states. Indeed, Dodge’s initial vision went even as far as
(eventually) requiring decentralization to the county level, thus introducing American-style
unit banking. Conducting business outside a bank’s home state was not to be prohibited,
but banks were to be kept outside the influence of any other banking or government entity.
Not only would this have affected the Großbanken, but it also meant that the savings
48See the letter from Clay to McCloy from 29.6.1945 in Smith (1974, pp. 35–46).
49Zink (1957, pp. 89–90) reports that the issue of German occupation was not a topic of great interest
to either the American media or President Truman during the first year of occupation. Domestic problems
were much more pressing.
50See Holtfrerich (1995, p. 407). Indeed General Clay did not even have a financial or economic adviser
in the first months of the occupation. See Clay (1950, p. 202).
51Joseph Dodge was chairman of the Detroit Bank and Trust Co. and at the same time the president of
the American Bankers Association. He became director of OMGUS finance division in September of 1945.
Later, Dodge would also play a key role in the economic restructuring of occupied Japan. See Holtfrerich
(1995, p. 407) and Tsutsui (1988, p. 67) for biographical information about Joseph M. Dodge.
52For the Dodge Plan, as presented to the Allies, see the Allied Control Council Document
DFIN/P(45)33, Subj.: Elimination of Excessive Concentration of Economic Power in Banking, dated
30.10.1945, as well as Allied Control Council Document DFIN/P(45)29, Subj.: Elimination of Bank Power
to Invest in Corporation Stocks and Engage in Stock Exchange Transactions, dated 23.10.1945, both found
in NARA RG 260, Records of US Element, Allied Control Authority, Records of the Finance Directorate
(DFIN), Master File, 1945–1948, NND: 75043, Box: 353.
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banks and the cooperative banks, which had formed umbrella organizations, should now
give up this centralized structure as well. The best known feature of the Glass-Steagall
Act, the separation of investment and deposit banks, was also to be pursued. This plan
would prohibit regular banks from buying or selling stocks for their own account. Another
important prohibition was to be that of banks’ entitlement to exercise the voting rights
of the shares of the banks’ customers, so-called “proxy-voting”. This arrangement had
given banks not only the votes corresponding to their personal share in a corporation, but
also that of its customers – an effective way to lever banks’ influence without having to
invest in a company. Decentralization should also apply to the Reichsbank. It was to be
abolished entirely and each state would have its own central bank – a structure akin to the
Federal Reserve System. The primary regulatory institutions were to be the departments
of finance of every state - just like it was the case in the American state banking system.
The central bank should be removed from most regulatory matters.53
The decision of Dodge to press for complete decentralization was due to two factors.
On one hand it was because of the extremely negative image he and many other American
officials had of the Großbanken.54 They were considered to be extreme concentrations
of economic power that helped to foster and sustain the Nazi dictatorship and its war
machine. The old economic structures needed to be torn apart as part of a larger process
aimed at restructuring German society as a whole. On the other hand, Dodge was con-
vinced of the superiority of the American decentralized approach to banking. At the same
time, he wanted to avoid the regulatory arbitrage and other problems the dual banking
system was suffering from in the United States. Thus, only the state banking system was
to be replicated, but the national banking system was not.55
53See also the detailed ‘Dodge Memo’ sent to German state government officials, where Dodge outlined
his plans for Central Banking and Bank Supervision dated 01.11.1945, a copy of which can be found in
NARA RG 260, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Records of the Finance Committee of HICOG,
The Allied Bank Commission, General Records, NND 775048, Box 2. Interestingly, the introduction of
deposit insurance was not part of the Dodge plan. The possibility of introducing deposit insurance was
briefly hinted at page 21 of A Plan for the Liquidation of War Finance and the Financial Rehabilitation
of Germany, dated 20 May 1946, found in NARA, RG 466, Office of the Executive Secretary, General
Records, 1947-1952, NND: 968095, Box 5.
54This view was shared by a majority of individuals in both government and business. See Horstmann
(1991, p. 67). But it was not shared by everyone within OMGUS Financial Branch. See for example the
Memorandum to Dodge by E.C. Ophuls from 09.10.1945, Subj.: Financial Program for the Year October
1945 to Year October 1946, found in NARA RG260, OMGUS, FINAD, Financial Policies & Military
Government Legislation, NND: 775058, Box 69. It advocates for a unified approach towards banking.
55See Horstmann (1991, pp. 61–65) for Dodge’s intentions. For Dodge’s view of the American system
see Tsutsui (1988, p. 67). For the unfavorable view Americans had of the Großbanken see also Clay (1950,
pp. 327-328).
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Table 4.3: The intended impact of the Dodge Plan
Germany (1935)
United States
(1935)
Dodge Plan
(1945)
Regulatory
Institutions
Centralized Decentralized Decentralizeda
Central Bank Centralized Decentralized Decentralizedb
Branching Free Restricted Restrictedc
Investment
Restrictions
Universal banking
Separation of
investment and
deposit banks
Separation of
investment and
deposit banksd
Deposit
Insurance
None Yes Not mentioned
aRegulation and supervision should be decentralized to a state level. The central bank should be
excluded from banking regulation entirely.
bReplication of the Federal Reserve System.
cAt the very least restriction to the state level. If possible it should even be restricted to a municipal-
level, i.e. introduction of unit banking.
dJust like it was prescribed in the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933.
4.3.3 Discussions amongst all four Allies
When the American Military Government introduced its Dodge Plan to the Allied Control
Council in November of 1945, it had hoped to be able to press through this item by the
spring of 1946. Indeed, Dodge’s plans were discussed on numerous occasions in the Allied
Control Council.56 While there was considerable agreement amongst the American, French
and Soviet representatives, that decentralization of the banking system should take place,
the British had strong doubts with respect to this policy. They feared that decentralization
would make the banking system unstable and jeopardize the recovery of the German and
thus British economy.57 Furthermore, the British were aware that such decentralization
would make coordination of banking policy between the Allies difficult. They were only
willing to further this policy, if there was to be a central bank of some sort, spanning all
four zones. Such a central bank covering both West and East-Germany was unacceptable
to both the Soviets and the French at that point in time. Consequently, decentralization
discussions within the Allied Control Council stalled in the fall of 1946. The negotiations
surrounding a separation of universal banks into deposit and investment banks continued
until the Control Council ceased to operate in 1948, but did not yield any tangible results
56Loehr (1952, p. 8, fn. 9) reports that 30 proposals for financial reform were drawn up in the Allied
Control Council until May of 1946.
57Indeed, they considered a more centralized banking system more efficient. After all their own bank
system was more similar in structure to the German than to the American system. See Dickhaus (1998,
pp. 163–164), Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 410–414) and Horstmann (1991, pp. 68–75) for the British policy
approach to the banking system.
Chapter 4. Failed Institutional Assimilation 159
either.58 Instead, while discussions were ongoing in the Allied Control Council, each
country went about realizing their visions for the banking system within their own zone.
This made any future quadripartite agreement on the issue more unlikely by the day. The
most resolute action was undoubtedly taken in the Soviet zone.
4.3.4 Soviet bank reform in East-Germany
The Soviet Military Government irrevocably tore apart the East-German banking sys-
tem within a matter of months, ensuring that the old ‘universal’ bank system could not
re-emerge. The banks and the transfer system were shut down as soon as the war was
officially over. While savings banks and credit cooperatives were allowed to re-open even-
tually, private banks were nationalized.59 No compensation was paid to the owners, and
depositors did not receive any of their money back. The banks’ assets were then used to
capitalize five newly founded regional state banks.60 These were government-run universal
banks so to say. The state banks’ board of directors consisted almost entirely of political
appointees.61 Last but not least, the five state banks were equipped with a government
guarantee to cover any losses that went beyond its reserves and 10% of the capital. This
was paired with an explicit order “[...] not to operate on the basis of profit and loss calcu-
lations, but in the ‘public interest’ [...]”.62 Of course the measures taken were a function
of the economic system the Soviets were implementing, which saw no place for private
initiative. This is why, the Soviet bank reform is not analyzed further in this chapter.63
58The minutes of the Allied Control Council Meeting from 22.04.1946 (DFIN/M(46)13 ) clearly displays
the different positions of the Allies with respect to decentralization. It was found in NARA RG260, OM-
GUS, FINAD, Financial Policies & Military Government Legislation, NND: 775058, Box 66. Furthermore
see also Adler (1949, p. 325), Smith (1974, pp. 429–430), Dickhaus (1998, pp. 163–166) and especially
Horstmann (1985). With respect to the separation of investment and deposit banks see the existing drafts
printed as an Appendix to DLEG/P(40)2nd Review found in NARA RG260, OMGUS, FINAD, Financial
Policies & Military Government Legislation, NND: 775058, Box 69.
59Only a handful of small private banks were allowed to operate for a few more years until they were
forced to close as well. The largest credit banks lost each between 33% and 67% of their branches due to
nationalization (Wandel, 1980, pp. 83–84).
60They would be the most important banks in the Eastern Zone by the end of 1946 with almost 75% of
the assets of the banking sector
61Members of the board of directors were the respective state’s president, the finance minister, 8 more
political appointees and two representatives of the banks’ staff.
62See Adler (1949, pp. 333–335).
63For a detailed account of the Soviet transformation see for example Deckers (1974, pp. 12–98).
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4.4 The Institutional Assimilation in West-Germany (1945-
1949)
Already within the first year of occupation, it came to significant changes of the western
Allies’ general economic policies. While the French generally still adhered to the ‘Mor-
genthauian’ principles of keeping Germany weak64, the Americans changed their policy
stance.65 They no longer intended to restrain the German economy. Rather they planned
the reconstruction of the German economy on the basis of democratic, bottom-up, federal
principles similar to those in the United States. Britain was generally supportive of this
approach as well.66 By the summer of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067 was
replaced by directive 1779, which had the aforementioned reconstruction at its heart and
officially broke with the Morgenthau mantra of keeping the German economy feeble.67
Why the change of heart? Three developments were crucial. First, it was soon real-
ized that keeping the German economy weak and having to feed the German population
with the help of American taxpayer’s money was expensive; widespread famine was not
an option. Second, it would be impossible to convince the German population of the
superiority of democratic values and institutions, if, in fact, their standard of living was
well below that prior to the war and even during the war. Third, the Americans had to
acknowledge that, as Secretary of War Stimson and the British had previously argued, the
speed of the recovery of Western Europe depended to a large extent on the reconstruction
of Germany.68 Another important point were the dynamics of the Cold War. A feeble
Germany was seen as a power vacuum, which the Soviet Union would try to fill. Thus, se-
curity considerations became a dominant factor of US policy in Germany.69 However, even
though the J.C.S. 1779 was constructive in terms of rebuilding the German economy, it
64This is no surprise, given that France had been invaded by Germany thrice in the previous 70 years
as Wandel (1980, p. 42) points out. Instead, German production was to be used for the reconstruction of
France.
65The Stuttgart speech by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes is emblematic of this change in policy.
See Clay (1950, pp. 8, 78–81).
66See Stolleis (2008, pp. 288, 308).
67See Holtfrerich (1995, p. 406). General Clay had been advocating for a pragmatic policy overhaul
since the beginning of 1946 already. See Berghahn (1986, pp. 90–92).
68See the explanation by Adler (1949, p. 340), a former high level official in the banking section of
OMGUS.
69See Murach-Brand (2004, pp. 80–82). See also Hansmeyer (1998, p. 15) or Wandel (1980, p. 158)
and their discussion of the prominent role of the Hoover-report. This change in policy, from a punitive one
outline in the Morgenthau Plan and the J.C.S. 1067, to one of reconstruction, led the frustrated Henry
Morgenthau to conclude that if the policies prescribed would not be applied in the future, “the foundations
for renewed German aggression [...] would have been laid”. See Morgenthau (1946, p. 129).
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still explicitly called for the decentralization of the banking system.70 Therefore, although
the initial occupation period was one of political change, there was policy continuity with
respect to banking regulation throughout the first years of the occupation period. Within
the Finance Division there was surprisingly little open disagreement over the reform plans
laid out by Dodge.71
Thus, at the same time that Dodge launched his foray in the Allied Control Council
for a quadripartite restructuring, he initiated the assimilation process in the American
zone. His plans were sent to the respective German state governments, which were then
expected to issue laws that corresponded with Dodge’s vision.72
4.4.1 Decentralization of the regulatory institutions
The assimilation of the regulatory institutions was probably the easiest task at hand. Even
though the Credit Act of 1934 (in its amended form from either 1939 or 1944) might still
have remained in force, it could not be applied directly anymore. The directorate of the
Reichsbank and the Commissioner of the Banking system – the main regulatory bodies
– were both dissolved by the Allies at the end of the war. During the initial occupation
period the Allies took over regulatory powers. After the re-establishment of state govern-
ments, the Americans and the French began to transfer limited regulatory powers to the
Finance Ministries of each state (and to a lesser extent to the remnants of the central bank
in each zone), paired with the task to establish a dedicated oversight agency.73 Regulatory
powers remained with the Finance Ministries of the states, none of which created a dedi-
cated oversight agency. As of 1946 several proposals were drawn, all of which would have
reinstated the German Credit Act of 1934 (in its amended form) on a decentralized basis.
70See Holtfrerich (1995, p. 406).
71This is in a stark contrast with the Deconcentration Branch of the Economic Division of OMGUS,
where officials clashed repeatedly over the extent and the desirability of the decentralization of German
industry. For the disagreements within the Deconcentration Branch see for example Berghahn (1986, pp.
98–99), Martin (1950, pp. 187-204) or Murach-Brand (2004, pp. 43–50). It is probably due to the fact that
there was a strong presence of Treasury personnel in the finance division. Also, Dodge had an important
like-minded ally in Walter Lichtenstein – a former vice-president of the First National Bank in New York,
and chief of the Financial Institutions Branch. See Ahrens (2007, pp. 162–163).
72This directive was issued on the 12.12.1945. See OMGUS (1949b, No. 6, January 1946, page 12).
See also the Dodge Memo that was sent to German state government officials, where Dodge outlined his
plans for Central Banking and Bank Supervision dated 01.11.1945, a copy of which can be found in NARA
RG 260, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Records of the Finance Committee of HICOG, The
Allied Bank Commission, General Records, NND 775048, Box 2
73The fact that the responsibility for the banking sector shifted from the respective States’ Ministries of
Economics to the States’ Ministry of Finance, was a major break with the German administrative tradition.
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The American Military Government rejected these proposals, as it wanted a strict separa-
tion between monetary policy and technical supervision. Consequently until 1949, when
the Americans passed a corresponding military law, regulatory supervision was relatively
light.74
The British maintained unified regulatory institutions and a single ‘central bank’ for
their entire zone at first.75 In 1947 they delegated some authorities to the state govern-
ments, but it was only in 1948, when the Americans and the British agreed to form an
economic bizone that the British decentralized the regulatory institutions entirely to the
state level.76 From then on, all three western zones had similar arrangements with respect
to the regulatory institutions.77 In every state it was now a duopoly which was in charge
of banking regulation: the states’ ‘central banks’ together with the states’ ministries of
finance. Instead of there being two regulatory institutions for the whole of Germany there
were now 20. As of 1948, the Americans pressured the German state governments to pre-
pare a revised banking act to codify the changes to the regulatory institutions. It would
take the Germans until 1961 to come up with a ‘new’ banking act.78
4.4.2 Branching restrictions and decentralization of banks
Deconcentration efforts of the banking system focused initially on the three remaining
Großbanken, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the Commerzbank.79 It was
not merely a measure of punishing these banks for their involvement in the Third Reich.
More importantly, the Americans tried to break-up the large credit banks because they
74See BArch102/23052 Letter from Fischer to Kattenstroth from 31.01.1950 as well as OMGUS (1949b,
No. 2, p. 2 and No. 5, p. 1), and a copy of a Letter from Jack Bennet (Finance Advisor) to the Finance
Divisions in the American zone (undated - probably mid 1948), and the rejection Cable by the Military
Government to the La¨nderrat, dated 28 May 1948. Both documents can be found in NARA RG 260,
U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations, Records of the Finance Committee of HICOG, The Allied
Bank Commission, General Records, NND 775048, Box 2. For the law see OMGUS (1949a, Law No. 57
(revised), Art 1 & 2). See also the
75They continued to use the structures of the Reichsbank’s former Hamburg office as a central clearing-
house for their entire zone.
76The corresponding ordinance to transfer regulatory power to the Finance Ministries of the states in
the British zone came in force on 01.04.1948. See CCG/BE (1949, Ordinance No. 133, Art. 1 & 2). See
also Wandel (1980, p. 63).
77The Americans would pass a military law to harmonize legislation with the British zone on 15.04.1949.
See OMGUS (1949a, Law No. 57 (revised), Art 1 & 2).
78See also Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
79Two of the other Großbanken, the Reichskreditgesellschaft and the Berliner Handelsgesellschaft were
based in Berlin and had no branches. They were shut down and liquidated right at the end of the war by
the Soviets. The Bank der deutschen Arbeit was also shut down and liquidated by all four Allies, as it was
a bank directly linked to the National Socialist Party via the German Labor Front. See Loehr (1952, p.
53).
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believed that the concentration of financial power made it easier for Germany to wage war
and that decentralization might prevent Germany from building up as rapidly as it did.
In particular the contribution of the large credit banks was seen as a crucial element.80
This idea is somewhat puzzling, not because the large credit banks were not engaged
in re-armament and war finance – they undeniably were to some extent.81 It is puzzling
because the country with probably the most decentralized banking system in the world, the
United States, had no problem mobilizing its resources and converting its economy into the
most efficient armament factory in the world at that time. The American banking system
accomplished this with the help of well-developed financial markets. Nothing prohibited
Germany from building equally efficient capital markets of her own over time.82
The decentralization effort becomes more plausible when it is put into a larger per-
spective. It formed part of a drive to restructure the German economy along the same
federal lines America’s economy was built upon. A decentralized regulatory regime and
central bank would only make sense if the banks were not operating on a national scale
either. Thus, the break-up of the large credit banks was also a regulatory necessity.83 In-
deed, neither the Americans, nor the French proceeded to break-up the major large credit
banks immediately after the war ended. It was only in the fall of 1945 that the Americans
initiated this development, in parallel with the decision to decentralize the regulatory su-
pervision. While doing so, Dodge and his colleagues were aware that, from an efficiency
standpoint, this might not be the ideal solution. But they sincerely believed that the
political gains would outweigh the economic costs.84
Initially, the decentralization of the three remaining largest credit banks (Deutsche
Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank) did not progress much. After all, the Americans
were hoping for quadripartite action on this matter via the Allied Control Council. At
the same time that the Americans were trying to obtain a multilateral agreement, the
80See for example Adler (1949, pp. 340–341), Horstmann (1991, pp. 63–64) or Clay (1950, pp. 327-328).
See also Dodge’s Statement to the Finance Directorate of the Allied Control Council on 05.04.1946, as
Appendix ”A” to DFIN/M(46)11, which can be found in NARA, RG 260, OMGUS, FINAD, Financial
Policies & Military Government Legislation, General Records Re: Financial Policy & Legislation 1945-49,
NND 775058, Box 66.
81Direct government finance by the large credit banks was limited. Merely 10% of government bonds were
held by the large credit banks at the end of the war. The vast majority was held within the Sparkassen-
system. See Holtfrerich (1995, p. 415).
82See Tooze (2007) for production figures during the Second World War. A similar point regarding the
efficacy of decentralized and centralized banking sectors was made by Adler (1949, p. 341).
83See Ahrens (2007, p. 163) and Horstmann (1991, p. 67).
84See Horstmann (1991, p. 100).
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three Großbanken attempted to re-establish their former unity across the western zones
of occupation with the silent agreement of the German state governments, even though
this was clearly against the plan set forth by the American Military Government. This
prompted the American Military Government to issue a ‘cease and desist’ order on the
12th of March, 1946, representing a first ‘cut’ to the zone level. Banks within the American
zone (and soon thereafter in the French zone too) were prohibited from contacting their
banking headquarters located outside of their zone. The three Großbanken, were explicitly
prohibited from cooperating in any way with their former headquarters in Hamburg.85
However, the banks were generally allowed to maintain correspondence accounts with
banks outside their zone. The ordinance was the first step to turn the Dodge Plan into
policy actions that concretely affected the banking system in its structure and operation.86
Contrary to this, the British tried to avoid change in the banking system in their zone.
Yet, they had to accept the realities created by both the French and the Americans, that
restricted banks based in the British zone from expanding into the other zones.
It was only in the first half of 1947 that the three remaining Großbanken were broken
up into even smaller units. The quadripartite solution had not materialized, and the
German state governments or the banks themselves had not taken any action either.87
The Großbanken had already been divided along the zonal lines. Now they were broken-
up to the state level. The names of the resulting institutes were to be changed as well, so as
not to resemble their former affiliation. Additionally, custodians were appointed that were
expected to manage and administer the property of the banks within each state. This was
first decreed on May 6th, 1947, in the American zone, followed by the French on October
1st, of 1947.88 By April 1st, 1948, the British followed suit as part of an arrangement that
had lead to the economic Bizone between the American and British zone. The British
agreed to decentralize their banks, since they realized that in a ‘Bizone’, the Americans
would have the upper hand, and that the British were unlikely to be able to put the
85Anticipating a Soviet occupation of Berlin, the Deutsche Bank, the Dresdner Bank and the Com-
merzbank, had begun to relocate their head offices from Berlin to Hamburg before the end of the war. See
Hansmeyer (1998, p. 21) and Horstmann (1991, pp. 42–46, 75–81).
86For the ordinance see Horstmann (1991, p. 105).
87The Americans had just passed Military Law No. 56, which prohibited an ‘excessive concentration of
economic power’ on 27.01.1947 (OMGUS, 1949a, Law No. 56). There was also a major reshuﬄe within the
Finance Division that was aimed at reviving the stalling deconcentration efforts. See Horstmann (1991, p.
111).
88The American Military Law Nr 57 became effective on 06.05.1947. It came as a surprise to the majority
of the banking sector. Merely the Deutsche Bank saw it coming. See Horstmann (1991, pp. 117–118) and
Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 420, 422). For the law see OMGUS (1949a, Law Nr. 57: Custodians for Certain
Bank Organization) or the reprint in the aforementioned Holtfrerich.
Chapter 4. Failed Institutional Assimilation 165
American decentralization drive into reverse. Thus, their strategy was to make the best
out of their situation – and the best, from the point of view of the British, was to have the
Americans shoulder a larger share of the financial burden of occupation. Consequently,
they advocated for both a bizonal budget and a real bizonal central bank. Thus, while
the Americans agreed to installing a central bank for both zones, the British agreed to
decentralize their banking sector in turn. And so, out of three Großbanken became thirty.89
The attempt to finally extinguish the centralist ambitions of the Großbanken was a
botched reform. Again it was expected from the Germans to eventually pass a democrati-
cally legitimized law codifying the assimilation. Also, legally, the newly founded institutes
were subsidiaries of the ‘old’ Großbanken, which formally continued to exist. The old
Großbanken had no operational business of their own and the board of directors and the
oversight board were both ‘disfunctionalized’ by the Allies. It was like a financial con-
glomerate with a dysfunctional central body, which was prohibited from interacting with
all its subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the legal shell of the ‘old’ Großbanken lived on. The
Großbanken ‘problem’ had not been solved, after all.90
What had happened to the Girozentralen and the Zentrallkassen – the regional um-
brella organizations of the Savings Bank System and the Credit Cooperatives? They too
were large (universal) banking organizations that in some cases were active in several states
and also served as clearing houses. Interestingly enough, for the most part, they were able
to fly below the Americans’ radar. The Military Government was focusing on the the
Großbanken, and it largely overlooked the Girozentralen and Zentralkassen. Only in the
summer 1948, when the Großbanken had been decentralized and a central bank estab-
lished, did OMGUS’ Finance Division develop a keener interest in the Girozentralen and
Zentralkassen. They too were to disappear entirely. More than a threat to security they
saw them as instistutions that were undermining the recently established central bank and
its effort to create a unified clearing system. Both the Sparkassen and the Credit Coop-
erative system had developed alternative cashless payment systems alongside the central
bank’s system prior to the Second World War. Consequently, the Military Government
89Each of these banks could maintain branches within their state. See figures 2 and 3 on pages 167
and 168 respectively, for an overview of the break-up. See also Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 422-423, 431) and
CCG/BE (1949, Ordinance No. 133: Decentralization of banks).
90The Allies were aware of this problem. See for example the Memo by Kelleher to James from 21
August, 1950, Sub.:Status and Problems of German Banking Reorganization, found in NARA, RG 466,
Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject Files, 1948-55, NND: 903642, Box 1.
See also Ahrens (2007, p. 174), Loehr (1952, pp. 54–55) and Wandel (1980, pp. 89–90).
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asked for a working group of German officials91 to come up with proposals to restructure
the savings bank and credit cooperative systems, including the dissolution of the umbrella
organizations. The Germans dodged the task by presenting a memorandum declaring the
unfeasibility of such a move. No further actions were taken by the Allies until the estab-
lishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. The public savings bank system and
the credit cooperative system remained largely unscathed by the decentralization efforts.
Only the branching restrictions applied to them – as far as they applied to any bank.92
Table 4.4: The balance sheet size of the 30 decentralized subsidiaries of the
former Großbanken by region
31.12.1949 31.08.1950
(in Million DM)
American Zone
Hessen
a) Hessische Bank, Frankfurt a. M. 219 279
b) Rhein-Main-Bank, Frankfurt a. M. 213 316
c) Mitteldeutsche Creditbank, Frankfurt a. M. 63 88
Bayern
a) Bayerische Creditbank, Mu¨nchen 182 185
b) Bayerische Bank fu¨r Handel und Industrie, Mu¨nchen 112 142
c) Bayerische Discontobank, Nu¨rnberg 38 42
Wu¨rttemberg-Baden
a) Su¨dwestbank Stuttgart 301 363
b) Allgemeine Bankgesellschaft, Stuttgart 103 127
c) Bankverein fu¨r Wu¨rttemberg-Baden, Stuttgart 58 76
Bremen
a) Disconto-Bank, Bremen 102 78
b) Bremer Bank, Bremen 78 84
c) Bremer Handelsbank, Bremen 21 21
British Zone
Nordrhein-Westfalen
a) Rheinisch-Westfa¨lische Bank, Du¨sseldorf 818 1032
91The working group was made up of officials of the recently established central bank and the finance
department of the bizonal economic administration.
92See the Memo by Adolphe Warner to the Allied Banking Council from 06.11.1948, Subj.: Background
for Savings Bank Decentralization, found in NARA RG 260, OMGUS, FINAD, Financial Policies & Military
Government Legislation, Correspondence Re: Financial Policy & Operations, 1946-49, NND: 775058, Box
90. See also the Letter by the Finance Adviser of the British Zone, Sir Eric Coates and the Finance Adviers
of the American Zone, Jack Bennett, to the Chief of the Finance Group of the Bipartite Control Office
of the U.S. Army from 09.06.1948, as well as a Memorandum on the Decentralization of Banking from
04.02.1949, both of which can be found in NARA RG 260, U.S. Elements of Inter-Allied Organizations,
Records of the Finance Committee of HICOG, The Allied Bank Commission, General Records, 1948-51,
NND: 775048, Box 2.
Chapter 4. Failed Institutional Assimilation 167
31.12.1949 31.08.1950
(in Million DM)
b) Rhein-Ruhr-Bank, Du¨sseldorf 431 514
c) Bankverein Westdeutschland, Du¨sseldorf 416 558
Niedersachsen
a) Nordwestbank, Hannover 133 156
b) Niederdeutsche Bankgesellschaft, Hannover 65 95
c) Merkur-Bank, Hannover 67 98
Hamburg
a) Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg 279 284
b) Hamburger Kreditbank, Hamburg 220 277
c) Hansa-Bank, Hamburg 177 143
Schleswig-Holstein
b) Lu¨becker Bank fu¨r Handel und Industrie, Lu¨beck 9 12
c) Holsten-Bank, Kiel 23 28
French Zone
Baden
a) Oberrheinische Bank, Freiburg i.Br. 110 123
b) Su¨ddeutsche Kreditanstalt, Freiburg i.Br. 21 22
Rheinland-Pfalz
a) Rheinische Kreditbank, Ludwigshafen/Rhein 121 127
b) Industrie- und Handelsbank, Mainz 59 71
c) Mittelrheinische Bank, Mainz 17 21
Wu¨rttemberg-Hohenzollern
a) Wu¨rttembergische Vereinsbank, Reutlingen 43 48
b) Bankanstalt fu¨r Wu¨rttemberg und Hohenzollern, Reut-
lingen
6 9
Note:
a) formerly Deutsche Bank
b) formerly Dresdner Bank
c) formerly Commerzbank
In 1950 the Großbanken had been decentralized for about 2-3 years already (depending
on the occupation zone). Most of them were able to expand their balance sheets. Source:
BArch B102/28179, “Abschrift: Bilanzsummen der 30 Nachfolgeinstitute der Großbanken
(in Mill. DM)”.
4.4.3 A federal central bank and a new currency
The decentralization of the German central bank was one of the key objectives in the
American decentralization effort. The original Reichsbank structure differed greatly from
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Figure 4.1: Out of 3 became 30
Formerly Deutsche 
Bank   
Formerly Dresdner 
Bank 
Formerly 
Commerzbank 
April 
1948 
The successor banks of Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank and their
corresponding headquarters by the end of April of 1948l. Source: Own work based on a
map by Wikimedia Commons (2008).
the American Federal Reserve System, in three key ways: first, it had a centralized decision
making body. Second, it was subject to political influence. And third, it was actively
competing with commercial banks through its branches. The Americans preferred a central
bank modeled after the Federal Reserve, more decentralized, less susceptible to political
influences and more limited in function, especially not as a competition to commercial
banks.93
The first official proposal for a central bank was made in the spring of 1946 by Josef
93See Loehr (1952, pp. 10–11).
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M. Dodge in the Allied Control Council.94 Dodge introduced the idea of installing a
Germany-wide (yet decentralized) “La¨nder Union Bank” in an effort to break the British
resistance in the discussions surrounding the decentralization of the banking system as a
whole. While it did indeed break British opposition, it created opposition with the French
and the Soviets who opposed any centralized monetary authority, and consequently the
proposal stalled – and with it the quadripartite talks surrounding the decentralization of
the banking system as a whole as well.95
The German state governments of the American zone had been requested to develop
proposals for the introduction of state central banks of their own. At first, they were reluc-
tant to do so, but eventually they came up with drafts. From the American perspective,
the initial drafts were uncomfortably close to the old Reichsbank system. However, by the
fall of 1946 under strong American pressure, they presented a satisfactory draft, which the
German state governments of the American zone were allowed to pass into law.96
On the 1st of January 1947, the ‘new’ state central banks were created. They were
modelled after the Federal Reserve Banks in the sense that they would be led by an
independent board of directors, whose members were to represent all parts of the economy.
Also, the state central banks’ shares were to be sold to member banks within the state no
later than two years after the founding date of the state central banks.97 It was hoped
that the respective state governments would embrace the state central banks as a means
of influencing regional economic policy, which would not prove to be the case.98 As the
state central banks did not have the authority to issue money, their main function was
that of clearinghouses and of fiscal agents for the state governments. To a limited extent
they were also involved in the regulation of the banking sector. However, every major
decision by the state central banks had to be approved by the Military Government. As
94That is why it is sometimes also known as the ‘Second Dodge Plan’. See Allied Control Council
Document DFIN/P(46)39, Subj.: Proposal for a new Laender Union Bank, dated 05.04.1946, found in
NARA RG 260, Records of US Element, Allied Control Authority, Records of the Finance Directorate
(DFIN), Master File, 1945–1948, NND: 75043, Box: 353. Also reprinted in Wandel (1980, pp. 174–175).
95See Horstmann (1985, pp. 11–13) and Wandel (1980, pp. 55–59).
96In Hesse, the Military Government had to decree the passage of the corresponding law. See Wandel
(1980, p. 61).
97However, this never happened and they remained in control of the respective states. See (Loehr, 1952,
pp. 9–11) and Martin (1950, p. 190).
98See the memo by Warner to Pumphrey, Subj.:Decentralization of banking, dated 09.02.1950, found in
NARA, RG 466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject File, 1948-55, NND:
903642, Box 1.
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usual, the French shadowed American policy and followed suit just a few months later.99
These state central bank laws in Bavaria and Wu¨rttemberg-Baden were to be the only
ones during the assimilation attempt that the Americans (and the other Allies) did not
have to pass as military decrees.100
The British Military Government only agreed to decentralize the ‘central bank’ within
their zone once the preparations for a merger of the American and British zones into a
‘Bizone’ had gathered steam. As part of the Bizone deal, the British decentralized their
banking sector, the regulatory institutions and the central bank. In return, the Americans
agreed to establishing a real central bank for the Western Zones - not just a coordinating
body as they had preferred.101 To the Americans, coming to an agreement with the British
was more important in terms of reviving the German economy than the exact structure
of the future central bank.102 After all, it would only be a provisional central bank for
the western zones, which was needed as a prerequisite for desperately needed currency
reform.103 As usual, the French trailed the Americans – and this time also the British –
by three months in joining the new Central Bank System.104
The “Bank deutscher La¨nder”105 (BdL), as the new central bank was called upon
its establishment in March of 1948, was largely based on the La¨nder Union Bank Plan
that had been proposed by Dodge in the Allied Control Council two years earlier. It did
not lead to an exact replica of the Federal Reserve System, but it was close to it.106 To
some extent the BdL was a compromise between British and American viewpoints.107 It
was headed by a directorate, based in Frankfurt, which carried out the policies decided
upon by the central bank council. The central bank council was mainly composed of
99The state of Bremen, which had been part of the British zone but became part of the American zone on
21. January, 1947, passed a similar state central bank law soon thereafter. For a more detailed discussion
and the various laws see Adler (1949, pp. 327–328), Loehr (1952, pp. 10–12) and Wandel (1980, pp.
59–65).
100Even so, the German government in the American Zones was not democratically legitimized at the
point in time, but nominated by the American Military Government. See Horstmann (1991, p. 110).
101See Dickhaus (1998, pp. 164–165) and Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 422–423, 431).
102See Smith (1974, pp. 429–430, 435).
103Inflation was galloping, black markets and the cigarette currency were widespread. Currency reform
had been on the agenda in the Allied Control council since mid-1945, but agreement failed due to political
reasons. See Wandel (1980, pp. 132– 156, 162–165).
104See Wandel (1980, p. 68).
105The literal translation is “the Bank of the German States”.
106See the comparison by Cwik (1970) or Wandel (1980, pp. 80–81).
107See Buchheim (1999, pp. 74–80), Dickhaus (1998, pp. 164–166) and Marsh (1992, pp. 144–150) for a
treatment of the Allied discussions in the run-up to the founding of the Bank der La¨nder. See also Deutsche
Bundesbank (1998) for the limited involvement of German experts on this matter. However, please not
that this source does not provide specific references.
Chapter 4. Failed Institutional Assimilation 171
the presidents of the state central banks and was nominally independent from German
political influences.108 However, it was super-seeded by the newly formed Allied Banking
Commission (ABC), which had veto power over any council decisions. The ABC was even
based in the same building as the central bank. The BdL had no branches and was a banks’
bank. It could only engage with the German states’ central banks, the German or Allied
governments, or other foreign central banks. The state central banks were also involved in
the regulation of the banking sector, together the states’ regulatory institutions.109 After
the currency reform of 1948, the Bank deutscher La¨nder would be also given the note
issuing monopoly.110
With respect to the Reichsbank, the Bank deutscher La¨nder differed in four key re-
spects: control was more decentralized, it did not compete with commercial banks any-
more, it imposed minimum reserve requirements and it had a monopoly on bank balance
settlement across states.111 The establishment of the BdL was also a ‘return of the old
guard’. Many senior figures in the newly-founded BdL had already been working at the
Reichsbank before the Second World War. In particular, the president of the new direc-
torate, Wilhelm Vocke, had been member of the old Reichsbank directorate prior to the
Second World War. Nevertheless, the old guard was outnumbered and outvoted by the
presidents of the state central banks.112
4.4.4 Only partial resistance to the assimilation
Interestingly, German resistance to the American assimilation efforts varied. Not all mea-
sures were vigorously opposed and not all the states opposed in equal measure. The decen-
tralization of the regulatory institutions to a state level and the transfer of competence to
108Indeed, there was no central central German government yet, which could have influenced it directly,
as Marsh (1992, p. 144) points out.
109Thus by 1949, 20 institutions were involved in the regulation of the banking sector. Their actions
would be coordinated in a central commission for banking supervision. See for example Honold (1956, p.
86).
110For the BdL Law see OMGUS (1949a, Law No. 60) and CCG/BE (1949, Ordinance No. 129). For a
comparison of the Reichsbank and the BdL see Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, pp. 88–91). For an overview
of the West-German currency reform see Bennett (1950), Buchheim (1988, 1999) and Ha¨user (1998).
111See Loehr (1952, p. 12–13).
112Indeed, the influence of Reichsbank figures on German central banking would not wane until the 1970s.
See Marsh (1992, pp. 20–22, 159–161) for a treatment on the “return of the old guard”. Apparently, the
Allies tried to avoid the full-fledged return of the old Reichsbank guard. See Wandel (1980, pp. 74–77)
for the Allies’ initial difficulties in finding qualified individuals to lead the new central bank. Prior to
the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany OMGUS moved to harmonize state central bank
legislation in the zones. See OMGUS (1949a, Law Nr. 57 (revised)).
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the Finance Ministries was accepted by the German states without much ado. And there
was of course no federal government any longer, which could object. The introduction of
state-level central banks caused some resistance from German state government officials at
first. Not so much because of the decentral structure, they soon began to appreciate the
federal powers it came with, but because of the extent of political influence the government
would have over the state central banks. The Americans were not prepared to grant the
state governments any direct political influence. The state governments wanted at least
some. Once the BdL was put in place, its structure was accepted and not opposed in the
first years of its existence.113
The trickiest part of the assimilation was undoubtedly the introduction of branch-
ing restrictions and the decentralization of the Großbanken. Branching restrictions had
generally not existed since the emergence of the German nation state. And there was no
German interest group that sought a restriction of branching. Thus, the branching re-
strictions amounted to an imposition of American ideology. Unlike the powerful unit bank
lobby in the United States, branching restrictions had little support in Germany. And
even back in the United States, branching became more wide-spread during this period.
The Großbanken had been reduced in numbers, and had been badly shaken up by the war,
but they still possessed a disproportionate amount of political clout in West-Germany.
They would not decentralize voluntarily. On the contrary, right after the war had ended,
the Großbanken went about re-establishing their unity. Later on they even ignored Allied
orders to cease active cooperation between the former Hamburg ‘headquarters’ and the
local entities in other zones. Cooperation continued on a covert basis. Information flows
between the headquarters in the British zone and the corresponding banks in the other
zones became more time consuming, but they never ceased.114
113See Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, pp. 29–31), Holtfrerich (1995, pp.415–419), Horstmann (1991, pp.
96–103, 110–111), and Loehr (1952, pp. 10–11). Indeed, the BdL was able to build a remarkable degree of
independence from both the ABC and the German government, which also increased its reputation with
the public, as Berger (1997, pp. 434–435) points out.
114See the description of the ‘covert’ management of the Dresdner Bank via the Hamburg headquarters in
Ahrens (2007, p. 164). For a more general overview of the extent of cooperation see Horstmann (1991, pp.
187–188) or Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 411–412). During the war, the large credit banks had already prepared
themselves for some kind of de-centralized operation in order to secure the existence of the banks. The
banks operative divisions were relocated to other cities throughout Germany. These preparations began
as bombings of Berlin, where their headquarters were originally located, intensified and the defeat and
occupation of Germany became more certain. For the preparations of the large credit banks see Horstmann
(1991, pp. 42 – 46). It is likely that these preparations benefited them in maintaining contact even after
the Allies prohibited them to do so.
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German state officials were generally opposed to the proposed changes to the Großbanken
as well. The notable exception was the government of the state of Wu¨rttemberg-Baden,
which was led by committed federalists, who actually favored such a move, but only under
the condition that the necessary measures were taken to ensure the continued economic
and financial integration with the rest of the country. The government of the state of Hesse
was willing to compromise and consequently drafted a proposal for the decentralization of
the Großbanken. This foresaw that the branches of the three large credit banks active in
the state would have been merged into a single large credit bank. It was meant as a partial
concession to the Allied demands of nationwide decentralization, while at the same time
bringing about greater regional concentration. A first draft of the bill was shown by the
Hessian government to representatives from both the large credit banks and industry, who
vehemently opposed it and quickly succeeded in having the bill withdrawn. Even so it is
also highly doubtful, whether it would ever had a chance to be accepted by the American
military government. After all, the bill would have created a regional behemoth. The
Großbanken refused to cooperate outright with the American demands, even though they
were aware that they might not be able to prevent Allied decentralizing actions. They
anticipated that control would eventually be returned to a German federal government.
And if the Großbanken and the German governments had not taken part in their disman-
tling it would eventually be easier to demand the recentralization on the grounds that the
decentralization had been an American imposition in the first place. Consequently, the
lobbied the state governments to remain passive.115
One of the most vehement opponents of the decentralization of the Großbanken and
the introduction of branching restrictions was the Minister of Economics of the state of
Bavaria, Ludwig Erhard.116 He advocated for a federal political system, but with a cen-
tralized economic system, with supraregional capital, which saw no role for branching
restrictions or decentralization of the Großbanken. However, the German state officials
did not engage the Allies head-on in this matter. Instead they went on a path of pas-
sive resistance by remaining largely inactive. After all, this topic was not one of general
interest to the public, and hence politicians were not subject to public pressure. The
only pressure they were subject to, was the American military government, and of course
115See Adler (1949, pp. 325–329), Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 415–416, 419) and Horstmann (1991, pp. 96–
103).
116Only a few years later he would become Economics Minister and, eventually, Chancellor of West-
Germany.
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the affected banks’ and insturies’ interest groups. At best, they would submit memo-
randa describing the undesirability of decentralizing the banking sector down to the state
level. These memoranda by both state government officials and representatives of the
Großbanken highlighted the historical role of the Großbanken in the German banking sys-
tem and their future role in the reconstruction the German economy, as well as the legal
complexities involved in a break-up.117 The bureaucrats’ and legislators’ passive resistance
was very much in line with the banking sector’s opinion when it came to the break-up of
the Großbanken.118 When the break-up of the Großbanken did take place, it failed to
divide the Großbanken into separate legal entities. By doing so, it kept the major force
resisting the assimilation in place.
4.5 In reverse gear (1949–1961)
As it stood in 1949, the American assimilation effort was surprisingly successful.119 The
restructuring of the banking sector was often touted as a hallmark of successful decon-
centration policy by American officials.120 Yet, the reforms were introduced via military
decrees and now it was up to the recently elected German government to transform these
Military decrees into democratically legitimized laws. The recently adopted constitution
would play a key role in this process.
4.5.1 A new constitution
After intense discussions, a new constitution for a Federal Republic of Germany was pro-
claimed on the 23rd of May 1949. Since the Allies were still the occupying force, they
had to approve the constitution for it to enter into force. During the drafting process, the
American Military Government went to great lengths to avoid giving the German officials
117See Ahrens (2007, p. 169), Holtfrerich (1995, p. 415) and Horstmann (1991, pp. 96–103). It is
interesting to note that the decentralization did not have any major adverse effect on the credit availability
of the German economy. The contrary was often claimed by the banks in an effort to make their case. See
Horstmann (1991, p. 181).
118Horstmann (1991, pp. 199–200) quotes an enquiry by the Office of the Director of Intelligence in the
American zone amongst bankers, industrialists and bureaucrats with respect to the banking reforms just
conducted, with the following remark: “All contacted bankers are opposed to decentralization!”.
119See table 4.5 on page 175 for a comparison of the original Dodge plan and its actual implementation.
120See for example the Report of Conference with General Clay, Berlin, Germany, dated 19. 12. 1948,
found in NARA, RG 466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject Files 1948-
55, NND: 903623, Box 5. The other ‘success story’ often touted was that of the industrial conglomerate
I.G. Farben. For the break-up of the I.G. Farben see Borkin (1978) or Kreikamp (1977).
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Table 4.5: The Dodge plan and its implementation by 1949
Germany
(1938)
Dodge Plan
West-Germany
(1949)
Regulatory
Institutions
Centralized Decentralized Decentralizeda
Central Bank Centralized Decentralized Decentralizedb
Branching Free Restricted Restrictedc
Investment
Restrictions
Universal banking
Separation of
investment and
deposit banks
Universal banking
Deposit
Insurance
None Not mentioned None
aTo the state level.
bLargely modeled after the Federal Reserve. See Cwik (1970) or Wandel (1980, pp. 81–82).
cTo the state level.
the impression that the Americans were forcing a constitution upon them. To that end,
the Allies had given the parliamentary council (the Parlamentarischer Rat) guidelines
according to which the council was expected to draft the new constitution. A federal
structure was one of the key characteristics the Allies requested in those guidelines.121
Even though the Germans were working on a new constitution behind closed doors, the
Allied Military Governments made sure that they were well informed of the developments,
so that they could intervene and steer the committees in the desired directions. The Allies
intervened several times in the early drafts, because they perceived a lack of federalism,
in particular in financial matters. They wanted the Germans to strengthen the rights of
the states, and even provided the Germans with revised versions of the corresponding arti-
cles.122 While the American Military Government intervened strongly for a decentralized
fiscal arrangement that would give the states independent sources of income, it failed to
intervene when it came to the responsibilities of regulating the banking sector. It was left
in the field of the concurring legislation.123 This kept the right to legislate in the hands of
121This was in addition to the obligatory notions of republicanism, democracy, rule of law, adherence to
the fundamental human rights, etc. The Americans were federalists by nature. The French saw a federal
system as a way of weakening the German central government. Indeed, this time around the French were
stronger ‘federalists’ than even the American representatives, whereas the British did not feel strongly
about this issue. See Wagner (1975, pp. XVI–XIX) and Feldkamp (1995, p. XXXII).
122See Feldkamp (1995, pp. XXVIII–XXIX and 120–130). The Germans wanted to maintain the con-
stitution’s flexibility. For the time being, a more decentralized arrangement was acceptable to them. But
Germany was to be fully re-integrated into the European and the world economy. This, the Germans
officials argued, would make a move towards a more centralized government indispensable in the long-run.
See Werner (1986, pp. 352–355).
123For the American intervention in fiscal matters and their failure to give the state the unalienable right
to regulate the banks see Feldkamp and Mu¨ller (1999, pp. XLI–XLVIII) and Feldkamp (1995, pp. 131-144).
For the article of the German constitution listing all areas of the concurring legislation, including that of
banking, see Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Art. 74).
Chapter 4. Failed Institutional Assimilation 176
the states, unless the central government deemed it necessary to issue a uniform law for
the entire country for reasons of practicality or economic unity. This implied that there
was no firm constitutional barrier for the central government to eventually re-centralize
the regulation of the banking sector. Furthermore, the temporary nature of the Bank
deutscher La¨nder was also enshrined in Article 88 of the Constitution.124
4.5.2 HICOG replaces OMGUS
The establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany heralded the beginning of a new
epoch. However, the Allies had not given Germany its full sovereignty just yet. Germany
could not establish relations with other countries, her currency was not freely convertible
and in many crucial areas, including banking and antitrust, her laws were still subject
to approval by the Allies. These rights were exercised by the newly established Allied
High Commission (also known as the High Commission for Occupied Germany).125 The
Americans wanted to make sure that the Germans would pass the relevant laws under
their auspices to turn the structural reforms into permanent institutional changes. The
establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and the passage of the so-called ‘oc-
cupation statute’ also meant that non-defense responsibility of Germany was transferred
(in the American case) from the U.S. Department of War to the Department of State.
OMGUS was now replaced by the the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany
(generally abbreviated as HICOG126). With it came important personal and structural
changes. Almost none of the most senior figures of OMGUS were retained for HICOG.127
124Change in central bank matters was certainly a possibility, but not a certainty. Indeed, the entire
constitution was considered to be temporary in nature. After all, a constitution for the whole German
nation could only be written by a reunited Germany. Consequently, the term Grundgesetz (basic law’) was
adopted instead of Verfassung (constitution). See Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Pra¨ambel and Art. 88). For a
document outlining creation of the German constitution and the various amendments see the Documents
on the Creation of the German Federal Constitution, prepared by OMGUS, dated 01.09.1949, found in
NARA, RG 84, Germany: Berlin Mission, Allied Kommandatura Secretariat, Classified Files, 1945-1990,
NND: 948811, Box 194.
125This was established in the ‘Occupation statute’, which entered into force on 21.09.1949. It is pub-
lished in Allied High Commission for Germany (1950, pp. 5–7). For the establishment of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany and the Allied High Commission see Lee (1951). For its relation with the
German government see Plischke (1952).
126Strictly speaking, the correct acronym is USHCG, since HICOG referred to the entire (Allied) High
Commission for Occupied Germany. However, in the American documents from that time period HICOG
is generally used equivalent to USHCG.
127See Zink (1957, p. 49) and Lee (1951, pp. 58, 69–73). Jack Bennett, who had been financial advisor
of the American military governor General Clay and a staunch proponent of the decentralization of the
banking sector, returned to the United States in 1949. His successor, Shepard Morgan, did not see the need
to press on further. He is quoted as saying that “this is a period of recovery rather than reform [...] We
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Unlike OMGUS, HICOG did not even have a dedicated finance division anymore.128
Nevertheless, the period of transition in 1949/1950 lead to a brief impetus amongst
the Americans to press for a completion of their Institutional Assimilation of the bank-
ing system before a new federal government took over and was fully functioning.129 The
unfinished break-up of the Großbanken was to be tackled. Also the reform of the Girozen-
tralen and Zentralkassen and the introduction of the separation of investment and deposit
banks were briefly back on the table.130 However, it was soon realized that imposing
additional decentralizing changes would cause insurmountable opposition. Not only with
the German government, but also with the British Military Government, who had agreed
to the decentralization only reluctantly in the first place.131 Thus, instead of aggressively
pursuing new reforms, the American Military Government shifted towards the preserva-
tion of the institutional changes. The Germans were expected to replace the military laws
by democratically legitimized ones. In order to prevent re-concentration, the American
have already gone too far in endeavouring to force Germans to adopt American practices and procedures.”
See Horstmann (1991, p. 199).
128As Ahrens (2007, p. 203) points out, the policy directives to the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner
did not explicitly call for any further structural changes to the banking sector. Financial affairs were
now part of the Economic Division. Matters relating to the restructuring of the banking sector were
henceforth handled by the decartelization and deconcentration division that was part of the Office of
General Counsel. See the organizational chart of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner printed as
attachments in Lee (1951, pp. 84, 87). For a summary of the policy directives issued to the Office of
the U.S. High Commissioner see the secret policy report: HICOG Fundamentals, Authority, Policy and
Responsibilities, prepared by the Office of the Executive Secretary, HICOG, Apo 757, dated 15. March 1950,
found in NARA, RG 466, Office of the Executive Secretary, General Records, 1946-1952, NND: 968095,
Box 5. See also the confidential letter of Hoyt Price to the U.S. Ambassador, dated 08.03.1948 in which
he lobbies for a unified economic division in HICOG, due to the lack of a unified policy in OMUGS, found
in NARA, RG84, Office of the Political Advisor for Germany, Berlin, Miscellaneous Classified Records,
1948-1949, NND: 863528, box 1.
129The assimilation had stalled completely in the course of 1948. The main reasons for this was a British
blockade paired with passive resistance at all levels on the German side. For details see Horstmann (1991,
pp. 173–177).
130See the Military Government draft laws Elimination of power of banks to engage in stock exchange
transactions and to divest in certain securities and Registration of certain instruments of control of eco-
nomic enterprise, both dated 1949, the Memo by Heymann (Legal Advisor of the U.S. Decartelization
Element) to March (Finance Group - Bipartite Control Office) from 31.08.1949, Subj.:Draft Laws on
Bearer Shares and Bank Participation in Stock Exchange Transactions, the Memo by Kelleher to James
from 21.08, 1950, Subj.:Status and Problems of German Banking Reorganization, the confidential message
by Acheson of the State Department to HICOG, dated 04.12.1950, all of which were found in NARA, RG
466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject Files, 1948-55, NND: 903642,
Box 1. See also the excerpt of the American directive from 29.11.1949 found in NARA, RG 466, Office of
General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject Files, 1945-55, NND: 903623, Box 5.
131See the letter by the outgoing British High Commissioner for Germany to the U.S. High Commissioner
for Germany McCloy from 24.06.1950, found in NARA, RG466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization
Division, General Subject Files, 1948-55, NND: 903623, Box 5, and a position paper by the U.K. Member
of the Allied Control Council, Subj.: Decentralization of Banking - A Paper by U.K. Member, Appendix
C to FIN/P(50)1, dated 22.12.1949, found in NARA RG 84, Germany, Berlin Mission, AK Secretariat,
Classified Files, 1945-1990, NND: 948806, Box 106. See also Adler (1949, pp. 339–341), Berghahn (1986,
pp. 98–103) and Dickhaus (1998, pp. 163–165).
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Military Government intervened numerous times in the drafting processes. Simultane-
ously, the Americans pursued a re-education program that was aimed at convincing the
Germans policymakers and businessmen of the advantages of the American decentralized,
‘anti-trust’ approach to the economy.132
4.5.3 Removal of branching restrictions: Großbanken again
Given the need to codify Allied legislation into democratically legitimized law, the issue
of the Großbanken came to the forefront almost immediately.133 The Allies were aware
of the unfinished nature of their reforms, and so were the Großbanken. In 1948/49 the
French and the Americans had already begun drawing up plans to abolish them once and
for all, while the Großbanken took the necessary countermeasures to prevent just that.
The fact that there was a unified German government backing the Großbanken certainly
aided their cause, and so did the return of the old banking elites from the denazification
programs.134 The Großbanken were also aided by the British, who had never shared the
same enthusiasm for this measure as the Americans. On the contrary, they were convinced
of the importance of the Großbanken for reviving German industry and as a consequence
the (European) economy. As a result, the British outright blocked the liquidation of
the remains of the large credit banks. Not only were they critical of the need for such
a measure in purely economic terms, but they feared that a liquidation of these banks
would jeopardize British banks’ claims against them, which had been pending since a
standstill agreement during the 1931 financial crisis. Consequently, Allied discussions did
not yield any concrete results even though numerous drafts had been drawn up that would
have liquidated the legal shells of Großbanken.135 On the contrary, from then on British
officials began advocating the recentralization of the German banking system.136
132See Berghahn (1986, p. 103–105) and Murach-Brand (2004, pp. 126, 137). See also the letter from
Mu¨ller-Armack to the American HICOG from 12.02.1953, Subj.:Lectures of U.S. Antitrust Experts in
Germany, found in NARA, RG466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject
Files, 1948-55, NND: 903623, Box 5. In this letter he explicitly asks for American officials to lecture on
the American antitrust concepts in the economics ministry as part of a larger American exchange program
aimed at re-educating German government officials at all levels.
133This topic was also picked up by the general public. See Horstmann (1991, pp. 208–209, fn. 67–77)
134Many of them had been held by the Allies, since they wanted to try them for war crimes. These trials
did not materialize in most cases. See Horstmann (1991, p. 177–181) for the return of the ‘old elite’. Two
of Chancellor Adenauer’s most trusted advisors were the bankers Abs and Pferdmenges.
135See Adler (1949, p. 341), Ahrens (2007, p. 202), Horstmann (1991, pp. 189–217) and Loehr (1952,
pp. 52–58).
136See Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 440–441, 445-446).
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It had become hard to justify the reorganization of the banking sector. The economic
revival of Germany was the priority now, so why did the Allies insist on weakening the most
prestigious banks? Their role in the industrialization had, after all, become mythical.137 If
the reforms were about the efficiency of the banking system, why not apply the efficiency of
a historically grown system that adapted to the local conditions? If the reforms were about
decartelization and freedom, why not let the Germans choose freely?138 Amidst growing
German resistance from a centralized German government and the British government’s
opposition to press ahead with additional reforms, a tipping point was reached in the
winter of 1949. The Americans lost not only the British as a crucial ally in this matter,
but also their own drive for further decentralization. In March of 1950, the Allies officially
asked the German government to come up with a proposal on how to resolve the ‘legal’
issues of the Großbanken and their subsidiaries. The initiative had gone over from the
Americans to the German government and it would remain there.139 The only thing that
remained at that point in time, was the Americans’ hope that German policymakers and
businessmen would come to value the changes introduced to the Großbanken.140
Leading German bankers of the decentralized Großbanken immediately seized the op-
portunity and presented their own plan (the Abs-Plan) for partially removing the branch-
ing restrictions and thus allowing for a partial re-integration of the Großbanken within
three seperate banking districts (North, West and South).141 The Abs plan was generally
welcomed amongst the federal government, business and industry.142 A notable exception
was the central bank council, which was dominated by the state central banks, who feared
for their existence. Dividing Germany into three banking regions would certainly trigger
calls for a reduction in the number of state central banks. And even if the number of state
central banks would not be reduced. While the directorate of the BdL was in favor the
plan, it clashed repeatedly with the BdL’s central bank council over this matter. There
137This mythical status was later reflected by Gerschenkron (1962).
138See Loehr (1952, p. 126). For a detailed overview of the positions see also the Memo by Klopstock to
Pumphrey, Subj.:Re-centralization of German Banking, dated 02.02.1950, found in NARA, RG 466, Office
of General Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject Files, 1948-55, NND: 903642, Box 1.
139See Horstmann (1991, pp. 194, 210, 216–217).
140See also Loehr (1952, p. 126).
141See BArch B102/28179, “Vorschlag betreffend die zuku¨nftige Struktur der deutschen Aktienbanken”,
submitted by H.J. Abs, C. Goetz and P. Marx on 31.05.1950. A complete as well as a summary English
version of the plan can be found in NARA, RG 466, Office of General Counsel, Decartelization Division,
General Subject Files, 1948-55, NND: 903642, Box 1. Abs, Goetz and Marx had been key figures in
Großbanken-matters for quite some time already. In particular Abs played the central role in staging a
‘defense’. See Ahrens (2007, pp. 210–211) and Horstmann (1991, pp. 190, 204–210).
142See Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 446–449).
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is evidence that some of the smaller states’ central banks saw the the reorganization of
the banking districts even as a potential trigger for a reorganization of German states
altogether. The Allied High Commission did not make matters easier on the German side
by releasing an opinion that it considered it sensible that the banking districts should be
congruent with the State Central Banks area of operation, effectively calling for the aboli-
tion of a number of state central banks if the plan to re-centralize went ahead. It was only
when the finance ministry leaked rumors to the press that the Abs plan with the three
banking districts had been accepted both by the Allies and the German government. This
alarmed the state central banks of the largest states, which were quick to propose to have
six banking districts. This would have secured their survival, but not that of the smaller
state central banks. The small-states’ central banks were naturally alarmed by this devel-
opment and they consequently sided with the Großbanken in their attempt to establish
three banking districts. In return, the Großbanken and the Finance Ministry supported
the smaller states in decoupling the recentralization of the Großbanken from the questions
relating to the restructuring of state central bank districts and of state boundaries.143
The finance ministers of the three southern German states (Hesse, Wu¨rttemberg-
Baden and Bavaria) used this opportunity to obtain concessions.144 After all they were
reneging on federal principles. And if need be, they could delay the entire recentralization
process of the Großbanken. If united, they could even block it with their vote in the Bun-
desrat. Hesse soon pulled out of this coalition after representatives of the banks outlined
the (tax) benefits of having the German financial capital in its state. The remaining two
states, Bavaria and Wu¨rttemberg-Baden, consequently signalled a willingness to compro-
mise, as their coalition could no longer block the recentralization. They demanded to have
two of the Großbankens’ southern banking districts headquarters to be based in their state
capitals of Munich and Stuttgart. As a consequence of the opposition of the state central
banks and the southern states, the recentralization issue dragged on over several months,
before the German government finally presented a first draft to the Allies for approval.145
143See Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 439–453), Horstmann (1991, pp. 219–243) and Wolf (1998b, pp. 86–87).
144Interestingly, Holtfrerich (1995, p. 454) reports that the Economics Ministries of the states were in
favor recentralization and even passed a resolution urging the federal government to work in this direction.
145See Holtfrerich (1995, pp. 454–459), Horstmann (1991, pp. 249–261) and Wolf (1998b, pp. 86–87).
Horstmann (1991, p. 250) and Holtfrerich (1995, p. 454) report that it was the states in the American
zones that were opposed to the recentralization in part because the Americans had placed federalist-leaning
individuals in key positions such as the State Central banks. Holtfrerich (1995, p. 450) also reports that
these states and some of state central banks federal sentiments were even stronger than that of the American
High Commission at the time.
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Approval by the Allies was still necessary, since Germany had not yet regained full
legislative autonomy. The British High Commissioner was fully supportive of the Ger-
man Abs plan. Indeed, the chief author, Hermann J. Abs had conferred with the British
several times before publishing the detailed plan. Nevertheless, the German government
and Abs were both aware that a complete restoration was not an option as long as the
Americans had a say. For their part, the American HICOG representatives had realized
that they could not avoid a partial removal of branching restrictions and re-concentration
of the Großbanken.146 Instead, they made an effort to introduce provisions in the Ger-
man regulatory landscape, which they considered to be of importance. The number one
banking practice the Americans wanted the German central government to ban was that
of proxy voting. They also tried to convince the Germans of the necessity to introduce
shareholder registration.147 As the discussions dragged on, the German government was
seriously concerned of an ‘I.G. Farben episode’. In the summer of 1950, the Allies had
issued a military law that broke-up the industrial conglomerate I.G. Farben without any
prior involvement or advance notice of the German side. Now the government feared that
any further delay caused by German infighting over the exact details might trigger yet
another such an action by the Allies.148
The Branch Restriction Act, which was eventually passed by the German parliament
with the approval of the Allies, introduced three banking zones as it had been proposed in
the Abs plan. Each bank had to choose a banking zone in which to operate, and it could not
maintain subsidiaries or branches in other zones.149 The Großbanken’s 30 offspring were
allowed to merge within their respective zones as new legal entities. In order to be able to
cover all three banking zones, each of the three universal bank groups would be composed
146For the sympathy of the British for the German cause see the Memo by Klopstock to Pumphrey,
Subj.:Re-centralization of German Banking, dated 02.02.1950, found in NARA, RG 466, Office of General
Counsel, Decartelization Division, General Subject Files, 1948-55, NND: 903642, Box 1. For an analysis
from within the German Economics Ministry of the situation in the summer of 1950 see BArch B102/28179,
Memo by Dr. Henckel, 1310-V/7, Subj.:Neuorganisation der Großbanken, dated 01.06.1950. Holtfrerich
(1995, p. 454) also reports that the Korean War might have shifted American policy priorities further
towards economic reconstruction rather than ensuring the strict adherence to federalism in Germany.
147For a presentation of the discussions taking place see Ahrens (2007, pp. 202–221), Horstmann (1991,
pp. 261–286) and Loehr (1952, pp. 58–67). For archival material from the German Economic Ministry
refer to BArch B102/28179.
148See BArch B102/28179, Memo by Henckel, Subj.:Neuordnung der Großbanken, dated 12.10.1950 and
Memo by Kremer, Subj.:“Vermerk u¨ber die Unterhaltung auf dem Petersberg mit den Finanzberatern der
Hohen Kommissare am 8.5.1951 u¨ber das Großbankengesetz”, dated 10.05.1951.
149For the Act see Bundesgesetzblatt (1952). Colloquially this act was called the Großbankengesetz – the
law of the large (universal) banks.
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of three ‘subsidiaries’.150 The ‘subsidiaries’ were even allowed to change their names so
as to resemble the universal bank in whose tradition they stood. However, they were
prohibited from owning shares of each other, and board members were prohibited to have
a seat on another ‘subsidiary’s’ board.151 In order to obtain approval from the Allies, the
German government promised to introduce safeguards to the practice of proxy voting in
the corporate legislation. This was meant to keep banks from assuming too much financial
power. Banks were to obtain explicit permission from their customers, if they wanted to
make use of the voting rights associated with their customers’ shares in other companies.
Additionally, the German government had to refrain from further reforms with respect to
branching restrictions and the Großbanken for a period of three years.152 This provision
alone shows clearly how little the Americans believed in the long-term persistence of even
these ‘reformed’ branching restrictions. And indeed, the Branch Restriction Act of 1952
would only be a temporary stopgap on the route to the restoration of the Großbanken.153
In the meantime, the ‘subsidiaries’ of each bank cooperated closely with each other and
they even signed legally binding contracts in which they agreed on pooling their gains and
losses.154
Sure enough, three years after the first Branch Restriction Act, Germany’s occupation
status was lifted and Germany regained full legislative autonomy and restricted sovereignty
in 1955.155 Not long thereafter, the decentralization in the banking sector imposed by the
Allies would be largely reversed. The Branch Liberalization Act from 24. December,
1956, was indeed a major Christmas present to the Großbanken groups.156 It allowed any
bank to operate throughout Germany without any restrictions. This also implied that
the universal bank subsidiaries could merge and they soon did. The restitution of the
Großbanken was completed.157
150Consequently this was also called the “3 ∗ 3 solution”. See figure 4.3 on page 184 for the subsidiaries
and figure 4.2 and table 4.6 on pages 184 and 183, respectively, for an overview of the size of the Großbanken
groups.
151For every stock owned in the former Großbanken, shareholders were given one stock of each of the
three new ‘subsidiaries’, as well as a fourth share of a ‘trunk’ institute, which represented a claim on assets
held in East Germany and elsewhere abroad. For details see Ahrens (2007, pp. 245-248).
152See Horstmann (1991, pp. 283–284) and Loehr (1952, p. 67).
153By 1952 there was already a consensus amongst the German government, parliament and banking that
complete recentralization of the Großbanken was only a matter of time. See Ahrens (2007, p. 220).
154For an example of such a pooling contract see that of Gruppe Deutsche Bank (1955, p. 6).
155Allied soldiers remained stationed in Germany and she was required to join the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. Full and unrestricted sovereignty would only be restored in 1991 after reunification had
taken place and the “Two plus Four Agreements” became effective.
156See Bundesgesetzblatt (1956).
157Ahrens (2007, pp. 124–125) points out that the National Socialists’ arization process of the 1930s had
a longer lasting impact on the personnel continuity of the large credit banks than the denazification and
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Table 4.6: The Großbanken groups in international perspective in 1950/51
Balance sheet size (in mio. US$)
Bank 1950/51 1930/31
Bank of America (USA) 7,022 1,061
The National City Bank of NY (USA) 5,580 1,973
The Chase National Bank (USA) 5,228 2,215
Barclays Bank (UK) 5,126 2,207
Midland Bank (UK) 4,030 2,085
Lloyds Bank (UK) 3,608 2,050
Guaranty Trust Company of New York (USA) 3,095 1,863
Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Company (USA) 2,554 1,129
Royal Bank of Canada (CAN) 2,249 852
Bank of Montreal (CAN) 2,004 786
Canadian Bank of Commerce (CAN) 1,606 686
Nederlandsche Bank (NL) 1,578 372
Credit Lyonnais (F) 878 596
Deutsche Bank Group (D) 842 1,174
Philadelphia National Bank (USA) 823 456
Socie´te´ Ge´nerale (F) 744 577
Schweizerischer Bankverein (CH) 618 317
Banca Commerciale Italiana (ITA) 601 957
Dresdner Bank Group (D) 525 603
Schweizerische Kreditanstalt (CH) 524 352
Comptoir National D’Escompte de Paris (F) 511 408
Zu¨richer Kantonalbank (CH) 470 233
Banco di Roma (ITA) 464 227
Banco di Napoli (ITA) 442 260
Credito Italiano (ITA) 408 487
Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (NL) 398 266
Mitsubishi Bank (JAP) 388 376
Mitsui Bank (JAP) 364 431
Commerzbank Group (D) 347 430
Amsterdamsche Bank (NL) 295 430
Rheinische Girozentrale und Provinzialbank (D) 271 226
Schweizerische Volksbank (CH) 254 329
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank (D) 250 247
Rotterdamsche Bank (NL) 250 165
Banque Cantonale de Berne (CH) 172 112
Banque de Paris et des Pays - Bas (F) 169 166
Hollandsche Bank - Unie N.V. (NL) 117 32
Solothurner Kantonalbank (CH) 90 56
Note that in 1950/51 the Großbanken groups did not officially operate as groups yet. Sources: own work
based on data from Thomas Skinner & Co. (1931, 1951, pp. 505–1476 & pp. 19–868). German bank data
for 1950/51 is from BArch B102/28179, “Abschrift: Bilanzsummen der Nachfolgeinstitute der Großbanken
nach den Bastameldungen per 30. September 1951” and “Abschrift: Bilanzsummen der gro¨ßten Banken
in Nordrhein-Westfalen und Bayern”. Exchange rates were used from Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (1943, 1976, pp. 663–682 & pp. 1035–1047).
decentralization efforts of the Allies. Of the 13 members on the board of Dresdner Bank in 1957, merely
one of them had joined the bank after the Second World War.
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Figure 4.2: The Großbanken Groups’ balance sheet sizes by region in 1951
(in mio. DM)
Region Deutsche
Bank Group
Dresdner
Bank Group
Commerzbank
Group
Western banking zone 1,458 780 775
Nordrhein-Westfalen 1,458 780 775
Northern banking zone 693 604 389
Hamburg 386 372 192
Bremen 114 90 28
Niedersachsen 193 126 139
Schleswig-Holstein – 16 30
Southern banking zone 1,382 818 291
Hessen 322 375 127
Bayern 244 173 46
Wu¨rttemberg-Baden 439 159 96
Wu¨rttemberg-Hohenzollern 67 10 –
Baden 145 28 –
Rheinland-Pfalz 165 73 22
Total 3,533 2,202 1,455
Note: the banking zones did not yet exist at this point in time and thus the Großbanken Groups
are fictional. Sources: BArch B102/28179, “Abschrift: Bilanzsummen der Nachfolgeinstitute der
Großbanken nach den Bastameldungen per 30. September 1951”.
Figure 4.3: When 30 became 9 in 1952
Deutsche Bank Group Dresdner Bank Group Commerzbank Group
Rheinisch Westfa¨hlische
Bank, Du¨sseldorf
Rhein-Ruhr-Bank,
Du¨sseldorf
Bankverein Westdeutsch-
land, Du¨sseldorf
Su¨ddeutsche Bank,
Mu¨nchen
Rhein-Main-Bank, Frank-
furt
Commerz- und Disconto-
Bank, Hamburg
Norddeutsche Bank,
Hamburg
Hamburger Kreditbank,
Hamburg
Commerz- und Credit-
Bank, Frankfurt
The 3 ∗ 3 solution that resulted from the Branch Restriction Act of 1952 (also known as
Großbankengesetz ). Sources: Ahrens (2007, pp. 238, 241), Gruppe Deutsche Bank (1955, p.
6) and Wolf (1995, pp. 22-23).
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4.5.4 From Bank deutscher La¨nder to Bundesbank
Article 88 of the German constitution required the government to pass a new law for a
Bundesbank, in order to put the central bank on a democratically legitimized footing.158 It
is easy to infer from this that the Germans politicians would have grabbed this opportunity
to shed themselves of the American ‘dictate’ and resurrect the Reichsbank. However, the
process was not straight forward. The Bundesbank Act that was passed in 1957 did restore
several of the characteristics of the Reichsbank, but not all of them. Furthermore, the path
towards a new Bundesbank Act resembled a serpentine with several exits, each of which
would have led to a different Bundesbank Act. Over the 7 years of the deliberation process
a total of 25 official drafts159 were put forward. Proposals ranged from one spectrum to the
other: from simply adopting the existing Bank deutscher La¨nder as the new Bundesbank,
to a reinstatement of the Reichsbank.160 During these negotiations the Germans debated
vigorously to what extend to roll back the changes imposed by the American occupiers.
Two points were the main focus of these discussions. One was the extent to which the
German government would control the central bank. The other was the organizational
structure of the central bank – whether to maintain the decentralized system or whether
to revert to a centralized approach.161
In the first years of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundesbank Act was drawn
up under the auspices of the Federal Government’s Finance Ministry. The Ministry, under
the guidance of federalist Minister Hans Scha¨ffer, had a favorable view of the decentralized
organization of the BdL-System.162 However, the Finance Ministry wanted to give the
federal government direct control over the future Bundesbank, in order to be able to force
it to finance job creation programmes and to prevent it from counteracting the governments
expansionary fiscal policy by tightening monetary policy. He wanted to avoid a state within
a state In this he was backed by Chancellor Adenauer as well as a number of parties in
the Bundestag, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the Socialdemocratic Party (SPD) as
158See Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Artikel 88).
159See Hentschel (1988a, p. 10).
160For a comparison of the most important drafts between 1952 and 1957 see Deutsche Bundesbank (1988,
p. 195).
161See Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, Vorwort), Hentschel (1988a, p. 2), Stern (1999, pp. 112–113) and
Wolf (1998a, p. 120). Other important, but less controversial issues were with respect to the legal form
and the monetary tools available to the Bundesbank.
162Indeed the BdL System had performed well in its first years of existence and even built a solid reputation
inside and outside of Germany. See Dickhaus (1998, p. 179). For Scha¨ffer’s federalist tendencies see for
example Hentschel (1988a, p. 14).
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Table 4.7: Conceptual overview of the different interest groups with respect
to the Bundesbank Act in1950
Decentralized Structure Centralized Structure
Direct government influence
Scha¨ffer (Finance Ministry),
Adenauer (Chancellor), CDU
(‘Southern Group’), CSU, SPD
CDU (‘Northern Group’), DP
Central Bank Independence BdL, Bundesrat
Ludwig Erhard (Economics
Ministry), FDP
Note: The positions shown here are conceptual in nature. The actual positions are not necessarily as
clear cut and indeed more nuanced and did shift in the subsequent years. Source: Own elaboration based
on information from Berger and Haan (1999, pp. 23–24), Deutsche Bundesbank (1988) and Hentschel
(1988a, pp. 10–16).
well as numerous members of the CDU.163 Adenauer and Scha¨ffer even thought about
assigning the federal government half of the future Bundesbank’s share capital (and thus
seignorage profits), and to relocate the future Bundesbank from Frankfurt to Cologne, just
next to Bonn, the capital.164
Their position was vigorously opposed by those that either favored the centralization
of the central bank, such as the Economics Ministry under Ludwig Erhard and the Free
Democratic Party (FDP), or those that attempted to maintain the central bank’s indepen-
dence from the federal government, such as the BdL itself and the German states. Erhard
also wanted to keep the Bundesbank nominally independent. He advocated for more sub-
tle measures to influence the Bundesbank, such as the nomination of its directors, rather
than outright government ordinances as Scha¨ffer suggested.165 Within the BdL itself, the
president of the directorate, Vocke, supported Erhard in his drive for greater centralization
of the central banks’ structure. However he was outvoted by the presidents of the state
central banks who dominated decision making within the BdL-System.166 The constitu-
tion itself contained no restrictions as to the structure or the independence of the future
Bundesbank. Consequently any of these arrangements was legally feasible.167
163CDU delegates who had constituencies in the ‘northern’ states supported this line fully, whereas those
who had constitutencies in the ‘southern’ states tended to prefer a decentralized structure of the central
bank.
164See Berger and Haan (1999, pp. 23–25) and Hentschel (1988a, pp. 10–12). The question whether the
Bundesbank was to have its headquarters in Cologne resurfaced in 1956 again. See Deutsche Bundesbank
(1988, pp. 133–136).
165See Hentschel (1988a, pp. 11; 14).
166See Vocke’s Letter to Minister Erhard, Subj.: “Zentralbanksystem ku¨nftigen Problemen nicht gewach-
sen” from 12.08.1950, reprinted in Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, p. 165). See also Hentschel (1988a, pp.
11–15).
167See Bundesgesetzblatt (1949, Artikel 88).
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In the fall of 1950, it seemed as if the Finance Ministry’s position would prevail and a
corresponding Bundesbank Act could be passed by the lower house of parliament, the Bun-
destag.168 However, members of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the German Party
(Deutsche Partei, DP), which formed part of the ruling coalition between the CDU/CSU,
FPD and the Deutsche Partei (DP), came out strongly in favor of a centralized structure
for the Bundesbank. Moreover, they began questioning the constitutionality of the BdL
system. In particular its decentralized nature and the lack of political legitimization of
its actions was critized. Additionally, Erhard (and Justice Minister Dehler) also came out
strongly in favor of the centralization once more and also voiced constitutional doubts.169
Shortly thereafter, the Allied High Commission announced that it wanted to renounce its
rights in the area of currency and money, under the precondition that a German law was
passed that compensated for the discontinuation of the Allied Banking Commission.170
Minister Scha¨ffer immediately tried to seize the opportunity to install the federal gov-
ernment in place of the Allied Banking Commission, giving it the power to issue direct
guidances to the BdL-system and to veto any of its policies. This sneak-attack on the
independence of the BdL-System was resisted successfully by the Economics Ministry and
especially the BdL itself. Scha¨ffer was forced to compromise and instead the German par-
liament was asked by the government to pass a provisional law that stipulated that the
BdL should merely support the federal government in its general economic policy. The
Allied Banking Commission’s veto power was reduced to a suspensive veto that gave the
federal government the possibility to suspend BdL policy decisions for a 8 days. Thus, the
Bundesbank’s independence from the German government was kept largely intact. How-
ever, in exchange for this independence, 20% of the bank’s profits in 1951 and 1952 was
allotted to the federal government.171 From that moment on, the Allies had renounced
their privileges to actively shape this particular legislative process, not that they had in-
terfered much in the first place. Indeed, more than anything else this legislative process
was a constitutional struggle between federalists and centralists.
168Whether the mere passage in the Bundestag sufficed for the Bundesbank Act was unclear. Scha¨ffer
argued that no consent of the upper house of parliament, the Bundesrat, was needed in the case of the
Bundesbank Act. The Bundesrat contested this interpretation of the constitution. In any case, if the
Bundestag have passed the Bundesbank Act without the consent of the Bundesrat, it is certain that the
states would have launched a constitutional challenge.
169See Hentschel (1988a, pp. 12–13, 19). See also the overview of the different interest groups in 1950 in
table 4.7 on page 186.
170The BdL’s economic policies had been subject to the approval of the Allied Banking Commission.
171See Berger and Haan (1999, p. 24), Berger (1997, p. 435), Hentschel (1988a, pp. 17–18) and Marsh
(1992, pp. 164–167).
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The attempts by Chancellor Adenauer to increase the governments influence over the
Bundesbank weakened over the next years. This can be attributed to both Erhard’s and
the BdL’s success in winning the media’s and thus public’s opinion, which insulated them
from further government attempts to influence the Bundesbank.172 But the struggle over
the degree of federalism continued as before. When the competence for money and credit
was transferred from the Finance Ministry to the Economics Ministry in the spring of
1952, the Finance Ministry was not prepared to give up just yet. Consequently, both
ministries published separate drafts for a Bundesbank Act, either of which failed to rally
the unanimous support of the cabinet. While the Finance Ministry’s draft stipulated
the continued decentralization, the Economics Ministry’s draft would have centralized the
central bank. In November of 1952, Chancellor Adenauer grew impatient with the inability
of his cabinet, and in particular Erhard and Scha¨ffer, to reach a consensus. He wanted to
pass the Bundesbank Act before the end of the legislative period in 1953. Consequently,
Adenauer decided to forward the Finance Ministry’s bill – which he personally favored –
to the Bundesrat for parliamentary consultation, where it was received favorably. Thus,
once more it seemed as if the Finance Ministry was about to reach its goal to keep the
decentralized BdL-structure in place, albeit with more direct government influence on the
central bank. However, in the lower house of parliament, the Bundestag, the Finance
Ministry’s bill faced the stiff opposition from the centralists in the FDP, which presented
Erhard’s draft as a counter proposal to the Finance Ministry’s bill. They could also count
on the SPD, which had changed course and now supported the centralization. The bills
were almost identical in their technical details such as the scope of monetary tools they
assigned to the central bank. The major difference was of course the future structure
of the central bank. In a number of parliamentary sessions both bills were discussed,
but no stable majority could be found for either a central or a decentral structure of the
Bundesbank. As a consequence, the passage of a new Bundesbank Act was deferred to
the next legislative period.173
In the following legislative period, the Economics Ministry under Ludwig Erhard was
172See Berger and Haan (1999, pp. 25, 27, 35–36).
173See Hentschel (1988a, pp. 21-31). In the outgoing legislative period, the FDP had also called upon the
constitutional court to challenge the Bundesrat’s opinion that it had to consent to the future Bundesbank
Act and that no such act could be passed against it approval. The FDP believed that the constitution
gave the Bundesrat no such veto power. In July of 1953, the constitutional court declared the challenge
invalid, as it could only rule on legislative proceedings that had led to actual laws, but that it could not
rule on bills that parliament may intend to pass.
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solely put in charge with the work on a new Bundesbank Act. However, ministerial work
on the act began to pick up steam only towards the end of 1955. Neither Erhard nor
Adenauer wanted to force this issue early on in the parliamentary period. This gave the
Erhard and the government more time to form a consensus. Additionally Erhard spent
much of his time with the passage of an Antitrust Act, which was to be a cornerstone of
his social market economy.174 In 1955 and 1956 Adenauer once more tried to challenge the
independence of the central bank when the BdL tightened monetary policy and criticized
Adenauer’s plan to expand fiscal policy. The expenditure was meant to buy Adenauer fa-
vors with the electorate prior to the next election in 1957. Intriguingly, the BdL was openly
supported by Economic Minister Erhard, who was worried about inflation, and Finance
Minister Scha¨ffer, who preferred to use the funds for German rearmament. Together the
two Ministers drew up a joint stabilization plan for the budget. Adenauer reacted strongly
by attacking both his ministers and the BdL, and vowing to “discipline” them. The reac-
tion by the public media outlets, as well as financial and small business interest groups was
to come out heavily in support of the BdL’s independence and the stabilization plan of the
Erhard and Scha¨ffer. In turn, Adenauer had to acquiesce and accepted both the central
bank’s independence and the stabilization plan. Adenauer’s silver lining in this episode
was that he could subsequently shift responsibility for the relatively tight monetary and
fiscal policy on the BdL and his ministers, securing him another election victory.175
With the issue of the independence of the future Bundesbank settled, the only contro-
verisal issue that remained was its organizational structure. It had already been difficult
for the Economics Ministry to obtain a consensus in cabinet, especially since Scha¨ffer and
the BdL, continued their opposition to a centralized arrangement.176 Erhard had been
instructed by Adenauer to find a common ground with both, before forwarding a bill to
parliament. However, Scha¨ffer attempted to delay the reform, just as Erhard had done
back in 1953, whereas the BdL put forward their own proposal, which amounted to a
two-tier system with some central elements. While this was supported by Scha¨ffer, it was
rejected by the Economics Ministry as the decentral elements outweighed the central ones.
174See Hentschel (1988b, pp. 80–83, 87).
175For this episode see Berger and Haan (1999, pp. 25–27), Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, p. 116),
Hentschel (1988b, p. 95), Kitterer (1999, pp. 168–172) and Stern (1999, p. 114).
176Scha¨ffer also played a key role, since a centralized solution meant significant fiscal burdens for the
federal government. During the currency reform of 1948, the state central banks had been allocated
equalization claims by the state governments amounting to DM8.7 billion. If the state central banks were
converted into federal government institutions, it was expected that the federal government would also
take over these liabilities from the states. See Ha¨user (1998, pp. 48–51) and Hentschel (1988b, p. 97).
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Both Adenauer and especially Erhard began to press for action to ensure the passage of
the Bundesbank Act before the end of the legislative period. This insistence of Adenauer
and Erhard seems to have caused the BdL to accept a compromise offered by the Eco-
nomics Ministry that foresaw a centralized structure, but with decentral elements. It also
guaranteed the Bundesbank’s independence. At last, a bill was agreed upon in the fall of
1956, which was forwarded to the Bundesrat.177
Whereas there was little disagreement about material questions such as the scope of
the Bundesbank operations, the Bundesrat outright opposed the central bank structure
outlined in the government’s bill. Furthermore the Bundesrat made it clear that it believed
that any change to the BdL’s structure would require its approval and that it would not
hesitate to launch a constitutional challenge if need be. After all, the states’ administrative
rights were being affected by such a move. The upper house of parliament proposed
a number of changes that made the bill much more similar to the structure outline by
Finance Minister Scha¨ffer’s unsuccessful bill from 1953. The cabinet in turn dismissed the
proposals by the Bundesrat and it also denied that the Bundesbank Act needed approval
by Bundesrat. It consequently forwarded the bill, as well as the Bundestag’s opinion and
the government’s reply to the opinion, to the Bundestag. There the bill encountered the
opposition of the federalist CSU, which had prepared an alternative bill almost identical to
the demands of the Bundesrat. The rest of the lower house of parlament was also largely
undecided. It was then the task of the Bundestag’s Committee for Money and Credit to
act as a mediating forum between the government, both houses of parliament and the BdL.
But it was clear that neither of the two organizational proposals, the government’s or the
CSU’s, could be passed as is. One compromise by the commission’s chairman, Scharnberg,
found the necessary majorities in both houses of parliament.178
In the summer of 1957 the Bank deutscher La¨nder was finally replaced by the Bun-
desbank. Even the states voted in favor of the Bundesbank Act and no constitutional
challenge was brought forward. The buildings, assets, and personnel of the BdL became
part of the Bundesbank. To some extent, the federal structure was maintained as the state
177See Hentschel (1988b, pp. 80–97, 99).
178It is noteworthy that the BdL opposed the compromise and instead proposed once more its two tier
system with central elements. It also urged to postpone the Bundesbank Act for the next legislative period.
Ironically, this BdL opposition may have played a role in nudging the other actors towards accepting the
compromise. See Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, p. 191–194) and Hentschel (1988b, pp. 87–111). See
Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, p. 195) for an overview of the key differences of the main proposals throughout
the legislative process.
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central banks continued to exist in name. However, they were degraded to the status of
branches and they no longer owned the central bank. As compensation, the state central
banks were granted the responsibility to engage with banks only operating in parts of the
country as well as with the local authorities. The center was responsible for banks that
operated nationally, for operations involving the federal government, for foreign exchange
dealings and for open market operations. The center could not issue orders to the state
central banks either, merely guidelines. Henceforth, the central government owned the
central bank, which gave it the power to appoint the members of the directorate.179 In
turn, the Bundesbank was to support the general economic policies of the government.
But other than that the Bundesbank was independent in its policies. The central bank
council consisted in equal numbers of members from the directorate and the state central
banks.180 Thus, the American decentralization efforts were rolled back substantially and
some of the old Reichsbank privileges were introduced as well, but only after 7 years of
intense parliamentary negotiations between the states, the parliament, the BdL and the
central government.
4.5.5 The (re-)birth of the Credit Act of 1961
The path towards a new Credit Act would take more than 13 years. Its history finds an
important parallel in that of the Bundesbank Act of 1957: both legislative processes were
characterized by a fierce federalist struggle between the German federal government and
the states.181
The Allied changes to the supervisory institutions were introduced in a piecemeal
manner. This created a situation of legal uncertainty. The Allies had also refrained from
passing their own military law outlining a new credit act. Consequently, the Credit Act
of 1934 (in its amended form of 1939 or 1944) was still the primary source of legislation
for the regulation of the banking sector. As a consequence of the decentralization of the
179Although this seems to have had almost no influence on the independence of the Bundesbank as
Berger1997 points out. Indeed, the Bundesbank came to be known for being a particularly independent
central bank.
180See Bundesgesetzblatt (1957b) for the legislation. See also Hentschel (1988b, pp. 113–114), Wolf
(1998a, pp. 120–123). See Marsh (1992, pp. 20–22) for the personnel continuity between the Third Reich
and the senior levels of the Bundesbank. And last but not least see Deutsche Bundesbank (1988, p. 265)
for an excellent overview of the differences between the BdL System and the Bundesbank, as well as the
initiators the different proposals.
181This subsection is based on Chapter 3 of this thesis.
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regulatory structures, banking regulations were not applied uniformly throughout the Ger-
man states.182 In 1948, the American Military Government began pushing the Germans
towards drafting a new Credit Act. One that would replace the old act and restore legal
certainty. The American Military Government wanted the Germans to adopt a two-tier
regulatory scheme, where the government was in charge of policing the banking sector and
where the central bank was no longer directly involved in the supervision of the banking
sector and instead focused primarily on monetary policy.
Work on a new Credit Act began under the auspices of the BdL in corporation with
the Special Committee for Banking Regulation, which was a body founded in 1948 by the
German states to harmonize their regulatory practices. The first drafts were prepared by
early 1950. These incorporated the changes introduced by the Allies: the decentralization
of regulation, the transfer of competence to the Ministries of Finance and the dissociation
of the central bank in regulatory matters. A final draft of the Credit Act was forwarded
by the working group to the Ministry of Finance in 1951.
At this time, the Ministry of Finance was engulfed in a struggle for subject-matter
competence with the Ministry of Economics. The Ministry of Economics under Ludwig
Erhard was trying to bring back the competences for Money and Credit to its Ministry,
where traditionally it had always been been. The struggle lasted for almost three years
(1949-1952). Eventually, subject-matter competence did indeed return to the Ministry
of Economics. As a consequence of the transfer, work on a new Credit Act began from
scratch in 1953 within the Ministry of Economics. The 1934 Credit Act (in its amended
form from 1939) was taken as the starting point, rather than the draft prepared by the Bank
deutscher La¨nder. In the following years there were severe internal disagreements within
the Economics Ministry, whether the banking sector should be subjected to competitive
pressures or not. Whereas one division, which represented Minister Erhard’s preferences,
argued for virtually free competition in the banking sector, another division, which was
formally in charge of drafting the Credit Act and which was in close contact with the
banking associations, advocated to maintain the banking sector cartelized. There was,
however, unanimity over the goal to recentralize banking regulation eventually. In 1957,
just before the end of the legislative period, the Economics Ministry attempted to centralize
the regulatory institutions with a brief amendment to the Credit Act. This attempt failed
182The Credit Act of 1961 eventually had to revoke 35 laws and decrees passed both before and after the
Second World War, in order to re-establish regulatory homogeneity.
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as both the states and the BdL resisted the centralization. Not only was the bill delayed
in parliament by the states, but it also became clear that the Economics Ministry would
not be able to rally the necessary supermajority in the lower house of parliament, to
override a potential veto by the states in the upper house of parliament. Consequently,
the amendment was not voted upon before the legislative period came to an end in 1957.
It was only after the passage of the Bundesbank Act and the German Antitrust Act
in the summer of 1957 that the first official draft of the Credit Act made available to the
public in early 1958. This draft took another three years to make its way through the
German parliament. On its way it encountered stiff resistance from the German states.
Just like the states in the U.S., the German states were not prepared to give up their
regulatory privileges either. The federal government and the lower house of parliament
supported the law. Crucially, the Economics Ministry was able to obtain the support
of the central bank, which had significant political influence and which had helped to
defeat a previous attempt to recentralize the regulation of the banking sector. Eventually,
after several attempts by the states to derail the project, the Credit Act was passed
by the Bundestag, only to be rejected almost unanimously by the Bundesrat. However,
this rejection was in turn overruled by the Bundestag with near unanimity. The conflict
between the states and the central government continued in constitutional court. The
states argued that the transfer of power from the states to the central government was
illegal, since such a measure required the consent of the Bundesrat. The constitutional
court dismissed the case referring to the German constitution, which had explicitly granted
the central government to powers to unify regulation of the banking sector.
The Credit Act of 1961 looked strikingly similar to the Credit Act of 1934. Almost
all regulatory elements found in the 1934 Credit Act, could be found in the Credit Act
of 1961. A few elements had been added, a few had been subtracted, others had merely
changed in scope. The most important characteristics were the same, however: a central-
ized supervisory authority for virtually the entire banking sector183 with extensive powers,
in particular that to impose an interest rate cartel. The only significant changes were
twofold. First, the central bank was less involved in regulatory affairs than it had been in
the 1930s. This was in line with the original American demands for the banking system,
but are attributable not to American intervention, but to the Bundesbank’s reluctance to
183Again like in 1934, with the exception of the mortgage banks.
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accept a greater role in regulatory affairs. And Second, the regulatory agency could no
longer restrict entry to the banking sector or branching on the grounds of economic neces-
sity. This was because of a court ruling in 1958 that referred to the constitutional clause
that allowed businesses to freely chose their trade. By restricting entry to the sector, the
government was infringing on this right.
The reason why the two Credit Acts looked so similar is because the Economics Min-
istry primary objective was to recentralize control over the banking sector. And since it
was clear that the states would reject any such proposal, the Economics Ministry had to
secure a supermajority in the Bundestag that could overrule a veto by the Bundesrat. And
the surest way to obtain the necessary supermajority was to return to the provisions of the
Credit Act of 1934, and to refrain from implementing innovative changes, such as intro-
ducing competitive pressures into the banking system, until the recentralization of control
over the banking sector had taken place and a supermajority was no longer necessary.
4.6 Conclusion
The Americans tried to transplant their ideological principles of decentralization and an-
titrust into a banking system that was generally characterized by just the opposite; cen-
tralization and cartelization had dominated the German banking landscape prior to the
Second World War. Germany’s largest and most iconic banks were broken down into
much smaller units. This was flanked with a new regulatory approach, which introduced
branching restrictions and a degree of regulatory decentralization previously unknown in
Germany. In a major break with German administrative tradition, the responsibility for
the banking sector was transferred from the Ministries of the Economy to the Finance Min-
istries on both a federal and central level. Furthermore, a central bank was established
that was similar to American Federal Reserve System.
Despite being able to introduce major changes to the banking system by 1950, the
Americans’ ambitious plan largely failed in the end. The mark left on the large credit
banks by the American intervention is small. At the end of the 1950s the Großbanken
reemerged as the branching restrictions were abolished. The Bundesbank also shed itself
of much of the American ballast. Instead it reintroduced many tried and tested Reichsbank
structures. Remarkably, the Bundesbank was able to maintain its independence from
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Figure 4.4: The Failed Institutional Assimilation
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A schematic overview of the changes imposed by the Allies on the regulatory institutions,
the central bank and the banking sector, and their subsequent reversal. Note: A map
of the West-German borders between 1952–55 has been used for all these years in order
to reduce complexity. Source: own elaboration based on a map by Wikimedia Commons
(2011).
German government influence. Last but not least, the Credit Act of 1961 turned out to
be the younger brother of the Credit Act of 1934. Thus, much of the American mark
disappeared barely a decade after it had been made. Indeed, the most lasting impact the
Americans had on the German banking system was less in the form of outright intervention
in the banking or industrial sector, but more an indirect one via the German constitution.
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Why did the Institutional Assimilation fail? Of course it is easy to infer just from the
results that Germans were universally opposed to all institutional changes imposed by the
Americans, and that the decentralization effectively rises and falls with the influence of the
Americans. However, such an explanation is not satisfactory, since it does not reflect the
actual events, in particular the vigorous constitutional conflict that took place between the
states and the federal government. In the case of the branching restrictions and the de-
centralization of the Großbanken, initially the states opposed the recentralization because
they correctly feared that it could serve as a trigger for greater centralization of the central
bank. Some city-states even feared that it could lead to their disappearance altogether.
After the states secured the federal government’s assurance that such questions would not
be treated in parallel with the recentralization of the Großbanken, the southern states
tried to obtain concessions for their agreement, which they did in the form of tax income
from the headquarters of the regionally re-merged Großbanken based in their respective
states’ capitals. Matters were even more complex with the institutional changes to the
central bank and the regulatory structures. The institutional outcomes of these struggles
were not evident ex ante at all. By changing the institutional framework, the Americans
had also changed the power balance between the states and the federal government. Sub-
sequently the states wrangled to defend their newly gained responsibilities, whereas the
federal government attempt to retake them.
Four factors contributed to the failure of the assimilation, one of which was easy
to overlook, but it turned out to be crucial. The first shortcoming was the delay and
incomplete nature of the reforms. As with any reform, time tends to be on the side of the
incumbent rules, regulations or practices. The Americans were aware of this. Yet, they
still tried to reach as broad a compromise as possible. First, they hoped for a compromise
involving all four of the Allies, then for action taken by the Germans themselves and finally
they tried to obtain an agreement with the remaining three western Allies. While intending
to reach a cooperative solution, precious momentum was lost. It was only after 112 years of
virtual stalemate that the Americans decided to press ahead with the reforms, and, sure
enough, the French soon followed and so did the British. This delay would not have caused
much of a problem by itself, especially when it came to decentralization of the central bank
and the regulatory institutions. However, the delay paired with the botched break-up of
the Großbanken and the introduction of branching restrictions were a major headache
for the Allies. The Americans had failed to eliminate the most vigorous opponents of
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their assimilation effort in the form of the Großbanken. The delay in implementing the
assimilation allowed the Großbanken to recover from the initial chaos after the surrender
and to stage a more structured response. Ironically, it seems likely that the Americans
seem to have overestimated the impact of the Großbanken on the (war) economy, while
dramatically underestimating their political impact. Had they not, then the break-up of
the Großbanken might have succeeded.
The second shortcoming was the fact that the Americans had to pass all of their
reforms as a ‘military law’ – effectively an order. Proper democratically legitimized legis-
lation was to follow by the German legislators at a later stage. It was generally understood
that the imposed institutional changes were ‘temporary’ in nature. Temporary not in the
sense that they would be rolled back in the near future, but temporary in the sense that
the Germans would eventually democratically decide on their own, on which system to
adopt. Consequently, the use of military decrees made it harder for the status quo bias to
perform its ‘magic’.
A third important factor in the failure of the Institutional Assimilation was a policy
reversal that took place within the American administration as OMGUS was replaced
by HICOG, which exchanged much of the key personnel. Not only did the Americans
switch from an active to a passive role, focussing instead on re-educating the German
businessmen and policymakers. But, by the time the Federal Republic of Germany had
been set up, many of the new American officials on the ground were less firm in their
convictions about the optimality of the American banking system and consequently about
the desirability of imposing those reforms on Germany in the first place. This view was
certainly strengthened by strong British opposition to any further institutional changes
once the federal Republic of Germany had been created.
None of the preceding three factors are sufficient. Americans failed to implant the
necessary safeguards in the German constitution that prevented recentralization. This is
what made all the difference. The German constitution, too, was formulated under Amer-
ican supervision. Its constraints set the political and economic playing field. However, the
American officials seem to have failed to recognize the importance of having sufficiently
strong states’ rights included, if the American institutions were supposed to survive in the
regular democratic process. As a matter of fact, the German states fought long and hard
with the federal government to retain the privileges the Americans had given to them.
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The legislative process over the reform of the central bank law was long and drawn out.
At one point it even seemed that the American Federal Reserve model, that the BdL had
inherited, might find a democratic majority. In the case of the regulatory institutions,
the states fought even harder to retain their supervisory rights. And here at one point
it too seemed like the American model might be adopted. In the end, the states could
not retain these privileges either, as the constitutional court ruled in favor of the central
government, who went ahead and stripped control over banking regulation from the states.
The constitution allowed the Germans to centralize their banking system much more than
the Americans had initially anticipated.
This historical episode can tell us something not only about German banking regula-
tion, but also American regulatory history. If one assumes that there are two regulatory
systems to chose from: the American decentralized regulatory system and the German cen-
tralized system with. Let it be assumed that the German banking system with centralized
regulatory supervision is superior to the other.184 Then the main question is, of course,
why did this ‘superior’ arrangement not materialize in the United States? The answer to
this question is likely to be found with the states’ constitutional right to charter banks,
which kept the United States trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium.185 Now, is there a way
to test such a hypothesis? One would have to find the identifying variance, i.e. one needs
to find a country with a constitution that did not contain the same states’ rights as the
American constitution, and where the American system was introduced exogenously. In
such a case one would predict that the American system would not prevail in the long-run,
i.e. that there would be a switch from a ‘bad’ equilibrium to a ‘good’ equilibrium.
The German case after World War II was just such a scenario. The Americans project
their regulatory system upon the German one. If one looks at the German constitution
from 1949 then one can see that it was clearly federal as well. However, it also included
the banking matters as part of the concurrent legislative powers. Unlike the United States,
the central government was able to claim exclusive jurisdiction over banking matters, if
it deemed it vital, which it eventually did. Similar to the United States, the German
states fought the centralization efforts in the banking sector vigorously. Only that this
time, unlike in the United States, it was in vain. It was the relatively more centralized
184This is merely a speculative assumption for the sake of this argument, which would have to be tested
more thoroughly. However, as financial markets become more integrated, the tendency of regulatory
structures worldwide have clearly been towards more centralized arrangements, rather than less.
185This is argued in chapter 2 of this thesis.
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constitution, which made all the difference. Therefore, the failed assimilation could be
interpreted as concrete evidence that the American decentralized banking system, with the
multiple chartering authorities, has been kept in place artificially through constitutional
forces. Put differently, if the political process was not constrained by the constitution
and was free to choose the regulatory institutions (as there was in the case of Germany),
a system such as the American decentralized regulatory arrangement would not survive
for as long as it did. If this rationale is accurate, there is no need to look for economic
explanations that have helped sustain the American regulatory system.
Would the Institutional Assimilation have had a chance if the Americans had acted
more swiftly and more boldy? A brief look at the developments in Soviet-ruled East
Germany show that permanent radical change to a banking system is possible. However,
East Germany was being transformed into another dictatorship with a different economic
set-up, whereas the western Allies wanted to implant the notion of democracy. Thus,
dictating a new order of things was almost impossible from the moment Germany had
its own democratically legitimized parliament. Nevertheless, it seems plausible to assume
that had the Americans successfully eliminated the most vociferous advocates of a cen-
tralized banking system – the Großbanken – and had the U.S. implanted ‘safeguards’ in
the constitution in the form of impenetrable state rights to regulate the banking system,
that the assimilation could indeed have succeeded. The states were taken in by the federal
system, which gave them greater power. They were not prepared to let it go. Even more,
had the constitutional court ruled in favor of the states rights in 1962, then we could still
see a decentralized regulatory system in Germany today.
Chapter 5
Epilogue
After the passage of the Credit Act in 1961 and the Constitutional Court’s ruling in 1962,
the issue of banking regulation did not subside. The question of whether to introduce
additional competitive pressures, which was one of the two key issues debated in the
genesis of the Credit Act of 1961, continued to be a matter of debate in the banking
circles.1
A ruling from the Federal Administrative Court in 1958 had already abolished the
requirement to obtain the government’s approval, if banks wanted to open new branches.
This unintentional liberalization2 led to a sharp increase in the number of bank branches
being established throughout Germany. Between 1957 and 1967, the number of banks and
their branches increased from 26,333 to 37,144. At the same time a mild concentration
process took place, as the total number of banks shrank. But even so the overall result
was a net increase in banking offices. This increased the competitive pressures to some
extent.3 Competitive pressures also increased as some of the Sparkassen, and most of
their parent institutions, had increasingly turned into full-fledged universal banks, to the
dismay of the other private credit banks and the credit cooperatives. The private banks
in turn discovered that many of the small and medium scale clients of the Sparkassen had
become sufficiently wealthy so as to become a lucrative business opportunity, which they
1It was hardly ever a topic of general political interest. See for example Muthesius (1967, p. 3).
2It was unintentional since it did not originate in actions taken by either the legislative or the executive
branch of government.
3On average, the number of banking offices increased by about 1250 per year during this period. See
Ambrosius (1998, pp. 157–158) and Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 398–399). For the concentration process see also
Pohl (1982d, pp. 460–483).
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intended to tap. And in order to tap this market, they needed to find a way to break the
dominance of the public banking sector in this segment.4
Already in the spring of 1961, as Ludwig Erhard struggled to obtain the necessary
supermajority in parliament to secure the passage of the Credit Act of 1961, he convinced
the lower house of parliament to install a government commission under the auspices of his
Economics Ministry. The internal commission was to study the feasibility of introducing
deposit insurance. It was also to investigate the nature of competition within the banking
sector, to identify distortions to competition, which needed to be removed in order to
establish a level playing field. This commission was strongly supported by the association
of the private banks, and the association of the credit cooperatives, who saw it as an
opportunity to defend themselves from the competitive pressures of the public banking
system, and to bring about competition on more equal terms. After all, the public banks
still enjoyed important privileges over non-public banks, such as the implicit government
backing as well as tax exemptions.5 This issue was a highly sensitive topic and Erhard was
well aware of this. The public banks naturally saw this Enqueˆte as a major threat not only
to their privileges, but also to their very existence as a public institution. Consequently
they attempted to discredit the Enqueˆte altogether, by questioning its objectivity and by
accusing the private banking sector of calling for the help of the federal government to
masquerade their own inefficiency.6 The final report of the Enqueˆte, was only published
in 1968.
The commission was not tasked with analyzing the question of whether to liberalize
the interest-rate restrictions. Nevertheless, this discussion grew increasingly in intensity
within the relevant circles. As of 1961, the public banks welcomed a gradual abolition of
the interest rate cartel. After all, they benefited from a number of government subsidies
that gave them an important competitive advantage over private-sector banks. In turn,
the private-sector banks vigorously opposed any liberalization. It secured their rents and
more importantly it shielded them from additional competitive pressures from the public
4See Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 305–308).
5See Deutscher Bundestag (1968, pp. II–III). Please note that the final report does not state the
personnel composition of the commission. Thus, it is likely that the report was prepared by members of
the Economics Ministry, who had previously asked experts for their opinion on this matter.
6See Pohl et al. (2005, pp. 307–308, 341).
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banks. They argued that the liberalization would lead to higher interest rates, ruinous
competition, greater concentration and ultimately financial instability. In early 1960s, the
Bundesbank also officially opposed to abandon the interest-rate restrictions, as it still saw
the restriction as an important tool, safeguarding its monetary policy transmission.7
A cautious liberalization took place in 1965, when interest rate restrictions on deposits
with a duration of over 30 months were abandoned by a decree of the Federal Supervi-
sory Office. Before announcing this decision it had consulted the Economics Ministry, the
Bundesbank and the banking associations on this matter. Note that the states were not
officially involved in determining the terms of the interest rate restrictions anymore, and
could therefore not object, if they had wanted to. The liberalization was introduced along-
side a number of refinements to the interest rate restrictions that linked short term lending
rates to the discount rate, as well as establishing ceilings to short term deposit rates. While
the public banking system welcomed the gradual liberalization, it was opposed by the pri-
vate banking sector, as they feared the renewed competition from the Sparkassen system.8
A consequence of the partial liberalization of deposit rates was that banks subsequently
began to refinance themselves cheaply by issuing medium term notes that were not subject
to the restrictions, and, unlike regular deposits, were not subject to reserve requirements.
Subsequent adjustments in the regulations failed to contain the banks’ circumvention of
the interest rate restrictions. This development came hand in hand with the increasing
internationalization of German banks, which expanded operations into the Euromarket by
establishing subsidiaries abroad, in particular in Luxemburg. Some observers saw this as
7See Ambrosius (1998, pp. 164–165) and (Muthesius, 1967, pp. 1–2). See also Ashauer (1982, p. 323),
Becker (1967, p. 18) and Pohl et al. (2005, p. 337) for the position of the public banks. See Bu¨schgen
(1995, p. 703) for the opposition of the influential Deutsche Bank. See the opinion piece Gespra¨ch des
Tages (1965), which reports that proponents of interest-rate liberalization were intellectually ‘stoned to
death’ by the opponents in the banking sector in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Similarly see the opinion
piece by Muthesius (1966, p. 1).
8See Becker (1967, p. 18), Ambrosius (1998, pp. 165–166) and Franke (2000, p. 9). Henckel (1966)
pointed out that official cartelization of the banking sector began in 1912. In 1931 it was transformed
into a government-sanctioned interest rate cartel (i.e. the banks agreed on interest rates limit, which
the government then declared universally binding), and now interest rates were outright decreed by the
government, without a prior agreement by the banking associations. Technically, the liberalization in 1965
was also the first time that the Federal Supervisory Office issued a decree with respect to interest rate
restrictions. Prior to that, the no longer existent state regulatory agencies had always taken the consensual
decisions of the banking associations and then declared them universally binding. See Franke (1999, p.
257).
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the first step towards a complete liberalization of interest rates.9
And indeed, the discussion surrounding the liberalization of interest rates became more
intense.10 The private banks’ associations continued their stiff opposition and painted a
grim picture of financial conditions, should interest rates be further liberalized. They were
only willing to accept a liberalization of interest rates, if it went in hand with the abolition
of the tax privileges for the public banks. At the same time, many of the associations’
member banks reacted to the changing conditions and took advantage of the new liberties
given to them. In turn, proponents of liberalization, i.e. the Sparkassen, the Economics
Ministry and the Federal Supervisory Office, began to point out that ‘grey’ markets had
already effectively undermined the interest rate restrictions. Additionally, they pointed
out empirical studies, which indicated that an abolition would not have an adverse effect on
the transmission mechanism of the Bundesbank’s monetary policy, and that it might even
have positive effects. Furthermore, the Bundesbank’s position shifted towards cautious
liberalization as well. What the proponents of liberalization had in common was that all
believed that the most sensible way to proceed would be to further loosen restrictions once
more in a few years time, and to abandon them after another period of adjustment.11
The interest rate restrictions were eventually abolished altogether in the spring of
1967. The timing of the liberalization was remarkable in the sense the Erhard-led gov-
ernment, which was presumably in favor of liberalization, had just collapsed in the wake
of a growth slowdown that had led to higher unemployment. A grand coalition govern-
ment between the SPD and CDU with Georg Kiesinger at its head, and Karl Schiller as
economics minister took over from Ludwig Erhard. The grand coalition quickly resorted
to implementing anticyclical fiscal and monetary policy and it was supported in this by
the Bundesbank.12 It was in this environment that Economic Minister Schiller, who had
9See Ambrosius (1998, p. 165–166), Bu¨schgen (1995, p. 632), Franke (2000, p. 10), Franke (1999,
pp. 257, 259) and the opinion pieces by Gespra¨ch des Tages (1965) and Henckel (1966). Henckel was a
senior bureaucrat of the Economics Ministry at the time. For an overview of the internationalization of
the German banks after the Second World War see Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 383–396).
10The first issue of the bankers’ magazine Zeitschrift fu¨r das gesamte Kreditwesen in 1966 was dedicated
to this question. It contained opinion pieces by all the relevant actors on the question of whether or not
to liberalize interest rates any further.
11See Becker (1967, p. 18, 20), Draheim (1966), Heide (1966), Henckel (1966), Hoffmann (1966), Jan-
berg (1966), Kalkstein (1966), Ko¨nnecker (1966), Looff (1973, pp. 11–12), (Muthesius, 1967, p. 1) and
Muthesius (1966).
12See Pohl and Jachmich (1998, pp. 203–207).
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not been much of a supporter of free-market ideas, pushed for the complete liberalization
of interest rates, as he hoped that they would be pushed lower by this step.13 The pri-
vate banking association attempted to prevent further interest-rate liberalization until the
very last momen and when the government announcement came it was a surprise to all
banks. No-one had expected such a swift and complete liberalization. The monumental
importance of the liberalization – after of 36 years of government sponsored interest-rate
cartelization – was reflected in the banking associations’ subsequent behavior. In order to
smooth the transition from an environment of restricted short term interest rates to one of
complete interest-rate freedom, the banking groups’ associations issued non-binding rec-
ommendations on interest rates to their members.14 The interest rate recommendations
were at first tolerated by the government, but eventually became a source of disagreement
between the Federal Supervisory Office for the Banking Sector and the Antitrust author-
ities, as the latter saw these recommendations as a violation of the Antitrust Act. The
banks reacted in the early 1970s by first abolishing the recommendations altogether, and
later replacing them with softer guidelines.15
Within a couple of months of the abandonment of the interest rate restrictions, the
government further liberalized competition in the banking sector by annulling restrictions
to competitive behavior. These had restricted the advertisement practices of banks and had
been in place since 1928, after which they were incorporated into the Credit Act of 1934.
This liberalization was supported by all banking associations, as they now accepted the
changed circumstances and saw greater marketing expenditures as a way to outcompete
13The irony of these developments was not lost to contemporary observers. See for example (Muthesius,
1967, p. 2).
14See Ambrosius (1998, p. 166), Bu¨schgen (1982, p. 375), Pohl and Jachmich (1998, p. 207) and (Muthe-
sius, 1967, p. 1–3). Lore Ba¨hre, a subsequent president of the Federal Supervisory Office, acknowledged
that the liberalization of interest rates was necessary, because of the circumvention and the complexities
of maintaining such a system with banks, which were active internationally. According to her, the Federal
Supervisory Office favored to liberalize interest rates gradually, much like the public banks. The complete
liberalization of 1967 took the Federal Supervisory Office somewhat by surprise. She attributes the lib-
eralization with the federal government’s desire to lower interest rates – which the liberalization did not
succeed in achieving. See 7. Symposium zur Bankengeschichte (1982, pp. 47–52). For the interest-rate
recommendations see also the opinion pice Gespra¨ch des Tages (1967) and one of the announcements by
the association of the private banks in the Zeitschrift fu¨r das gesamte Kreditwesen, Vol. 8., No. 8, p. 17,
1967.
15See Ashauer (1982, p. 323) and Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 400–401). For an analysis of the economic effects
of the interest rate liberalization see Looff (1973).
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each other. Within the next decade, financial institutions significantly increased their
advertising and marketing expenditures.16
Last but not least, the government also reduced the tax advantages the public banks
enjoyed. Whereas they were previously exempt from corporate taxation, they were now
subject to it – however to a much reduced rate compared to private credit institutions.
Even so, the association of the public banks attempted to lobby for an indirect compen-
sation, to restore its competitive advantage. It demanded, once more, that the implicit
government backing (the Gewa¨hrtra¨gerhaftung) should be taken into account when cal-
culating the Sparkassen’s capital. After all, as public institutions they could not access
markets to raise capital and could only do so through retained earnings. However, the
public banks were unsuccessful and no exemption was granted.17
By the end of 1968, when the Enqueˆte had finally published its final report, major
liberalization had taken place in the German banking sector. Competition amongst banks
was no longer restricted; a first since the late 1920s.18 Each bank group was both a winner
and a loser of the reforms. Whereas the public banks profited from the long-sought removal
of the barriers to competition, they had to accept corporate taxation for the first time in
their history. Conversely, the credit cooperatives and the private credit banks that had
tried to prevent the removal of the restrictions to competition, could at least be satisfied
that the savings banks’ special treatment had been rescinded to some extent.
In its final report in 1968, the Enqueˆte recommended the introduction of a unified
government-mandated system of deposit insurance, in order to cushion the impact of the
increase in competition in the banking sector. Yet, no such measure was taken. Instead,
discussions between the banking associations, the relevant government ministries and the
Federal Supervisory Office ensued. In these the banking associations eventually agreed to
self-regulatory measures, promising to establish guarantee funds, if they had not already
done so like the Credit Cooperatives, that would insure depositors up to a certain amount.
16See Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 401–402).
17See Ashauer (1982, p. 323) and Pohl et al. (2005, p. 340–341).
18A proposed amendment to the Antitrust Act would even have taken liberalization even further, as it
would have rescinded the exemption of the banking sector from the general prohibition on cartelization,
but it failed to come to fruition. See for example Mo¨schel (1972, pp. 548–552) for an analysis of the draft
amendment.
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Even the public banks agreed to establish a fund of their own. Banks that were not
members of any of the banking associations, were soon encouraged by the Federal Super-
visory Office to nevertheless join the guarantee fund scheme. In the aftermath of the 1974
Herstatt crisis, the private credit banks rushed to introduce an improved private deposit
insurance scheme. Government-mandated deposit insurance was introduced in Germany
only in 1997 as part of the harmonization of financial legislation within the EU. In an
ironic turn of history, the finance ministry was again given the subject matter competence
over money and credit in 1972, where it continues to remain to date.19
In the shadow of the debate with respect to competition in the banking sector, another
discussion began in the mid 1960s with respect to the structure of the banking sector. This
question had not been raised in Germany since the 1930s. Once more the question was
raised, whether universal banking was desirable or if the separation of investment and
deposit banks should be introduced in Germany as well. This time around the trigger for
this discussion on the potential separation was not another banking crisis, but the sluggish
development of capital markets in Germany vis-a-vis the Anglo-Saxon world. Critics of
universal banking had pointed out – once more – the potential conflicts of interest that
could arise within universal banks, which would inhibit the efficient allocation of funds.
After all, the private interest was dominating welfare or public interest considerations
within corporations. The discussion eventually led to a government commission in 1974,
which, in its final report of 1979, recommended to maintain universal banking, however.20
19See Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 376–378). He does not mention why the chancellor took the decision to
transfer competence back to the finance ministry. For an chart of the liberalization of the German financial
market until 2000 see for example Franke (2000, p. 7).
20It argued that the advantages of the separation would not outweigh the costs incurred by the inherent
of conflict of interest. See Bu¨schgen (1982, pp. 356-360). He also reports that the ruling Social Democratic
Party (SPD) had included a demand to abolish universal banking in its policy framework for the years
1975-1985. However, the SPD-led government showed no actual intention to push this agenda.
Chapter 6
Conclusion & Discussion
6.1 Conclusion
This thesis set out to investigate the evolution of the structure of banking regulation of two
federal political systems: that of the United States and Germany. It aimed at explaining
why Germany introduced a regulatory monopoly and why the United States opted for
a decentralized regulatory architecture. Furthermore, it set out to explain why there
seems to be such a strong path dependence between the banking regulations introduced
in Nazi Germany and those drawn up in post-war Germany, even though the German
banking system was subject to a massive structural intervention by the American military
government that aimed to decentralize all aspects of the banking system. The main driver
behind these developments is found in the varying degrees of constitutional states’ rights
to regulate the banking sector, rather than in diverging macro-prudential considerations.
The findings suggest that at several times throughout its history, the American fed-
eral government actively tried to bring about a unified regulatory banking system under
national supervision. First, with the establishment of the national banking system (1861–
1865), then with the introduction of the Federal Reserve System (1910–1917) and again
with the addition of the Federal Deposit Insurance (1930–1935). All of these institutional
additions can be interpreted as an attempt by federal policymakers to set the incentives
in such a way that would compel state banks to subject themselves to national regula-
tion. In exchange, these banks would obtain competitive advantages vis-a-vis banks not
submitting to national regulation. The federal government had to take this indirect route,
since the constitution prevented it from explicitly prohibiting states to charter banks. The
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states’ right to charter and to regulate banks is enshrined in the constitution. Not even
the constitutional clause on the supremacy of federal law could break this states’ right.
Every single one of these indirect centralization attempts failed as they were eas-
ily ‘loopholed’ either by legislation or financial innovation soon after their establishment.
There was no doubt, however, that influential parts of the American policymaking elite
considered a unified banking system superior, in terms of stability, to the decentralized
arrangement that was in place. Furthermore, each attempt to bring about a central-
ized regulatory system was accompanied by the creation of new institutions. Subsequent
attempts to centralize regulation did not reform or supersede the existing regulatory insti-
tutions and instead created new ones alongside the old ones. Thus, the ‘regulatory ruins’
of previous attempts persisted and evolved into political actors themselves and ultimately
contributed to a further decentralization of the regulatory structure.
In Germany, matters were quite different. The federal government tried to avoid regu-
lating the banking sector for as long as it could.1 It was aware of certain deficiencies within
the sector, but it delegated the responsibility to the Reichsbank. In turn, the Reichsbank
worked together with the banking associations in order to overcome the deficiencies, and
to keep the federal government’s profile in regulating the banking sector small. The Re-
ichsbank’s corporatist regulation was succesfull in the sense that up until the Banking
Crisis of 1931, the German government had no intention to introduce widespread regula-
tion. It shied away from the responsibility associated with it and it relied completely on
the Reichsbank. The crisis, however, forced the central government to regulate. It needed
to rescue Germany’s largest commercial banks as they were considered too big to fail. It
also needed to bail-out the public Sparkassen system, which, in theory, was supervised and
backed by the states. Thus, as the central government took a large stake in both private
and public banks, it felt compelled to introduce a centralized regulatory regime in return.
In addition to that, the American system was often brought forward as a negative example
against decentralized regulation.
The German central government encountered no resistance in introducing a central
regulatory regime. By 1931, the German government had resorted to governing with the
help of emergency decrees, which did not require parliamentary approval. Contrary to the
American case, there were no constitutional barriers to a centralized regulatory solution
1Merely pure mortgage banks were restricted in their activities. Also, the emission of banknotes was
mostly restricted to the central bank.
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either. At the same time, the regulation introduced by the German government was
understood to be temporary in nature only. A permanent system would only be introduced
after the ‘structural defects’ in the banking system had been identified and erased. The
fact that the German banking system (and consequently the banking regulations) retained
its shape, and was not outright nationalized entirely by Nazi ideologues, is attributable
to Hjalmar Schacht. Hitler valued his expertise, and this allowed Schacht to ‘hijack’ the
reform deliberations and to stage a bank inquiry, whose outcome was largely determined
before it even began. It eventually proposed a regulatory system according to his personal
preferences, which was very much in line with the system first introduced as emergency
decrees by the Weimar government.
After the Second World War, American military government officials, some of which
were staunch supporters of the antitrust ideology and thus of independent unit banking,
managed to project many of the principles governing their own state banking system onto
the German one. This implied the decentralization of the German banking system by
introducing branching restrictions, by breaking-up of the largest banks, by federalizing
the central bank and by decentralizing the regulatory institutions. These institutional
changes were pursued with religious zeal until 1949. The American assimilation effort of
the German banking system came to a halt with the establishment of a German federal
state based on democratic principles. From then on, the primary policy goal for the Allies
was to turn Germany into a sovereign nation within Western Europe, rather than the im-
plementation of fresh American economic ideas. In terms of the banking sector, the policy
was to ensure that the large commercial banks did not re-establish themselves completely
and that at least some level of decentralization or antitrust thinking was maintained in
the banking sector.
German businessmen and policymakers rejected the introduction of branching restric-
tions and the decentralization of its largest commercial banks. Other large commercial
banks that were in state hands did not suffer much of a decentralization, although this
was discussed by the American military government as well. This inconsistency in the
behavior of the American occupiers made their arguments, that they were attempting to
reduce financial concentration, seem incoherent to Germans. Consequently, the policy
appeared as a punishment, rather than a benevolent institutional reform. At the same
time, the decentralization of the large commercial banks was not carried out completely,
Chapter 6. Conclusion & Discussion 210
as the legal shells of the former large institutions lived on throughout much of the period.
Thus, it was relatively easy for the banks to reunite once branching restrictions were lifted
again. The branching restrictions, that had been introduced in parallel with the decen-
tralization of the largest commercial banks, were motivated by banking ideology rather
than by economic considerations. Even in the United States, branching restrictions were a
controversial topic. In Germany, where these had not had much of a historical precedent,
they were only seen with disbelief. There was no influential interest group in support of
unit banking in Germany. Thus, in the case of the decentralization of the largest banks
and the branching restrictions it was the American influence that held them in place.
Once the Allied High Commission withdrew from German banking politics, the changes
to the largest credit banks and the branching restrictions were reversed. While there was
some opposition from the BdL and from some German states to the abolition of branching
restrictions, these were not motivated by belief in the necessity of restricting branching.
Rather, for the BdL the opposition reflected a fear that the abolition of branching restric-
tions might go hand in hand with reforms to the decentral organizational structure of the
BdL. The opposition of the southern states reflected an attempt to extract fiscal rents for
their political support.
The decentralizing changes to the central bank structure and to the regulatory struc-
ture, however, had a much better chance at survival than it is often implied in the existing
literature. Indeed, the first drafts of both the Credit Act and the Bundesbank Act largely
reflected the decentralized status quo that was introduced by the Americans. It was only
after the subject matter competence for money and credit changed from the Finance Min-
istry to the Economics Ministry, that more centralized drafts were drawn up. Just like
in the United States, the primary bone of discord were states’ rights. It was not the
American influence that held the decentralized arrangement in place in Germany for so
long, but it were the German states. They were not willing to give up their newly gained
competences to the central government. The German states fought every attempt by the
central government to extend its control over the banking sector, but eventually they had
to concede defeat. The constitution, as it was ultimately interpreted by the constitutional
court, had given the central government the right to unilaterally legislate in the field of
money and credit without the consent of the states, provided that it had a sufficiently
large majority in the lower house of parliament. Had the constitutional court ruled in
favor of states’ rights, Germany might well have a decentralized regulatory regime today.
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The need for a supermajority is the key reason, why Germany retreated to its pre
World War II central regulatory system. The central government’s primary objective
was to re-establish centralized regulatory control over the banking sector. In order to
do so, it had to build a sufficiently large coalition that could overrule the states’ veto.
Any modification to the pre-war Credit Act, even if progressive in nature, would have
threatened the parliamentary supermajority. Thus, going back to the old consensus path
was the easiest way for the central government to strip the states of their rights to regulate
and supervise the banking sector. Innovative reforms, such as the introduction of deposit
insurance, the reform of the public banking sector, or even the introduction of competitive
pressures, were discussed and also supported by Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard. But
ultimately, they were left to the future in order not to jeopardize the supermajority. The
only changes in the Banking Act of 1961 with respect to that of 1934 were primarily
modifications that were due to the new constitution and the modified central bank, but
they were not due to the American assimilation effort. Another clear indicator of the
federal conflict is the fact that the Central Bank Act and the Credit Act were only passed
as late as 1957 and 1961, numerous years after the American military government had
ceased to actively shape German legislation and policy.
Thus, the most lasting impact the American military government had on the German
banking system was less in the form of outright intervention in the banking sector, but
more an indirect one via the German constitution. It too, was formulated under the
supervision of the Americans and its Allies, and it contained elements of the American
federal set-up. The constraints of the German constitution set the political and economic
playing field. Although the Grundgesetz was certainly federal in nature and gave the
states extensive responsibilities, it allowed Germans to centralize their economic and thus
banking system much more than the American banking reformers would probably have
liked to see. It seems like American policymakers were not careful enough in the drafting
process of the German constitution, to ensure that appropriate decentralizing safeguards
for the banking sector were implanted. Ultimately this omission sew the seeds for the
failure of their decentralized banking system to take hold in Germany.
And indeed, the years following the passage of the German Credit Act of 1961 saw
changes in the regulatory framework. An extensive government commission was set-up to
investigate the banking sector. Amongst other things, it suggested the introduction of a
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deposit insurance scheme, and it addressed the issue of competitive inequalities between
government and private banks. However no major change arose from this other than
the introduction of private deposit insurance schemes rather than a government insurance
scheme. Indeed, government deposit insurance was introduced in Germany only in 1997 as
part of the harmonization of financial legislation within the EU. But other major liberal-
izations took place just a few years after the passage of the Credit Act of 1961. The state
enforced interest-rate cartel, which had effectively been in place since 1932, was abolished
in 1967. Similarly, restrictions on banks’ advertising practices also expired a few months
later that had been first introduced 1928. Both these measures increased competitive
pressures within the banking sector. As a measure of compensation for the private banks,
who had continued to advocate a restriction to competition in order to protect themselves
from the public banking sector, the public banks were, for the first time in their history,
required to pay corporate tax – although not quite at the same level as private sector
banks. More liberalizations would follow in the subsequent years, but the structure of
the regulatory institutions remained unchanged. In an ironic turn of history, the finance
ministry was again given the subject matter competence over money and credit in 1972,
where it continues to remain to date.
The post war period in Germany also holds insights for American regulatory history.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I concluded with the hypothesis that it was the states’ rights,
which kept the American decentralized regulatory system in place and that in the absence
of strong states rights, no such system would persist over time. The American intervention
in Germany after the Second World War can be interpreted as a test of this hypothesis.
After all, the Americans exogenously forced their decentralized banking principles onto
the German banking system. Since the German federal constitution did not contain the
same extent of states’ rights with respect to chartering banks as its American counterpart,
one would expect that the decentralized institutional arrangement would not persist. And
indeed this it what happened. Germany reverted to a centralized framework of regulating
its banking sector.
What is further striking is that one could observe almost the same, intense constitu-
tional conflict between the states and the federal government as there was in the United
States. The German states fought the federal take-over equally vigorously. They even
began to use similar arguments to those put forward by proponents of the decentralized
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state banking system in the United States. However, in the German case, the constitution
did not give the states the same powers with respect to the banking sector and, eventually,
they were stripped of their regulatory privileges. Thus, this episode provides additional
leverage to the hypothesis that it was indeed the states’ rights and not an economic ex-
planation that kept the American decentralized regulatory system in place.
It is also telling that after deciding to introduce comprehensive banking regulation in
the wake of the financial crisis of 1931, German policymakers actively chose their regulatory
framework at three points in time. They selected their preferred set-up during the Weimar
Republic (in 1931 after the Banking crisis), during the Third Reich (with the 1933/34
Banking Commission) and after the Second World War (1949–1961). And every single
time the top policymakers came to the conclusion that a centralized system of regulating
the banking sector was preferable to a decentralized one. The only time that there was a
strong opposition towards a centralized system of regulation was because of the American
regulatory gift to the states after the Second World War.
The findings of this thesis may lead to a re-interpretation of the long shadow of Hjalmar
Schacht. In the banking sector, the shadow is clearly visible, however it was not quite as
long in the banking sector as it may have been in other parts of the economy. It began to
dissipate in the mid 1960s, when a deliberate liberalization of the banking sector set-in.
Also, Schacht’s shadow may have been prolonged by the fact that the Allies introduced a
federal constitution. At the outset of the Federal Republic of Germany, many important
economic control mechanisms were not in the hands of the federal government, but in
those of the states. Thus, the central government had to engage in a federal struggle with
the states, in order to reinstate its legislative superiority over economic matters. This
was not only the case in the banking sector, but in other sectors too. The struggle over
German Antitrust Act reflects a similar process. It, too, significantly strengthened the role
of the Economics Ministry in regulating the economy.2 And the only way for the federal
government to secure the necessary supermajority to do so, was to retreat to the existing
centralized corporatist economic order that had largely been established during the Third
Reich. Only once the central government had successfully recentralized economic control,
could it then move to liberalize the economic structure.
2See for example Hu¨ttenberger (1976).
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Such a re-interpretation of German post-war economic history essentially inverts the
Olson hypothesis. Instead of a liberalization taking place at the outset of the German
Federal Republic, this interpretation suggests that institutional change was unlikely at
the outset, as control over the economic order was decentralized. Only over time, when
the federal government regained control, was it able to break up vested interests. And
only then was it able to introduce real institutional change that allowed it to emerge
from the shadow of Hjalmar Schacht. Thus, even though Ludwig Erhard may not have
been able to introduce many of his liberal economic principles himself, he nevertheless
provided the ground-work for future liberal reforms by recentralizing economic control
over the economy with the federal government, and in particular with the Economics
Ministry. While Erhard was not the German Margaret Thatcher he is often made to
be, he made Margaret Thatcher-style reforms possible in Germany by overcoming the
American-induced institutional sclerosis. This may be an important legacy of Ludwig
Erhard – one that had been largely overlooked so far.
This view of Erhard’s accomplishments are in line with the biographic portrayals of
Ludwig Erhard. These generally portray his post-political period as that of an exhausted
and unfulfilled man.3 According to the interpretation put forward in this thesis, Ludwig
Erhard would have spent most of his political career not creating the free-market economy
he advocated so strongly, but rather he spent his political capital fighting with vested
interests, which sought to maintain the restrictions to competition, and with the states in
an effort to reestablish the federal government’s control over the economy. By the time he
was elected Chancellor, presumably the apex of his political power, he had spent most of
his political capital and made so many enemies in the prior struggles, that he was unable
to introduce any major free-market reforms. He retired from political office frustrated that
he was not able to bring about the legendary social market economy he became so famous
for.
To sum up, in answering the research questions, this thesis makes the following original
contributions to knowledge: (1) This thesis offers a novel perspective on the evolution of
the structure of American banking regulation by interpreting it as being largely driven
by constitutional conflict (2) it shows that prior to the Banking Crisis of 1931 there was
no intention to introduce a comprehensive regulatory structure for the banking sector
3See especially Hentschel (1998) and Mierzejewski (2004).
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in Germany (3) It provides a reassessment of the origins of the German Credit Act of
1961 as a non-deterministic process (4) It interprets German banking regulation after the
Second World War as a failed Institutional Assimilation, which provides evidence that the
decentralized regulatory arrangement of the American banking system was held in place
by strong states’ rights. In the absence of strong states’ rights such a system would not
persist and, indeed, in Germany it did not (5) It re-interprets German post-war economic
history as being driven by the need of the German federal government to re-establish
supremacy over economic matters. This assigns a new important role for Ludwig Erhard
in German post-war competition history, as being an enabler of liberalization rather than
being a liberalizing force himself.
6.2 Future Research
There are several ways to build on this line of research. One could compare the American
approach to the banking sector in Germany and in Japan.4 Why was American banking
policy in Japan much less ambitious than in Germany?5 Given that the Americans had the
sole control over Japan it would have been much easier for them to implement a desired
change. Indeed, Joseph Dodge, who had crucially stimulated the institutional changes
in Germany was later assigned to Japan as Economic Adviser. Why did he not pursue
banking reforms with equal vigour, given that the German and Japanese banking structure
was similar in many respects? One could also compare the regulatory policies undertaken
by the Allies in Austria with those that took place in Germany. After all, Austria was
also under the occupation of the four powers. Did the Allies pursue different regulatory
policies? If so, why? And if not, do we find a different development than in Germany?
It would certainly also be fascinating to study recent American efforts at state-building
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Which approaches have been taken in terms of the banking
system in these countries? Was there an American learning process from the German and
Japanese experiences?
After the Second World War, there were movements in the United States to centralize
the regulatory institutions at various times.6 But centralization continues to be elusive to
4This would be analogous to the PhD Thesis of Partridge (2011), who compared the outcomes of
American industrial Antitrust efforts in Germany and Japan after World War II
5See Tsutsui (1988) for an account of American banking policy in Japan.
6See for example Pierce (1977, pp. 605–607), Robertson (1966, p. 686) or Scott (1977, p. 46).
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this day, even though banks now often operate on a national scale. Why is this so? Even
more perplexing, how come the American federal government is even unable to merge its
existing federal supervisory institutions? Where exactly does this inability to centralize,
even at the federal level come from? Why are the ‘regulatory ruins’ so hard to make away
with despite the obvious shortcomings of such a decentralized system when it comes to
crisis prevention and resolution?
It would also be interesting to study the German regulatory development from 1961
onwards and its subsequent interactions within the European framework of banking regu-
lation. To what extent did European pressures force changes upon the German regulatory
framework, if at all? Why did subject-matter competence over the banking system re-
turn to the Finance ministry in the 1970s? Did German banks play an important role in
lobbying European and International decision makers during the Basel negotiations and
the negotiations to create the European Monetary Union? And if so, to what extent?
After all, Germany was a main opponent to a unified regulatory system of the banking
sector for the Eurozone. Was the failure to implement centralized banking supervision and
regulation alongside the monetary union another case of a constitutional conflict between
states (the EU countries) and the federal government (the EU level) or was it primarily
due to bank lobbying?7
Last but not least, this thesis opens up the opportunity to engage in a more com-
prehensive and systematic meta-study based on existing research that documents and
analyzes to what extent the shadow of Hjalmar Schacht persisted in the various sectors
of the German economy. Only then will we be able to better judge to what extent the
proposed hypothesis, that Erhard was an enabler of liberalization rather than a Margaret
Thatcher himself, is indeed applicable to other sectors of the economy.
7See James (2012, Loc: 532–539) a treatment of the political economy of a unified regulatory system
within the European framework.
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6.3 Lessons for today
The exact causes of the recent financial crisis is controversial to say the least.8 Regulators
have naturally received much of the blame for the crisis even though a number of safeguards
have failed in multiple countries at the same time.9
The political dynamic of current attempts to overhaul the regulatory structure in
the European Union follows similar, though not identical, patterns as those outlined in
this thesis. After all, the European Union is a looser federation than both Germany and
the United States were in the time period studied and it does not yet possess significant
financial resources of its own. Furthermore, it is characterized by a core of countries that
have decided to engage in a monetary union and a periphery that has decided, for the
moment, not to join the monetary union. However, the severity of the current financial
crisis has made it clear that an integrated financial market with a monetary union only has
only a realistic probability of survival if there is some kind of banking union that allows
for a single supervisory and crisis resolution mechanism.10 Given the findings of my thesis,
one would expect the European states would not be willing to give up their regulatory
responsibilities lightly. And indeed, the wrangling over the extent of a regulatory situation
is already in full swing. One can already observe some states negotiating to retain their
regulatory powers.
Based on my research, a crucial element of the future regulatory structure will be
to what extent the European leaders will be able to forge a coherent, centralized system
under the leadership of the ECB. It will be important to re-shape the existing regulatory
institutions into full-fledged European (and not national) institutions. Otherwise, the
danger is that Europe will end up with a semi-centralized regulatory framework in which
8See for example Lo (2012). The American Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) (FCIC), which
was officially tasked with examining the causes of the financial crisis, contains a majority opinion as well
as two dissenting opinions. Not even the dissenters could agree in their dissent. For the majority opinion
see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011, xv–xxviii) and for the first dissenting opinion see Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011, pp. 411–440).
9Sheng (2009, pp. 387–388) suggests that blaming only the regulators is too easy. After all, “four
lines of defence for financial stability” needed to be breached for the crisis to occur: 1. Self-discipline
(corporate governance), 2. External auditors and advisors (investment banks, lawyers, consultants, 3.
Sunshine or transparency mechanisms (rating agencies, market analysts and media) and last but not least
4. Government regulation (financial regulators and criminal enforcement agencies).
10See the first blueprint to the proposed banking Union by the European Commission (2012b), the
conclusion by the Council of the European Union (2012) on the Single Supervisory Mechanism, as well the
agreement of the European Council (2012) on a raodmap for the completion of the economic and monetary
union, which encompasses the banking union.
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the regulatory ruins take on a political life of their own that could potentially counter-
act the policies of the center, the ECB. My findings also suggest that when it comes to
EU treaty changes or even the drafting of an EU constitution, care should be taken to
officially transfer powers to charter, regulate and supervise the banking sector to the EU
level, rather than leaving it to the individual states. If the central regulatory institutions
are to be truly independent from the states, the EU level will have to be given a much more
significant measure of fiscal power as a percentage of EU GDP. After all, crisis resolution
mechanisms may require regulators to recapitalize or wind down banks. They also need
to be readily available as time is of the essence, and in a decentralized structure with
overlapping responsibilities the resolution process can be drawn out, increasing uncertainty
and thus delaying economic recovery.
Interestingly, the way the American federal government has been able to significantly
extend its reach of the banking sector during the past three to four decades, seems to have
been by reducing restrictions and by lowering regulatory standards for national banks and
state member banks. The race in regulatory laxity seems to have persisted up until the
beginning of the financial crisis of 2007, but not only between national and state chartered
banks, but also between federal regulatory agencies.11 Although the government may have
managed to bring much of the formal banking sector under some kind of federal control,
primarily under the FDIC which administers the deposit insurance, the problem of the
multiplicity of regulatory institutions and jurisdictions has still not been solved. It has
merely been transferred to the federal level.12
The fragmentation of regulatory responsibility and consequently of information has led
to a failure of regulators to see the dangers building up within the system. Additionally,
diverging opinions, responsibilities and fiscal capacities amongst the regulators has also
prevented the smooth implementation of crisis resolution mechanisms.13 Not only has
the United States still not found a way to combine the regulatory ruins left from previous
11This view is often reflected in the contemporary legal literature on federal preemption of state law.
See for example Johnson (1995) or Natter and Wechsler (2012). Abrams and Settle (1993, p. 701) suggest
that the S&L crisis at the end of the 1980s weakened the small bank lobby as well as state regulators, thus
paving the way for countrywide branching.
12Neither has the federal government been able to take away the states’ constitutional power to charter
and regulate banks. Some of the largest commercial banks are indeed state banks that are members of the
FDIC, but not members of the Federal Reserve System. See Federal Reserve Board (2012) for an overview
of the largest commercial banks in the U.S..
13This seems to be one of the main messages of the first hand account of the crisis of Treasury Secretary
Paulson (2010). Similarly see also the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011). In
Europe this problem was arguably even more pronounced and has not yet been solved.
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attempts to regulate the banking sector into a unified regulatory system, but as part of the
Dodd-Frank Act, it continued to expand the number of federal regulatory and supervisory
institutions.14
14To the American Congress’ credit one has to acknowledge that it abolished the Office of Thrift Super-
vision (OTS) that was established as regulator of federal savings and loan associations during the 1930s
as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. The OTS was notorious for attempting to attract more banks
under its regulatory fold, by offering lax regulatory standards. Its regulatory functions were transferred to
the other federal regulatory institutions. For an overview of the current regulatory structureat the Federal
level in the United States see for example Jickling and Murphy (2010). The overview does not include the
state-level regulatory institutions.
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